MILITARY NEWS: A PERCIPITATE BREAKTHROUGH OF A PREPARED ENEMY DEFENSE IN WINTER BY A MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. BAKSOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500380001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 17, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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A Precipitate Breakthrough of a Prepared Enemy Defense
in Winter by a Motorized Rifle Division
by
Lieutenant-General A. Baksov
In February 1960 in the Moscow Military District,
divisional exercises were carried out on the theme
"A Precipitate Breakthrough of a Prepared Enemy Defense
by a Motorized Rifle Division (msd), and the Development
of an Offensive with the Forcing of a River Barrier in
Cobrdination with an Airborne Force".
The operations were carried out under unfavorable
meteorological conditions. Despite the sharply broken
terrain, deep snow, a snow storm, ice-covered ground
and
,
an insufficient number of roads, the rites of the offensive
reached 85 km; but when one considers the distance covered
by the division from the concentration area to the forward
edge of the battle area, it was more than 100 km per
calendar day.
Tactical missile batteries were employed for the first
time in the exercises, and the commanders of the divisions
acquired a certain experience in employing them. The ad-
vancing units of the division coordinated fully with the
tactical airborne force.
The general situation, created by the directing staff
at the commencement of the exercise (Sketch 1):
The 12th Army of the "Eastern Forces" having defeated
the "Western Forces" Two words missinff7 continued to
develop /about seven words missing7 14 February reached
the line of,the Lama River, Garutino, Ostashevo (not on
the sketch). The attempts by the "Eastern Forces" to
break through the 'lenemy" defense precipitately, using the
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forces of the previous grouping, were not successful. T.ha
commander of the 12th Army therefore decided to commit .to
battle the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division,which had been
added to the army, and to drop the 10th Airborne Division
(vdd) to capture the river crossings on the Volga River
and prevent "enemy reserves moving u]I 'iti!Qm the west.
The 5th Army of the "Western Forces", after sustaining
losses, had to withdraw to a previously prepared defense
line, on which, with the units that had been withdrawn and
then committed again to the battle, it managed to stop the
offensive of the "Eaystern Forces". To prevent the break-
through of the "Eastern Forces" and to cover firmly the
Rzhevsk axis, it was decided to move up from the
depth the 26th Motorized Rifle Division, to the area of
Staritsa,and the 17th Motorized Rifle Division, into the
area of Afanasovo, Lebedki, and Gladkoye. The 114th
Motorized Rifle Division,which had been added to the com-
plement of the 5th Army and was located in the concen-
tration area~was given the following task: to be ready by
16 February to carry out a march and occupy a defense line
along the western bank of the Shosha River in the zone of
Kashentsevo, Churilovo, Michkolvo, and Plyusnikovo and pre-
vent an enemy breakthrough in the direction of Dorozhayevo
and Staritsa.
Thus, the "Eastern Forces" endeavored to destroy the
Lotoshinsk grouping of the "Western Forces" by using atomic
weapons and bringing fresh forces into the battle and en-
deavo'red. to develop the offensive on the Rzhevsk axis.
The "Western Forces", on the other hand, tried to strengthen
their defense by using reserves and to inflict losses on
the "Eastern Forces" and prevent a breakthrough by using
atomic strikes.
The commander of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division
of the "Eastern Forces", in compliance with the task laid
down, decided to breakthrough the defense precipitately
in the sector of Garutino and Afanasovo, destroy the
opposing enemy, and capture the line of Abushkavo,
Frolovskoye, and Novomikhaylovskoye; then, precipitately
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break through the second zone of the defense, destroy the
"enemy" reserves moving up, and capture the line of Stepurino
(env.) Dorofeyevo; then, further, by bringing the second
echelon into the battle, force the Volga River precipitately
and, in coordination with the 10th Airborne Division, by
the morning of 17 February capture the line of (env.) Pankovo,
Staritsa Station, and Ilinskoye in readiness to develop an
offensive in the direction of Kushnikovo and Ostashkovo
(not on the sketch).
Besides the four atomic warheads from army resources
earmarked for delivering a strike against the enemy in the
zone of the offensive of the division, the 23rd Motorized
Rifle Division also possessed its own three atomic warheads.
The division commander decided to use them in the battle
in the depth--the first when breaking through the second
defense zone, the second when repulsing possible enemy
counterattacks, and the third when forcing the Volga River
and holding the bridgehead.
