MILITARY THOUGHT: INCREASING THE STABILITY OF CONTROL OF THE TROOPS OF A FRONT (ARMY), BY MAJOR-GENERAL M. IVANOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029500110001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 5, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops
of a Front (Army)
by
Ma j or-General M. Ivanov
The first issues of the Special Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought? correctly state the problem concerning a
review of the postulates of the theory of strategy, operational art,
and tactics in light of the revolutionary changes which have come
about in the realm of armament from the moment when nuclear weapons
and missiles appeared on the scene. In the interests of the further
development of military theory, we must decisively reject attempts to
adapt old forms and methods of conducting military operations to new
conditions, and we must work out comprehensively and profoundly the
problems of modern combat and operations and the structure of the
organizations pertaining to them, including the control organs.
As is known, the organizational structure of staffs is directly
dependent upon methods of conducting combat operations and of equipping
troops with the means of combat. At the present time, significant.
changes have taken place in armament, combat, equipment, the nature of
operations, and the methods of their conduct. Consequently, there
should have been a corresponding change in the organization of staffs.
However, this has not come about and in fact our operational organs
of control, from the organizational standpoint, still remain at the
level of the staffs of the World War II period.
In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of troop
direction, the organization of operational staffs must, in our view,
at least correspond to the following requirements:
--to ensure a capability for constant control of the readiness
of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear warheads and of the location
and movement of all objectives of nuclear attack;
--to preclude any lack of coordination.in the actions of
commanders of arms of troops and services; commanders of troops
of the front, (army) must work jointly with their immediate
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subordinates in one place, controlling and coordinating their
actions; chiefs of directorates and services must decide all
problems together, and not in isolation from one another;
--to eliminate disunity in the processing of data concerning
asituation; all information must be concentrated in one place,
in-one organ so that it can be immediately available to the
commander of troops of the front (army);
--to unify control of the weapons of destruction;
--to promote sufficient viability in the control organs.
At the present time, the organizational structure of operational
staffs is based on the same division of labor and distribution of
functions in the staff as existed many years ago. In this connection,
now as in the past, a great number of elements takes part in implementing
control of the troops of a front: combined-arms staff with many
independent directorates (departments), the artillery staff; the air
army staff, the PVO staff, the engineer directorate and others. In
their work, all these elements depend upon one another and are
constantly forced to coordinate their actions. If these organs are
located at separate control points, coordination of their.acti.ons,
even in accomplishing simple tasks, seriously hampers the work of the
front (army) staff and leads to an extremely great loss of time.
Consider., for example, the planning of operations. As is known,
the staffs of all the arms of troops, special troops, and services
take part in this process together with the staff of the front (army).,
and the planning is carried out on a broad scale. But despite this,
it still is a single, centralized process. Although they act on
behalf of the common goal of the operation, all services and arms of
troops work disconnectedly. As a consequence, planning breaks down:
the operational plan is worked out in one place by one organ, the plan
for the combat use of missiles and the artillery is worked out by
another organ in another place, the plan for the combat use of
aviation is worked out by a third organ in a third place, etc. Because
all these plans are closely tied in with one another and require
constant coordination during their working out, the planning of operations
extends over a long period of time.
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This-principle of planning was tolerable as long as the factor
of time did not play such a decisive role in the control of troops as
it does at the present time.
The dynamic nature of operations and the striving of the opposing
sides to seize the initiative will lead to one form of combat operations
rapidly-transforming into another without significant pauses. Those
.prolonged periods of preparation of operations, which now take place
in our conduct of all types of training exercises, will vanish. Under
these conditions, it.is natural that staffs will.be required to coordinate
and execute an entire complex of complicated measures, which must.be
planned in short periods of time. Decisions must be implemented on
a broad coordinated front, and very rapidly. Consequently, an urgent
need arises to speed up and improve the process of planning. It seems
to us, that in order to resolve this problem, it is advisable to have
a single planning center in the composition of the field comband`of
a front (army).
We carry out the direction of troops and the control of weapons
of destruction in much the same manner as the planning of operations.
