IRAN, LIBYA, SYRIA: PROSPECTS FOR RADICAL COOPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000500630003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: SNIE

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Iran, Libya, Syria:
Prospects for
Radical Cooperation
Special National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE 3012765
April 1985
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SNIE 30/2-85
IRAN, LIBYA, SYRIA:
PROSPECTS FOR
RADICAL COOPERATION
Information available as of 26 March 1985
was used in the preparation of this Estimate,
which was approved by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board on that date.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 9
Introduction ....................................................................................... 9
Areas of Cooperation ........................................................................ 10
Mutual Assistance: Military Aid to Iran ...................................... 10
Economic Aid to Syria ................................................................. 10
Military Personnel Exchanges ...................................................... 11
Cooperation on Terrorism ............................................................ 11
Independence Versus Cooperation on Global Activities ................ 13
The USSR: Benefits and Drawbacks of Association
With the Radicals ......................................................................... 14
Prospects ............................................................................................ 15
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SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate addresses the question of cooperation among Iran,
Libya, and Syria, the extent to which they are pursuing joint policies-
especially of an anti-US nature-and the impact of this cooperation. It
also discusses the many differences among them that will tend to set
limits on coordinated action-including the use of terrorism-over the
next two years. The Estimate also examines the Soviet Union's relation-
ship with these states and the degree to which the USSR benefits from
their activities.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Three radical states in the Middle East-Iran, Libya, and Syria-
under their current leadership have long been pursuing policies broadly
inimical to US interests in the region and beyond. Although the
independent activities of each state will continue to pose by far the
greatest threat and challenge to US interests, their recognition of certain
common purposes and a willingness to consult regularly and to pursue
numerous goals in tandem increase the overall threat to the United
States.'
During the past two years, these countries have in fact increased
efforts to move closer together on matters of common interest, that
include:
- Opposition to US policies in the region.
- A desire to weaken Middle Eastern states and groups that are
friendly to the United States.
- Hostility to Israel's existence.
- A willingness to extend assistance to opponents of the United
States in areas far removed from the regional interests of these
states.2
- A desire to encourage the emergence of revolutionary, anti-
Western regimes elsewhere in the world.,
During the period of this Estimate, we believe these three states
will continue to find opportunities for ad hoc cooperation-particularly
if the United States takes actions which they perceive to be threatening
to their interests.
Cooperation among the states generally takes the form of bilateral
rather than trilateral activities, involving any two of the three states at
one time. Formal cooperation is less important to them than joint
perception of common enemies and the need to combat them.
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, agrees that all three
countries pose serious threats to US interests, but believes that the Estimate overstates the degree of
trilateral cooperation among them and thus the degree to which they can be treated as an entity for ana-
lytical purposes. The Estimate itself acknowledges that the radicalism of each is different, their
congruence of interests limited, frictions common, and cooperation among them sporadic and essentially
bilateral rather than trilateral. Other similar factors could be cited. But the net impact of the paper, what-
ever its nuances, leaves the reader with the conclusion that there is a tripartite entente, which in fact does
not exist and whose conjuration can lead to serious errors in policymaking.
' The Director, INR, does not believe there is evidence of active Syrian support for this goal.
The Director, INR, does not believe there is evidence of active Syrian support for this goal.
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These three states differ sharply in their ideologies, degree of
radicalism, and style of leadership, and all pursue their own parochial
interests, which are sometimes in conflict. Although only Iran fully
espouses fundamentalism, we believe the perceived communality of
interests among them-even though limited-presents potentially seri-
ous challenges to US interests. They are more dangerous collectively
than individually. Cooperation serves to:
- Strengthen their sense of solidarity and reduce feelings of
isolation.
- Demonstrate the success of Iranian and Syrian strategies in
Lebanon.
- Embolden them to undertake greater risks in attacking US
interests.
- Consolidate the regimes by enhancing their conventional mili-
tary or economic capabilities.
- Encourage an atmosphere conducive to the use of terrorism.
The present radical challenge to the United States in the Middle
East is in many ways more virulent and less manageable than any other
challenge to the West in the region during the last several decades
because:
- The present radical cooperation enjoys the use of greater
wealth-Libya and Iran-than Arab nationalist states had
available to them.
- The use of terrorism by these states today is enhanced by
modern technology, modern communications, growing inter-
national contacts, and more sophisticated weaponry.
These states consult on a general basis, often publicly articulate
common goals, and agree on certain policy actions to be implemented
singly or jointly. Such actions involve:
- Arms assistance to Iran.
- Financial support to Syria.
- Provision of Syrian fighter pilots and technicians to Libya.
- A determination to employ terrorism and force against Israel.
- Attempts to subvert Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and the Arafat wing of
the PLO.
- Attempts to intimidate or change Arab regimes in the Persian
Gulf region.
- Selective coordinated support to enemies of regimes allied with
the United States.
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Despite close ties to Syria and Libya, the Soviets generally cannot
control the foreign policy of either, and Moscow is shut out of any close
relationship with the Khomeini regime in Iran. The Soviet Union,
nonetheless, derives significant benefits from the anti-US activities of
these states:
- US personnel and installations are under attack in the Middle
East, rendering an effective US presence nearly untenable in
Lebanon and seriously complicating the conduct of US policy
elsewhere in the region.
- The overall thrust of radical activity is anti-US and anti-Israeli;
only in Iran is it also anti-Soviet. (At the same time, there have
been no Iranian-sponsored attacks against Soviet targets other
than Mujahedin activity in Afghanistan.)