The main strike was carried out in the direction of
Lvovo, Kornevskoye, Oremovo, and Staritsa. The combat
formation of the division was made up of two echelons; in
the first - three regiments (the 73rd Motorized Rifle Regi-
ment, the 290th Tank Regiment (tp) and the 406th Motorized
Rifle Regiment); in the second - the 404th Motorized Rifle
Regiment.
Such an arrangement of the combat formation permitted
a larger part of the divisional forces to deliver a strike
against the enemy on a wide front. The operations of the
tank regiment in the first echelon made it possible to
take rapid advantage of the results of the atomic strikes.
The increase of effort in the depth and in the development
of the offensive at a fast tempo were ensured by the
second echelon of the division.
Special features of the employment of the second
echelon of the division in the exercise consist, of the
fact that L-9 lines missing] Bashmakovo, and Novotroitskoye
(not on the sketch) and ensure the forcing of the river with
the main forces of the division. Such employment of a regi-
ment of the second echelon of the division in the given
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conditions-of-the the situati-on. can . be considered as sound.
It would also be correct to assign it two possible lines
for commi tmen-t- into- combat (the f i-rat at a depth of . --30--km-,.
and the second .46- km- -f-rom the forward edge of the . enemy
defense)p because during- the offensive -the..situation. .may
suddenly change, and -w-ith the increase of the-general depth
of the combat it would be more difficult to -anticipate
such changes as- far as. time and lines are concerned.
The organization of aprreccipitate breakthrough of an
enem deense The work oche dander and the staff of
the s a, as- well as of the commanders of the units and
subunits, on. the organization of a precipitate breakthrough
of a defense was -carried out in a limited period of time.
From the time of receipt of the combat order (at -1400 hours
on 14 February) until the time of readiness for the offen-
sive (at 2400 hours on 15 February), less than one and a
half calendar days (34 hours) was available. This time was
allotted as-follows:-- reaching a decision on the map and
having it formulated; by the staff of the division - three
hours (1400-to 1700 hours on 14 February); the assignment
of the tasks on the map to the commanders of the units - one
hour (1700 to-1800 hours on 14 February); reconnaissance
to clarify the details -of the -situation and the decision
reached on the map,.and also to determine in greater detail
on the terrain the unit tasks and._.. the organilation of
coordination - two hours (0730 to 0930 hours on 15 February).
Under-this work procedure,. most of the time was allotted
to the commanders and the staffs of the units. Coordination
was organized- an the terrain- during the reconnaissance.
The main -probl ... of coordination with schedules-. (s raschotsmi-.).
as well as the sequence of units and subu-mits moving forward for
commitment to combatImere shown on the di ?ision -.commander'U map
of decisio*s (kar?ta-resheniye). A planning table (sketch)
for coordination was not worked out separately.
For the work of the division commander on the terrain,
besides the map-of decisions, a small plan was prepared
which gave the times of the work and a,.list of the basic
problems requiring solution.
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During the reconnaissance the division commander,
taking into account the conditions of the terrain, esta-
blished the departure line at a distance of 5 to 8 km from
the forward edge of the concentration area; the control
line (this is also the line of deployment from regimental
into battalion columns) at a distance of 15, to 20 km from
the departure line; and the line of deployment for the
assault: for motorized rifle subunits - 800 to 1000 m
and for tanks - li to 2 km from the forward edge of the
enemy defense.
The commanders of the motorized rifle regiments
established the lines of deployment of the battalion
columns into company columns at a distance of up to
3 km, and the coinpanies into platoon columns up to
li to 2 km, from the forward edge. The battalion commanders
designated the places for the infantry to dismount (speshi-
vaniye) and fit on skis, as well as the placgs for the
armored personnel carriers.
Movement of the division for the precipitate attack.
Experience has shown that it is most advisable to select
the concentration area for a division 30 to 50 km from
the f or;ard edge of the ezleny defense. In our exercise,
the concentration area for the 23rd Motorized Rifle Divi-
sion of the "Eastern Forces" was 40 km away. This ensured
rapid movement and deployment of the units for combat and,
at.the same time, made it difficult for the enemy to oppose
the advancing tropps in an organized and effective manner,.
