MILITARY THOUGHT: WAYS OF FURTHER INCREASING THE COMBAT READINESS OF TROOPS, BY MAJOR-GENERAL G. SEMENOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029400140001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 8, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ways of Further Increasing
the Combat Readiness of Troops
by
Major-General G. Semenov
In solving problems of further increasing the
combat readiness of our troops and of the continuous
strengthening of the defensive capability of the
country, we must proceed above all from the
possibility of a surprise attack by an aggressor with
the mass use of nuclear weapons. Now it is probably
no secret to anyone that the surprise attack, as
a means of attaining their basic predatory aims,
has been elevated to the status of military doctrine
by many imperialistic countries.
Inasmuch as incomplete readiness of the armed
forces under conditions of a surprise nuclear attack
can lead to very grave consequences, it would be
foolish of us to reckon on a threatening period.
Combat readiness must be regarded as readiness to
conduct a nuclear war which has started unexpectedly.
In other words, it means the capability of the Soviet
armed forces to defeat at any moment a sudden attack
by an aggressor, to parry his first strikes by
inflicting on him powerful nuclear weapon counter-
strikes, with simultaneous deployment of the ground
troops and the navy in vigorous military operations.
The latter will depend on the readiness of large
units and units of the border military districts
(groups of troops) to begin carrying out their
combat tasks in the shortest possible time.
The achievement of a high state of combat
readiness by the troops of the border military
districts is attained by the execution of a large
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number of very important and varied measures. In
this article we will not attempt to deal with the
whole complex of measures which form the concept
of combat readiness of troops but will give
consideration only to those problems which, as we
see it, are not yet wholly understood and, in
consequence, have found only weak and inadequate
solution among the troops.
The quartering of troops. Troops and especially
important headquarters are quartered as a rule in
cities and political-administrative centers. Many
garrisons, therefore, are overcrowded with troops,
and thus form suitable targets for an enemy's
nuclear strikes. It is fully understandable that
these concentrations of troops occupy the attention
of foreign intelligence, and we have every reason to
suppose that important military garrisons are entered
in the card indices of the Directorate of Planning
of Strategic Targets of the USA as the most important
targets and that nuclear/missile strikes are already
planned against them.
It seems to us that a certain contradiction has
been created between the present quartering of troops
and the requirement to keep them at a high level of
combat readiness. While fully aware of the possibility
of a sudden attack by the enemy with means of mass
destruction, we continue to quarter a large number
of troops and headquarters in one garrison.
Certainly, in favorable conditions, troops and
headquarters can move out of these garrisons in
proper time. We should not, however, underestimate
the danger of a sudden nuclear attack by an aggressor.
In particular, on the assumption that the enemy
possesses ballistic missiles with a range of
12-15,000 kms and a speed of 18-20,000 kms/hr, we
can suppose that the target chosen will be destroyed
within 20-30 minutes from the launching of the
missile. Even supposing the most favorable conditions,
when we have been able to detect, 30-40 minutes in
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advance, the preparations for launching the missile,
that amount of time will not be sufficient for us
to move our troops out away from nuclear strikes.
Many large units and units may be in places of
permanent quarters in towns and heavily populated
points.
At present it is difficult to judge the results
of an enemy's nuclear strikes on the troop garrisons
under consideration. Theoretical calculations,
however, demonstrate what colossal losses might be
inflicted in the towns struck by nuclear weapons.
At the military-scientific conference of the MPVO
(mestnaya protivovozdushnaya oborona - local
antiaircraft defense) of the Latvian SSR which took
place in 1960, estimates were given of losses to
be expected from a surprise nuclear strike in the
center of Riga by a nuclear bomb with a TNT
equivalent of 200,000 tons. According to these
data the general casualties could amount to
330,000 persons, of whom there would be 109,000
dead and 221,000 injured. All principal buildings
less than 4.5 kms from the ground zero of the burst
would be destroyed. The whole town would be a mass
of flames.