At present, on the scale of ii front, the combat operations of combined-
arms large units (tank and motorized rifle troops) are under the
immediate direction of the staff of the front (army), while the
weapons of destruction are in the hands of the chief of the missile
troops and artillery and his staff, of the commander and staff of the
air army, of the chief of the PVO troops, and of the chief of the
chemical troops. This situation also leads to great inconvenience in
the control of troops and does not promote increased effectiveness in
the work of the control organs.'
We consider that unification of the functions of the direction
of troops and the control of the weapons of. destruction may prove to
be not only beneficial but even extremely necessary.
In the work of the staffs, the rapid. collection, processing and
transmission of information materials to cammand echelons and troops
become especially important. Today, it is extremely important to know
at all times the exact location of all forces and weapons and their
condition and readiness to fulfil combat tasks. For this reason,, it
is necessary that the staffs sharply reduce the time for processing
information.
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However, the existing system for the collection of data on a
situation is multi-staged. Information material, as formerly, is
transmitted successive]y from one echelon to another: the regimental
staff transmits information to the division staff, which transmits it
to the army staff; it is only the army staff which informs the front
staff of the situation. All directorates (departments), services and
arms of troops engage in the collection of information at the scale
of the front (army). Therefore, information on the situation is
scattered among them. After reaching the front command post, the data
on a situation are first studied;and.,collated in the staffs of the
arms of troops and the services, then they are reported and re-reported
to various chiefs, and only after'this are they reported to the
commander. In order to have a complete picture of a situation, the
front (army) staff and particularly the operations directorate
(department), in addition to receiving information directly from
subordinate staffs, is obliged to collect situation data from the
staffs of arms of troops and from the services. Coming from various
sources, many of these data are incomplete and contradictory, do not
coincide in time, and require rechecking and clarification.
All this creates excessive'red tape within the staff and finally
leads to the fact that the collected and processed situation data do..,
not correspond to the true troop situation at any given moment. In the
army staff, the data lag behindby 1 or 2 hours, and in the front staff
by 2 or 3 hours. The commander is deprived of the capability.to influence
the course of an operation.in time, and often makes decisions according
to a situation which, in reality, no longer exists.
In addition, the content of the information received by each
service and arm of troops has much in common, and the requests:for
these data by various consumers create an extremely heavy load on
subordinate staffs, upset them, and tear them away from the solution
of other important and complex problems unnecessarily.
The necessity for all services and all staffs of arms of troops
to collect information, which stems directly from the organization of
the control organs, leads to the. overloading .?of lines of communication,
necessitates supplementary channels, and involves an increase in the
expenditure of communications resources at control points; this in
turn makes the staffs more cumbersome and less mobile. It should also
be noted that all inquiries and reports on the situation and.the
operations of the troops are still made by means'of message and radio
signal codes, which greatly delays the collection and processing of
information.
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It is perfectly obvious that such an information system has
completely outlived its usefulness. In order to ensure rapid
reactions by the' command echelon-and the staffs to a situation, it is
necessary to centralize the collection and processing of information
data. All information must be concentrated in one organ and be put
on an overall map or screen. However, this can be done only after an
appropriate reorganization of the control organs.
Intelligence should be considered separately. New demands
are also being made on it, particularly on the process of collecting
and processing date on the enemy. Carefully organized and unceasing
intelligence work has become the guarantee of timely detection of
.enemy preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Today,
as never before, the combat readiness of troops and their ability tto'
a'coaadi$ct-t;successfully combat operations depend on intelligence operations.
The fulfilment of all the tasks assigned to intelligence demands an
even greater centralization of its resources, single-control, and
firmer direction. Without this, intelligence organs will hardly be
able to play their part.
Even though this is obvious, the intelligence organs and their
forces and means'are still disconnected from the organizational
standpoint. On the scale of a front, not only the intelligence
directorate, but also the artillery staff, the air army staff, the
engineer directorate, the chemical staff and others are engaged in
intelligence. A similar, situation exists in the staff of the army
and in the staffs of large units. All these intelligence organs frequently
work on their own, on behalf of only that arm of troops which they are
called upon to serve,and if some of the information obtained by them
does become the property of:all the troops, it reaches them only. after
a very great delay.
It is completely understandable that such an organization of
intelligence organs cannot, under modern conditions, ensure a high
degree of effectiveness in the receipt of intelligence data. The role
of. this service has grown to such an extent that there is a direct
necessity to combine all these organs into a single independent
intelligence center, directly subordinate to the coamnander of troops
of the front, and having all the means of intelligence at its disposal.