The 23rd Motorized Rifle Division began moving out
from the concentration area at night by four routes: along
route No. 1 - the 73rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (less tank
tkaattalion), rear directorate of the division; along route
No. 2 - the tank battalion of the 73rd Motorized Rifle Regiment
and the 290th Tank Regiment (tp) (less a tank battalion);
along route No. 3 - the tank battalion of the 406th Motorized
Rifle Regiment, a. tank battalion of the 290th Tank Regiment,
the tank battalion of the 404th Motorized Rifle Regiment; along
route No. 4 - the 406th Motorized Rifle Regiment (less tank
battalion), the 404th Motorized Rifle Regiment (less tank
battalion). At 0300 hours on 16 February the heads of the
columns of the regiments of the first echelon passed the de-
parture line.
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The motorized rifle regiments without their tank
battalions proceeded on the routes along the flanks,
the majority of which followed highways suitable for
wheeled vehicles.
The tank regiment of the division moved along two
central routes which followed dirt roads. In front of
it came the tank battalions of the motorized rifle regi-
ments of the first echelon of the division, which,by the
beginning of the deployment into precombat formations
had moved to the offensive zones of their own regiments.
This march formation of the division was caused by
the tank subunits' and units' not being permitted during
the exercises to use the better roads on the outer routes
(Nos. 1 and 4). The presence of the tank grouping in the
center of the division, although creating the best con-
ditions to exploit the results of our own atomic strikes,
did at the same time expose it to the danger of suffering
heavy losses in tanks from an enemy atomic attack.
Besides this, the movement of the tank battalions of the
motorized rifle regiments along the routes of the tank
regiment required additional regrouping when deploying
the units for battle.
We consider that when assigning four routes for the
division, it is most advisable that the motorized rifle
regiment with all its subunits should move in a column,
having, as a rule, at the head of the column the tank
battalion and artillery. This will permit the unit to
deploy rapidly when the enemy is met, attack him with
tanks, and also provide the attacking subunits with timely
artillery support. The tactical missile battery of the
division should move by a separate route or along the
route of the main forces, but at a distance from them that
lessons the likelihood of the destruction of the battery
in the event of an enemy atomic attack.
The division moved from the concentration area at an
average speed of 14 kph. Taking into account the night
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conditioner;--- falling -snow -changing -to ice, the large ..nom-._
ber of small rivers- and streams.- with steep banks. that.
were encountered along the route, as well as anti-tank
obstacles, this speed - can--be--considered normal-. -
Each column of the 23rd -Motorized Rif lle Di-vision.
had its own-equipment for road construction - andclearing
For this purpose bulldozer-prime mov-ers (BAT) .O tank-
mounted snow.ploughs (STU), and bulldozers were employed,
and the armored personnel carriers and motor, vehieles?
were equipped with,previously prepared treadway bridges,
anti-skid-chains, tow ropes, and other equipment to in-
crease pass ability.
The infantry dismounted at the line of deployment of
the battalion columns into company columns because any
further movement of the wheeled armored carriers in com-
pany and platoon columns was impossible owing to deep snow.,
and no time and means were available for the preparation
of cross-country routes. Having dismounted from the
armored carriers, the infantry continued the movement and
deployment on skis while the armored carriers were left
near the movement routes in areas with natural cover.
The division cgmmander controlled the units moving
forward and deploying from a forward command post
situated 2 km from the forward edge of the "enemy* def ease .
At 0732 hours on 16 February, an atomic strike was
carried out against the "West" defense. With the commence-
ment of fire preparation, the infantry located on the re-
verse slopes of the heights under natural cover began to
move out on skis to the line of deployment for the attack
in company columns with subsequent deployment into platoons
and then into combat formation. Six to eight km from the
forward edge the tank battalions began reforming into com-
pany columns, and at 3.km the companies deployed into pla-
toon columns and after that into combat order. The troops,
therefore, were moving out into combat order at the com-
mencement and during the fire preparation which,in the
situation that had taken shape,was most advisable.
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To take part in the fire preparation and in support
of the offensive by the units of the division, in addition
to the atomic weapons, two regimental artillery groups and the
divisional artillery group were brought in from the
8th Motorized Rifle Division, engaged in a defensive role
in front, as well as a subgroup of the army artillery
group.
