MILITARY THOUGHT : THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE, BY COLONEL-GENERAL OF AVIATION I. PODGORNYY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029800080001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense
(From foreign sources)
Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy
Under the conditions of a nuclear/missile war,
reliable antimissile defensesas a factor of strategic
significance., is becoming one of the most important
conditions for the successful conduct of a modern
war.
The development of defensive weapons takes
place in dialectical j.nity with the deveTopi.f
ent o
aItack"weapons . A comprehensive study of the
"characteristics, potentialities, and direction of
the future development of ballistic missiles must
be the basis for the cor.ztect resolution of questions
of the organization of combat against ballistic
missiles.
The basis of an aerial attack on objectives of
the country consists of attack weapons of strategic
designation, which in the USA are divided into three
basic groups in accordance with their flight-technical
characteristics:
-- aerodynamic aircraft;
-- ballistic missiles;
-- cosmic devices.
The second group is the most promising- and
rapidly developing. Here the main efforts are
being-directed toward,-? the production of long-
range missiles as the main striking force. The
share of missiles' participation in the performance
of the tasks of aerial attack will increase with
every year, and in the near future, the ballistic
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missiles in the enemy's arsenal of attack weapons
will assume the leading role. The armed forces of
the USA are equipped with ballistic missiles of
various classes and various ranges of operation. 50X1-HUM
The intercontinental missiles, "Atlas", "Minuteman"
and "Titan", are intended for delivering strikes
against objectives located at a distance of rO,OQO to
16,000 km, the intermediate-range missiles, "Jupiter",
"Thor" and "Polaris", - for objectives located up
to 2,000 to 3,500 km away and the short-range missiles,
"Pershing", "Redstone", and others - against objectives
at a distance of up to 350 to 550 km.
In the USA work is being conducted on the creation
of ballistic missiles of the "air-to-surface" class.
Specifically, it is intended to arm the B-52, "Victor",
and "Vulcan" strategic bombers with a missile of this
class, the "Sky Bolt".
At the present time the strategic missile attack
weapons of the potential enemy are deployed in the
continental part of the USA, and also on the territories
of their allies in the aggressive blocs. In the
USA, 65 launching sites for intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles have already been built; by 1965 it
is planned to increase their number to 860 launching
mounts. On British and Italian territory there are
90 intermediate-range missile launching sites deploy-
ed; the construction of 15 launching sites is being
completed in Turkey. There are 5 atomic submarines
armed with "Polaris" missiles on combat patrol.
Thus, an analysis of trends in the development
of weapons of strategic attack and in the proposed
deployment of the probable enemy's missile bases
permits one to conclude that in the future the basic
means of strategic attack will be intercontinental
ballistic missiles deployed on the territory of the
United States of America, and intermediate-range
missiles, the launching sites of which are located
around the Soviet Union and the countries of the
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peoples' democracies.
Missile-carrying submarines, missile-carrying
aircraft, and strategic bombers will be the man-
euverable weapons. 50X1-HUM
An- effort. to use force against the elements
that make up the national might of the probable
enemy is the basis of the official American aerospace
doctrine. The first task of aerospace operations
is undermining the nuclear/missile might of the
Socialist Camp in order to disrupt or weaken to a
significant degree the strength of our missile strikes.
Simultaneously with the performance of the :main task,
it is planned to deliver strikes against the most
important administrative-political and military-
industrial centers and other objectives,with the goal
of disorganizing the control of the country, disrupt-
ing the mobilization of troops, and undermining the
military-economic potential and morale-of_ the
people. A nuclear/missile attack must be massive, and
be carried out using the element of surprise and
in a short period of time. It should be assumed
that the most powerful first ballistic missile
strike will be organized so that the missiles of
various ranges of operation will enter the zone
of detection of the antimissile defense means at
the same time.
For this reason the antimissile defense can
successfully perform its tasks if its structure
takes; into consideration a capability for repulsing
the first nuclear/missile strikes of the initial
period of war which are carried out by the enemy with
the use of various countermeasures directed toward:
reducing the effectiveness of the defensive weapons.
