COMBAT WITH ENEMY NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, FREE ROCKETS, AND GUIDED MISSILES IN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF AN ARMY (CONCLUSION AND BIBLIOGRAPHY)

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8
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RIPPUB
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S
Document Page Count: 
29
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 13, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
September 4, 1962
Content Type: 
MEMO
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 ~ SFPRFT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25. D. G. IRONBARK MEMORANDUM FOR; The Acting Director o~ Central Intelligence SUBJECT Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Operations of an Army (Conclusion and Bibliography) 1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of the conclusion, appendix, and bibliography of a seven-chapter TOP SECRET Soviet publication entitled "Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Oper- ations of an Army'?. It was issued by Scientific-Research Artillery Institute No. 1 in Leningrad in October 1960. 2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IIZONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material. 3. In the interests of prgtecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report_or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the origitnating office. Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans) - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 CG [IRONBARK Originals The Director of Central Y~tel~$gence cc: The Director~of~Intelligence and Research, Department of State The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief~of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force The Director, National Security Agency Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission National Indications Center Chairman, Guided INissiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee Deputy Director for Research Deputy Director for Intelligence Assistant Director for National Estimates Assistant Director for Current Intelligence Assistant Director for Research and Reports Assistant Director for Scientific $ntelligence Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 IRONBARK COUNTRY USSR SUBJECT : Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensi,ue Operations of an Array (Conclusion.and Bibliography) DATE OF INFO ; October 1960 APPRAISAL 0~' CONTENT ; Documentary SOURCE A reliable source (B) Following is a verbatim translation of the Conclusion and Bibliography of a TOP SECRET Soviet publication titled "Combat with Enemy Nuclear Artillery, Free Rockets, and Guided Missiles in Offensive and Defensive Operations o! an Array". This document contains.se.ve:n. chapters and was published on 15 October 1960 by Scientific -Research Artillery .Institute No, 1?f.n Leningrad. Each chapter will be disseminated as it becomes available and is translated. In some casesv, there are imperfections in the original text which leave doubt as to the accuracy of translation. Question marks are inserted in brackets following uncertain words or phrases. Ae in other IRONBARK reports, transliterated Cyrillic letters axe underlined in translation, while Greek and Roman letters are given .as in the original. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Sf~RET IRONBARK Conclusion The armed forces of our potential enemies have at their disposal various types of nuclear attack weapons. The bulk of these weapons consists at present of tactical and operational-tactical weapons. In view of this, combat with the enemy's tactical and operational-tactical nuclear attack weapons becomes a matter of exceptional importance. Combat with the enemy's tactical, and to some extent with his operational-tactical, nuclear attack weapons cannot be organized on the scale of a front alone. For carrying on this combat a front must con- centrate in its hands control of all types and means of -intelligence and all weapons for inflicting damage on the enemy, which are deployed in a comparatively narrow zone stretching for hundreds of kilometers. Naturally, it is impossible to centralize control at the front level of all the forces and weapons, brought in to combat all the enemy's nuclear attack weapons without exception. Consequently, the front cannot be the sole organizer of this combat. The organization of combat with the enemy's nuclear attack weapons should be carried out at two echelons or levels: in the front and in the army, The best version of dividing the tasks in organizing this combat is for the front to organize in detail combat with the enemy's operational-tactical nuclear attack weapons with the forces and weapons directly subordinate to it (taking into account the capabilities of the operational-tactical missiles of the armies), and to restrict itself to giving general directions only regarding combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear attack weapons, while the army organizes in detail combat with the enemy's tactical nuclear weapons, taking into consideration the tasks which it has been given by the front for combat with the enemy's opera- tional-tactical nuclear attack weapons. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 SEC ET IRONBARK In accordance with this, the army must have at its disposal the necessary .intelligence forces and means to ensure fulfilment of the tasks with which it is faced . It is necessary to note that the :intellig.e,nce means now in existence can fulfil the requirements for combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons to a certain extent. However, for this it is necessary to create an efficient system of control of these forces and means, and, in the first place, to take all measures to re- duce the time spent on target designation in the case of such important and mobile targets as nuclear attack weapons on firing or launching positions, Bearing in mind the improvement and strengthening of the antiair defense troops of our probable enemies and the development of new, more perfected and mobile nuclear attack weapons, it is essential to pay the most serious attention to the most rapid development of new pilotless means of reconnaissance, which would be capable of fully replacing the existing means of aerial artillery reconnaissance and of getting accurate information very quickly regarding the enemy's nuclear weapons . The investigations. carried out in this Judy, show that combat