MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING MODERN DEFENSE, BY MAJOR-GENERAL V. PETRENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700490001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 17, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Some Questions Concerning Modern Defense 50X1-HUM
by
Major-General V. Petrenko
From the moment that nuclear weapons appeared, military-
theoretical thought has been persistently searching for the
answer to the question: what is the role of defense in mo-
dern armed combat? During this search three fundamentally
different approaches to the solution of the problem of de-
fense have been revealed.
The advocates of one of them deny the existence of de-
fense as a form of combat operations in a nuclear/missile
war. Others allow the possibility of using defense only
at the tactical level, denying that it is an operational
category, but they assert that even at the tactical level
defense may have a place only during friendly offensive
operations. The advocates of the third approach (they are
clearly the majority) recognize defense as one of the most
important and natural types of combat operation:; on any
scale, but differ in their views on the methods of its
structure and conduct.
We too think that defense in a nuclear/missile war
remains as a necessary type of combat operation.. It is
used where, because of various reasons, an offensive is
not possible or advisable. As before, defense is organized
and conducted by limited forces and means against numerically
superior enemy forces. However, the goal, organization and
methods of conducting defense in a modern war are funda-
mentally different from what they were in past wars.
The basic factors that determine the trends to develop
defense as a type of combat operation.; are: the use of
qualitatively new means of armed combat, especially nuclear/
missile weapons; the maneuvering nature of armed combat,
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conducting combat operations along axes without a continuous
front; the increased power and the determining role of fire
in combat operations; the increased capabilities of ground
troops, the basis of which are the missile troops and tanks,
and the widescale use of airborne landings; the changed
methods of organizing and conducting an offensive by our
probable enemies. 50X1-HUM
An analysis of these factors shows that progressive
trends in development are inherent in defense in a nuclear/
missile war.
One of the important trends in the development of de-
fense is the steady increase in the determination of the
goals of defensive operations while decreasing the time
to achieve them. Nuclear/missile weapons permit maneuver
by fire at great distances while still permitting the quick
and reliable destruction of the nuclear means and the strike
groupings of the enemy; modern reconnaissance means are cap-
able of detecting means of nuclear attack and enemy troop
groupings at a considerable depth, which permit:. the defenders
to destroy them even before they approach the field of battle
and engagement; the complete motorization of troops has in-
creased their mobility and maneuverability on the field of
battle and engagement. All this permits modern defense to
be assigned the goal - - to disrupt the enemy offensive which
is being prepared or which has already started.
Today, not only the troops directly opposite the enemy
participate in the destruction of his offensive groupings,
but also those troops located tens and hundreds of kilometers
from the field of battle and engagement; and with their
missile weapons and aviation, these troops can come to the
assistance of the troops under attack in a short period of
time. Therefore, the disruption of the enemy offensive must
be declared the main goal of defending troop operations.
The losses they inflict on the attacker must be such that
the correlation of strength changes in favor of the defense,
because only in this way is it possible to create conditions
that are advantageous for passing from defensive to offensive
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operations. The requirement to disrupt the offensive evi5OX1-HUM
dences the role and might of modern fire, the capability
of nuclear weapons to destroy quickly, almost instantan-
eously, subunits, units and, in massed employment, entire
groupings, and in this way change the correlation of forces,
not by increasing the number and massing of friendly troops,
but by quickly decreasing the forces of the opposing enemy.
The goal of disrupting the enemy offensive gives a clear
requirement to the troops directly engaged in carrying out
defensive operations - - to create advantageous conditions
for passing to the offensive for themselves, and not only
for the troops that will come up from t e depth or that are
located nearby.
At the present time, everyone admits the need to or-
ganize defense at any level in an extremely short time, but
as yet there is no single opinion concerning the question
of the distinction between a prepared and a hastily assumed
defense. Many still continue to define a hastily assumed
defense with the indicatorsythst'.had been set up in the 1948
Field Service Regulations, where it stated that this defense
is distinguished by incomplete readiness, resulting in decreased
stability, inadequately developed and weakly organized system
of fire, hastily organized coordination, and unstable control.
Under conditions of the extreme dynamics of armed combat,
the rapidity of combat operations and abrupt changes in the
situation, when the enemy is organizing an offensive from
the march, i.e., in the process of moving up troops to the
defense, this definition of defense as being created in a
short time is not only wrong, but is even harmful. We can-
not, and must not, form a poor defense, in which the system
of fire and coordination is organized hastily, in just any
way, in which control is unstable, etc. Even though the
defense is created in a short time, it must be stable and
vigorous, based on planned and organized fire of all types
of weapons, on close coordination of all forces and weapons,
and on firm control.