- Moderate leaders in the Middle East are repeatedly threatened
and potentially intimidated from closer cooperation with the
United States or from granting strategic access rights.
- US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace efforts are opposed by the
radicals.
- The activities of the three radical states create situations of
instability that can serve Soviet interests by providing oppor-
tunities to weaken the West and to increase Soviet influence.
At the same time, there undoubtedly exist drawbacks for the
Soviets in maintaining too close ties to the radical states:
- Radical and adventuristic behavior can affect Moscow's rela-
tions with states neighboring the radicals and possibly push these
states toward the United States for security.
- Miscalculated adventurism could bring about direct confronta-
tion with the United States or could trigger US retaliation
against Soviet clients.
- In the case of Iran, its actions can be, and have been, directed
against Soviet interests as well-such as the crackdown on the
Tudeh Party or support for the Mujahedin in Afghanistan-
although the damage to Soviet interests is not nearly as great as
that to Western interests.
- The radical states can sometimes hinder Soviet efforts to
develop or maintain ties to other radical activist groups with
which the Soviets would like to maintain independent influ-
ence-Syria's efforts to dominate the Arafat-led PLO is a
particular case in point.
- The radicals sometimes seek to undermine other states that are also
Soviet clients-such as Syria against Iraq, or Libya against Algeria.
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- The USSR has little desire to see Tehran successfully export
Islamic fundamentalism to its neighbors,4 and is strongly op-
posed to Tehran's pursuit of the Gulf war and support for the
Afghan insurgents.
Although Moscow probably is skeptical that these three states will
be able to cooperate effectively, it will continue to encourage Libya and
Syria to improve ties to other pro-Soviet states and groups in the region
and around the world, and will continue to seek over the long run a less-
ening of tensions with Iran-with the long-term objective of a broad
accommodation.
Moscow will continue to provide weapons, guerrilla training (in
conjunction with East European states), and intelligence and security
training to Libya and Syria despite their terrorist activities. Even where
Soviet interests are not served by the radical activities of these states, the
Soviet Union will not jeopardize its broader equities in order to try to
turn off or redirect certain policies they consider ill conceived-unless
serious Soviet interests are at stake. For example, Moscow has tried to
prevent the transfer of sophisticated Soviet-origin military equipment
by Libya and Syria to Iran. We believe that Moscow has little or no in-
fluence on the conduct of terrorism by either Tripoli or Damascus.
Of the three states, Iran is the most implacable foe of the United
States and will remain the most effective and dangerous state sponsor of
terrorism over the next few years. Were Iran to forge closer links with
Syria and Libya, the terrorist threat to US interests would escalate. We
do not believe, however, that long-term cooperation will develop,
although the states may forge temporary, tactical ties. There is little the
United States can do to prevent short-term cooperation by the radicals,
especially in the realm of terrorist attacks against US targets.
Radical Middle Eastern and leftwing European terrorist groups
share strong anti-US sentiments, and we do not rule out the possibility
that they might undertake joint operations, despite major differences in
ideologies and goals. There is no evidence, however, to link Iran, Libya,
and Syria jointly to terrorist groups outside the Middle East, although
they may use common sources of supply for arms, other materiel, and
logistic support. Each of these states has the capability to undertake
operations outside the Middle East on its own.
' The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the Soviet
Union favors the export of Iran's Islamic revolution to the Gulf states, although the Soviets do not view
Iraq's defeat as the most appropriate vehicle for this because that could easily draw the United States into
the military defense of the Gulf states and greater involvement in the region. The role of Islamic
radicalism in the region is "objectively progressive," in the view of Moscow, because it decreases
"imperialist"-that is, US-influence in the region. The damage to Western interests resulting from the
undermining of the conservative regimes and the exclusion of the United States would be of major
benefit to Moscow and outweigh any accompanying disadvantages.
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The radical states' efforts to cooperate will persist, and may
increase in response to perceived threats to their interests. The strength-
ening of a moderate Arab alignment responsive to a broader US role in
the region and supportive of a Jordanian-PLO peace initiative, or an in-
crease in assistance to Iraq in the Gulf war, would prompt continuing
efforts by the radical states to form a "counteraxis."
In the case of Iran and Libya, the strongly anti-US thrust of their
policies is likely to continue regardless of US actions. Syria will pursue a
more guarded policy-especially vis-a-vis the United States-avoiding
direct confrontation or statements of general hostility to the United
States. We nonetheless believe that Syria will continue to perceive the
United States as largely working against Syrian interests by supporting
Israel and seeking bilateral accommodations between moderate Arab
states and Israel.
Significant differences among Iran, Libya, and Syria will continue
to hinder a much broader range of cooperation. Syria and Iran-
representing probably the greatest polarity among the three-are most
likely to encounter severe strains in their relationship, especially in
Lebanon. The durability of these relationships will depend on the
relative advantages of cooperation versus conflict over a given issue.
Long-term divergence in national interest will ultimately serve to
dissolve working partnerships. Conversely, continuing challenges to the
radicals, from either the United States or moderate Arab states, will
tend to perpetuate radical coalescence of interest; hostility to the United
States, Israel, and the moderates will be the most abiding common
denominator.
Over the period of this Estimate, contacts and cooperation among
these states-predominantly on a bilateral basis-are likely to persist
and might increase under some circumstances. Syrian-Libyan contacts
will continue, and Libyan leader Qadhafi is likely to cooperate with
Syrian President Assad in pressuring Jordan and the moderate Palestin-
ians by providing arms, training, and money to PLO Chairman Arafat's
opponents. Qadhafi's ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard might facilitate
Libyan cooperation with Iran on anti-US operations if they were
designed to mask Libyan involvement. Both Assad and Qadhafi will
continue to support Iranian efforts to weaken Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn, although neither would want to see a Shia regime in Baghdad.