A feature of the fire preparation at these
exercises consisted of the artillery's opening fire at
the same time as the delivery of the atomic strike. As
a result, the gap between the atomic strike and the
beginning of the artillery fire onslaught was eliminated,
and surprise and the simultaneity of enemy destruction
were achieved. But, for this purpose, it was necessary
to place the artillery in firing positions at a safe
distance from the ground zero of our own atomic bursts,
i.e., 5 to 6 km from the forward edge of the "enemy"
defense.
The tactical missile battery did not participate
in the fire preparation because, in the zone of the division,,
offensive atomic strikes with four warheads were planned
and carried out by the army weapons in the areas of
Khanevo, Aleksandrovskoye, Dryzlovo, and Monoseino. In
a number of cases, however, when atomic strikes are not
carried out against the enemy by the army weapons, or
when these weapons are insufficient to ensure a
successful precipitate breakthrough, the battery can be
brought in for strikes before the division goes over to
the offensive.
The precipitate breakthrough of the defense (Sketch 2).
As a result of employing atomic weapons and artillery
fire the"enemy"losses in manpower and equipment were more
than 60 percent, and this also predetermined the success
of the precipitate breakthrough of his defense.
At 0800 hours, the tanks and infantry of the regiments
of the first echelon of the division deployed into
combat formation and attacked the enemy, trying to exploit
the results of the atomic strikes rapidly. The infantry
attacked on skis.
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As a result of the swift and concerted attack, the
division units quickly broke through the first position.
True, the "Western Forces" managed to take up defensive
positions and close the breach created by the "East"
atomic strike by the timely maneuver of the tank
subunits and the antitank reserves. This, however, was
insufficient.
After the breakthrough of the first position, the
"East" motorized rifle subunits continued their movement
on armored carriers and riding on tanks.
The personnel boarded the armored personnel carriers
during the battle when they were being formed up into
battalion columns. This was caused by the impossibility
in the conditions of deep snow and snow storms of
building and maintaining in workable condition a large
number of the cross-country routes.
In this connection, the experience of a number of
tactical exercises carried out in the military district
shows that it is most advisable to carry out in the
following manner the boarding by the infantry of the
armored carriers in the course of the offensive. On
signals from the battalion commanders the armored,
personnel carriers are driven up to the combat formations
of the subunits. The motorized rifle subunits, while
continuing the offensive, close up from their combat
formations to platoon columns. The armored personnel
carriers drive up to their platoons and during brief
stops the boarding of the personnel is carried out.
With the "Eastern Forces" going over to the offensive, the
114th Motorized Rifle Division of the "'Western Forces"
was given the task of immediately moving out of the
concentration area to the line of Kashentsevo and
Churilovo, with the task of taking up,a defensive position
on this line and preventing any further advance of the
"Eastern Forces".
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However, owing to the swift offensive of the
"Eastern Forces" the division was unable to move to this
line. At 1130 hours on 16 February in the area of
Kovrigino, the reconnaissance subunits of the 23rd
Motorized Rifle Division of the "Eastern Forces" and the
114th Motorized Rifle Division of the "Western Forces"
met and later. on the line of Terpnikovo, Korshikovo, and
Kalachevo a meeting engagement began between these
divisions.
Consequently, the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division
entered the meeting engagement during the development
of the offensive after the breakthrough of the first
zone, when'its units were deployed along the
front and in-the depth and 'tonducted battles with the
retreating enemy subunits while the 114th Motorized
Rifle Division was forced to enter the meeting engage-
ment from the line of march. Such a case of the
beginning of a meeting engagement can be considered as
typical.
At 1400 hours on 16 February, the 23rd Motorized
Rifle Divisi.on,after the delivery of two atomic strikes
attacked the enemy and by 1530 hours moved forward on
the left flank to- a depth of up to 6 km. At the same
time, the 114th Motorized Rifle Division, taking advantage
of the results of the atomic strike, pressed the
"Eastern Forces" on its left flank, but nevertheless
found itself in a worse position because the units of
the 23rd and the 8th Motorized Rifle Divisions of the
"Eastern Forces" were already advancing into its rear.