The only characteristic that distinguishes a so-called
prepared defense from one organized in a short period is
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the degree of its engineer preparation and its saturation 50X1-HUM
with various types of obstacles. All the remaining in-
dicators must be the same, both for the defense prepared
in advance and for a defense created in a short time. We
have all the capabilities for this - - both the reconnaissance
means and means of destruction. When quickly going over to
the defense during combat operations, it is necessary~:to
know the situation in the zone of friendly troops as well as
in the zones of adjacent troops; therefore, the process of
working out and making decisions for defense will, first of
all, basically consist of entering the necessary changes and
additions into the decisions made previously for the oper-
ation or battle. From the sum total of problems in the
estimate of the situation, the commanding officer will have
to select those which will be the main and decisive ones in
a specific given situation; and he and his staff should
concentrate their attention specifically on them. The high
mobility of troops, the great range of modern combat means,
the highly efficient engineer excavating equipment, and the
effective means for setting up mines and other barriers - -
all this helps in the organization of a stable defense in
a short time.
An important trend in the development of modern defense
is the ever-increasing need for troops to resolve their de-
f.erisive'tas s by aggressive maneuvering operations, and no
by te passive repulsion of enemy strikes from a standstill.
This trend made its appearance in the second half of World
War I and increased significantly in World War II. But in
the past, positional forms of defense prevailed; and while
maneuver by forces, weapons and fire was considered important,
it nevertheless played a subordinate role. This was explained
mainly by the inadequate mobility of troops and by the weak
destructive power and insignificant range of the means of
fire.
Under modern conditions, the trend toward increasing
the role and significance of maneuver in defense has in-
creased to such an extent that positional defense has lost
its definite place and, in essence, has become a means of
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supporting maneuver. In a nuclear/missile war 50X1-HUM
maneuver will undoubtedly prevail on the field of battle
and engagement. But this does not mean that positional
defense has completely lost its significance. In order
to inflict destruction on an enemy advancing in dispersed
formations along separate axes and at high speeds, it is
still necessary, in defending separate important areas of
terrain, to comb une. positional stability closely with the
broadest maneuver by fire strikes and by troops on the
threatened axes.
As a rule, the defender is weaker than the attacker
in forces and in means. But he has a number of advantages
in his favor, which, even in a nuclear war, to a certain
extent compensate for the lack of forces and means and en-
able him to carry out successful combat , operations against
a numerically superior enemy. The very presence of known
advantages of defense over an offensive justifies its em-
ployment as a form of combat operation.. If the main ad-
vantage of an offensive is initiative in operations and
the right to select the time and direction of the strike,
then the main advantage of defense is the right to select
the place and position for the battle and the area for
the engagement. In defense, it is possible to make more
effective use of the protective characteristics of the
terrain; to utilize camouflage more successfully to con-
ceal the true objectives and to reveal the false ones,
thereby causing the attacker to waste his ammunition by
delivering fire strikes against empty places and secondary
objectives; to study the terrain better, which facilitates
maneuver by forces and means and permits the preparation
of firing data; and to increase the accuracy of fire.
Terrain is always on the side of the defense, and its skil-
ful use may, to a significant degree, compensate for the
lack of forces and means.
However, despite all the importance of utilizing the
advantages of positional forms of combat, the retention of
the terrain must still be subordinate to maneuver. This is
explained by the fact that modern means of destruction,
especially nuclear weapons, are so powerful and destructive
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that no-defensive position or zone, even the most rein-
forced and heavily saturated with troops and combat equ50X1-HUM
ment, can withstand them. Since this is the case, the
defenders will not be able to hold important areas of the
terrain, much less inflict destruction on the attacking
enemy, if maneuver in defense is made subordinate to posi-
tional defense.
The trend toward an increasing role in vigorous offen-
sive operations by troops in fulfilling defensive missions
is well summarized in the formula that says that positional
stability and offensive strike force are essential to mo-
dern defense. In practice, this is reflected in the striving
to allocate a considerable part of the troops to the second
echelons and reserves and assign them vigorous missions con-
nected with the maneuver.
Increasing the role of aggressiveness in defense is de-
pendent on specific reasons, of which the main one is the
utilization of nuclear/missile weapons and the increased
role of fire as a whole.