The nature of nuclear/missile war, with its
decisive goals and unprecedented spatial scope,
makes antimissile defense the most serious task of
the present da
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Success in combat with ballistic missiles can
be achieved by the joint efforts of all types of
armed forces. Disruption of enemy nuclear/missile
strikes can be accomplished by destroying ballistic
missiles which are ready for launching on launching
sites,as well as by destroying them in flight.
We understand antimissile defense (PRO)
(protivoraketnaya o orona to be one o theane:thO4s
of armed combat, directed toWar the protection of
the country and its axmed-orces from an enemy missile
attack by means of destroying ballistic missi es:'. n
flight.
Combat with ballistic missiles in flight is a
complex military-technical problem. In order to
realize all its difficulty it suffices to say that.
in PRO it is necessary to deal with insignificant:
targets, as far as size and reflecting surface are
concerned, flying at enormous altitudes and at
cosmic speeds. Thus, for example, the nose condr
of an "Atlas" missile, in the dbntimeter wave band,
has a reflecting surface of about 0.5 square meters,
a maximum flight speed of more than 25,000 km per
hour.and a maximum height of the trajectory of 1,300
km.
This problem can be made even more complex by
the enemy if a series of measures that complicate
detection, interception and destruction in flight
are taken into consideration:
1. The launching of ballistic missiles under
quadrant angles of departure that are less than the
optimum, which leads to a reduction in the range of
detecting them by the means of the PRO.
2. The employment of dummy targets which lower
the probability of destruction of the nose cones of
the ballistic missiles.
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3. The reduction of the reflecting surface of
the nose cones of the ballistic missiles by
using various materials that absorb radio signals.
4. The use of special transmitters for creating
active interference with the PRO radiotechnical
equipment, including those that are located in the
nose cone of the ballistic missiles or are ejected
in containers.
Based on the nature of antimissile defenses
the tasks of PRO are:
-- detection and recognition (raspoznavaniye)
of ballistic missiles;
--destruction of ballistic missiles in flight;
immediate warning of the military command
and the civil defense of the start of an enemy
missile strike;
-- detection of artificial earth satellites.
Antimissile defense as a whole, like anti-
air defense, must satisfy a series of requirements,
the basic ones of which are constant readiness to
repel an enemy missile attack, high effectiveness
and stability.
Consequently, the construction of antimissile
defense must be carried out simultaneously in two
interrelated directions. One of these is the creation
of a system of means for combatting ballistic missiles
in flight, the other is the elaboration of the
theoretical principles of employment, combat utili
ization and organization.
In principle, the destruction of missiles is
possible both in the initial, active sector of the
flight and in the final sector of the trajectory.
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In the opinions of foreign specialists, at: the
present time an antiaircraft missile complex specially
created for antimissile defense, with a guided anti-
missile missile can be an effective means for combatting
ballistic missiles. Such an antimissile complex must:
-- detect the ballistic missile at a considerable
distance from the area being covered and determine
the elements of the trajectory of its flight;
atmosphere, is most realistic.
However, research shows that at the present time,
t e crew on oE. _means of -antimissile defense capable
of destroying missiles in the passive sector of the
flight, before entry into the dense layers of the
-- pick out the nose cone against a background
of dummy targets;
-- carry out the placing of the antimissile missile
on the pt-otted flight trajectory of the ballistic
missile and secure, with the necessary accuracy, the
approach of the antimissile missile to the nose cone;
-- destroy the nose cone of the ballistic missile.
The total time during which an antimissile complex
must fulfil its mission is only a few minutes; there-
fore all its operations must be fully automated.
From the technical standpoint the PRO complex must
be an aggregate of radar sets, ground equipment, the
control system, the antimissile missiles, and com-
puting devices.
The structure of the organization of combat
with ballistic missiles may be examined from the
example of the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile system that
is being developed in the USA.
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Diagram 1. Structural diagram of the basic elements
of the PRO of the USA.