Besides, by this time an "East" airborne force had
landed and was in operation on the western bank of the
Volga River in the area of Staritsa. The commander of
the "West" 5th Army was forced to give the order for
the 114th Motorized Rifle Division to disengage from
the battle and withdraw to the western bank of the
Volga River. Under the cov'vr of rear guard action,
the main forces of the 114th Motorized Rifle Division
had crossed over to the western bank of the Volga River
by 2230 hours, where they began to take up defensive
positions and, in conjunction with the 26th Motorized
Rifle Division, to prepare for a counterattack.
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As mentioned before, each division had a tactical
missile battery consisting of a command platoon and two
firing platoons (two launching mounts). The transport
platoon for the missiles was not formed. Unfortunately,
it was impossible in the exercise to master and check
in practice the whole range of problems of the combat
employment of this battery, including the sequence of
its preparation for fire. Certain experience was
obtained, however,in planning the combat use of tactical
Missiles, the movement of the battery during the battle,
and carrying out topographic work in getting fixes on
elements of its combat formation.
The battery of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division
of the "Eastern Forces" was moved out to the siting
(standby) area two hours before the delivery of atomic
strikes against the"enemy: In the siting area, 8 km
from the forward edge of the enemy defense, an area
for the primary launch sites and two areas for alternate
sites were selected.
Planning the movement of the battery was based
first of all on the necessity for its continuous readiness
to deliver an atomic strike. Taking into account the
depth of the division combat task and the capability of
the battery, it was intended to move it three times
during combat. The first time the battery moved was
after the capture of the enemy second position, into
an area which ensured it the delivery of a strike against
the second zone of defense,and for repulsing the
counterstrike by enemy army reserves. The second and
third moves were carried out according to the developing
situation, the tasks of the division units, and the
rates of their advance.
The battery moved as a whole in bounds of 20 to 25 km,
which,on the average,required about two hours, as
follows: for dismantling fire positions--5 to 10 minutes;
move to a new area--80 to 90 minutes; battle deployment-
5 minutes; preparation for firing--15 to 20 minutes.
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The experience of the exercises has shown that for
communication of the division commander with the battery
it is necessary to issue the forward command post (PKP)
radio sets with a.greater range than those held by
artillery units. at present.
The problems of employment of the tactical missile-
battery were provided for in the general artillery plan
for combat operations, and the promotion of topographic
work was provided for in the reconnaissance plan and in
the combat order of the artillery staff of the division
for reconnaissance.
The landing and combat operations of the airborne
force. The 10th Airborne Division (actually one ba alion)
armed immediately on the airhead (platsdarm) in an
area where there were no large enemy forces. The depth
of the drop consisted of up to 80 km. After destroying
the enemy in the landing area and capturing the airhead,
the 10th Airborne Division took up a defensive position
on a wide front;. holding separate sectors of the terrain
useful from the tactical point of view and covering the
most important axes, organizing aggressive operations by
diversionary groups, independent ambush subunits, and
counterattacks along the flanks and rear area.of the
enemy
The Airborne Division defense front was up to 45 km
along the perimeter, of which 27 km were in sectors of
the terrain difficult of access along the Volga River,
with its steep banks, and in the wooded roadless sector
between Ramenye and Ledinnikovo, where the defense was
built up by separate company and platoon strong points
with big gaps between them. These gaps were protected
by fire, observation, patrols, log obstacles in wooded
sectors, and mine fields..(minno vzryvnoye zagrazhdeniye).
The limited road network, deep snow, and snowfall
considerably lowered the maneuvering capabilities of the
'enemy"and at the same time increased the stability of
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the airhead defense. These conditions, however, to an
equal extent also hampered the maneuver of the defending
subunits and units of the airborne force.
Of special significance during the capture and the
holding of the airhead was the well thought-out and
precise coordination between the airborne force and the
troops advancing from the font. The operations of the
23rd Motorized Rifle Division were exactly coordinated
with the operations of the airborne force. So, when
the troops of the "East" 12th Army were approaching the
river, the coordination was directed toward ensuring
a quick joining of the offensive units with the airborne
force and at the airhead7toward ensuring joint operations
to repulse an''enemy'"counterstrike and to develop the
offensive.
By holding the captured airhead, the airborne
force assisted the units of the 23rd Motorized Rifle
Division in successfully forcing the river precipitately.
The commander of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division, in
his turn, for a more rapid joining with the airborne
force, sent out a forward detachment which strengthened
the troops at the airhead and ensured that an'enemy"
attack would be.successfully beaten off.
