MILITARY THOUGHT: SOME QUESTIONS OF COMBAT WITH ENEMY NUCLEAR MEANS, BY COLONEL S. LYSHAK AND COLONEL V. PARKHOMENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029700360001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 3, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25. D. C.
IRONBARK
3 JUL 19U2
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Some Questions of
Combat with Enemy Nuclear Means", by Colonel
S. Lyshak and Colonel V. Parkhomenko
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the
SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought",
published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and,distributed down
to the level of division commander.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office.
Requests for-extra copies of this report or for utilization of
any part of this document in any other form should be addressed
to the originating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
CSDB-3/650,437
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Vw SEPRFT
IRONBARK
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The.Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Divison of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
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BFZ
IRONBARK
CSDB-
3/650, 437
COUNTRY
USSR
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Some Questions
of Combat with Enemy Nuclear Means", by
Colonel S. Lyshak and Colonel V. Parkhomenko
DATE OF INFO
December 1961
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT
Documentary
SOURCE
A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of an article
entitled "Some Questions of Combat with Enemy Nuclear Means",
by Colonel S. Lyshak and Colonel V. Parkhomenko. This article
appeared in Issue 6 (61) of 1961 of a special version of
the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified
SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly.
Issue 6 (61) was
sent to press on 7 December 1961.
Comment: Military Thought is published b
y
e USSH Ministry of Defense in three versions
cl
ifi
,
ass
ed
RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version
has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two
versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version
was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues
of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during
1961.
The article by Chief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov
which this article is concerned with was disseminated as
CSDB-3/650,214.
Copy No.
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SW SEC~ET
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CSDB-3/650,437
COMMENT ON A PREVIOUS ARTICLE
Some Questions of Combat with Enemy Nuclear Means
by
Colonel S. Lyshak
The article by Chief Marshal of Artillery S. Varentsov,
"The Problem of Combat with Enemy Nuclear Means and Its
Solution"* is devoted to one of the most urgent and, at
the same time, complex questions of a modern operation.
The author of the article effectively disclosed the ,.essence
of combat with enemy nuclear weapons ;and pointed out the
,manner in which it should be conducted` It is impossible
not to note that, on the whole, the article constitutes
a most conclusive treatment of this subject and presents it
in an incisive and profound manner.
We completely agree with the author's conclusion on
the need for a thorough review of views regarding the
organization of combat with enemy nuclear means and for the
development of "an orderly and all-embracing system, in
which will be included all the forces and means necessary
for reconnaissance and destruction, a well-organized rear
area and, lastly, precise control". The introduction of such
a system can be greatly facilitated by developing a special
manual or set of instructions~as proposed by the author of
the article. This set of instructions should clearly and
precisely define the functions of the appropriate commanders
and their staffs, the rights and responsibilities of the
chiefs of missile troops and artillery concerning the organ-
ization and conduct of combat with enemy nuclear means, the
general order of combat, the use of technical means, the
norms of work, the contents and procedure for drawing up
documents, etc.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought", No. 5 (60), 1961
via SEQRET
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The mission of combatting enemy nuclear means must
be raised to the level of a mission of primary importance
in the practical work of commanders and staffs. It should
be included among those questions that always occupy the
center of attention of the front troop commander, the army
commander, and their staffs during the preparation and
conduct of an operation.
It is known that the necessary condition for the
successful execution of an offensive operation is the
gaining of fire superiority over the enemy. The battle
for this superiority is a continuous process and remains
exceedingly tense from the beginning of the operation to
the end. Naturally, this battle must be part of the goal
of the operation and of those combat and operational
missions that are being resolved by the large units and
formations of missile and ground troops.
For example, the goal of an army offensive operation,
in general terms, may be defined as follows: the gaining
of fire superiority over the enemy; the rout of the large
enemy operational grouping in coordination with other
armies and means of the front; the swift development of the
offensive into the depth; and the seizure of areas that
will ensure favorable conditions for conducting subsequent
operations.
The essence of the immediate mission of the army:
to destroy the means of nuclear attack; to rout'the first
and second echelons of the enemy field army; and the sei-
zure of areas which will ensue favorable conditions for
the subsequent development of the offensive. The subsequent
mission of the army may be the destruction of the enemy
means of nuclear attack located in the depth; the develop-
ment of the offensive; the routing of the deep operational
reserves; and the seizure of areas, the occupation of which
is part of the goal of the operation.
During the assignment of combat missions to the second
echelons, to the reserves, to the forward detachments, and
to the landing forces, the destruction of enemy means of
SECT
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nuclear attack must be given as one of the basic missions.
In our opinion, all this will assist in a more com-
plete definition of the goal of combat operations and of
the scope and order of fulfilling the assigned missions.
Accordingly, the questions of destroying enemy nuclear
means will occupy a central place in the plans of the
operation and battle.