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Therefore, under the existing organization of the field command
of a front (army), the efforts of all its elements are disunited;
this gives rise to frequent confusion in the operations of various.
arms of troops, complicates coordination of the efforts of the various
means of combat, and creates great difficulty in the rapid assignment
of their combat missions.
In order. to eliminate these shortcomings, and to ensure stable
control of troops on the scale of a front (army), it is necessary to
centralize. drastically the direction of troop combat operations.. The
organizational structure of operational staffs must be changed
correspondingly.
It appears to us that from the standpoint of centralization of
the control of troops and weapons of destruction, the reorganization.
of control organs must proceed by way of unification of all the
directorates (departments) and staffs of the arms of troops and
services which are concerned with the direction of troops into single
control centers.
In accordance with this, it is advisable, in our opinion,to have
within the composition of the field ecmmand of a front (army):
--a main command-planning center;
--a nuclear/missile center;
-man operations center;
--an intelligence center;
--a PVO control center.
The main command-planning center must be the basic working organ
of the commander of troops of the front. Here must be united all the
currently existing control organs of the staffs of arms of troops and
the services which are concerned with the planning of operations and
the direction of troops. All the planning of an operation must take
place in this center only. Centralized control of all means of
combat,,including ground troops, missile weapons, PVO, and aviation,
will also be carried out from here simultaneously'. The complement of
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this center will include generals and officers from all arms of troops
and specialties. When located at the command post, the chief of staff
of the front and all chiefs who are directly responsible for the
direction of the operation must be located in this center together
with the commander. For rapid analysis of the situation and decision
making, a single map of the operational and radiation situation, the
aerial situation, and the situation of the PVO,and a map of the.
grouping and combat readiness of our missile weapons must be
constantly-maintained here. These maps should be mounted in a
vertical position for observation, in the manner of the PVO screen.
In.relation to the remaining echelons of the field command
of the front (army), this center will be the directing organ. It
should direct their activity in order to ensure rapid reaction of the
command echelon to all changes in the situation.
The nuclear/missile center will be a united organ for controlling
the weapons of destruction of the front. All the weapons of nuclear
attack must be concentrated in the hands of the chief of this center
i.e. missiles of all types, bomber aircraft and others, which will
undoubtedly improve and expedite their use.
Inasmuch as the overall plan for the use of nuclear/missile
weapons will be implemented by the main.command-planning center,.the
functions of the nuclear/missile center in this respect will consist
of making all the essential calculations for the use of nuclear/missile
weapons, calculations of the possibilities for neutralizing various
targets, of the safe removal of our troops from the ground zeros of.
bursts, of the probable degree of destruction of the objectives, etc.
In addition, it must keep track of the movement and readiness of the
missile weapons of the front, maintain an operational record of the
availability and receipt of missiles and the special charges for them.,
and maintain a graphic chart of their readiness.
The nuclear/missile center must have direct communications with
all the weapons of nuclear attack and must coordinate all its work
closely with the operations and intelligence centers which are the
sources of information.
The operations center should engage in the collection and
processing of data on the operational and radiation situation, decide
questions of combat support, implement the transmission of combat
tasks to the troops and control their fulfilment.
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All information on the location and operations of'our troops and
on the results of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides will be
concentrated, summarized, and thoroughly analyzed in this center.
This will permit the creation of the,conditions for the uninterrupted
processing of all data on the ground and aerial situations and will
bring about completeness and a high degree of effectiveness in the
collection. and preparation of data, permitting decisions to be made
rapidly by the commander of troops-of the front (army). In order
to achieve rapid processing of information, the operations center must
have direct communications with all the formations. of the front..
The activities of this center will be conducted through the
chiefs of axes, who must process the-data on the position of their
troops on the appropriate operational axes and transmit commands
received from the main command-planning center to the staffs of the
appropriate formations (large units) for implementation.
Since our proposed organization of field command of a front (army)
assumes the abolition of a number of currently existing services and
directorates (engineer, chemical,. and others) and the transfer of
decisions on their problems to the operations center, the functions
of this organ will be much broader than those carried out by the
operations directorate. In connection with this, the operations center,
as well as the main command-planning center, must have a complement
of highly trained generals and officers from the appropriate arms of
troops and specialties.