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I- Radar center of the system of ultra long-
range (sverkhdalrleye}' detection;
1. Acquisition (obnaruzheniye) radar set AN/FPS-50;
2. Tracking (soprovozhdeniye) radar set AN/FPS-49
II-Target designation (tseleukazaniye)
radar set
III-Means of the "Nike-Zeus" system:
3. Recognition (raspoznamaniye) radar set;
4. Target tracking (slezheniye za tselyu) radar set;
5. Antimissile missile tracking (slezheniye za
protivoraketoy) radar set;
6. Complex of electronic-computing equipment;
7. Launching site of the antimissile missiles.
IV-Area defense center with an electronic-
computing equipment complex.
In preparing a new world war, along with the
development of new weapons of attack, American
imperialism has in recent years been increasing work
on the creation of means of antimissile defense. In
this field efforts are exerted in two directions:
the creation of an early warning system capable of
ensuring ultra long-range detection of intercontinental
ballistic missiles in flight and the creation of a
complex of active PRO means capable of destroying a
missile warhead.
Scientific-research work on the creation of
active PRO means began in 1952 in the USA. As a
result, plans for several systems were worked out;
however, with the exception of the "Nike-Zeus" system,
work on all the remaining plans was stopped. The
basis of this system is composed of a battery of
antimissile missiles, the unit of equipment for which
includes: a target recognition radar set, a target
tracking radar set, an antimissile missile tracking
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radar set, an intercept computing device, control
equipment, launching mounts, and auxiliary equipment.
It is intended that control of the fire of
several batteries be carried out from a so-called
area defense center that is equipped with a target
designation radar set and a computing device, the
function of which is the processing of data on
detected targets, and target designation for the
batteries.
The organizational structure of the subunits of
the system is still in the study stage, it is intended
to have several antimissile missile tracking radar
sets in a battery, which will permit the carrying
out of several simultaneous guidance operations
against one target.
The sequence of the work of the basic elements
of the "Nike-Zees" system in destroying the nose
cones of ballistic missiles is as follows:
According to the early warning systeip's data,
the target designation radar set detects the nose
cone of the ballistic missile. and the computing
device of the area defense center, on the ba4is
of these data, carries out target distributipn and
target designation for the antimissile missile
batteries. The set works in a pulsed... mode.
Because of its great power (up to 50 megawatts
per impulse) it has separate transmitting and
receiving antennas placed up to 300 meters apart.
In order to ensure protection of the personnel
from radiation, the transmitting antenna is en-
closed by a screened metal shield with a height
of 20 meters. The maximum range of operation of
the set isl600 km. The time available for reliable
detection of the target and for determining its
parameters is about 20 seconds.
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The antenna of the recognition radar set, located
in the fire complex, is aimed according to the target
designation data.
The need to use such a set is brought about by
the peculiarities of protecting the system from
passive interference and dummy targets outside the
dense layers of the atmosphere, where they have the
same high speed as the nose cone of the missile.
At the present time the set is in the stage of
development (dorabotka), in the process of which it
is planned to use the results of the work on the
"Defender" program, specifically the study of the
electromagnetic characteristics of the nose cones
of ballistic missiles. It is planned that the
recognition set will work in the decimetric wave
band and have an operating range of about 1,000 km.
After separating the real target from the group
of dummy ones it switches over to the target tracking
radar set, which is designated for automatic tracking
of the missile nose cone and processing of the data
necessary to determine the calculated point of impact
and the commands for guiding the antimissile missile
to the target.
Using a parabolic reflector with a diameter
of 7 meters, the antenna system of the set creates
a narrow pencil-like beam, which is necessary for
a high degree of accuracy in determining continuous
coordinates of the target. The operating range of
the acquisition and tracking (soprovozhdeniye tseli)
radar set is about 1,000 km.
The antimissile missile tracking radar set is 50X1-HUM
designated for the automatic tracking of the
antimissile missile, for processing the data
necessary for guiding it to the target and for
transmitting guidance commands and commands for
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detonating__ the warhead Of the antimissile missile.
In order to simplify tracking of the antimissile
missile, a radar responder is installed on board.
For intercepting and destroying the nose cone
of a ballistic missile, the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile
missile is used; it is a three-stage wingless
missile 14.7 meters long and has a launching
weight of 10,400 kg. The booster of the antimissile
missile, which operates on solid fuel, develops a
thrust of about 200 tons. The antimissile missile
has a maximum altitude. of 150 km, a range of 320 km
and a maximum speed of up to 2,600 m/sec. These
performance characteristics are obtained both by the
booster and by the powerful solid fuel sustainer
motor. All the missile-borne control equipment is
located in the casing of the third stage of the
missile. Control of the flight of the antimissile
missile in the atmosphere is carried out by means
of external rudders (aerodinamicheskiy rul. ), and at
great heights it is carried out by means of jet
nozzles.