Success in modern combat requires a high degree of
coordination in the operations of long-range means andlclose-
combat means and swift implementation of the results of
fire by bold troop attacks following the fire strikes. A
nuclear strike, the sudden employment of chemical weapons
or massed fire with conventional ammunition, followed im-
mediately by a strike of a small force of infantry and tanks,
may lead to the complete destruction even of a numerically
superior enemy. Therefore, the most effective method for
carrying out a modern defense must become a powerful fire
strike by all types of weapons, immediately concluded by
a troop strike.
The next important trend in the development of modern
defense consists of increasing the depth of its formation.
This trend applies to the depth of combat and operational
troop formations, to the depth of defensive areas and po-
sitions, and to the depth of vigorous action against the
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enemy with the destructive means of the defense.
Since the appearance of the Field Service Regulations
of 1959, the depth of combat and operational troop forma-
tions in defense has approximately doubled in size. The
depth of a-combat formation for a regiment increased from
4-6km to 8-10km; for a division, from 10-15km to 20-30km;
and for a combined-arms army, from 50-70km to 100-120km.
The depth of vigorous action against the enemy by defending
ground troops using their own means has reached 200km and
more for an army and 30km or more for a division. The fac-
tors that permitted an increase in the depth of the defense
were the sharp increase in the range and destructive power
of fire means and the equally sharp increase in the
maneuvering capabilities of the ground troops.
Under modern conditions, the goal of increasing the
depth of the defense is different from what it was in the
past. It does not consist of bringing up fresh forces from
the depth into battle in order to strengthen the combat
formations of the troops of the first echelon, thereby in-
creasing the efforts in the threatened axes in order to
counteract the attacking groupings by passive repulsion
of strikes for the purpose of stabilizing the situation.
Instead, it consists of taking advantage of freedom of
maneuver to utilize troops located in the depth of the de-
fense, at the necessary moment and at the decisive place,
to fulfil missions by vigorous offensive methods, i .e . ,
to complete the rout of the enemy grouping immediately after
the nuclear strikes. Considering the destructive force of
modern combat means and the nature of an offensive, it is
unquestionably necessary to have a significant part of the
forces and means in the depth of the defense, which are
also capable of fulfilling such missions as: the closing
of dangerous breaches made by nuclear weapons in the com-
bat formations of troops of the first echelon; the re-
placement of troops that have temporarily lost their com-
bat effect:iveness., destruction of enemy airborne landings;
the defense of important areas and objectives in the depth,
etc. But, we repeat, the main mission of the second echelons,
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especially at the level of the army and front, must be the
completion of the rout of the enemy grouping immediate ly50X1 -HUM
after a powerful nuclear strike.
In connection with this, the fundamental change in the
role and nature of the missions fulfilled by the basic ele-
ments of the combat and operational troop formation -- by
echelons and combined-arms reserves -- may be considereT
to be a fully defined trend in e development of modern
combat. The first echelon of the operational and combat
formation will not always play the decisive role in re-
pelling an enemy offensive. Furthermore, there are rea-
sons to assert that the leading role in the resolution of
this mission will most frequently belong to the nuclear/
missile weapons and troops located in the depth, and the
troops of the first echelon will only provide advantageous
conditions for delivering nuclear strikes and for carrying
out broad maneuver by the combined-arms reserves for the
purpose of completing the rout of the enemy. All this
inevitably leads to a striving to decrease the composition
of the first echelons and to assign a large and the most
mobile part of the forces and means to the second echelons.
The missions of these elements of troop formation are
also undergoing serious changes. During World War II, se-
cond echelons were assigned two typical missions: to carry
out counterstrikes and counterattacks; and to hold tena-
ciously definite zones and positions in the depth on the
probable axes of the main enemy strike.. In accordance with
this, the troops of the second echelons were assigned specific
combat missions before the start of active defensive oper-
ations. As a rule, specific missions were not defined for
the combined-arms reserve before the start of the enemy
offensive; it was usually oriented as to the possible nature
of the operations during the defensive battle and engagement.
A characteristic feature of a modern defensive operation
is the steady increase in the depth of the simultaneous de-
ployment of vigorous defensive operations on the axes of
enemy strikes, and also the need to resolve various missions
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not successively, one after the other, but simultaneously.