The intelligence center is assigned the collection and processing
of all intelligence information. All the intelligence resources of
the front are concentrated in the hands of this single organ: it must
conduct intelligence work on behalf of all arms of troops and
disseminate information concerning the enemy to all centers. For
the nuclear/missile center, the intelligence center must keep an
account of targets (objectives for nuclear attack), make an evaluation
and general description of them, keep track of the movement of
primary targets, calculate the most advantageous time and place for
the delivery of nuclear strikes, pinpoint the coordinates of the
targets and prepare the initial topographic and geodetic data. The
chief of intelligence of the front should be the head of the
intelligence center.
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This center must have direct communications with reconnaissance
aircraft aloft, with radio reconnaissance means and with other
important sources of intelligence information.
The PVO control center is designated for control of the PVO
weapons, including the fighter aircraft of the front. Its mission
will include directing the :.repulse , of massed enemy aircraft and
missile strikes. This center must have direct communications with
all PVO weapons, with the staffs of aviation large units and with the
intelligence center. It should be headed by the chief of PVO of the'
front.
We shall not stop to consider materiel, technical and other
support. It appears to us that their organization must also be set
up in accordance with-the same principle.
This organizational structure of the field command of a front
(army), will undoubtedly permit all its echelons to decide more
effectively all the complex problems of troop. control which are
concerned with a common goal and a single concept. In addition,
,such an organizational structure of the operational staffs will
correspond to a greater degree to modern methods of controlling troops,
which are based on the use of the latest control equipment.
In our opinion, the organization of all subordinate staffs must
also be built in accordance with this same principle.
In order to increase the flexibility of control, along with the
proposed changes in the organizational structure of the field command
of a front (army), it is necessary to review the means and methods of
work of the staffs in the area of collection, analysiq and transmission
of information data.
Without going into a detailed description of this problem, we
believe that the information system must ensure that all interested
elements receive the data on a situation as the events occur. In
order to achieve this, it is necessary to make;, some:.changes'lin the
procedure for sending reports at the level of the division, :army. and ? front . .
Along with a periodic presentation, say li.or(2 times a day, of the
more substantial reports with a description of the positions and
operations of the two sides which are now presented, it is essential.
to organize the transmission of short signals to indicate only the
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lines attained by the units of the first echelon and the nature of
their combat operations ("I am advancing","I am defending", "I am
withdrawing", etc.). These signals must be transmitted by the staffs
of large units every 30 to 40 minutes according to a strictly
established schedule. In order to send these signals, the division.
staffs could take data from the battalions which come in automatically
through the use of course-plotters (kursoprokiadehik) and determine
for every given moment only,the prise location of the battalion command
post (the center of the combat formation).
It must be supposed that this simplification of reporting and
elimination of intermediate elements will permit the staff of the
front to have precise data on the position of the first echelon troops
30 minutes after the units reach any line. Experience from wars and
exercises indicates that these data, especially under complex
situational conditions, are sufficient to enable the commander to
react instantaneously to the course of events.
In this connection, reality requires the establishment of a
procedure for transmitting information by which each command echelon
can relay information on the position of its troops and the enemy
directly to the next higher staff: the regimental staff to the army
staff, the division staff to the front staff, and simultaneously to
relay this information correspondingly to the division and army
staffs also.
[14 have examined above only one of the questions of incongruity in
the organizational structure of operational staffs due to the changed
nature of combat operations. A second problem,which is directly related
to the organization of control organs and which, in our opinion, is
also in need of review, is the problem of control points.
The increased importance of uninterrupted control of troops
provides a basis for assuming that in future operations staffs will
be one of the primary targets of enemy action. The combatants will
adopt every measure to disorganize the work of control organs and to
disrupt the direction of troops. For this purpose, strikes by
missiles or aircraft may be delivered, diversionary groups may be
sent out, and jamming may be conducted against the means of
communication. The capability of using nuclear weapons creates a real
threat of instantaneous removal from action of entire control echelons
and large bodies of troops. Therefore, the organization of operational
staffs must be subordinated first of all to guaranteeing their vitality
and ability to retain control in the most complex situation.