It is scarcely possible in these circumstances
to talk about any combat readiness of large units
and units stationed in this garrison when the nuclear
strike is made; they will be either completely
annihilated or disabled.
The question involuntarily arises: Is it not
time to review the current quartering of troops and
headquarters from the point of view of their
maximum dispersal within the territories of the
military districts?
The posing of this question is nothing new.
Certain comrades have already put forward in the
military press the idea of doing away with big
barrack cantonments) and dispersing the troops
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on the principle of each battalion in a separate
military cantonment. These proposals, however,
were not developed further because they were not
adequately presented and chiefly because the
authors did not indicate the means of their
practical application.
In our view, dispersal of troops is necessary
even in peacetime; undoubtedly it would lead to
an increase in the viability of large units and
units and consequently in their combat readiness.
In the first place, the necessity has arisen
for important military garrisons to be reduced to
the utmost so that in the event of a sudden enemy
nuclear attack several of their large units would
not undergo the risk of simultaneous destruction.
Subsequently, to the degree possible, it is
desirable to disperse the troops in every large unit
in a manner consistent with the general operational
plan for the deployment of the troops. If is of
course quite evident that dispersal must have its
limits, but the principle advanced by some authors
of dispersal by battalions is, in our opinion,
quite untenable, as it can lead to a wide dispersal
of troops which, though favorable from the point of
view of antiatomic defense, is inexpedient as
regards the necessary creation of groupings of
forces and weapons in the very first hours of a war.
As we see it, troops should be dispersed so that
there are not more than one or two combat units
quartered in each garrison, and the quarters for
these garrisons should be selected in those areas
from which it would be most convenient for them to
begin active operations in the required grouping
at any time.
In raising the question of changing the quarters
of troops, we do not mean only combined-arms large
units and units. It is a question of the dispersal
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of large units and units of all arms of troops and
types of armed forces. In particular the location
of missile large units (units) in border military
districts (groups of troops) should be such that
every battalion is dispersed in a separate garrison.
Part of the missile subunits should be on combat
duty beyond the military post limit, periodically
changing the area of the launching sites.
In the disposition of the district PVO radio-
technical units it is necessary to make their
location points conform strictly with the location
of the radiotechnical posts of large units of the
PVO of the Country so that, if the latter go out
of action, the district radiotechnical units can
replace these losses and restore in good time the
impaired radar field of observation.
Air large units should be dispersed so that
there is an airfield as a base for each air
regiment and one or two reserve airfields for
maneuver on which the necessary supplies should
be established in advance and komendaturas and
control points organized. Furthermore, a network
of decoy (lozhnyy) airfields should be constructed
and a notional change of bases by air large units
should be carried out periodically. While effecting
a dispersal of air large units we must certainly
allow first of all for the capacity to create at
the right time air groupings which would ward off
an enemy's massive air attack, deliver an immediate
retaliatory strike, and which would make the most
effective use of the available forces for supporting
the first operations of the ground troops.
The need to disperse the control organs of
higher formations has also arisen. Under the present
dispositions, the headquarters and directorates of
the military district, the headquarters of the air army,
corps (army) antiaircraft defense, etc, are frequently
stationed in one town. Such a concentrated location
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of the controlling organs may, in the event of a
surprise nuclear strike, lead to the simultaneous
destruction of several headquarters of higher
formations, and consequently to the loss of troop
control in the very first hours of a war. We
suggest, therefore, that, in order to disperse
the controlling organs, the important combined-arms
headquarters should be withdrawn from large towns
to more suitable places to ensure stable control
in the event of a surprise enemy attack. Furthermore,
with this in view, headquarters of military districts
and armies should prepare in advance field control
points with a sufficiently developed communications
system and arrange that responsible staff officers
should be on continual duty there.
We realize that these measures which we are
proposing for altering the existing dispositions
of the troops require large material expenditures
on supplementary capital construction. Nevertheless,
this problem should be resolved gradually by the
united efforts of military commanders and directors
of agencies of local government, by a transfer of
housing, storage, and other funds. In this way
local authorities can carry out construction of
installations for the use of troops outside the
limits of garrisons, and the military command for
their part would compensate for these expenditures
by putting the corresponding housing funds at the
disposal of the local councils. This will permit
the dispersal of troops and material resources
without considerable expenditures.