The possibility of sudden leadership changes is an important
variable in estimating the longer term prospects for increased radical
cooperation. Each of these states-especially Libya-follows policies
heavily dependent on the outlook of its leader, and a change in the top
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leadership would most likely work against increased multilateral
coordination:
- A new regime in Libya would be unlikely to reverse Tripoli's
hardline policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict and would maintain
ties to Damascus, but the new leader would be less likely to
pursue the broad geographic scope of Qadhafi's anti-US activi-
ties or to promote terrorist operations.
- Assad's successor almost certainly will lack the strong political
position, tactical brilliance, and effectiveness that have made
possible Assad's controversial alignment with Iran and adept
handling of Libya, and he might shrink from extensive commit-
ments to such unreliable allies.
- Khomeini's heir presumptive-Ayatollah Montazeri-is known
in Tehran and Tripoli as a friend of the Libyans, but recently he
also has become clearly identified with conservatives on foreign
and domestic issues who want improved ties to the West. In any
case, the wellsprings of current radical policies probably run
deeper in Iran than in Libya or Syria.
Unless there are changes in the leadership of the radical states, the
United States will have to consider cooperation in the use of terror by
the radicals in any calculations concerning such regional events as
movement in the peace process. The mere acquiescence of one of the
parties can greatly facilitate the terrorist activities of another radical
state-Syrian acquiescence in Iranian activities in Lebanon is a prime
example. Even if the radicals decide to resort to terror to further mutual
goals, however, individual constraints will often limit actual coopera-
tion.
The casual and disparate nature of the grouping will give the
United States limited opportunity to hinder further radical cooperation.
Syria, the "weak link" in this radical grouping, will use its relations with
the United States to its own advantages-for example, by playing the
"US card" to keep its Soviet ally honest. Damascus, moreover, remains
relatively more open to US diplomacy, if only to burnish Syria's regional
prestige. US interests may occasionally coincide tactically with Syria's,
especially in reaching limited tactical accommodations with Israel or
restoring a balance in Lebanese confessional relationships. Such willing-
ness to do business seldom occurs between the United States and Libya
or Iran. In addition, Assad's drive to be either the paramount warmaker
or peacemaker of the region requires that Syria's sphere of influence re-
main unchallenged by Iran and Libya. In the final analysis, however,
Syria's policies on the Arab-Israeli conflict are likely to run broadly
counter to US interests in the region for the foreseeable future.
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DISCUSSION
Introduction
1. Three radical states in the Middle East-Iran,
Libya, and Syria-under their current leadership have
long been pursuing policies broadly inimical to US
interests in the region and beyond. Although the
independent activities of each state will continue to
pose by far the greatest threat and challenge to US
interests, their recognition of certain common pur-
poses and a willingness to consult regularly and to
pursue numerous goals in tandem increase the overall
threat to the United States.-'
2. During the past two years, these countries have
in fact increased efforts to move closer together on
matters of common interest which include:
- Opposition to US policies in the region.
- A desire to weaken Middle Eastern states and
groups that are friendly to the United States.
- Hostility to Israel's existence.
- A willingness to extend assistance to opponents of
the United States in areas far removed from the
regional interests of these states.6
= A desire to encourage the emergence of revolu-
tionary, anti-Western regimes elsewhere in the
world.7
3. A round of high-level visits in summer and fall
1984 by the leaders of Libya, Syria, and Iran-
including President Assad's trip to Libya in August
" The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State, agrees that all three countries pose serious threats to
US interests, but believes that the Estimate overstates the degree
of trilateral cooperation among them and thus the degree to which
they can be treated as an entity for analytical purposes. The
Estimate itself acknowledges that the radicalism of each is differ-
ent, their congruence of interests limited, frictions common, and
cooperation among them sporadic and essentially bilateral rather
than trilateral. Other similar factors could be cited. But the net
impact of the paper, whatever its nuances, leaves the reader with
the conclusion that there is a tripartite entente, which in fact does
not exist and whose conjuration can lead to serious errors in
policymaking.
The Director, INR, does not believe there is evidence of active
Syrian support for this goal.
' The Director, INR, does not believe there is evidence of active
Syrian support for this goal.
and President Khamenei's first official travel abroad to
Damascus and Tripoli in November-reflects an in-
tensification of contacts among these radical states.
Syrian and Libyan assistance to Iran in the Gulf war,
together with Iranian and Libyan involvement in
Lebanon, where Syria plays a major role, have
prompted a steady expansion of ties. Qadhafi's second
in command, Major Jallud, Syrian Vice President
Khaddam, and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister
Sheikh-ol-Eslam have made frequent trips among the
capitals to deal with a range of concerns, including
intra-Arab disputes over the Palestinians and the peace
process.
4. Since early 1983, Libya, Syria, and Iran have
attempted to supplement ad hoc bilateral cooperation
by reviving a multilateral "front" of radical states.
Meetings of senior officials of the three states have
taken place in Damascus .(January 1983), at the United
Nations in New York (October 1984), in Tripoli prior
to the Islamic Conference ministerial meeting in Sanaa
(November-December 1984), and in Tehran (January
1985). Currently, there are plans for the group to meet
again this summer.