The warhead of the antimissile missile may be
equipped with both ready-made (gotovyy) destructive
elements and with a nuclear charge.
Destruction by ready-made elements occurs as
a result of a mechanical effect on the nose cone
of the ballistic missile. The nature of the
destructive action of a warhead with a nuclear
charge depends on the altitude at which it is
employed. At heights of up to 40 km the basic
destructive factor is the energy of the shock-
wave; at greater altitudes it is the energy of
various types of radiation, mainly neutron and
roentgen.
According to data from the foreign press, total
expenditures off the USA on the development of the
"Nike-Zeus" system have exceeded 1 billion dollars;
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however the question of developing the production of
the system has been postponed until the end of its
testing program. American specialists consider that
the tremendous success of the Soviet Union in the
field of missile technology permits it to have any
missiles required with appropriate devices and to
outstrip the employment of countermeasures in a
PRO system. Therefore a correct understanding of
the potentialities of the PRO system may be grasped
only after carrying out test firings against ballistic
missiles that create dummy targets and other inter-
ference.
In order to repel a massed missile attack,a
system of antimissile defense that is organized in
advance and built according to a single plan on
the scale of the entire country is necessary. The
theoretical bases for constructing an antimissile
defense are the foundation on which a PRO which
gives the maximum effect with the minimal expendi-
ture,of forces and means must be built.
In constructing a system of antimissile defense,
the nature of employment and the technical charact-
eristics of the enemy's ballistic missiles, the
combat capabilities of antimissile weapons, the
quantity and nature of the objectives to be de-
fended, and also their location in relation to
the probable axes of missile approach exert the
determining influence.
If we take the Soviet Union,.then the probable
axes of missile approach for it at the present time
are the northern, from the USA, and the western,
from Britain and Italy.
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In conformity with the individual objectives of
the country, specific sectors can be allotted on the 50X1-HUM
probable axes of missile approach, within the limits
of which the appearance of ballistic missiles of the
probable enemy may be expected. These sectors are
the determining factors in creating antimissile de-
fense of objectives or groups of objectives. However,
when determining probable axes and sectors of missile
approach, the possibility of an attack with ballistic
missiles of various classes, launched both from
missile bases and from submarines and missile de-
livery aircraft, should be taken into consideration.
The structure of antimissile defense must provide
for the interception of missiles not lower than the
specific altitude at which the burst of the nuclear
charge will be safe. Calculations show that for the
safety of objectives of the country, when intercepting
intercontinental missiles and intermediate-range
missiles, the altitude of the destruction of their
nose cones must be not less than 40 to 50km, and when
considering the use of nuclear charges with a TNT
equivalent of 7 to 10 megatons - not less than 80km.
For short-range missiles. whose TNT equivalent does
not exceed 1 megaton, the altitude of interception
should be not less than 15km. Consequently the fire
complexes must ensure destruction of the warheads of
ballistic missiles at altitudes not lower than those
indicated.
The defensive zones of the fire complexes exert
a decisive influence on the structure of antimissile
defense.
We consider the defensive zone of a PRO fire com-
plex to be that part of the territory that is covered
by the given complex. It represents the geometrical
location of the possible points of impact of ballistic
missile nose cones, the trajectories df which pass
through the destructive zone of this fire complex.
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The size of the defensive zone of the fire com-
plex essentially depends on the angles of fall of the
ballistic missiles, and its orientation depends on
the direction of firing (diagram 2).
There is a definite part of the territory that
is covered by the fire complex irrespective of what
are the angles of fall and from which directions
the ballistic missile firing is being conducted.
This part of the territory may be called the internal
defensive zone.
The objectives located in this zone will be
covered under any angle of fall and direction of fire;
the remaining objectives located within the limits
of the external defensive zone of the fire complex
will also be covered, but only for certain angles of
fall and directions of fire.