When it became possible, the artillery of the
23rd Motorized Rifle Division supported the combat
operations of the airborne force with its fire. Moreover,
the artillery staffs of both divisions determined the
allocation of the firing tasks in greater detail between
themselves.
The successful precipitate forcing of the river by
the main forces of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division
decisively strengthened the defense of the airhead and
made it possible, by the joint efforts of the 23rd
Motorized Rifle Division and the 10th Airborne Division,
to repulse the counterstrike of the 26th and the 114th
Motorized Rifle Divisions of the "West". During the
development of the offensive from the airhead, the 10th
Airborne Division secured the flanks of the 23rd Motorized
Rifle Division.
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The problems of coordination were 4ecided specifically
and fully due to a meeting of the 23rd Motorized Rifle
Division and the 10th Airborne Division commanders, and
to the continuous exchange of information between the
staffs of the divisions. The meeting of the commanders
of the divisions took place immediately before the
commencement of the drop.
It is worth noting that although such a meeting of
the commanders of the divisions in the present situation
was possible and undoubtedly useful, in other circumstances
it might not take place owing to the considerable
distance to the disposition area of the airborne division.
Besides this, in a number of cases, taking into account
the possibility of enemy use of nuclear/missile weapons
and sharp changes in the situation during the offensive,
it will not be possible to determine precisely in
advance which division of the offensive army will be
entering the area of the drop. Therefore, the main
problems of coordination must be determined first of all
by the army commander.
Coordinating communications (svyaz vzaimodeystviya)
of the airborne force units with the units entering the
area of the drop were carried out on the coordinating
radio net of the 12th Army, including in the net the
commanders of large units and units of both divisions,
using radio sets R-105 and R-115. The coordinating radio
net included the radio stations of the staff of the 12th
Army, the staffs of the divisions, and regiments of both
the coordinating divisions. The communications of the
staff of the airborne division with the staff of the 12th
Army and the staff of the division entering the airhead
were also maintained by R-104 and R-105 radio sets of the
front. With the move of the troops of the 12th Army to
the line of Stepurino and Yurkinoa radio-relay system
of communications was established between the staffs of
both divisions,using R-401,sets.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500380001-3
Precipitate forcing of the river. The operations.
of the a r me force, and pr- -mar y their capture of
the airhead and:- the -river crossings, decisively- assisted
the motori-zed --rifle- division in- the --sueceseful -pfiecipit-ate
forcing of the Volga River. The crossing points along
the line of advance were r-econ .mitered by the combat
engineers of the airborne force, and this made it possible
for the units of the 23rd Motorized Rifle Division on
reaching the river to cross-over to the.opposite bank
without delay. Moreover, it made it possible to get
tanks across immediately on reaching the river.
From the experience of the exercise, the conclusion
can be drawn that if the airborne force captures a river
crossing suitable for tanks it is advisable in many
cases to assign to the forward detachments not only
motorized rifle units and subunits but also-tank-subunits
and units. This will allow troops to move more rapidly
to the river, join up with the airborne force, get over
the tanks of the main forces of the division, and develop
the offensive more decisively from the airhead. The
enemy will not be in a position to offer organized
resistance.
When organizing the forcing of a water..barrier in
winter, the thickness of the ice should be considered.
If it reaches 20 to 30fcm, then the infantry and loads
up to 5 tons should belsent over the ice on a wide
front. However, with this method special attention
should be paid to the organization of a rescue service.
For each crossing over the ice a rescue team is appointed
on amphibious vehicles equipped with life jackets, ropes,
boathooks, and other equipment. Prime movers with
.hawsers long enough to cover the entire width of the
river must be available here to tow out vehicles that
have got stuck or :-hjve.sunk.
For getting across tanks and heavy loads, self-
propelled ferries, ferries from pontoon parks, floating
bridges, and bridges on rigid supports are employed.
The chief difficulty when using this river crossing
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500380001-3
equipment is the preparation of channels in the ice by
means of explosives or breaking the ice manually into
separate blocks-of a definite shape ("cards" -='karty").
In the exercise conducted, electric saws were used
together with other--means for breaking up the ice.
Experience in their use will, of course, require further
improvement. On the whole, electric saws increase the
efficiency of the work in preparing a channel in the
ice.