5. The new radical grouping also seeks to rebuild
the moribund Steadfastness Front with Iranian partici-
pation. The Front-comprising Syria, Iraq, Libya,
Algeria, the PLO, and South Yemen-coalesced in
December 1977 in response to President Sadat's trip to
Jerusalem. By late 1982, the Front had disintegrated as
a consequence of renewed Syrian-Iraqi hostility, dis-
array in the PLO after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
the evolution of a more pragmatic regime in Algeria
under President Bendjedid, and the development of a
new Arab consensus on a framework for peace negoti-
ations represented by the Fez Declaration of 1982.
Multilateral consultations among the three radical
states thus far have yielded few concrete gains over
the cooperation achieved in bilateral contacts:
- Syria, Libya, and Iran presented a common front
at the Islamic Conference meeting in Sanaa and
prevented PLO Chairman Arafat from making a
speech, but radical-drafted language for the con-
ference resolutions failed to pass.
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- Efforts to draw Algeria and South Yemen into
the Front so far have failed, although South
Yemeni President Hasani's recent visits to
Damascus, Tripoli, and Algiers suggest a renewed
South Yemeni interest in cooperation.
- Each of the three states has made rhetorical
commitments to sweeping goals, but the` agenda
for specific actions resulting from their discus-
sions has been limited for the most part to
routine diplomatic tasks and agreement to hold
further meetings.
6. Cooperation among the three radical states is
more often bilateral than trilateral. Often the coopera-
tion extends no further than an agreed-upon agenda of
priorities on which each state then acts independently.
7. These three states differ sharply in their ideolo-
gies, degree of radicalism, and style of leadership, and
all pursue their own parochial interests, which are
sometimes in conflict. Although only Iran fully es-
pouses fundamentalism, we believe the perceived
communality of interests among them-even though
limited-presents potentially serious challenges to US
interests. They are more dangerous collectively than
individually. Cooperation serves to:
- Strengthen their sense of solidarity and reduce
feelings of isolation.
- Demonstrate the success of Iranian and Syrian
strategies in Lebanon.
- Embolden them to undertake greater risks in
attacking US interests.
- Consolidate the regimes by enhancing their con-
ventional military or economic capabilities.
- Encourage an atmosphere conducive to the use
of terrorism.
8. The present radical challenge to the United
States in the Middle East is in many ways more
virulent and less manageable than any other challenge
to the West in the region during the last several
decades because:
- The present radical cooperation enjoys the use of
greater wealth than Arab nationalist states were
able to employ in earlier decades.
- The use of terrorism by these states today is
enhanced by modern technology, modern com-
munications, growing international contacts, and
more sophisticated weaponry.
9. Despite the common radically oriented goals of
the three states, fundamental differences in the nature
of the regimes continue to impede closer cooperation.
Ideological variations among Qadhafi's idiosyncratic
interpretation of Islam contained in his "Green Book,"
Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalist Shia Islam, and
Assad's secular Arab nationalism and Ba'thist socialism
continue to cause frictions among the three states.
Divergent leadership styles are an additional compli-
cating factor, leading to some rivalry and lack of
personal rapport, and setting limits on cooperation.
Conflicting longer range national interests-notably
divergent ultimate goals in Lebanon and the Gulf-
also impede broader coordination of strategy by the
three states.
Areas of Cooperation
Mutual Assistance: Military Aid to Iran
10. Both Syria and Libya will probably continue to
support Iran as a mutual ally, as they have done in the
past, although the assistance is probably not jointly
coordinated. Libyan and Syrian military aid to Iran,
although limited, has been of considerable importance
to Iran, which is otherwise beleaguered by a broad
arms embargo. Both countries have assisted Iran by
facilitating the transshipment or transloading of ma-
teriel destined for Tehran, mainly from East European
Communist suppliers.
11. Libyan military sales to Iran began with the
Iran-Iraq war (in 1980) and are valued at $406 million
since 1979.
The bulk of Libyan materiel going to Iran
has een munitions; however, in 1981 Iran acquired
tanks anc=Iartillery pieces. The
ovie nion apparently vetoed Libyan transfer of
more sophisticated equipment-such as MIG-23s and
surface-to-surface missiles-but Tripoli probably sent
at least[::]SS-1 (Scud) surface-to-surface missiles to
Iran last November.
12. Syrian military assistance to Iran has been
valued at $158 million since 1979, It is
noteworthy that Syrian arms sales worldwide-prior to
the Iran-Iraq war-were valued at less than $10
million. The last known Syrian-Iranian agreement
occurred in early 1984, when Damascus agreed to ship
an unspecified number of 122-mm rockets and
explosives.
Economic Aid to Syria
13. Syria received about $200 million from Libya in
1984. There was no known Libyan economic assis-
tance to Syria in 1982 or 1983.
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14. Syria has not received any direct financial
assistance from Iran in recent years; however, Iran
provides Syria with all its imported oil and at conces-
sionary prices. Syria owes Iran $990 million for oil
deliveries and Iran has allowed Syria to delay payment
repeatedly. Syria will probably never repay its grow-
ing debt in full, but Tehran benefits greatly from
Syria's continued closure of Iraq's oil export pipeline
through Syria. Syria depends upon Iranian oil deliver-
ies for its refineries and this represents a significant
factor in their relations. The value of Syria's close
relationship with Iran would be partially diminished if
it could get oil from other sources. Syria could not,
however, turn to Iraq instead of Iran as a source of oil
without a major reorientation of its regional strategy.
Military Personnel Exchanges
15. Libya feared a confrontation with Egypt early
in 1979, and requested qualified Syrian personnel to
u ment its Air Force.
16. The deployment of the Syrian squadron L_
=:::::~as also proved important in defense of Libya s
claimed airspace over the Gulf of Sidra.F-
We
believe that Damascus would allow Qadhafi to use
these pilots to defend Libyan-claimed territorial rights
and airspace in an encounter with US forces.