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Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this may be
achieved by creating dispersed, more ramified, and constantly operative
networks of control points to ensure rapid replacement of points which
have been put out'of action, and broad continuity in the control of
troops.
In an operational element, the solution to this.problem is
reflected by the creation in formations of control points, command
and forward command posts, and also rear control points. In this
connection, it is believed that the existence of these,points
permits successful control of a large number of troops and weapons
of destruction.
In our opinion, such an organization and echeloning of control
points in the front (army) cannot. sufficiently ensure their vitality
under new conditions and, consequently, does not promote increased
stability of control.
The creation of several points for the control of front (army)
troops is justified only when each of them functions constantly, is
fully independent and is capable of assuming troop control in the event...
that another point is destroyed by an enemy nuclear strike. Unfortunately,
front (army) command and forward command posts, as they are at present
constituted, do not meet these requirements. The basic reasons for
this consist of- the following.
In the first place, despite its numerical strength, the T/0 of
the field control of a front (army) does not in fact provide for the
creation of two full-fledged control points. For this reason, only
one independent control element, the command post, is actually
created in a front (army). The forward command post is organized by
using the forces and means of the command post. In its make-up it is
usually a temporary and poorly organized control organ and, naturally,
cannot fully provide the commander with firm direction of troops in
the-event that the command post is put out of action.
Secondly, the forward command post is not a constantly functioning
control organ, because it is usually created only for the period of the
conduct of combat operations. During the preparation for an operation,
the generals and officers and the transportation and communications
means designated for the command and forward command posts are usually,
located together.at the command post.
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It must not be overlooked that the enemy will seek out and
destroy control points, not only during the course of combat
operations, but also during the period of preparation for an offensive
and during the organization of defense. For this reason, it is quite
obvious that with the personnel and the means of control of.the .
command and forward command posts all located in one place, even for
a short interval of time, there is serious danger of their simultaneous
destruction and the actual removal from action of the entire control
of the front (army), which can undoubtedly cause complete disruption
of the control of a large number of troops.
Thirdly, the very fact of the creation of a forward command post
predetermines its place and role in an operation. As is known, it
moves forward on one of the axes, as close as possible to the front,
so that the commander can feel the "pulse" of the combat and observe
it to the extent possible. Almost all the chiefs of directorates
(departments), services, and the commanders of arms of troops arrive
at this post together with the commander, all communications channels
are switched here, and in this manner the center of gravity in the,;:
control of troops is transferred entirely to the forward command post..
Thus, because of this, the command post, with all the means of control,
becomes an unnecessary attribute and actually participates only
indirectly in the direction of troop combat operations.
We consider this to be nothing more than a vestige of the past..
The tendency to move the commander and his observation post forward
to the troop combat formations was justified in the years of World War II,.
when operations developed relatively methodically, when front
formations and armies had a comparatively shallow operational formation
f+ or 5 words missing] means of control permitting direct influence
on the course of operations from command posts far removed from the
troops.
Now, however, when the nature and conditions of conducting
operations have changed sharply, such a situation cannot be acknowledged
as correct. In the future, the basic method of conducting combat u-
operations will be mass nuclear/missile strikes, carried out with the
aim of simultaneous mass destruction,not so much of troops located on
the line of combat contact of the opposing sides, as of objectives
located in the rear area. The center of gravity of combat operations
under these conditions can shift from the zone of combat contact to
the depth of the disposition of front (army) troops. The former
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linear formations and operations of troops will also disappear,
engagements will be conducted on axes and in separate areas, and;'.. :.,.';
operations in the rear area will frequently (begincbefox'e-i.the. advance.,.
of ground troops from the front.
It is perfectly obvious that in making decisions in such a
situation it is insufficient to be guided by the picture of combat
on one axis. In order to-reactuboth-,correctly and quickly to the
course of combat operations, the commander must constantly be
aware of the entire situation. But this is only possible if, during...
the course of the entire operation, he is supported by the basic
personnel of the front staff who are located at the command post in
the area of the main grouping of troops. If, however,:4uring the
course of an operation,the commander is located primarily at a forward
command post on only one of the axes, he will be unavoidably detached
from the overall situation and will be unable to influence not only
the development of the operation as a whole but even the most important
changes which may arise at any moment away from the forward command
post. Under these conditions, it is difficult to say where the
presence of the commander will be required first--forward, on one of
the flanks or in the rear of the front's troops.