Of course measures for the dispersal of troops
outside of towns require a comparatively long time,
in the course of which we must be continually ready
to ward off a sudden attack by the enemy. We
must therefore seek additional ways of increasing
the troops' combat readiness and the stability
of command exercised by headquarters, with the
locations as they are today. This can be achieved,
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in our opinion, by changing the routine and activities
of the troops. At present, as is well known, large
units and units, if they do not move out to summer
camps, are located all the year round in permanent
quarters and carry out combat training in the
immediate vicinity. In training centers, units and
large units move out only in order to carry out
various training exercises, for a very short time.
We consider it advisable to put into practice
the training of troops by moving out large units
and units into so-called mobile camps in winter and
summer. In this connection, the move out should be
of not less than 2-3 weeks' duration. The sequence
of these moves of troops should be planned on a
district (army) scale, so calculated that concurrent-
ly there should be about one-third of the combat
troops outside permanent quarters, i.e., in mobile
camps. At a time of increased tension in the
international situation and on the introduction of
increased combat readiness, the number of large units
and units in mobile camps can be increased by
decision of the district (army) command and, under
favorable circumstances, on the other hand, can be
decreased.
While they are in the mobile camp the troops
can, within the complex, carry out tactical,
tactical-special, fire, and other types of combat
training in various localities and under different
conditions of a situation. Every unit (large unit),
in a mobile camp should therefore move out at full
strength with all transportable reserves of materiel.
Linked with the change of routine of troops,
certain changes in the program of combat training
must evidently be introduced, chiefly in increasing
the time for tactical and tactical-special training.
This may be effected by cutting down the hours of
exercises in fire training and altering the
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conditions for carrying them out. We think that
in a nuclear war the fire skill of the personnel
should consist of the ability /2 or 3 words missinj7
weapon, massive automatic fire in the composition
of a subunit. To achieve this it is not at all
necessary to spend a lot of time in exercises out
of the Manual of Firing (Burs strelb). The soldier's
training in accurate fire may be carried out
successfully in the initial period of his training
by his doing 2 or 3 exercises. Further skill in
marksmanship should be acquired in tactical exercises
with combat firing. We consider it possible for all
tactical exercises, from platoon to battalion, to be
carried out with combat firing alone, in different
places and under varying conditions. The troops will
move out to these exercises on the calling of a
combat alert, as is done at the present, but not
widely enough.
A change in the routine of the troops and in the
methods of combat training in the direction indicated
will undoubtedly increase the combat readiness of
large units and units, because these measures will
improve the field training of troops and will permit
the dispersal, to some degree, of troops stationed in
large garrisons.
The question of finding ways of increasing the
stability of troop control in the first days of a
war deserves special attention. One such method, in
addition to the changes of location of headquarters
to effect their dispersal, is the maintenance between
headquarters of a smooth transition in troop control.
For example, the headquarters of a district (group)
must envisage the possibility of assuming the control
of army or corps large units in the event of the
destruction of the army or corps headquarters. In
turn, the headquarters of a combined-arms army must
always be ready to take the place of the headquarters
of a district (group) in the event the latter goes out
of action. This succession of control must be provided
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for at all levels. Each headquarters of a formation,
large unit, or unit must, even in peacetime, have its
own replacements (understudies) or successors who
are ready to take the command upon themselves when
the basic organs of control go out of action.
For this purpose it is certainly not sufficient
to confine oneself to a formal appointment of
understudy - headquarters. They must be able, in
time of need, to utilize each large unit in
conformity with its operational purpose. It is
therefore necessary, in our opinion, to have in
the substitute headquarters duplicates of the
operational and mobilization plans, cryptographic
documents (SUV), and the requisite means of
communication. Furthermore these understudy head-
quarters should, even in peacetime, be ready to
function at one level higher and during troop and
command-staff exercises they should be given the
control of the troops more often.