The experience of many postwar exercises shows that active
defensive operations quickly spread to an enormous depth.50X1-HUM
An example is the war game conducted by the Commander-in-
Chief of the Ground Troops in February of this year, in
which the active defensive operations of the front troops
reached a depth of 200 to 250km; in this case the engage-
ment was conducted simultaneously by troops of the first
echelon and a considerable portion of the second echelon
of the front . It was characteristic that, before the
army which made up the second echelon of the front was
committed into battle for the purpose of delivering a
counterstrike, it was practically expended in carrying out
missions which had not been anticipated: two of its divi-
sions were thrown into combat with the operational "enemy"
landing; and two other divisions had to enter into combat
with tank large units that broke through into the depth.
The highly maneuvering nature of combat operations,
and the abrupt changes in the situation that are inherent
in them, require a new way of utilizing second echelons and
reserves in a defensive operation and in combat.
In modern conditions troops located beyond the first
echelon are assigned a multitude of various missions: to
defend importaht areas in the depth; to execute a maneuver
in threatened axes with the goal of stopping or destroying
the enemy grouping that broke through; to deliver counter-
strikes and carry out counterattacks; to close dangerous
breaches in the defense of the first echelon or to replace
the first echelon troops that temporarily lost their com-
bat effectiveness as a result of enemy nuclear strikes; and
to annihilate enemy airborne landings.
It is completely unrealistic to presuppose that these
missions will be fulfilled successively, one after the other,
or that it will be possible to determine beforehand, before
the start of active defensive operations, which part of the
forces and means of the second echelon should be brought in to
fulfil.. this or that mission. It is more probable that the
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majority of the indicated missions will have to be fulfilled
simultaneously and that specific combat missions for the
troops located in the depth will have to be defined during
the engagement as it develops. 50X1-HUM
When making a decision for defense by the large units
and units which make up the second echelon, the above cir-
cumstances require that not only the main mission be indica-
ted, but also the secondary missions which they must be pre-
pared to carry out during defensive operations. Multi-
fariousness in the use of second echelon troops -- is an
essential condition in the planning of a modern defensive
operation and battle. In order to achieve a high degree of
readiness of second echelon troops for the fulfillment of
any of the missions that arise during defensive operations,
they must be able to maneuver freely; and to do this they
must be located at the greatest possible distance from the
lines of contact with the enemy. Taking into consideration'
that the width of alarge unit defensive front may reach
20 to 30km. or more, and that that of an army may reach
200km, it is advisable to locate their second echelons
correspondingly at a distance of 15 to 20km and 50 to 70km.
from the main line of defense.
Regardless of their intended use, the troops allocated
in the depth (second echelons and reserves) should be lo-
cated in those areas of the terrain where, according to the
concept of the battle and operation, they are expected to
hold the ground tenaciously. Each disposition area of
units and large units that. are part of the second echelon
composition must also simultaneously be their defensive area.
There has long been a need to examine the questions of
dividing troops into echelons and combined-arms reserves
and to define their role and place in an operational and
combat formation, as well as their most typical missions.
Sometimes it is difficult to explain why in some cases a
large unit that is allocated to the depth of a defense is
called the second echelon, and in another case the reserve,
because in both cases their missions are usually formulated
identically.
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Probably it will be correct to establish that the
combined-arms reserves are always allocated only in a 50X1-HUM
front formation (froi3tovoye obyedineniye). In an army
and division they are allocated only in a single echelon
formation, which is explained by three main reasons: troops
of the second echelon and combined-arms reserves of an army
and division now fulfil similar missions; as a rule, a
limited number of combined-arms large units is allocated
for an army defensive operation; it is necessary to have a
powerful second echelon in an army and division. Only in
a front is it actually possible to have reserve large units
intended for the strengthening of the army or for fulfilling
missions that arise suddenly.
Reserve large units in a front may be formed from
large units arriving from the zone of the interior, as well
as from large units taken from the composition of armies
for replacement. Naturally, both groups of large units will
not have combat missions before being turned over to the
armies or before being used for some purpose by the front.
At the present time, the trends in the development of
modern defense which deal with the forms of its structure
have also become clearly defined.
Before the mass use of nuclear/missile weapons and
other modern means of destruction, the troops, when going
over to the defense, strived to create a continuous front,
not only at the level of subunits and units but also of
large units and operational formations. The front of the
battle was almost always concentrated in one direction.
For the purpose of creating a single solid defense and better
coordination between the large units,'zones of definite
sizes were formed for them. These zones and positions were
formed according to a single plan of the senior commander,
who indicated their location and outline on the terrain. As
a result, a defense had the form of continuous defensive
zones, divided into a series of continuous defensive posi-
tions which, in turn, were composed of a series of continuous
fortifications and trenches. This form of defense corresponded
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to the conditions for conducting combat operations in the
past war, where it fully justified itself.