Deep disposition of front (army) troops, particularly of reserves,
missile units, airborne troops, and the possibility of committing
large units to battle in a hurry from the depth also make the forward
move of the commander and the forward command post senseless,because
in essence it causes him to be detached from the main forces. In the
control of troops, emphasis must t ow)be placed not on personal
observation of the field of combat and on personal contact of the
front troop... commander with the commanders of large units, but on
control from a distance. Of course, even under modern conditions, the
commander must visit certain axes for the immediate direction of
battle, particularly during the critical moments of the development
of an operation. But this will take place only incidentally and will
not be the system to which we adhere today.
It is also essential to consider the fact that the evolution of
means of control is proceeding in the direction of complex automation
of the processes of direction of troop.;combat activity, and it must .be.:
assumed that staffs will soon be equipped with automated systems.
However, the relatively large size of these systems and the complexity
of their apparatus limit their maneuverability and permit their
effective use only at the command post.
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 Fourthly, the necessity 1:f o r. _a nn auxiliary control point will
often arise, in the course of an offensive operation as well as in
defense, especially when we succeed in breaking up the enemy's.
operational formation and in cutting off part of his troops from the
main grouping, and when the operation therefore disintegrates into a
number of engagements. However, at present it is impossible to do
this because of the limited capabilities in forces and means of the
operational staffs, which are capable of creating only command and
forward command posts from their complement.
And, fifthly, as has already been mentioned, as a result of
changes in the situation,critical moments may arise on individual
axes in an operation,requiring the personal presence of the commander
and his involvement in the direction of troop combat operations.
But the existing organization of control points and the means of
communications and movement available to. the staffs do not permit the
commander to move rapidly to these sectors of the front. The forward
command post is obviously not suited to accomplishing such tasks since
it is too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, and it is impossible to..
conceal its location in the vicinity of the enemy. However, there is.
no other organ for this purpose in a front. or army.
Another important condition in increasing the viability of
control points is their reliable security (okhrana), defense, and.
combat support. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons
against control points and the increased possibilities of an attack
on them by mobile units of enemy ground troops, diversionary groups,
and airborne troops(indicate the necessity for having sufficiently
strong special organic security and support units for the protection
of staffs.
During World War II subunits and units from, the troops were.
usually used for the preparation, support, and,-.'frequently, also for
the defense of control points. This led to disengaging combat subunits
from the accomplishment of important tasks at the immediate front and
was not justified. As a rule, temporarily detached subunits and units
were not suitable in their organization, equipment, training, and
experience for accomplishing the tasks of preparing and supporting
control points. The productivity and quality of their work was low,
despite the fact that a large quantity of personnel and equipment..'
was detached, part of the equipment was not used because of the
impossibility of using it in the preparation of control points, and
work was performed separately and was not united under a single command.
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The"situation concerning the security, defense, and support of
control points is also in approximately this same state, even at the
present time. The security and service regiment provided for by the
T/O&E and. attached to the front staff, and the battalion attached to
the army staff do not have organic engineer, chemical, and other
special subunits at their disposal. This situation, as in the years
of the last war, again leads to the fact that it will be necessary to
use temporary and untrained special line units and subunits.for:the:'
preparation, support, and servicing of control points.
Entirely different results can be achieved if these subunits
are united and if on the basis of them, special units are created,
equipped with the necessary weapons, equipment and the other standard
items required for the combat support, servicing, and preparation of
control points. The personnel of these units who are trained in
advance will also acquire experience. On the whole, significantly
greater effectiveness in the use of these same forces and means will
be achieved and the organization and conduct of the security, defense,
servicing, and support of control points will be greatly improved.
The problem of the direction of the entire security service for
control points and of the maintenance. of the required order in them
is still decided by us in the old manner. Up to the present time,
apart from the staff commandants, many staff officers who are
insufficiently trained and inexperienced in this respect engage in
this work,while having more than one function.