It appears that a similar takeover of the
organs of control can be adopted not only for all
arms of troops but for military commissariats,
organs of civil defense, and for other institutions
and departments, according to their own specific
character.
Concerning the methods of daily maintenance
of the troops at an increased level o combat
rea ness. One of these methods consists of
changing the existing routine of storing mobile
supplies and moving them on the alert signal.
This refers,fi stly, to large units and units
which are in a continual state of readiness and
whose mobile supplies are kept, at the present time,
in permanent (statsionarnyy) depots. In order to
move out these supplies at the alert, a large number
of personnel and transport are brought in, and what
is more, much time is wasted. The adoption of various
means of mechanization would certainly speed up the
process of moving the supplies and would ease the
labor of loading them, but radical changes are not
suggested.
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The moving of mobile supplies from places of
permanent stationing continues to be a thorny
problem for the combat readiness of troops.
Actually it is only the shifting of supplies which
limits the time for assembling troops at the
alert and for moving them to the concentration area.
With the aim of continued maintenance of
increased combat readiness of large units and units,
some comrades suggest keeping part of the mobile
supplies in the areas of troop concentration, while
others advocate cutting down the overall weight
of mobile supplies and thus rendering our large units
(units) more maneuverable.
We do not share these opinions. Firstly,we
can not rule out the possibility that certain large
units and units may be placed on alert, but instead
of moving out to the concentration areas in the
event of a sudden enemy attack, they may be moved
directly from their places of permanent quartering
to perform their combat tasks. Secondly, the
cutting down of the overall weight of the mobile
supplies of large units and units in their present
organic constitution could significantly lower the
combat efficiency of the troops in the first days
of a war.
As we see it, this problem should be solved by
splitting up the stationary warehouses and by
maintaining the greater part of mobile supplies
(especially ammunition) in combat vehicles and
motor transport. In short, mobile stores must be
really mobile so as not to limit the combat readiness
of troops. To this end we consider it possible for
large units and units, especially tank, which are
permanently in a state of readiness, to keep their
ammunition in combat vehicles and their equipment
of all kinds in specially allocated and equipped
motor vehicles. When the troops are placed on alert,
mobile supplies must be transported together with
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the units (large units) or concentrated in suitable
places, according to the decision of the respective
commanders. Such a method of keeping supplies ensures
great viability and decreases considerably the time
needed to bring large units and units to combat
readiness, and also increases the maneuverability of
troops on the battlefield.
Another, no-less-important measure is the
further improvement of the methods of providing
combat tasks to the troops who are in permanent
readiness. We doubt if it is necessary to point out
that with the existing system of communications,
there is the possibility of loss of troop control
by the highest command echelons in the first hours
of a war. As a result, certain large units and units,
although ready to perform their combat tasks may be
inactive for a long time because they do not know
their assignment.
What measures can we take to improve the methods
of communicating combat tasks to troops? It is
evident that firstly a much more reliable multi-
channel system of communications must be established
for large units which are in constant readiness. In
order to effect a periodic check of the working of
the means of communications and of the maintenance
of these large units (units) in a continual state of
alert, it is advisable to have a training signal of
combat readiness in each military district.
Immediately on the transmission of this signal, it
is necessary to allot to the commander of the district
troops, his deputy, chief of staff, and chief of the
operational directorate /several words missin7
large units of constant readiness, to set them out
on a map and in peacetime to keep them in the
personal safe of the commanders of these large units
and units of remote garrisons. At the required time,
on receiving the agreed signal or on a sudden enemy
attack, the commanders must open the packets and act
according to the prescribed instruction. This method
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of communicating tasks to troops, which has been
current for some time in certain military districts
(groups) as a way of checking combat readiness, is
to be recommended strongly. It should therefore,
in our view, be used by all types of armed forces,
but chiefly by missile troops and aviation.
