MILITARY THOUGHT: PLANNING THE UTILIZATION OF NUCLEAR/MISSILE WEAPONS IN A FRONT OFFENSIVE OPERATION, BY COLONEL-GENERAL V. CHIZH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Missile Weapons
in a Front Offensive Operation
by
Colonel-General V. Chizh
As is known, modern operations are characterized by the large
scale utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, by highly mobile troop
operations, and by sharp and rapid changes in the situation. The mass
employment of nuclear /missile weapons promotes a more rapid attainment
of operational goals than has been the case in the past. There is
every reason to suppose that the duration of operations will be sharply
curtailed. In any case, the protracted battles, lasting many days,
which were characteristic of the Second World War have, we consider,
become a thing of the past. According to the experience of a number
of exercises, a front offensive operation will continue for an
average of 8 to 10 calendar days.
Along with a significant curtailment in the duration of conducting
an operation, its depth will increase sharply. Whereas in the last
war the depth of a front offensive operation was within the limits of
250 to 300 km and only reached 500 km in exceptional cases, under
modern conditions a front operation will be conducted to a depth of
800 to 1000 km. Such depth can and must be attained mainly as a
result of the decisive exploitation of the results of nuclear/missile
strikes. At the present time, the problem of increasing the rates of
troop advance to 100 km in one calendar day has already been raised.
High rates of advance will now play a decisive role in the attainment
of operational goals.
However, in spite of the recognition of the dominant role of
nuclear weapons, we still do not fully take into account all their
capabilities in planning operations. We have cases in which many
problems in the preparation and conduct of modern operations are
decided from the standpoint of the past with insufficient regard for
the particular features of a nuclear/missile war. The nuclear
warheads released for an operation will, as the Minister of Defense
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points out, often be hastily expended as quickly as possible by
using obsolete methods of artillery preparation against insufficiently
reconnoitered targets.
The enormous role of the new means of combat, which they can
play in a future war, requires a new approach to the planning of their
use. With the modern scales of using nuclear/missile weapons, they
should not be looked upon as a means for supporting the combat
operations of ground troops. Nov. these weapons are the main and
decisive means of combat, determining the possibility of accomplishing
the majority of the tasks confronting the troops of a front in an
offensive operation. Consequently, problems of the employment of
nuclear weapons play a determining role in the planning of a front
offensive operation.
The operational directive of the General Headquarters of the
Supreme High Command on its conduct serves as the organizational
impetus in the planning of a front offensive operation. Following
the directive, after he has understood the task and has carefully
appraised the situation, the troop commander of a front reaches an
operational decision in which, in relation to the use of nuclear
weapons, he defines:
--the aims and tasks for which nuclear/missile weapons are
to be used in the operation and the allocation of nuclear
warheads in accordance with the operational tasks.--
--the objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons, and the
sequence and timing for the delivery of nuclear strikes
against them;
--the number of nuclear warheads allocated to the armies
for the operation and the order of participation of the army
missile units in the massed nuclear strikes of the front;
--the primary and alternate siting areas of the front's
missile large units (units) and the airfields at which
the delivery aircraft of the air army are based, the
sequence and timing of their employment; the order of
movement of the front's means for using nuclear weapons
during the operation;
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--the readiness periods of the missile units and aircraft for
the delivery of nuclear strikes;
--the reserve of nuclear warheads;
--the measures for material-technical and combat support
and other problems.
The authors of some articles, in considering the problems of
planning an operation, express the opinion that, in connection with
the appearance of nuclear/missile weapons in a front and army, two
plans should be worked out: a plan for the front (army) offensive
operation and a plan for the utilization of nuclear/missile weapons
in the operation.
We share the point of view of Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov and
consider with him that there can be no separate plan for the utilization
of nuclear/missile weapons. Nuclear/missile weapons and combined-arms
large units and formations cannot be used when isolated from one
another. The main elements in the operational formation of the
enemy's troops will be destroyed by nuclear/missile weapons, and, as
is known, the combined-arms large units will complete their rout.