In its significance and scope, as well as (especially)
by its results, combat with nuclear means cannot be compared
with counterbattery combat of World War II. Counterbattery
combat was planned and executed (as it is still done) by
artillery commanding officers and their staffs who had, and
still have, the necessary forces and means for this purpose.
Combat with enemy nuclear means is radically different
from counterbattery combat, despite the fact that it in-
cludes the destruction of artillery using nuclear warheads.
The following pertain to the basic principles of con-
bat with nuclear-means:
-- the preemptive nature of combat and its continuity;
-- the complex annihilation of all elements that enter
into the concept of means of nuclear attack (nuclear warheads,
launching mounts, guns, delivery aircraft, control centers
and points, radiotechnical means, storage and assembly
points, means of reconnaissance, etc.);
-- close coordination by missile troops, aviation,
artillery and other means of destruction;
-- the organization of clear-cut control of fire and
of maneuver by all weapons of destruction;
-- the assigning of strict responsibility for conducting
this combat at front, army, and division levels, and the
allotment of appropriate forces and means for this task.
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In his article, Chief Marshal of Artillery S.
Varentsov soundly presented the question of allotting
to the chief of missile troops and artillery the
necessary reconnaissance means and a certain minimum
amount of ammunition with nuclear and chemical filling,
and of granting him the right to carry out single and
group nuclear strikes' against enemy means of nuclear
attack. All this creates conditions that permit the
existence of a single system for combat with enemy
nuclear weapons, in which skillful combined. use will
be made of missile troops, artillery and other means
of combat.
When organizing combat with means of nuclear
attack, the greatest importance is attached to calculating
enemy capabilities.
Depending on the enemy troop grouping in the army
offensive zone, it is possible to expect up to 170
mounts and guns using nuclear warheads, as well as
rear area installas Qinnected with the supply of nuclear
warheads. Besides this, a significant number of surface
to air missile (ZURS) mounts, airfields of tactical avia-
tion, and other targets will be located in the army offen-
sive zone.
An important characteristic of enemy means of nuclear
attack is the quantity and yield of his nuclear warheads,
and also the manner of their distribution and echelonment.
In accordance with the accepted norms of reinforcement,
a field army of the USA may receive 60 to 90 nuclear war-
heads, and on army corps 20 to 40, for a defensive oper-
ation. According to preliminary data, a British, West
German or French corps may receive 20 to 30 nuclear war-
heads each. The significantly larger number of guns and
mounts capable of using nuclear warheads, over the number
of warheads which are actually allotted, to a certain de-
gree, makes combat with enemy nuclear means more difficult
and requires that particular attention be given to the dis-
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covery and destruction of nuclear warheads.
An analysis of materials from exercises shows
that the Americans are striving to create large stocks
of nuclear warheads on an administrative basis (on the
basis of 1 or 2 operations for each field army, or on
the basis of support irg tr3op combat operations for 20
to 30 days). Therefore, the reconnaissance and'des-
truction of Nuclear warheads at depots, and at points
for the assembly and preparation of projectiles, must
be the most important part of combat with enemy nuclear
means. The successful destruction of these objectives
and the disruption of his supply system may lead to
the failure of the enemy offensive or to a sharp weak-
ening of his activity on the whole. As shown by
calculations, the restoration of a disrupted supply
system for nuclear warheads may require from 2 to 4
calendar days, and, in a number of cases, even more.
When conducting combat with enemy nuclear means, the
main mission of the army will be the destruction of tactical
means of nuclear attack, which can be effectively destroyed
by tactical missile and tube artillery fire. We note that
50 to 60 percent of the tactical weapons are 203.2mm
howitzers, weapons which can be combatted effectively by
tube and rocket artillery. Army missiles may be used to
combat "Sergeant" ("Corporal") battalions, large control
points, and also troop ZURS mounts. The remaining objectives,
as a rule, are destroyed by the means of the front.
According to our calculations, an army comprising
six divisions plus its usual reinforcement of tube artillery
from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) may,, by
using all the gun battalions, a large part of the howitzer
battalions, and operational-tactical and tactical missiles,
simultaneously destroy about 20 percent of the expected
number of enemy nuclear means in the zone of its own offen-
sive. By using artillery chemical ammunition as well, up
to 30 percent will be destroyed.
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In view of the fact that, before our tactical means
enter the fire zone, the nuclear means of the enemy will
have been destroyed by operational-tactical missile an4
front aviation strikes, and, also, in view of the fact
that these weapons are destroyed as they are discovered,
it can be tentatively accepted that an army must have in
constant readiness a quantity of means that would permit
the simultaneous destruction of not less than 50 percent
of the expected number of enemy nuclear means.