17. Libya, one of Syria's staunchest supporters in
Lebanon, has been an important source of funds and
weapons for Syrian-sponsored Lebanese factions and
armed Palestinian groups, particularly the more radi-
cal, nonconciliatory factions. Although in 1982 Libya
deployed about 800 combat troops to Lebanon, its
military contingent did not play a significant role
there.
Cooperation on Terrorism
18. All three states employ terrorism as an instru-
ment of policy and provide support and training to
other terrorist groups-who sometimes act at the
behest of the sponsoring state. Iran, Syria, and Libya
each use terrorism for different reasons and, while
they share certain foreign policy goals, their primary
terrorist targets also are different:
- For Iran, terrorism is a way to strike back at the
enemies-the United States, France, the Gulf
states, including Iraq, and Iranian exiles-that it
believes prevent the export of its revolution.
Tehran justifies such activity on the basis of its
fundamentalist Shia ideology.
- Libya uses terrorism opportunistically and as a
response to. its perceived weakness relative to its
adversaries. Tripoli's attacks are directed primar-
ily against anti-Qadhafi Libyan exiles and select-
ed moderate Arab leaders.
- Syria uses terrorism as a foreign policy tool,
primarily against Israel, Jordan, and the mainline
Fatah Palestinians, and against the Gulf states to
encourage compliance with its foreign policy
goals. It has directly profited from Iranian anti-
US terrorism in Lebanon, however, and probably
privately condones the bulk of it.
19. Of the three states, Iran is the most implacable
foe of the United States and will remain the most
effective and dangerous state sponsor of terrorism over
the next few years. Were Iran to forge closer links with
Syria and Libya, the terrorist threat to US interests
would escalate. We do not believe, however, that long-
term cooperation will develop, although the states may
forge temporary, tactical ties. There is little the United
States can do to prevent short-term cooperation by the
radicals, especially in the realm of terrorist attacks
against US targets.
20. Tactical cooperation among these three major
state sponsors of terrorism may increase in coming
months, but the divergence of goals and the longstand-
ing rivalries among them almost certainly will pre-
clude the formation of a "terrorist international" to
plan or coordinate joint activity during the period of
this Estimate. Libya, Syria, and Iran will use terrorism
to advance the anti-Western and anti-Israeli goals they
share, but their efforts will remain largely unilateral in
execution. Moreover, even in Lebanon-the one place
where they would be most likely to cooperate-each
has a unique perception of how best to expand its own
influence. Beyond Lebanon, their interests become
more diffuse, making actual terrorist cooperation even
more unlikely:
- Despite an increase in terrorism in Lebanon
during 1984, there was little in the Gulf states-
contrary to Community expectations-during
the period following the bombing of the US
Embassy in Kuwait in December 1983. We do
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not understand what policy reasons have contrib-
uted to this relative lack of activity.
21. Such cooperation as has occurred has been
largely bilateral in nature and generally has involved
surrogates working at common purposes. Iran and
Syria, for example, have assisted the activities of the
fundamentalist Lebanese Shias, while Syria and Libya
have supported a variety of radical Palestinian groups.
While the three states occasionally have discussed
mutual cooperation on terrorism, there is no evidence
of any trilateral arrangement involving coordination of
attacks or operational planning.
22. Most of the terrorist cooperation that has oc-
curred in Lebanon has been between Iran and Syria.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard contingent-sta-
tioned in Lebanon since 1982-operates from the
Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley. The Guard has re-
cruited and trained Lebanese Shias for the Iranian-
backed Hizballah movement, elements of which we
believe are responsible for the major terrorist attacks
in Lebanon that have occurred since 1983. Although
Hizballah probably now is capable of conducting
attacks without Syrian or Iranian cognizance, both
they and the Revolutionary Guard would be hard
pressed to maintain their activities in Lebanon without
tacit Syrian support.
23. While we do not believe Damascus has directly
participated with the radical Shias in anti-US terrorist
acts, Syria has provided the logistic and material
support and acquiescence that makes their operations
possible. Arms and supplies must pass Syrian check-
points, and Syrian forces have provided security and
travel documents for Iranian-associated personnel in
Lebanon. Syria may have provided some logistic sup-
port to Tehran in the bombing of the US Embassy in
Kuwait in December 1983.
24. As long as Iran's activities serve Syrian purposes
in Lebanon, Damascus is likely to tolerate terrorist
action directed against Israeli, US, and Western inter-
ests. Damascus is aware, however, that Iranian-spon-
sored terrorist activity undermines its interest in estab-
lishing long-term stabilized Syrian control over
Lebanon. Successful Iranian efforts to recruit radical
adherents among the Lebanese population, moreover,
give Iran an independent base of support which Syria
will find increasingly difficult to control. The growing
strength of the extremists may ultimately compel Syria
to crack down on Iranian-sponsored terrorists, but
Damascus runs the risk of becoming a target in the
process, and it will have to weigh carefully the overall
gains and losses in its relationship with Tehran.
25. The bilateral cooperation between Syria and
Libya on terrorism is focused on the mutual support of
surrogates. Libya has long been a supporter of the
more radical Palestinian groups, and has been actively
supplying arms, funds, and training to the anti-Arafat
rebels. While such groups as Abu Nidal and the PFLP-
GC act with Syrian backing, Libya's influence is more
limited. Indeed, Qadhafi has often been frustrated
because Syria exercises control over the arms Libya
provides for the Palestinian groups it supports. We
have no evidence to indicate the Syrians and Libyans
have discussed operational details of terrorist opera-
tions against Western targets, although they almost
certainly have talked about anti-Arafat operations.