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In a future war the nature of combat operations will
become completely different. Soviet military art is based
on the fact that maneuvering forms of combat will predomi-
nate in a future war, that there probably will not be any
continuous fronts, and that combat operations will develop
along axes. Deep breakthroughs by troop groupings of both
sides will eliminate the linear front of combat operations,
and the mass use of nuclear weapons will predetermine the
appearance of large gaps and breaks between large units
and formations.
In these conditions, the divisions of the first
echelon of the army, when going over to the defense, will
not be located on one line, and the combat front for each
dividign will be able to have a different axis. Each divi-
sion will have to build its defense in a different manner.
This means that the single continuous army defensive zone
has already broken down into separate defensive areas and
centers and has lost its former orderliness. Now the army
defense will be characterized not by the orderly contour of
solid defensive zones and positions, but by separate defensive
areas, centers and positions unevenly dispersed along the
front and over the entire depth of the army defense.
Thus, the evolution of the structural forms of defense
leads to an intermittent-center'.(preryuchato-ochagovyy)
system, based on the creation of defensive areas of different
sizes and configurations that intersect the most important
axes with considerable gaps between defensive areas. This
does not eliminate the possibility that, should the front be
stabilized for a comparatively long time, separate defensive
areas may be gradually combined, with the result that se-
parate sectors of the front may become a single (divisional
or army) continuous defensive zone. But naturally this takes
time.
Modern defense must be based on a tight joining of
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maneuvering and positional forms, with maneuver, as we
have already indicated, prevailing over stability. The
main feature of defense is vigorousness. Positional 50X1-HUM
forms of defense must serve only as an important means
for ensuring the preparation and implementation of power-
ful fire strikes and a decisive troop maneuver designed
to rout the strike groupings of the advancing enemy.
The basic structural form for modern defense at all
levels must be considered to be dispersed areas which con-
tain positions for combat and which ensure all-around de-
fense, convenience for combat, and defense from enemy
means of mass destruction. However, the intermittent-center
system of defense must not be full of holes that permit the
enemy to maneuver freely between the defensive areas. Al-
though not continuous in its form, modern defense must never-
theless be monolithic. This means that defense is organized
by separate areas, but tied into a single system, and that
gaps are permitted when organizing defense between subunits,
units and large units, but the size of the gaps must not
destroy the integrity of the defense. The monolithic struc-
ture of defense and the coordination of troops operating
on separate axes within their defensive areas are ensured
not by close lateral contact but by the long range of fire
means and the maneuvering capabilities of troops.
In general terms, these are the trends in the develop-
ment of modern defense. Their analysis shows the need for
a fundamentally new approach to the solution of a whole
series of important questions of organizing and conducting
modern defense. Some of these questions are examined below.
The principle of concentrating the basic efforts in de-
fense and intensifying the resistance to the advancing enemy
arose as a result of defensive counteraction to offensive
methods, and is an expression of the art of defending troops
and their skill in conducting successful combat operations
against numerically superior enemy forces. In the past war,
the highest art in concentrating the basic efforts consisted
of the following: with an overall inequality in the forces
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and means of both sides along the entire front, the defender
achieved equality, or even superiority over the enemy in per-
sonnel and combat equipment in a selected position or zone.
In conditions of mass employment of nuclear/missile 50X1-HUM
weapons, the main materiel basis for counteracting the
attacking enemy cannot be considered to be personnel and
conventional combat means. As is known, the basic means
for combatting the attacking enemy now is nuclear/missile
and chemical weapons, supplemented by the fire of conven-
tional means. Therefore, the concentration of the basic
efforts must not consist of having the defender select a
certain position or zone ahead of time and concentrating
his main forces and means there, or-even, during the battle
or engagement, of executing a maneuver of forces and means
to these selected positions and zones in order to increase
the number of troops there. Instead, it consists of having
the defender foresee and carry out timely, powerful fire
strikes with nuclear weapons, in combination with other
means of destruction, against the nuclear means and the
main grouping of troops of the advancing enemy; and then,
with a strike by his own forces and without delay, im-
plementing the results of the fire strikes with the goal
of completing the rout of the advancing enemy on a definite
axis. This is the very essence of concentrating basic
efforts and intensifying resistance in modern defense.