Obviously, by means of appropriate deployment
of the fire complexes, the screening of an area that is
considerable in size may be carried out. In this,
the grouping of the complexes must be such that the
important objectives of the area are definitely lo-
cated with the limits of the internal zone.
The grouping of the PVO means must be sufficiently
effective to repel massed missile strikes delivered
simultaneously against a series of objectives. For
this the number of fire complexes defending objectives
or groups of objectives must be no less than the
number of targets expected to be operating simultan-
eously against the given objective or groups of ob-
jectives.
In creating fire groupings, covering of the
defensive zones of the fire complexes of contiguous
groupings should be provided for, in order to create
an overall defensive zone for all objectives located
in the given area. 50X1-HUM
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The influence of the
direction of the ballistic
missiles' flight on the
overall zone of defense
Flight trajectory at
minimum angle. of
departure
I
Lalma nal zone"
,;.,1?,?- .The PRO fire s
Defensive-zone atfr .
minimum angle of I
departure of the
missile
ensive zone at
maximum angle of
departure of the
missile
Internal defensive
Diagram 2. Defensive zone of the PRO fire complex.
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The advisability of this formation is determined
by the fact that, first, it permits concentration of
the efforts of a series of groupings in repelling a
strike by missiles whose number may exceed the fire
capabilities of a grouping taken by itself; secondly,
with a relatively smaller number of weapons it is
possible to cover a larger number of objectives of
various categories. 50X1-HUM
A system of antimissile defense, it appears,
should be based on the use of antimissile weapons of
several types, the basic ones of which may be: 11
- weapons intended for screening individual areas
from intercontinental ballistic missiles and inter-
mediate-range missiles; possibly these same weapons
may also be enlisted for destroying artificial earth
satellites in low orbit;
- weapons intended for screening individual
objectives from short-range ballistic missiles,
mainly for the defense of frontier and maritime ob-
jectives.
Concerning the,,int.erception of artificial earth
satellites in high orbit, for this it is apparently
necessary to have other fire weapons having a great
range of operation. However, the radar support of the
antispace defense fire weapons can be retained by
the antimissile defense.
The need to employ two types of antimissile
weapons is stipulated by the fact that the weapons
intended for combat with intercontinental and inter-
mediate-range missiles cannot be employed to destroy
short-range missiles.
The small ranges and flight time of operational-
tactical missiles make their destruction possible
at comparatively low altitudes and short distances
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from the objectives being covered. The dimensions
of the defensive zones of the fire weapons intended 50X1-HUM
for the destruction of these weapons will be limited
to several dozen kilometers.
As a result of this, groupings of these weapons,
may be used to cover individual objectives and com-
pact groupings of objectives, mainly those located
in border areas. It is completely possible that it
will be feasible also to combat cruise missiles with
complexes of this type.
The stability of an antimissile defense system
will be determined, to a significant degree, by the
stability of its radar system, for the disorganiza-
tion of which the enemy will use both radio interference
and strikes against its most important and vulnerable
elements. In connection with this, a grouping of
the PRO radiotechnical equipment must be created so
as to ensure that the zones of radar detection are cover-
ed by the_ necessary number of sets. These elements
of the system, like the centers of ultra long.-range
detection must without fail be screened by antiair-
craft-missile complexes.
The structure of the antimissile defense must
be thoroughly coordinated with the grouping of the
antiaircraft (protivosamoletnyy) defense weapons.
In this case the stability of the antiair defense
system as a whole is increased, and the enemy is
deprived of the advantages that the joint employment
of aviation and missiles could have given him.
Obviously, the deployment of the 4ntimissile
defense must be carried out in a definite sequence
calculated so that it ensures covering, first of all,
the most important areas and objectives, and at the
same time so that conditions are created for the
subsequent development of an antimissile defense.
which includes- new elements without reconstructing
the system created earlier.
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It is known that the Americans plan to carry out
the construction of their PRO system in two stages.
In the first stage such elements of the system
are created as radar centers for ultra long-range
detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, and
fire weapons capable of covering comparatively small
but the most important areas are deployed. Therefore
at this stage the systsn.of fire cover may be considered
to be a point system , receiving the necessary
information about the targets from the territorial
detection system.