The 23rd Motorized Rifle Division of the "Eastern
Forces" began forcing the river during the pursuit of
the withdrawing units of the 114th Motorized Rifle Division
of the "Western Forces". At 1800 hours on 16 February,
the reconnaissance subunits reached the river, and then
the forward detachment of the division, consisting of
the 404th Motorized Rifle Regiment. With the forward
detachment, river crossing equipment was brought up to
the river, as well as the 60th Pontoon Bridging Regiment,
which began building a heavy 50-ton bridge in the area
of Staritsa. The width of the river in the sector of
the crossing reached 130 to 140 m. In this specific
situation the channel through the ice was prepared in
4j hours. With the existence of the channel through
the ice, a bridge extending 136 m was completed in
1 hour and 50 minutes, and a total of three floating
bridges were built by the pontoon bridging regiment.
The work on building bridges was carried out on a
wide front by an assembly line method (potochnyy metod).
One pontoon company unloaded 6 pontoon sections,
cast them off, joined them into half-rafts (poluparom),
and took them out into the line of the bridge from the
side of the opposite bank. The same company prepared
the abutment span on lattice supports. Subsequently,
the personnel of this company were.switched to installing
flooring, fastenings(zapoZhilivaniye), and railings.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500380001-3
After the first six pontoon sections another
subunit unloaded the next ssix sections, dropped the
anchors, and placed the equipment on the decks of the
pontoons. The next subunit moved these sections into
the main channel in the ice.
Six teams of pontoon personnel closed up the
sections, assembled the half-rafts and passed them on
to other pontoon personnel who carried out the,joining
of the half -rafts.
Thus, the work was carried out simultaneously in
six sectors: No. 1--the construction of a trestle at
the departure bank; No. 2--bringing up vehicles for
unloading at the departure bank; No. 3--the unloading
of vehicles into the shore channel; No. 4--moving the
pontoon sections into the main channel in the ice;
No. 5--the joining of sections and the ass*bly of
the half-rafts in the main channel ; No. 6--.-joining of
of the flooring,-and
the half-rafts, the laying fastenings.
installing railings and
The extension of the area of the work was assisted
by the creation on the river of shore channels ("feelers"--
"usy") besides the main channel.
The exercise that was held has shown that a motorized
rifle division of modern organization is capable oT
conducting precipitate offensive at high rates even in
winter conditions, without roads, and in a doep covering
of snow. It has been confirmed in practice that with
the use of nuclear/missile weapons the rates of an
offensive can reach up to 100 km per calendar day and
more.
Under modern conditions the success of a precipitate
breakthrough of the enemy defense and the swift
development of the offensive are ensured by the reliable
destruction of the enemy by the nuclear/missile
weapons of the front, army, and division.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29500380001-3
A precipitate breakthrough requires thorough
organization of combat. operations and, in particular,
clear planning and carrying out of the movement of the
troops to the line of deployment for the attack and
their deployment into combat formations.
The division commander, having at his disposal an
organic (voyskovaya) missile battery and using nuclear/
missile weapons at the beginning of a breakthrough, as
well as during an offensive, is in a more decisive
position than previously to influence the course of
combat operations, sharply altering the correlation of
forces on the decisive axis in his own favor.
The employment of an airborne force, when forcing
a river precipitately,considerably increases the tempo
of the crossing and creates favorable conditions for
further development of the offensive from the airhead'.
At the same time, to carry out the task successfully,
it is necessary to have reliable support for the
operations of the airborne force and clear-cut
coordination of it with the advancing troops of the
front.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500380001-3
50X1 -HUM
DIAGRAM 2. THE COURSE OF ACTION
Molokovo
R
Ledipkovo
tar. TeIkchi',
The counterattack of thel
,
P
26 msd of the "Western
Forces" was marked
tentatively,
Position of Troops
at 0800 1&2
at0930 16,2
at110016,2
at 1300 16,2
;0t1600 16.2
at1800 16.2
at 1900 16,2
at 0600 17,2
Line of deployment
s
of rearguard of kanovskoye
114 msd when
withdrawing
area 'pt
X290 t
Lyakhev
X378 t\ J'
J`
5tepurino
$abliino
Yu r~
416"
oyf,
Zemerob
\Yurkino
alachevo
' 290A
igino y
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP80T00246A029500380001-3