Operations by ground troops are now impossible under any conditions
without the aggressive use of nuclear/missile weapons in both
operational and tactical elements. The basic problems for decision
by the troop commander of a front on the operational use of nuclear
weapons must be reflected in the plan for the front's offensive
operation. The various special technical problems connected with the
preparation and the delivery of nuclear strikes which do not come
into the operational plan are reflected in the appropriate plans of
the chief of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army)
and of the commander of the air army.
In our opinion, it is necessary to introduce clarity into the
problem of who must work and on what in planning for the use of
nuclear/missile weapons in a front (army) offensive operation.
It is known that the main role in planning for the use of nuclear/
missile weapons is played by the operational directorate (department)
of the staff of a front (army), the staff of the missile troops and
artillery of the front (army), and the staff of the air army. Let us
examine their functional responsibilities in planning an operation.
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The operational directorate (gs rtment of the staff of a
front (army), on the basis of the instructions of the commander and
chief of staff of the front (army), works out the specific problems
of the nuclear/missile preparation and support of a front troop
offensive, allocates the objectives to be destroyed between the
missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear
charges, the types and height of bursts, the safe distance of
friendly troops, estimates the expected results from the nuclear strikes,
and keeps a radiation situation map and a record of the irradiation of
the large units.
In performing these tasks, the operational directorate (department)
coordinates its work with other directorates (departments) and
receives from them essential data. Thus,
a. with the intelligence directorate (department), the following
are determined in detail:
--the locations of the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, depots,
and assembly bases for nuclear warheads and data on their
preparation;
--the disposition areas of major operational reserves, the places
in these areas where troops are most densely located, the degree
of engineer preparation of the areas, and the probable directions
of operations by the reserves;
--the locations of major control points (of armies and groups
of armies), the nature and durability of the installations
they occupy;
--the procedure for receiving intelligence data before and
during the offensive operation, in support of the employment of
nuclear/missile weapons.
Data on targets must be presented in the form of the precise
topographic-geodetic coordinates of the targets (and not in the form
of areas approximated on a map). Only then can the use of nuclear/
missile weapons produce the desired result;
b. with the staff of the missile troops and artillery of a front
(army) and the staff of an air army, the following are coordinated:
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ppcr i.ods of r:r,u Jear warheads for use in combat
and t r?ir issue to the m:issi._e (aviation) large units and
units of the front (army);
-- 'J:~ n` c ~; . ars f`ir de:. ~,rv >~ ?.;cr the missile units
:? and d -..very a!Y'.raG ?;
--problems in the allocation of nuclear warheads, accordini
to the objectives to be destroyed;
--tine timing for the delivery cf nuclear strikes;
--the order and periods of time for the dispatch of the
missile units and subunits to siting areas and aircraft
to dispersal airfields (aerodrom rassredotocheniya)
(or maneuvering airfields (aerodrom manevra) );
--the system of cooperation between missile units and aviation;
--measures for ensuring the security of friendly troops during
the delivery of nuclear strikes;
c. with the chief of the PVO troops of the front (army), the
problems of protecting the troops of the front (army), especially the
missile units (large units), against strikes by enemy aircraft in
areas of concentration and during the operation, are determined in
detail;
d. with the chief of engineer troops of the front (army)..
problems in the preparation of routes, the procedure for supplying
troops, and especially missile units, with the elements of
prefabricated structures and with other construction materials for
the preparation of cover are coordinated;
e. with the chief of communication troops, problems in the
organization of communications, primarily with the missile units
(large units) and with aviation, are coordinated; in this, communications
must be organized down to the duty battery (squadron) inclusively;
f. with the chief of chemical troops of the front (army),
problems in the organization of radiation and chemical reconnaissance
both by the means of the front (army) and by those of subordinate
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troops are determined in detail; in addition, together with the
operational directorate, the chief of chemical troops collaborates
in keeping up the radiation situation map and the record of irradiation
of large units; irradiation doses must be considered in an army for
the regiment and in a front for the division and for front units
(large units).
The staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army):
--in conjunction with the intelligence directorate (department),
organizes reconnaissance against objectives on behalf of the
missile troops of the front (army);
--on the basis of the tasks assigned by the commander of troops
of the front (army) to the missile units (large units), allocates
nuclear warheads among the missile units and subunits and
designates specific objectives to be destroyed by them in
accordance with their fire capabilities; conveys tasks to those
who are to perform them;
--in accordance with the nature of the objectives designated for
destruction, calculates the necessary yield and height of
nuclear bursts, ensuring the specified degree of destruction
of the objectives;
--organizes the preparation of siting areas and ensures the
timely delivery of missiles to the missile units and subunits;
--together with the staff of the rear services decides the
question of the procedure for the delivery of missile fuel;
--organizes the tour of duty for launch batteries in the
siting areas.
In addition, the artillery staff of the front (army), in planning
the combat use of the missile troops,decides such questions as the
organization and carrying out of topographic-geodetical preparation
and engineer preparation of the siting areas, meteorological support,
ballistic and technical preparation; the organization and safeguarding
of the movement of the missile units to the siting areas and of their
movement during the course of the operation; the organization of direct
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control of the missile units and of their fire; the clarification of
problems of coordination by the missile troops with aircraft and
cruise missiles in the joint destruction of objectives.
The staff of the air army:
--allocates nuclear warheads among delivery aircraft and
cruise missiles, designates specific objectives for destruction
by them and organizes the delivery of nuclear strikes in
accordance with the plan of the front's offensive operation;
--makes the necessary calculations (yield and height of nuclear
bursts) to ensure the prescribed degree of destruction of the
objectives;
--organizes and provides for continuous duty by delivery
aircraft and for the timely delivery of nuclear warheads to
the airfields on which the aircraft are based;
--organizes direct control of the large units (units) using
nuclear warheads and also their combat support and cover;
--clarifies problems of coordination by the aviation units
and cruise missile units with the missile units of a front
(army) in the joint delivery of nuclear strikes.
The procedure for planning the employment of nuclear/missile
weapons in an operation,suggested by us,eliminates the necessity for
preparation by the directorates and departments of the front's (army)
staff of a series of memoranda and considerations for the front
commander.
We have discussed only one side of planning, i.e., we have
defined the role of the directorates and departments of the staff of
a front (army) and have shown the content of their work in planning
for the employment of nuclear weapons in an offensive operation by
the front (army).
The other side of planning consists of the resolution of separate
problems connected both with direct planning and with the execution
of nuclear/missile strikes. Let us examine some of these:
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In the allocation of nuclear warheads for the tasks of the
operation and in the designation of specific objectives for destruction
by them, it is necessary to proceed from a basic rule: it is better
to destroy a smaller number of objectives with certainty, but those
that are more important and have ben well reconnoitered, than to
hit at all or a large portion of the objectives without attaining the
required result in doing so.
According to the experience of a series of exercises, nuclear
warheads can be allotted for tasks as follows: for the first mass
nuclear/missile strike (for the conduct of fire preparation)--
20 to 30 percent; for accomplishing the immediate task of the front--
30 to 40 percent; for accomplishing the subsequent task of the front--
20 to 30 percent; for the front's reserves--l0 to 20 percent. Of course,
this is a most tentative calculation. The specific allocation of
nuclear warheads in accordance with the tasks of an operation must be
made according to the actual situation.
The nature of the objective and the particular features of the
disposition of its separate elements.have an exceptionally important
significance in determining the type, amount, and yield of the nuclear
warheads needed for its destruction. For example, the enemy's
weapons of nuclear attack, battalions of "Honest John", "Corporal",
"Redstone" and of many other weapons, can be deployed in concentration
areas or assume combat formation, with their launching mounts. at the
waiting or launch sites. The most profitable objective for a nuclear
strike will be a concentration where these weapons are located more
compactly and for a longer time. The destruction of weapons of nuclear
attack at their launch sites will be impossible in most cases because
of their short stay at these sites.
In all cases, one must strive in the first instance to destroy
depots of nuclear warheads and their assembly bases, and also the
radio-technical means of control and guidance of missiles, without
which the launching mounts are nothing more than heaps of metal.