In the second stage the number of fire weapons
increases; their capabilities increase, mainly with
an increase in the antimissile missiles' operating
range. With this,the transition from covering in-
dividual objectives and fairly small areas to the
defense of a considerable portion of the country's
territory is carried out.
In stating our opinions concerning PRO, we proceed
from the fact that an antimissile system is not auto-
nomous, because the antimissile and antiaircraft defense
are united into a single system of antiair defense of
the country. It is also apparent that control of
antiaircraft and antimissile defense at the operational
level should also be unified. The question of tactical
PRO elements requires study.
Control of antimissile defense must, in our
opinion, be organized so that coordination of the
operations of its individual elements and groupings
and the most effective utilization of the antimissile
weapons are ensured. Its material base must be a net-
work of mutually connected command points making
widescale use of automation for studying and evaluating
the situation, making decisions, and for directing the
combat operations of the forces and weapons. Before
the start of an enemy missile attack, it appears that
control of the PRO weapons must consist, primarily,
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of maintaining them at the necessary degree of combat
readiness, of organizing coordination among the group-
ings of the fire complexes and among the radar centers
of ultra long-range detection, and of comprehensive
materiel-technical support.'
In the process of repelling enemy ballistic missile
attacks the control of the PRO weapons must consist of
allotting targets among the radar centers and fire
complexes, target designation, controlling the operat-
ing conditions of the radar sets, ensuring coordination
between contiguous groupings of fire complexes, reg-
ulating the expenditure of antimissile missiles, and
of other things.
The time available for performing the tasks
enumerated is extremely limited. In conformity with
the PRO system being developed in the USA, it will
consist of not more than 10 to 15 minutes from the
moment the missile is detected until the moment that
it strikes. The "Nike-Zeus" fire complex requires
only 4 minutes.
The limited time and the need to take into
consideration a large number of factors, when working
out a decision, require a high degree of automation
of the control processes by using a whale complex of
electronic computers at the command -Posts, of all
levels. In this, as shown by calculations, the
operating speed of the EVM (elektronno-vychislitel-
naya mashina-electronic computer) must consist of
several hundred thousand operations per second.
The high level of automation of PRO, however,
will not, it appears, rule out the participation of
combat crews at the command posts during the process
of controlling antimissile weapons. Their functions
will be to react to unexpected changes in the situation,
to introduce additional information, to analyze the
developing situation, to clarify the initial data
used in the algorithms of the machine resolution of
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tasks, etc. The equipping of command posts,. must
ensure, practically, immediate reflection of the develop-
ing situation and of the status of the antimissile
defense weapons.
The control of the antimissile weapons must
provide for the cooperation of antimissile defense
with the antiaircraft defense. Its goal is to operate
against the enemy in the most effective manner with
coordinated efforts. The cooperation must provide for:
-- concentrating the efforts of the antimissile
and antiaircraft weapons for the defense of important
areas and objectives;
-- questions of screening the weapons of antimissile
defense;
-- coordinated use of radar reconnaissance means
for discovering the start and the makeup' of an
air-missile attack, etc.
Thus, the main features of antimissile defense
control will be: a high degree of centralization
and subordination to a single command, comprehensive
automation at all levels and echelons of command with
the widescale employment -of fast-operating EVM, and
coordination of the operations of antimissile and
antiaircraft weapons in the overall system o antiair
defense.
Antimissile defense requires a reliable and fast
system for transmitting information. Therefore when
organizing PRO, questions of communications, both from
the standpoint of necessary technical means and from
the standpoint of its organization acquire an especially
important meaning.
The exchange of information among the individual
elements of the antimissile defense can be ensured
only on the basis of the comprehensive employment
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of various means of communication, even the use of
special earth satellites. In the PRO system of the
USA, for example, it is planned to use as.. communi-
cation links, cable lines, microwave band radio-
relay links, and tropospheric communication radio
lines, in which, the transmission of information
to certain levels must be duplicated on different
frequencies.
In connection with the creation of an antimissile
defense, a series of particular problems arises. Let
us examine some of them.