26. The Syrians generally deem Qadhafi too un--
trustworthy and mercurial for them to be interested in
genuine cooperation with him. Qadhafi uses extremist
rhetoric to urge attacks against Israel-which suits
Damascus-but Libya does not have the leverage to
direct Palestinian activities, nor would Damascus find
such meddling useful. Qadhafi has demonstrated in-
terests well beyond Middle Eastern boundaries, sup-
porting many insurgents and radical governments,
whereas the more practical Assad concentrates on the
Middle East, where he can exert the most influence.
27. Libya and Iran remain distrustful of each other
for a variety of reasons. Qadhafi's and Khomeini's
philosophies are incompatible, and Qadhafi regards
Khomeini's ability to inspire militant followers with
jealousy. Iran, for its part, keeps alive a legacy of
bitterness toward Libya because it blames Qadhafi for
the disappearance of Lebanon's revered Shia leader,
Musa Sadr, in Tripoli in 1978. In fact, a terrorist group
apparently composed of Lebanese Shias seeking re-
venge for Musa Sadr's death occasionally attacks Liby-
an targets.
28. Libya has little to offer Iran and Syria, both of
which have demonstrated a more sophisticated ability
to undertake and successfully carry out lethal terrorist
attacks. Qadhafi would find it difficult to win support
among the radical Shias in Lebanon, given their
religious fervor and their disdain for his brand of
revolutionary socialism. Qadhafi probably is no more
eager than Assad to see Lebanon become a fundamen-
talist Shia state, and his dreams of glory are such that
he perceives Khomeini-and sometimes Assad-as
rivals for influence in the region.
29. Radical Middle Eastern and leftwing European
terrorist groups share strong anti-US sentiments, and
we do not rule out the possibility that they might
undertake joint operations, despite major differences
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in ideologies and goals. Such an attack probably would
be a one-time tactical operation to strike at a major
objective shared by all, such as a US base or embassy.
There is no evidence to link Iran, Libya, and Syria
jointly to terrorist groups outside the Middle East,
although they may use common sources of supply for
arms, other materiel, and logistic support. Each of
these states has the capability, however, to undertake
operations outside the Middle East on its own.
30. Recently, Libya publicly indicated an interest
in joining hands with European terrorist groups. Qa-
dhafi has specifically threatened US and NATO instal-
lations in Italy, but we doubt Iran or Syria would be
willing to assist in such an undertaking.
toward this goal. Syria's interest in the Gulf Arabs is
mostly pecuniary, and Damascus has used terrorism
and assassination against the smaller Gulf states to
discourage them from opposing Syrian interests in the
region, supporting the moderate states' peace process,
or falling too far behind in their financial subventions
to Damascus:
- The December 1983 bombings of the US and
French Embassies in Kuwait, along with simulta-
neous bombings of Kuwaiti Government facili-
ties, by pro-Iranian terrorists may have been one
example of Syrian-Iranian cooperation to attack
moderate Gulf Arab and Western interests.r
Independence Versus Cooperation on Global
Activities
31. Libya and Iran have both strongly and publicly
articulated the need for oppressed states to strike
against US interests worldwide. Syria has been more
circumspect in such statements. Furthermore, there
are great differences in the degree, kind, and focus of
activity by Libya, Iran, and Syria around the world.
Apart from shared and articulated anti-US goals, there
is little conclusive evidence of specific coordination
among the three in their global activities. They oper-
ate independently, even in countries where their
activities are similar, probably reflecting some general
agreement on targets and opportunities rather than
intergovernmental planning.
32. Of the three, Libya is the most active, aggres-
sively trying to subvert its immediate neighbors and to
woo the West Europeans in order to divide them from
US policy toward Qadhafi, and supporting rebel or
dissident movements in pro-Western countries as far-
flung. as the Philippines, Pakistan, Zaire, and the
French protectorate of New Caledonia in the South
Pacific. Iran's efforts-from Africa to the Far East-
appear more focused on spreading its revolutionary
theology and encouraging Islamic revivals. Syria is
least involved in worldwide activities, and tends to its
more parochial interests in launching terrorist attacks
against Syrian dissidents, weak Gulf states, pro-Arafat
Palestinians, and Jordanian diplomats.
33. In the Persian Gulf, Iran, Libya, and Syria all
have contempt for, and seek to intimidate, the Gulf
Arab states. Iran seeks to export its revolution across
the Gulf and to replace the conservative, pro-Western
monarchies with revolutionary Islamic governments
under its sway. Tehran has used terrorism, covert
political action, propaganda, and educational efforts
34. Libya's Qadhafi opposes in principle moderate,
pro-Western Arab regimes such as those found on the
peninsula, but mixes his efforts to foment unrest in
them with periodic efforts to improve his image and
bilateral relations.
35. Western Europe. Of the three, Libya's Qadhafi
has the strongest interest in close ties with Western
Europe. He seeks to:
- Enchance his own world prestige and diminish
his isolation.
- Weaken US influence on the Libyan policies of
European countries.
- Maintain capabilities to move against Libyan
exiles there.
- Strengthen his military capabilities through arms
purchases and training.
- Threaten US and NATO installations in Europe.
While Iran and Syria probably support in principle the
goal of weakening the US political role in Europe, they
would. place action in this regard low on their priori-
ties. Iran has supported Lebanese Shia plans to attack
US installations in Europe, however.