In the allocation of objectives for destruction to the various
means of delivering nuclear warheads to their target, it is necessary
to consider the distance of the objectives from the main line of
resistance, the degree of their cover by PVO weapons, and the nature
of'the objectives (their mobility). The inclination to plan nuclear
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strikes against mobile objectives beforehand, as was indicated by
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov in his critique of the
1960 command-staff exercises, is nothing more than self-deception.
For the destruction of stationary and relatively immobile objectives,
it is advisable to designate missile units, and for the destruction
of mobile objectives, aviation. To deliver strikes against objectives
located near our troops and also against targets of small dimensions
which refer primarily to the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, it
is necessary to select means of destruction which are more accurate
in their combat characteristics (cruise missiles and solid fuel
ballistic missiles).
In order to allocate objectives for destruction between the missile
troops and aviation correctly, it is necessary, first, to consider
fully their characteristics and combat potential; and second, from the
total number of objectives, which almost always exceeds the capabilities
for their destruction, to select the most important, the destruction
of which will ensure the attainment of the assigned goals.
In determining the type and height of a nuclear burst it is
necessary to consider not only the probability of destroying this or
that objective, but also the possibility of radioactive contamination
of the terrain in areas in which operations of front (army) troops
are impending, as the result of one's own nuclear bursts.
As is known, depending on the location and nature of the objectives
(targets) to be destroyed, and also on the level of destruction required,
either surface or air bursts can be used.
Surface bursts should usually be planned for the destruction of
troops located in solid shelters (dugouts), and also for putting out
of commission military-industrial and other objectives with very
sturdy structures. In addition, it is advisable to use surface bursts
(along with the destruction of the objective) to create zones of
radioactive contamination of the terrain, with high levels of
radiation.
However, in each specific case it is necessary to consider
carefully the meteorological conditions (mainly the wind direction),
the location of friendly troops, and their subsequent operations,
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together with the configuration of the front line. In delivering
strikes against objectives located near our troops, surface bursts
may be used only when there is a steady wind in the direction of the
enemy and under conditions in which troops will not enter these areas
before the level of radiation falls to within safe limits.
Air nuclear bursts should be planned for the destruction of
troops without cover and also of objectives which do not have
sturdy structures. In addition, air bursts are used in all other
cases when it is necessary to exclude strong radioactive contamination
of the terrain. Low air bursts can be planned when it is necessary
to avoid strong radioactive contamination of terrain and, at the same
time, to destroy as large a number of sturdy structures as possible.
The solution to the problem of selecting the type of burst to
destroy one or another enemy rear area objective also depends on the
task which has been assigned. If, for example, it is necessary to put
a rail junction out of action for a short time, with the intention
of using it subsequently for the needs of the front during the
operation, it is more advisable to plan a high air burst.
In conducting an offensive operation, more air than surface
bursts are usually planned and in the conduct of a defensive
operation this is reversed. In mountains, it is more advisable to
use air bursts,because the protective qualities of the ground
configuration are thereby lessened.
Timing for the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes. It is
known that the greatest effect from nuclear missile strikes can be
achieved if they are delivered simultaneously, or within a strictly
limited time. Therefore, the troop commander of a front establishes
the timing for a simultaneous nuclear strike against the target by
all nuclear warhead delivery means. In accordance with this timing,
the staff of the missile troops and artillery and the staff of the
air army must calculate the time at which each missile (aviation)
unit (large unit) should begin launchings (strikes), separately.
The staffs of the missile and aviation large units (units)1depending
on the flight-time of the missile (delivery aircraft) to the target,
calculates the launch-times for each launch assembly (take-off time
of delivery aircraft).
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The timing of nuclear/missile strikes during an operation is
calculated so as to deliver the greatest destruction against this or
that enemy objective. For example, it is most profitable to destroy
infantry and tank groupings at the moment when they are deploying
for a counterstrike or in concentration areas when they leave cover
and prepare to move. It is advantageous to destroy airfields at
which delivery aircraft are based at the moment when the greatest
number of aircraft has built up or when nuclear bombs are being
loaded,, etc.
It is thus,, in our opinion,, that the planning for the use of
nuclear/missile weapons in an offensive operation by a front (army)
must be carried out.
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