Instead of selecting some one position in the defense
of a division, or a zone in the defense of an army, the re-
tention of which up to now required the concentration of
their basic efforts, it is now necessary to select areas
of terrain in which it is most advantageous to destroy the
advancing enemy grouping with massed fire strikes in com-
bination with troop strikes. It is expedient to call these
''areas fire destruction areas (rayon ognevogo porazheniya).
It is necessary to select fire destruction areas both
in front of the main line of defense within the range limits
of the defender's fire means and in the depth of defense of
his own troops. Within the limits of these areas, strikes
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by nuclear weapons and aviation, fire by other means of
destruction, and troop strikes are planned with the goal
of completing the rout of a predetermined enemy grouping.
In order to create advantageous conditions for de- 50X1-HUM
livering concentrated fire strikes and troop strikes, it
is essential to select advantageous areas of terrain which
are to be held tenaciously. Usually they will be located
on the probable axes of e enemy offensive, both within
the limits of the main line of resistance and in the depth.
For the defense of these areas the minimum necessary number
of troops is allotted. With the use of the organized fire
of all means, barriers and other positional advantages, these
troops have to delay the advancing enemy, compel him to con-
centrate in an area of terrain that is advantageous to the
defender, and in this way create conditions for delivering
an effective fire strike and troop strike against the enemy.
A fundamentally new approach to the methods of con-
centrating efforts and intensifying resistance in defense
must inevitably produce new content; in the concept of de-
fense and in the bases for decisions by the commanding officer
for its organization and execution.
In modern conditions the basis of the commanding officer's
concept for defense must include the definition of: the axes
of probable enemy strikes and his grouping against which it
is necessary to concentrate the basic efforts of one's own
troops; the areas of terrain that it is necessary to hold at
any cost; groupings of one's own forces and means and the
nature of their maneuver during defensive operations.
Such content. of the concept permits a decision to be
made on the organization and execution of defense, taking
into consideration: the decisive role of fire, the basis
of which consists of nuclear strikes; the conduct of combat
on axes, one of which will always be the main one; the re-
quirements for antinuclear protection, ensured by dispersing
and locating forces and means on a front which is not con-
tinous; and the need to carry out the broadest maneuver by
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fire, forces and means during the defensive battle.
The presence of missile units and subunits in the
composition of the army and division, the considerable
decrease in number of tube artillery on carriages, 50X1-HUM
the introduction of antitank guided missiles into the
troops and improved antitank grenade launchers, the con-
version of transports from means of transport into combat
vehicles, and a whole series of other changes in the arma-
ment of troops, require considerable changes in the structure
of troops for defense.
The saturation of motorized rifle subunits with anti-
tank guided missiles (pTURS) and improved grenade launchers
permit them to organize a firm antitank defense in their
own areas with their organic means. Therefore, now there
is no such need as before to reinforce them with tanks
from the tank battalion of the motorized rifle regiment.
When used in a centralized manner, a tank battalion is a
powerful means of maneuver on threatened axes; it permits
the creation of a deeply echeloned antitank defense. It
is evident that there is no longer any need to create
such an element as the antitank reserve in the combat form-
ation of a regiment. With modern means of combat, each
platoon strong point and the defense area of a company, regi-
ment, and division can, and must, be based on antitank fire
in combination with antitank barriers of all types. Therefore,
there is now no sense in creating company antitank strong
points, battalion antitank centers, and regimental, divisional
and army antitank areas by the special allotment of means.
It is generally recognized that in modern conditions
there is no opportunity, or even any need, to create artillery
groups in an army and division. In our view, this should
not be done even in a regiment, if the commanding officer of
the regiment has less than two artillery battalions at his
disposal.
At the same time we consider that it is absolutely
essential that a regiment have a mobile obstacle detachment
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and that the division and army have not less than two such
detachments. This is dictated by the broad front and the
increased depth of defensive areas of units and large units,
by the presence of large gaps between battalions, regiments
and divisions, and by exposed flanks. The enemy offensiv(50X1-HUM
along axes and his use of airborne landings demand quick
actions by the defending troops in building up their efforts
on the. threatened axes, including the creation of various
types of obstacles. In order to create obstacles in short
periods of time during a battle and operation, it is essen-
tial that commanding officers of regiments, divisions, and
armies have highly mobile and technically equipped obstacle
detachments.
The next question that requires critical examination
is the planning of fire and the organization of a system of
fire in a ense .
At the present time, troops are armed with a great
variety of weapons having various combat characteristics.