36. In Africa, Libya and Iran have the greatest
interests:
- Qadhafi's goals are to establish Libyan political
leadership in Africa, eliminating French and US
influence there. Qadhafi has seized upon insta-
bility and existing conflicts throughout Africa to
exacerbate regional tensions. A myriad of Afri-
can oppositionists receive training at camps in-
side Libya along with financial and military
assistance. Libya's principal targets are Egypt,
Sudan, Tunisia, Somalia, and Chad.
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- Tehran is spending substantial sums of money in
Sub-Saharan Africa to win sympathizers among
Sunni Muslim fundamentalist groups, expatriate
Lebanese and Asian Shia groups, and in the
universities of Africa. Although Qadhafi's revolu-
tionary ambitions in Africa must compete with
Iran's, he sees Tehran's campaign as reinforcing
Libyan objectives, particularly as it undermines
Western influence in Africa.
- Iran has been the largest purchaser of North
Korean weapons since 1980, with deliveries
worth $1.2 billion.
- Libya has been North Korea's second-best cus-
tomer, with deliveries of military equipment
worth some $350 million since 1980. There are
several hundred North Korean civilians and
about 100 military technicians in Libya.
- The closeness of Libyan-North Korean ties is
- Syria has no significant role in Africa.
37. Libyan and Iranian goals in Central America
and the Caribbean are similar, although there is no
evidence that they formally cooperate to achieve
them. Syria is not involved there. Islam constitutes
little part of Iranian or Libyan motivation there, but
both countries believe their involvement:
- Is a way to strike back at the United States in its
own "backyard."
- Boosts their individual goals of demonstrating
Third World leadership abilities.
38. Both countries-separately-provide aid to
Nicaragua:
- Libya has provided political, military, and eco-
nomic support to the Sandinistas for the past 15
years, and currently helps prop up the regime.
This Libyan support indirectly enhances the
Sandinista's ability to subvert neighboring states
such as El Salvador. Qadhafi has been largely
prevented, however, from shipping major arms
to Nicaragua.
- Tehran sends small arms and ships oil to Mana-
gua, and in January 1985 Prime Minister Musavi-
Khamenei paid a highly publicized visit there
(and to Cuba) designed to demonstrate Iran's
support for the Sandinista regime.
39. Libya's involvement in the region is much more
extensive than Iran's. Qadhafi is providing limited
funding to leftist opposition political groups in coun-
tries such as Dominica, St. Lucia, Antigua, Panama,
Colombia, and Costa Rica, and has developed ties with
Suriname, Guyana, and Brazil in South America.
Libyan activities in the region support many Cuban
objectives, but ties between these two states have never
been close. Competing ideologies and competition for
influence will restrict the extent of cooperation be-
tween Qadhafi and Castro.
40. In Asia, Libya and Iran have surprisingly active
relations with North Korea:
- Libya signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooper-
ation in 1982 with P'yongyang.
difficult to gauge
bu
-cooperation exists on security and military
matters. P'yongyang may have also provided
limited support last year for at least one Libyan
terrorist plot in Europe.
- Syria's relations with North Korea are limited.
41. Libya provides training and military and finan-
cial support to the Moro Liberation Movement in the
Philippines, and Iran provides the Moros with finan-
cial aid, but the degree of Libyan-Iranian cooperation
cannot be determined. The Moros have an office in
Damascus as well-reportedly to satisfy a request by
Qadhafi. Elsewhere in Asia, each country independ-
ently supports various Islamic causes or groups.
The USSR: Benefits and Drawbacks of
Association With the Radicals
42. Despite close ties with Syria and Libya, the
Soviets cannot generally control the foreign policy of
either, and Moscow is shut out of any close relationship
with the Khomeini regime in Iran. The Soviet Union,
nevertheless, derives significant benefits from the anti-
US activities of these states:
- US personnel and installations are under attack
in the Middle East, rendering an effective US
presence nearly untenable in Lebanon and seri-
ously complicating the conduct of US policy
elsewhere in the region.
- The overall thrust of radical activity is anti-US
and anti-Israeli; only in Iran is it also anti-Soviet.
(At the same time, there have been no Iranian-
sponsored attacks against Soviet targets other
than Mujahedin activity in Afghanistan.)
- Moderate leaders in the Middle East are repeat-
edly threatened and potentially intimidated from
closer cooperation with the United States or from
granting strategic access rights.
- US-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace efforts are op-
posed by the radicals.
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- The activities of the radical states creates situa-
tions of instability that can serve Soviet interests
by providing opportunities to weaken the West
and to increase Soviet influence.
43. At the same time, there undoubtedly exist
drawbacks for the Soviets in maintaining too close ties
to the radical states:
- Radical and adventuristic behavior can affect
Moscow's relations with states neighboring the
radicals, and possibly push these states toward
the United States for security.
- Miscalculated adventurism could bring about
direct confrontation with the United States or
could trigger US retaliation against Soviet clients.
- In the case of Iran, its actions can be, and have
been, directed against Soviet interests as well-
such as the crackdown on the Tudeh Party or
support for Mujahedin in Afghanistan-although
the damage to Soviet interests is not nearly as
great as that to Western interests.
- The radical states can sometimes hinder Soviet
efforts to develop or maintain ties to other
radical activist groups with which the Soviets
would like to maintain independent influence-
Syria's efforts to dominate the Arafat-led PLO is
a particular case in point.
- The radicals sometimes seek to undermine other
states that are also Soviet clients-such as Syria
against Iraq, or Libya against Algeria.
- The USSR has little desire to see Tehran success-
fully export Islamic fundamentalism to its neigh-
bors 8 and is strongly opposed to Tehran's pursuit
of the Gulf war and support for the Afghan
insurgents.