In antimissile defense, timeliness in the detection
of enemy missiles being launched acquires tremendous
importance. In the example of the PRO of the USA, it
is seen that such a system of early warning may be
constructed on the basis of employing radar sets of
ultra long-range detection, moved out to the probable
axes of missile approach. However, this solution does
not exhaust the problems. A more complete resolution
of it is connected with the creation and employment
of qualitatively new means - radar sets based on the
principle of back-scatter probing (vozvratno-naklonnoye
zondirovaniye) of the ionosphere, or artificial earth
satellites with equipment that permits fixing the
moment of launch of a ballistic missile.
Calculation shows that when such warning means
are set up, intercontinental ballistic missiles may
be detected about 30 minutes before they strike and
intermediate-range missiles 10 to 15 minutes before
they strike.
Plans for organizing early warning based on the 't
use of artificial earth satellites are being worked 50X1-HUM
out.
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For example, one of them envisages a system made
up of 72 satellites orbiting in six polar orbits whose
planes are successively displaced in relation to one
another by 609. Twelve satellites orbiting in each
orbit are the "simple cell" of the reconnaissance
system that permits the simultaneous surveying of a
strip of the earth's surface a little more than
6,000 km wide.
In each satellite, weighing up to 6 tons, it is
intended to have an acquisition radar set operating
on an impulse :mode, with a range of up to 1,600 km
and a scanning sector of 350.
In view of the great operating ranges of the
radar equipment and the extremely high requirements
for accuracy of the radar information, important
significance is acquired by the problem of studying
the influence of the ionosphere on the errors of
radar measurement of coordinates of high-flying
objects and of working out methods to compensate
for them.
It is known that when passing through the
ionosphere a distortion of the path of radiowave
propagation occurs and the speed of their movement
changes. The first circumstance is the reason why
errors occur in measuring angular coordinates, the
second is the reason for errors in measuring distances.
Moreover, the size of the error depends on the con-
dition of the ionosphere.
Under the influence of factors originating in
the cosmos, first of all radiation from the sun',
the condition of the ionosphere constantly changes.
These phenomena are both regular and accidental in
nature. This leads to corresponding changes of the
errors in radar measurements. Besides, within the
ionosphere itself. there are dissimilarities of
various scales, nature, the regularity of their appear-
ance, the existence of which has not yet been studied
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to the necessary degree.
The accidental nature of ionospheric phenomena
makes it impossible to take them into consideration
and to compensate for errors in radar measurements
without knowing the laws that are inherent to ionos-
pheric phenomena and without taking into consideration
the current condition of the ionosphere and the fore-
cast.
Especially important significance is attained by
this question in view of the fact that nuclear bursts
can bring about artificial ionization of the upper
layers of the atmosphere and changes in the condition
of the ionosphere enveloping the entire globe.
The problem of excluding mutual radio interference
also takes on great significance. The powerful
radiation of the radiotechnical equipment of the apti-
missile defense, if appropriate measures are not takeni,
will create powerful radio interference for the other
radiotechnical equipment. On the other hand, the
highly sensitive receiving equipment of the antimissile
weapons may find itself subjected to a powerful influence
from various radio transmitting and television devices.
In view of the use in antimissile defense of
radar sets with a great pulse power the problem of
biological protection of personnel has arisen.
The powerful radio frequency, and in some cases
even roentgen radiation, that exist when operating
radio equipment, are of danger to the health of per-
sonnel. Therefore the question of reliable biological
protection requires most thorough study and elaboration
of both technical means and organizational measures
to ensure personnel safety.
It is apparent that the search for rational res-
olution of these questions must be along the
line of employing a system of shield protection, and
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also a systematic measurement of the level of radiation
in working areas, with automatic signaling when levels
of radiation arise that are harmful to health.
The powerful economy of our country and the
great achievements of Soviet science are the materiel
base that ensures continuous growth of the strength of
the antiair defense of the Soviet Union. At the present
time the antiair defense troops of the country are
carrying out a new qualitative leap in their develop-
ment.
Speaking at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Minister
of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya.
Malinovskiy said: "I particularly have to report that
the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been
successfully resolved." This means that antimissile
defense, for the antiair defense troops of the country,
has already become a task of practical application.
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