The growing volume of "activities and the broadening functions of
the commandant's service (komendantskaya sluzhba), as well as the j,
necessity of carrying it out constantly, have'drastically elevated the
role of this service; it has now acquired the importance of one of the
main elements in troop control. This circumstance requires
centralization of the direction of the commandant's service, the
placing of a strong independent organ at its head., and the subordination
to it of all the forces and means assigned for the security and
preparation of control points. In our opinion, only with-.- this
condition is it possible to resolve more purposefully and effectively
the important problems of security and defense, of antiatomic
protection, engineer preparation, and the concealed placement and
transfer of control points and tonstantly:'.to maintain the strictest
order in their disposition areas, all'of which will directly affect
the viability of control organs.
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Therefore, all these arguments permit a restatement.of the
conclusion that the existing organizational struit'e of operational
staffs does not provide for the creation in a front (army) of a ramified
network of control points which. in turn does not promote an increase in
the flexibility and stability of troop control. The organization of
operational staffs, it appears to us, must be such as to ensure the
creation of not less than two permanently operative full-fledged control
points in a front (army) for all forms of combat operations and to
provide the opportunity for the commander, in certain cases, to
personally and directly participate in the direction of troops in the
most important sectors.
For this purpose, it is essential, in our opinion, to have two
independent control organs in the composition of the field command of
a front and army.
The first is the staff of the front (army), including the basic
complement of the field command and all the above-mentioned centers.
On the basis of it, it is necessary to develop the command post of the
front (2EM) as the primary control point, headed directly by the
front (armyltroop commander.
The second is the staff operations group (organic). This
control organ must be somewhat smaller in its composition than the
staff but must have an organization similar to that of the staff.
As an independent control organ, the group must have.its own organic
means of communications and transportation in such quantity as to make.
it capable of assuming complete control of all the troops of the front
in the event that the command post is put out of action. On the basis
of the staff operations group, regardless of the situation, a second:
permanent control point of the front (army) must be created and headed
by the deputy front army troop commander. Its title and designation
will be determined each time by the specific conditions of.the
situation. Therefore, during the preparation for an offensive operation
and in defense, this will usually be an alternate command post, but
during the course of the operation it can become an auxiliary control
point or can carry out the functions characteristic of the forward
command post.
In peacetime, the personnel of the staff operations group should
be located and worked in the appropriate control centers,in order to
facilitate the work and perfect the skills of the officers. During
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the training of staffs, this operations group must be prepared and
knitted, tcgethw as an independent control organ.
For the transportation of the commander and his deputy to any
particular axis where their personal intervention in the direction
of troop combat operations may be required, it is essential to have
specially allotted control vehicles in the T/O&E of the staff of
the front and the staff operations group.
For-the security and combat support of control points, it is
advisable to create special units and subunits and to include them
in the T/0 of the field control of the front (army). In our opinion,
they should be called commandant's units (keanendatskaya chast). It
appears to,,be advisable to use organic commandant's regiments and.
separate commandant's battalions as the organizational basis. For
servicing the command posts and rear control point of the front, it
is essential to have a commandant's regiment for each of them; for
servicing the staff operations group of the front and the command post
of the army, to have separate commandant's battalions.
For direction of the commandant's service and of the security,
defense preparation, and support of control points, it is essential
to. create in the staffs commandaturas (commandant's groups) with a
complement of 5 to 8 officers headed by the commandant to whom the
commandant's units and subunits must be subordinated. These will be
organic, independent, and influential organs which possess the necessary,
forces and means and are capable of maintaining order at control
points.and of directing their relocation, security, and, defense under
any conditions.
The daily.activity of the conmandaturas must be carried out through
permament duty commandants. In this connection, and also the basis
of the proposed changes in the structure of staffs, we consider.it .
advisable to abolish the operational duty'officer in the staffs, particularly
since he is no longer in a position to fulfil functions concerned with
the collection of situation data which he has been charged with to the
present time.
The presence of organic commandaturas will permit the concentration
of the direction of all measures of security of control points in one
element and in one place, will bring order to the commandant's service,
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and will significantly elevate its authority. In addition, this will
release many chiefs and officers of staffs from their involvement
in the organization and direction of the commandant's service and will
give them the opportunity to spend more time on their immediate duties.
We propose a broad study of the questions which have been raised
and a more rapid realization of the necessary changes in the structure
and methods of work of control organs.
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