The larger the organizational - T/0/ E military unit the
greater the amount of various armaments that it has. Even
rifle subunits have several types of armament that vary in
construction, rapidity of fire, range of fire and in other
combat characteristics, as well as in their intended use.
In modern conditions the enemy represents the most hetero-
geneous targets: infantry, armored vehicles)-various artillery
systems, missile installations, control points, radio-tech-
nical stations, rear area objectives, various air targets,
etc. These targets may be single or group, covered or ex-
posed, and may be stationary or may move at various speeds.
At a given time there may be few or many of them on the
battlefield, and they will be located at various distances
from one another but will operate in a coordinated manner
according to a single plan.
The quick and effective destruction of all the targets
which constitute the enemy by the fire from the various means
is a rather complex matter and requires great art in the or-
ganization of fire. Modern fire means can only reveal their
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qualities fully when they are used in an organized and
purposeful manner and coordinated according to target, 50X1-HUM
place and time.
The term "system of fire" is used in our military
art quite often, but it has such a broad connotation that
it is impossible to give it a clear-cut definition. It
is not accidental that the Field Service Regulations do
not give such a definition. They only state that "the
system of fire in defense is built on the coordination
of the fire of all types of weapons, atomic strikes and
strikes by aviation".
As used in military literature and in troop training,
the term "system of fire" likewise applies to the grouping
of fire means and to the combining of the fire of types of
weapons :. It means the organized fire of all the fire
means of this or that troopr;organism, and, therefore, we
speak of a system of fire of subunits, units and large units.
At the same time, this concept refers to the organized fire
of artillery (system of artillery fire), the fire of anti-
tank means (system of antitank fire), the fire of antiair-
craft means, infantry weapons, etc.
The need has arisen to examine the concept of "system
of fire" in defense and to answer the question of whether
or not this system can ensure an organized and purposeful
employment of various fire means in a modern defensive
battle or operation.
As is known, the organized employment of fire in de-
fense must serve the main goal -- to disrupt the enemy
offensive which is being prepared, or which has begun,
and to ensure the transition from the defensive to the
offensive. In order to achieve this goal in modern defense,
the following basic missions are assigned to fire: the
destruction of nuclear weapons and other means of mass
destruction as they,!are disclosed; the destruction or
neutralization of enemy strike groupings in concentration
areas, on lines of deployment, when moving out to the main
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line of defense, and in departure areas for the offensive;
the destruction of the enemy, who has passed over to the
offensive, on the main line of resistance, and when he 50X1-HUM
breaks through into the depth of the defense; the destruc-
tion of the air enemy who is at the approaches to the troops
on defense, or overhead; and the destruction of airborne
landings at the time they land and when they are dropped
(debarked).
Besides these basic missions, fire is also assigned
a series of individual missions that result from the con-
cept for the defensive operations. If a support zone
exists, fire must support the operations of the forward
combat security detachments and cover engineer obstacles,
unoccupied gaps in the combat formations of troops, open
flanks and flank junctions (styk), breaches in the defense
formed as a result of enemy nuclear strikes, etc.
To the question about whether the present understanding
of "system of fire" satisfies modern requirements, it is
necessary to reply in the negative. Since it is an attri-
bute of positional defense on a continuous front, "system
of fire" can no longer be the basis of organized fire in
defense in which positional and maneuvering forms are
combined, especially at the operational level. The or-
ganization of defense on a front which is not continuous,
the conduct of a defensive battle and engagement on axes,
broad maneuver by fire, forces and weapons, the irregular
development of a battle along the front and depth and its
rapidity of movement, and the diversity in types of troop
armament, require both centralized and decentralized use
of fire and broad initiative in all instances in the use of
fire for the immediate destruction of disclosed targets.
In order to carry out both centralized and decentralized
use of fire and its control, it is first of all necessary
to have clear-cut planning of fire at all levels from the
division to the front and, secondly, to organize a system
of fire for the types of weapons in subunits and units.
In the interests of defining the concept of "system
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of fire" and of working out a single opinion concerning
this question, we propose to establish that: a) in defense,
a system of fire is created by types of weapons - rifle,
artillery, mortar, antitank; b) a system of fire of types
of weapons as a composite part of the large unit fire
plan is created only in subunits and units; c) a system
of fire of types of weapons -- this is mainly the creation
of a grouping of the fire weapons of the subunits and units
and their disposition on the terrain in accordance with their
combat characteristics for the continuous and effective des-
truction of the enemy during the entire battle.