In our view, each division in the first echelon
must have at its disposal an average of 4 to 5 gun and
howitzer battalions, capable of conducting combat with
the nuclear weapons of the enemy at ranges of 12 to 20km.
For this purpose, an.army must be considerably reinforced
with artillery -- with 4 to 5 artillery regiments. Evi-
dently, the best solution, as is proposed in the article,
is to include long-range gun battalions, in addition to
the howitzer battalions, in the TOE of the divisions.
On the basis of the tentative calculations cited
above, it is possible to come to the conclusion that in
order to effect the simultaneous destruction of the enemy
means of nuclear attack and the destruction of his main
grouping, an army needs to be reinforced with operational-
tactical and tactical missile units: up to 1 to 2 batta-
lions of operational-tactical missiles (OTR) and 2 to 3
battalions of tactical missiles (TR) (under the existing
organization of missile units).
We agree with the author of the article that the
planning of combat with enemy nuclear means must be carried
out under the direction of the combined-arms staff and
participated in by the chief of missile troops and artillery,
by the commander of the air army (VA) (or his representa-
tive), and by the chiefs of chemical troops, PVO troops,
communications, and engineer troops. In our opinion, how-
ever, there is no need to work out separate plans for com-
bat with enemy nuclear means. The question of combat with
enemy nuclear means must be Question No. 1 of the general
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plan of the operation.
In the staff of the missile troops and artillery,
combat with enemy nuclear means is reflected in the
plan for the combat employment of missile troops and
artillery in an operation. This plan specifies the
quantity of warheads with nuclear and chemical filling
specifically allotted for combat with enemy nuclear
means and allocates them by missions (the preparation
period, the execution of immediate and subsequent mis-
s ions (by the army)).
Our calculations show that 30 to 50 percent of
all the nuclear warheads should be allotted to combat
with enemy nuclear means. Each division commander in
the first echelon should have at his disposal 3 to 5
nuclear warheads and missiles with chemical filling
that may also be used to fulfil other important mis-
sions.
The allotting of ammunition for the specific pur-
pose of combat with the means of nuclear attack is also
necessary in order to ensure the timely issue of war-
heads with yields that will effectively destroy enemy
nuclear means. According to research data, an R-170 at
a range of up to 100km; with an air burst, requires 50
to 75 kilotons; and at a range of up to 150km, 80 to
100 kilotons (in a surface burst, the yield increases
by 1.25 to 1.5 times); an R-30, at a range of up to
15km, requires 10 kilotons; and at a range of up to
30km, 15 to 20 kilotons.
In our opinion, the difficulty of conducting re-
connaissance of nuclear means, the need for exceptional
combat efficiency in combatting them, and the decisive
role of missile troops in this type of combat, make it
necessary to create, in the HQ's .f missile troops and
artillery, a fire control center (in the division a fire
control point)headed by the chief of missile troops and
artillery (chief of artillery). At the center there can
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be reconnaissance, planning and coordination, control,
supply, and information groups. The composition of the
center may include officers of the operations- group of
the air army staff and, when necessary, some officers of
the front (army) staff.
The fire control center will be an organ of the
front (army) troop commander for the-control of fire wea-
pons placed at the disposal of the front (army). The
work of the center is organized on the basis of the
troop commander's decision.
As is known, the reconnaissance of nuclear means
is organized by the combined-arms staff in accordance
with a single plan. The chief of missile troops and
artillery should have at his disposal aerial reconnaissance
means and fire-directing/reconnaissance aircraft for com-
bat reconnaissance and for determining the results of
strikes.
All data, obtained by all types of intelligence,
are channeled to a single intelligence information
collection and processing point. Information on the
means of nuclear attack is sent simultaneously to the
fire control center by means of radio relay (retranslyatsiya).
The. planning and coordination group headed by the chief of
the center determines the objective, the means of destruction,
and other data, and immediately assigns the mission to the
missile troop subunits on duty to prepare for a strike. At
the same time, the chief of the center reports to the front
(army) troop commander concerning the objective and the
action taken. While the final decision is being made, the
subunits and units on duty prepare for launching and re-
port on their readiness. After the decision is made, the
fire control.center gives the signal for the strike. In
our opinion, such a system of work will significantly re-
duce the time taken for the preparation of a strike.
In order to destroy enemy nuclear means located at
launch sites, the chief of missile troops and artillery
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must be given the right to deliver strikes independently,
with a subsequent report to be made to the appropriate
commander.
In our opinion, Chief Marshal of Artillery S.
Varentsov is absolutely correct in proposing that ground
missile units adopt some of the principles now being used
by the PVO Troops of the Country. Among the principles
that can be adopted are those on control, on the use of
radio receivers directly at the fire batteries for receiv-
ing commands from control points, and on automation in
the preparation of data and in aiming the missile at the
target. The use of these principles will lead to a
further reduction in the time required by ground missile
units to prepare for combat employment.
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