44. Although Moscow probably is skeptical that
these three states will be able to cooperate effectively,
it will continue to encourage Libya and Syria to
improve ties to other pro-Soviet states and groups in
9 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of
the Army, believes that the Soviet Union favors the export of Iran's
Islamic revolution to the Gulf states, although the Soviets do not
view Iraq's defeat as the most appropriate vehicle for this because
that could easily draw the United States into the military defense
of the Gulf states and greater involvement in the region. The role
of Islamic radicalism in the region is "objectively progressive," in
the view of Moscow, because it decreases "imperialist"-that is,
US-influence in the region. The damage to Western interests
resulting from the undermining of the conservative regimes and
the exclusion of the United States would be of major benefit to
Moscow and outweigh any accompanying disadvantages.
the region and around the world, and will continue to'
seek over the long run a lessening of tensions with
Iran-with the long-term objective of a broad
accommodation.
45. Moscow will continue to provide weapons, guer-
rilla training (in conjunction with East European
states), and intelligence and security training to Libya
and Syria despite their terrorist activities. Even where
Soviet interests are not served by the radical activities
of these states, the Soviet Union will not jeopardize its
broader equities in order to try to turn off or redirect
certain policies they consider ill conceived-unless
serious Soviet interests are at stake. For example,
Moscow has tried to prevent the transfer of sophisticat-
ed Soviet-origin military equipment by Libya and
Syria to Iran. We believe that Moscow has little or no
influence on the conduct of terrorism by either Tripoli
or Damascus.
Prospects
46. The radical states' efforts to cooperate will
persist, and may increase in response to perceived
threats to their interests. The strengthening of a
moderate Arab alignment responsive to a broader US
role in the region and supportive of a Jordanian-PLO
peace initiative, or an increase in assistance to Iraq in
the Gulf war, would prompt continuing efforts by the
radical states to form a "counteraxis." Libya, Syria,
and Iran will seek bilateral cooperation and multilater-
al coordination to impede Egypt's reacceptance into
Arab ranks, intimidate Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the
Gulf states, and to foment dissension among the
Palestinians. Moreover, the increasingly anti-US focus
of Qadhafi's Policies and Khomeini's vision of a new
Islamic order throwing off "imperialism" and "Zion-
ism" will provide a basis for growing cooperation
among the radicals regardless of the fate of the
moderate Arab alignment or recent peace initiatives.
47. Over the period of this Estimate, contacts and
cooperation among these states-predominantly on a
bilateral basis-are likely to persist and might increase
under some circumstances. Syrian-Libyan contacts
will continue, and Qadhafi is likely to cooperate with
Assad in pressuring Jordan and the moderate Palestin-
ians by providing arms, training, and money to
Arafat's opponents. Qadhafi's ties to Iran's Revolution-
ary Guard might facilitate Libyan cooperation with
Iran on anti-US operations if they were designed to
mask Libyan involvement. Both Assad and Qadhafi
will continue to support Iranian efforts to weaken
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, although neither
would want to see a Shia regime in Baghdad.
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48. The possibility of sudden leadership changes is
an important variable in estimating the longer term
prospects for increased radical cooperation. Each of
these states-especially Libya-follows policies heavi-
ly dependent on the outlook of its leader, and a change
in the top leadership would most likely work against
increased multilateral coordination:
-A new regime in Libya would be unlikely to
reverse Tripoli's hardline policy on the Arab-
Israeli conflict and would maintain ties to
Damascus, but the new leader would be less
likely to pursue the broad geographic scope of
Qadhafi's anti-US activities or to promote terror-
ist operations.
- Assad's successor almost certainly will lack the
strong political position, tactical brillance, and
effectiveness that have made possible Assad's
controversial alignment with Iran and adept
handling of Libya, and he might shrink from
extensive commitments to such unreliable allies.
- Khomeini's heir presumptive-Ayatollah Monta-
zeri-is known in Tehran and Tripoli as a friend
of the Libyans, but recently he also has become
clearly identified with conservatives on foreign
and domestic issues who want improved ties to
the West. In any case, the wellsprings of current
radical policies probably run deeper in Iran than
in Libya or Syria.
49. Unless there are changes in the leadership of
radical states, the United States will have to consider
cooperation-in the use of terror by the radicals in any
calculations concerning such regional events as move-
ment in the peace process. The mere acquiescence of
one of the parties can greatly facilitate the terrorist
activities of another radical state-Syrian acquies-
cence in Iranian activities in Lebanon is a prime
example. Even if the radicals decide to resort to terror
to further mutual goals, however, individual con-
straints will often limit actual cooperation.
50. The casual and disparate nature of the grouping
will give the United States limited opportunity to
hinder further radical cooperation. Syria, the "weak
link" in this radical grouping, will use its relations with
the United States to its own advantages-for example,
by playing the "US card" to keep its Soviet ally honest.
Damascus, moreover, remains relatively more open to
US diplomacy, if only to burnish Syria's regional
prestige. US interests may occasionally coincide tacti-
cally with Syria's, especially in reaching limited tacti-
cal accommodations with Israel or restoring a balance
in Lebanese confessional relationships. Such willing-
ness to do business seldom occurs between the United
States and Libya or Iran. In addition, Assad's drive to
be either the paramount warmaker or peacemaker of
the region requires that Syria's sphere of influence
remain unchallenged by Iran and Libya. In the final
analysis, however, Syria's policies on the Arab-Israeli
conflict are likely to run broadly counter to US
interests in the region for the foreseeable future.
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