with the enemy.'s tactical nuclear attack weapons is one of the main tasks for our tactical missiles and gun artillery. In this connection it is necessary to note that the views held hitherto re- garding the limited capabilities of gun artillery in combat with the enemy's nuclear weapons; are not in accordance with the facts. Gun artillery is capable of combatting the enemy's nuclear attack weapons successfully. Moreover, for carrying on this combat, i.e., for neutralization and destruction of these weapons, it is not necessary, as was thought before, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 ET IRONBARK to expend an enormous quantity of ammunition and to concentrate a large quantity of artillery. From the information given in this study, it is evident that in the conditions that have been laid down, fire for destruction of the enemy's nuclear attack weapons re- quires a comparatively small expenditure of ammunition and the employment, as a rule, of two or three batteries, i.e., not more than one battalion of artillery. This circumstance changes the significance and role of gun artillery considerably, and shows that at the present time gun artillery remains one of the main fire weapons of an army . The short time that nuclear attack weapons remain on their firing (launching) positions poses exceptionally exacting requirements in the speed of carrying out a strike against them or in the preparation of fire for destroying these weapons. Timely opening of fire or delivery of strikes at the targets is the most important condition for successful combat with the enemy's nuclear attack weapons. Under modern conditions, the destruction or neu- tralization of the enemy's nuclear weapons must not be postponed to a ~5pe.cific time, as, for instance, the neutralization of enemy batteries was postponed duting the Second World War until the time of the artillery preparation for the assault. If the enemy battery (platoon, gun or launcher) is not destroyed immediately on the position it occupies, it will remain whole and undamaged, as it will most certainly not stay on one and the same position, especially after firing a nuclear projectile. Under modern conditions, there shou~ci also be no delay in delivering a strike at a target or in opening fire to destroy it. Delay in opening fire or making a strike at the target will have the consequence that the target will escape destruction. ~ SEQRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 ~ SECXET {RONBARK Thus, reduction of the time taken for opening fire at targets of opportunity is one of the chief , if not the most important requirements both for or- ganizing combat with the enemy's nuclear attack weapons, and for those weapons and that armament which will be employed in this combat, In accordance with this, in developing new models of weapons and in perfecting the combat employment of those weapon models which are or can be used to destroy the enemy's nuclear weapons, it is essential to make every effort to ensure that their preparation for firing (launching) should require considerably less time than that required for the preparation for firing (launching) of the enemy's comparable weapons, Or, in other words, the weapons employed for combat with nuclear weapons must be better as regards their basic tactical-technical characteristics than the enemy's similar weapons. There is no'doubt that the solution of these and certain other questions mentioned in this report will ensure favorable conditions for successful combat with the enemy's nuclear attack weapons, The recommendations made in this study regarding the organization and conduct of combat with the eiemy's nuclear attack weapons should be tested at tactical and operational-tactical exercises .of tl~e~ troops. Responsible author ~ispolnitel~ Senior scientific worker of the 2nd Department Guards Lieutenant-Colonel ................(KURBATOV) Author Senior scientific worker of the 2nd Department Lieutenant-Colonel ,...>,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(FILIPPOV) ~SFC~iRFT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 IRONBARK Appendix Graphs for the determination of Rp and P dependent on d when the elliptical error of fire has the characteristics Vp and E For drawing up the graphs we calculated the coefficients 1'Ltaking into account the probability of a hit in a circle with a radius R , dependent on the characteristics of the elliptical error of fire (gip and E) and of the displacement d of the center of - dispersion in relation to the center of the circle. The values of the coefficients n, were determined by using the equation: R,. K r+ d = K r + d - _,,P ~ ~ Vp (1) To determine n,it is necessary: to take the values P, E_, and d'+, when Vp = 1; ~p - by means of P and E to find the value of the circular error r (in.Vp), equivalent to the probability of the elliptical error; to express d in terms of rand, making use of ~p the graphs K = ~ (P, der ) , for the given values of P, to determine the values of the coefficients K; - to substitute the corresponding values axrived at in the formula (1) and to calculate R,= f (P, d, E) . E ET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 IRONBARK In calculating the coefficients rluse was made of the graphs K ~- f (P, d, r) and the values.`. _ (P, E) given in the study (15)?~ T It should be noted that in calculating coefficient R , use can also be made of the data in Table 3B, given in the study (18). The procedure for calculating the coefficient it is given in the form of an example. Example: Calculate the value of coefficient R for d = 1 Vp , P = 80% and E 0.5. Solution: 1. for P = 80~ and E = 0.5 ~r= f (P, E)= 0.7$2Vp; and r as d = 2, we express d = 1V p 1 _ 1 .29 ; - 0-'T~~ 3. for d = 1.29 rand P = 80% K = f-(P, d,'r) = 1.9; 4. using formula (1) we findrL= 1.9 x Q782 + 1 = 2,485, The values of the coefficient rtfor the various d, P, and E , which have been calculated in a similar way, are given in the table. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 :CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246A029800210001-8 IRONBARK N M ~ N ~O N ~t O O O ~ ~ O~ .~ r~1 M ~+1 N1 N1 ~'1 r+1 M M /~1 ~ .. N u] ~O O~ M ~~ d ~O a v ~ v~ .n ~ r ao 0 .~ N N N N N N N N M ~'1 O O O~ O~ O~ O O .~i N. OV u'i ~D ri .~/ r-i r1 N N N N N N N r1 l`? ~ ` ~ O m rn O ~ u~ ~o ~ r r ,..~ r-1 r-1 .i H r~ N N N N' - ___ -_ O vi a` . y ~ ~ ~) O r+ O ~ ~ c-0 f N N a `. `O N tD O~ O .y .r .~ N r .~ ~ .a .-~ .-1 r 1 V t~ O 11"~ ^-1 N M ~ V1 ~O I~ O O ?+ y C n ~ t 0 r A ~p CT `1 r-1 O O~ W