In maintaining the continual combat readiness
of troops, it is very important for large units
and units of border military districts to be kept
fully staffed. We have raised this question
specially because the necessary attention has not
been given to it in practice, with the result that
certain large units, although actually at full
strength, sometimes cannot move out on the alert
to their own concentration area with their full
complement. This is explained by the fact that a
large number of the personnel and technicians in
these large units spend a considerable time in
carrying out various non-military tasks such as
getting in the harvest or felling timber. These
are certainly necessary tasks, but the existing army
method of allotting manpower and equipment to such
tasks requires review.
In the first place, large units and units which
are in a permanent state of readiness should not be
detailed for work a long way away from their
permanent quarters, nor should detachments made up
of their personnel be sent off to perform non-
military work beyond the boundaries of their garrison.
Under any circumstances every effort should be made
to ensure that large units in a state of permanent
readiness should always be at their authorized strength
and in the vicinity of their own garrisons. In the
case where the need arises to detach personnel and
equipment for non-military work at a great distance
from the permanent location posts, it is advisable not
to create composite formations (formirovaniye) but
to detail entire military subunits, so as not to
impair the combat readiness of several large units
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(units) simultaneously. The same principle should
well be applied in detailing the personnel and
equipment for any other work done by troops, both
inside the unit (large unit) and outside the
boundaries of their place of location.
The continual maintenance of troops at a high
state of readiness is effected by the skillful
choice and preparation of concentration areas of
large units and units when the alert is given.
It is therefore most necessary to select areas of
maximum suitability and usefulness for effecting
the concealment and dispersal of units and large
units which have means of communication, are equipped
with supplies and which have approach routes to
ensure the movements of troops at any season of the
year. We must not forget that the conditions of the
locality must permit the organization of antiatomic
protection with a minimum expenditure of personnel
and material in the carrying out of engineering works.
Commanders at all levels should know the place
of disposition of their own units and small units
in these areas and the approach routes to such
places, and should take all steps to ensure that they
are always maintained in good condition.
Concerning the system of checking combat and
mobilization rea ness. The present method of esting
separate un s an arge units by calling an alert,
although known to be effective as regards the troops,
cannot give the whole picture of the level of combat
readiness of operational formations. Moreover, the
combat readiness of headquarters of districts and
armies is still being insufficiently tested by higher
command echelons.
We consider it advisable for important operational
command-staff exercises of a district (or group of
districts) to start with placing headquarters on the
alert and issuing them their operational directives.
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Large units and units of all arms of troops (with
obvious exceptions), military commissariats, and
organs of civil defense in the district area,
together with the headquarters of districts, should
be put on the alert and assume a state of readiness.
At the same time it is advisable to have a test
mobilization (otmobilizovaniye)of a number of
large units and units. If such exercises take
place in a maritime area, it would be most useful
to alert the manpower and resources of the navy and
bring them into the exercise so as to carry out
joint operations with other types of armed forces.
As a result of such a complex test of all problems of
combat and mobilization readiness, we can detect
deficiencies and find ways of eliminating them.
Undoubtedly the carrying out of this measure
on such a large scale will entail large expenditures
and must receive the concurrence of the local soviet
and Party organs. However, the interests of
maintaining a high level of combat readiness dictate
the necessity for such expenses.
On the basis of these considerations, we think
it is also possible, in the interests of increasing
the combat readiness of the troops, to test, by
operational-strategic exercises the different
variants of the activities of the armed forces for
the initial period of a war, at different levels
of their readiness. Such a test of combat readiness
should take place on the scale of the armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact; not in the depth of our own
territory, as is the accepted thing, but on the
forward boundaries, near the borders of the capitalist
world.