In this way, the concept of "system of fire" in modern
conditions will include only the organized fire of the types
of weapons of subunits and units; therefore, we will have
to speak, not of a system of fire in the defense as a whole,
but of specific systems of fire of definite types of weapons
and of their coordination on the scale of the subunits and
units.
In modern defense, the planning of fire is the most im-
portant aspect of the decision for a battle and operation.
Its meaning consists of making the most effective use of
fire means and ammunition to deliver the greatest destruction
on the advancing enemy at a time and place which are most
advantageous for the defender.
When planning fire, it is necessary to proceed from
the fact that in modern defense troops basically carry out
three types of fire activities.
The first of these -- the immediate destruction of
disclosed targets and objectives. This fire activity i
s
carried out during the periods between massed fire stri
kes,
on the initiative of both the enlisted man armed with a
submachine gun or machine gun and of commanding officer
s of
all grades who have at their disposal weapons, mortars,
missile and artillery subunits, units and large units,
and
aviation. The immediate destruction of disclosed means
of
mass destruction, especially nuclear/missile means, has
the
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greatest significance. To accomplish this, use must be made
of any fire means capable of fulfilling this mission. 50X1-HUM
The second type of fire activity -- fire from all types
of weapons brought up to the highest intensity, with the goal
of disrupting the enemy tank and infantry attack. This fire
activity is carried out on the initiative of the commanding
officers of those troops against which the enemy has gone
over to the attack.
Finally, the third type of fire activity consists of
delivering massed fire strikes with the goal of disrupting
the enemy offensive that is being prepared or that has started.
These fire strikes are the most important and constituent
part of the plan of a defensive operation and battle of
large units. The basis of the fire strike is the use of nu-
clear weapons. If a fire strike is delivered in conditions
of contact with the enemy, a necessary requirement will be
the implementation of its results by an immediate strike
by troops in order to complete the rout of the enemy grouping
on a given axis.
The fire plan in an army defensive operation, or in a
defensive battle of large units, may include:
-- fire missions to be carried out in an army operation
or in a division battle, and such missions may be: the
immediate destruction of disclosed means of mass destruction
and other important targets and objectives of the enemy; the
disruption of an enemy offensive that is being prepared by
destroying groupings of his troops before they go over to
the offensive; the disruption or weakening of the enemy's
fire preparation and the destruction of his strike groupings
on lines of deployment; the destruction of nuclear means
and enemy groupings that have broken into the defense; the
delivery of counterstrikes (carrying out counterattacks) by
troops of the army (division);
the axes of concentrated fire efforts of the army
(division) and selected areas of fire destruction on these
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axes; as has already been emphasized, areas of fire destruc-
tion are selected both in enemy dispositions over the entire
range of the army (division) fire means and in one's own
disposition over the entire depth of the defensive formation;
the size of each area of fire destruction must be proportionate
to the basic capabilities of the army (division) in order to
ensure the reliable destruction of the selected enemy group-
ing;
-- the fire means brought in to fulfil fire missions 0X1-HUM
on selected axes and in each area of fire destruction, and
also the norms of ammunition expenditure for each type of
weapon;
-- the sequence of employment of fire weapons and the
basis for coordination among them when fulfilling each fire
,mission.
The fire plan is prepared by the headquarters of the
army (division) on the basis of the decision for defense.
First, the fire plan is brought to the attention of subor-
dinates by the commanding officer personally when assigning.
combat missions for defense and when organizing coordination.
The headquarters usually draws up the fire plan graphically
on a map with a legend, as a supplement to the plan of the
army operation or to the divisional commanding officer's com-
bat order for defense. Commanding officers and staffs of
the subunits, units and large units to be used in the
direct fulfilment of fire missions detail the fire plan to the
necessary degree and clarify specific missions for their
fire means, basing it on the characteristic of the fire
means and on the conditions of the situation.
The fire plan, like the decision for defense as a
whole, is constantly elaborated upon, and, in the event of
an abrupt change in the situation, it is changed.
The organization of fire in defense examined above
permits the most effective use of all the various fire
means, taking into consideration their combat characteristics
~IS~rr
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and the combining and maneuvering of the fire of various50X1-HUM
types of weapons in the interests of a decisive concein-
tration of efforts on important axes and in selected
areas.
Without claiming completeness and absolute correctness
in stating the questions touched upon in this article, our
main goal was to call them to the attention of generals
and officers in order to carry out, through common efforts,
the Minister of Defense's task for finding new and the
most expedient methods for organizing and conducting mo-
dern defense.
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