The necessity for such measures arises from the
aggressive actions of our probable enemies. It is
sufficient to refer to certain exercises carried out
by the NATO armed forces in 1959-60. For example,
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the command-staff exercise "Sidestep" (September 1959)
embraced nearly all the area of Europe, the Atlantic,
and the Mediterranean Sea. The commanders-in-chief
and headquarters of the armed forces of the North
European, Central European, South European, the
Atlantic, and Mediterranean theaters of military
operations, the commanders and headquarters of types
of armed forces and of areas in the theaters of
military operations, the commanders and headquarters
of groups of armies, of tactical air commands, field
and air armies, the commanders and headquarters of
army corps (19 in all) and divisions (51) and also
the commanders and headquarters of atomic artillery
units, guided missiles, and free rockets, all took
part.
Furthermore, the central directorates of
ministries of defense, the commands and headquarters
of military-territorial organs, rear organs, central
directorates of ministries of internal affairs,
transport, the merchant fleet, economy, public health,
communications and many other organs from all the
European countries belonging to NATO, were brought in.1
The exercise bore an openly aggressive character and
was conducted in the spirit of NATO military
preparations, obviously directed against the Soviet
Union and countries of the Socialist Camp.
The vast maneuvers of the combined armed forces
of NAZO , under the general title of "FOLLEX 60"
(September 1960) serve as a present-day dramatiza-
tion of a war against the Soviet Union. The area of
maneuvers embraced the territories of countries
belonging to NATO and the Atlantic zone. The air
and naval forces of the USA, Great Britain, France,
Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Portugal, Italy,
Greece, and Turkey and the ground troops of a number
of these countries all took part in them. In all,
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up to 300 ships of the navy (including 7 aircraft
carriers and 4 cruisers with guided missiles and
surface-to-air missiles), strategic and tactical
aviation, and up to 600 carrier aircraft took part
in the maneuvers. Political circles of the Federal
Republic of Germany considered these maneuvers to
be "a show of force" of the NATO military alliance
and also one of the important stages in preparation
for a future war.
It is quite clear that the military preparations
directed against the USSR do not stop at exercises
and maneuvers. The militaristic circles of the
Anglo-American bloc are conducting feverish prepara-
tions for war in every direction. Thus, the regular
execution of huge strategic exercises puts our
probable enemies in a favorable position with respect
to the armed forces of the Socialist Camp. Firstly,
exercises of this kind allow the enemy to introduce
masked measures relating to the threatening period
and thus create for himself the necessary prerequisite
for the sudden unleashing of war. Secondly, under
the cover of such exercises he can at any moment
switch to military operations with the necessary
grouping of forces and weapons.
All this, naturally, compels us to maintain our
armed forces continually on the alert and in the
highest state of combat readiness, so that the enemy
cannot catch us unawares. But this is not enough.
We believe that we must carry out counteractions
and conduct periodic strategic exercises with armed
forces on the scale of the Warsaw Pact. On the one
hand this will permit us to study the theaters of
military operations more thoroughly, to work out
problems of cooperation with the armies of the
socialist states, and to introduce measures for bring-
ing the troops up to combat readiness; on the other
hand, to limit somewhat, or even suppress, the enemy's
acts of provocation and his capacity to unleash a
sudden nuclear war.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400140001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400140001-0 JM
Undoubtedly such exercises are necessary, even
though they may provoke various interpretations in
the capitalist world, for the reactionary circles
of the imperialist governments will not fail to
use them in making false accusations of "aggression"
against the Soviet Union.
We shall not dwell on the questions of
intelligence, antiaircraft defense, and other
important measures whose significance in the
increase of combat readiness of troops is quite
evident. It need only be mentioned that the fulfill-
ment of a number of measures directed toward increas-
ing the combat readiness of troops requires preliminary
consent on the part of the local authorities on whose
territory the troops are located. In particular,
certain agreements must be made with the local Party
and government organs in altering the existing
location of troops, the conduct of important
operational-strategic exercises, and in the introduction
of mobilization tests of the population, etc. We
must, beforehand, coordinate the designated areas of
concentration of troops on the alert with the areas
of concentration of the civil population who would
be moved on the threat of a nuclear attack from large
cities to safer places, and define the methods of
organizing the work of rescue and reconstruction
and other problems to whose solution insufficient
attention is given in peacetime.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/06: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29400140001-0