PAKISTAN: ZIA'S DIVIDED OPPOSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00927R000300100002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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NESA 84-10090
March 1984
Directorate of - -mt
Intelligence
Pakistan:
Zia's Divided Opposition
COPY 3 5 9
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Pakistan:
Zia's Divided Opposition
Secret
NESA 84-10090
March 1984
This paper was prepared by I I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. F
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
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Summary
Information available
as of 23 February 1984
was used in this report.
Pakistan:
Zia's Divided Opposition
interest groups.
President Zia's fragmented domestic political opposition, frustrated by
continued failure to achieve consensus on political strategy, lacks the
cohesion and credibility to pose a serious challenge to his rule. Except in
Sind Province, where sectional discontent is at least equal in importance to
political grievances, opposition leaders have not attracted wide public
support or been able to coordinate their actions with antigovernment
commands respect.
Center-left agitation against Zia during the summer and fall of 1983
damaged his image as a strong leader but did not seriously threaten the
President's control. Zia inspires little enthusiasm, but, outside Sind, he
Zia ultimately depends upon the Army to retain power. The generals are
not likely to depose him unless they are called upon to put down widespread
civil disorders, particularly in the key province of Punjab. Such an
extensive breakdown of law and order is unlikely during the next year. F_
Zia's main center-left opposition, the Movement for the Restoration of 25X1
Democracy (MRD), is not a serious threat. Faction ridden and with little
conservative support, it lacks broad popular backing. The MRD is likely to
splinter over divergent election strategies and the failure of several key
constituents to participate fully in its civil disobedience campaign. 25X1
limit the PPP's ability to effectively challenge Zia.
The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) dominates the MRD and is Zia's
strongest opponent. The majority party in rural Sind, it retains substantial
support in rural Punjab and the cities. We believe the PPP might win an
unfettered election if it could unite behind a slate of candidates. A
leadership vacuum, poor party discipline, and internal bickering, however,
keep the PPP out of power.
Zia has identified the PPP as his primary threat and is determined to keep
it from participating in elections. He may not succeed in completely
excluding party members from office, but his countermoves probably will
iii Secret
NESA 84-10090
March 1984
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The right is critical of Zia but not hostile. It rejects the MRD and largely
spurned its civil disobedience campaign:
-The principal rightist party, the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) is well organized
and capable of staging serious urban demonstrations that could jeopar-
dize Zia's rule. JI leaders are unwilling to confront the President,
however, fearing his violent ouster would bring to power a PPP-left-
dominated government that would reverse Zia's Islamization measures.
? Pakistan's other conservative parties have limited support and share the
JI's reluctance to oust Zia]
India and the Soviet Union have links to MRD parties, including the PPP,
and probably are giving them limited financial and tactical aid. Both
probably believe that a civilian government, particularly one dominated by
the PPP, would be preferable to Zia's. A victory for the right would benefit
neither.
If Zia goes, his most likely successor would be another general with similar
foreign policy views. A shift of power to the political parties would have se-
rious implications for relations between the United States and Pakistan. A
PPP victory would bring a more neutralist foreign policy, possible recogni-
tion of the Communist government in Afghanistan, and increased criticism
of US Middle Eastern policy. A government dominated by the religious
right would retain Zia's Afghan policy but would be more suspicious of US
dealings with Pakistan and other Islamic nations.
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Pakistan:
Zia's Divided Opposition
Bleak Times for the Politicians
President Zia-ul-Haq's political foes are far from
their goal of forcing him from office. At present, the
parties are badly fragmented and have little leverage.
In our judgment, if the politicians could unite, they
might be able to combine with other pressure
groups-such as merchants, labor, and students-to
undercut Zia's military backing and prompt his re-
placement by another general
President Zia has never inspired great public enthusi-
asm,
outside Sind, he still commands public confidence.
Zia appears to have suffered little erosion of support
among merchants, bureaucrats, and local religious
leaders upon whose continued acquiescence he relies.
They believe that Zia has improved internal stability
and presided over a visible, if fragile, economic recov-
ery. Zia's policy to gradually Islamize national insti-
tutions is controversial, but we believe it has struck a
The successful political movements against the Ayub
Khan government in 1968-69 and Prime Minister
Bhutto in 1977 suggest that military intervention is
necessary to effect nonelectoral change. Recent politi-
cal and ethnic agitation centered in Sind Province
eroded the impression that Zia was in firm control of
events in Pakistan,
his military support did not decline. We believe
the Army desires a return to civilian rule, but only
under terms preserving a high degree of military
Scholars, press, and Embassy analysis strongly sug-
gest that the failures of civilian governments in the
1950s and 1970s have eroded public confidence in
existing political parties. These observers note that the
public increasingly finds civilian politicians irrelevant
and driven only by a desire to return to office. Even
within political circles, many fear forcing a leadership
change would most likely only bring another general
to power. Moreover, many moderate and conservative
Pakistani politicians say anti-Zia agitation would
jeopardize Pakistan's security while Soviet troops are
in Afghanistan and Indian intentions are unclear. We
believe Zia skillfully exploited this fear to undercut
center and left opponents in Punjab in 1983
broadly popular vein.
assistance.
Zia has ably exploited several foreign policy issues.
US diplomats report public concern that the Afghan
refugee population is becoming a burden, but most
Pakistanis still approve of Zia's refusal to recognize
the government in Kabul. We judge that most endorse
his efforts to negotiate a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan on terms that would encourage the refu-
gees to return voluntarily. Embassy reporting suggests
that Zia is also benefiting from his success at cultivat-
ing US ties to secure increased military and economic
The Opposition Parties
Zia's political opponents fall into two broad catego-
ries. The most vocal are those who seek his resignation
and a return to democratic rule and who endorse
agitation to achieve this goal. They include the parties
allied in the Movement for the Restoration of Democ-
racy (MRD), as well as the Pakistan National Party
(PNP).2 Predominantly center and leftist in outlook,
they scorn Zia's return-to-democracy blueprint as a
sham to perpetuate his rule. MRD leaders have shown
little inclination to negotiate or compromise with Zia.
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An Indian view of the MRD
anti-Zia a itation campaign
(fal! 1983)
Conservative and religious parties are split over the
propriety of agitation as a tool. The rightists are
hostile to the PPP, and most repudiate the MRD or
distrust it. The rightists, however, share the Move-
ment's position that civilian rule should be restored,
notes the US Embassy. Also critical of Zia's govern-
ment, they hint it could be acceptable if Zia advances
elections from 1985 and lifts his 1979 ban on party
activities. Unlike the MRD, the rightists have opened
a dialogue with Zia.'
The MRD-A Movement in Decline
The MRD emerged in February 1981 as a multiparty
alliance to lead peaceful agitation for Zia's resigna-
tion and a return to parliamentary government. Hop-
ing to forge a broad national movement, platform
drafters did not commit the MRD to specific policies,
according to the US Consulate General in Karachi.
When the late Prime Minister Bhutto's PPP joined,
conservative and religious parties stayed out, fearing
it would manipulate the MRD to replace Zia with a
'A more detailed discussion of Pakistan's political parties is
contained in the appendi
leftist anti-Islamic government, according to US dip-
lomats. The rightist parties also rejected an alignment
with groups favoring recognition of the Afghan Gov-
ernment and decried the MRD's failure to demand
intensification of the Islamization of Pakistan's insti-
tutions. Without the right, the MRD became an
easily isolated center-left coalition, Embassy analysis
has concluded.
MRD leaders seem to have taken few steps to build a
grassroots organization before they launched their
first anti-Zia campaign in February 1981. We believe
they anticipated that an outburst of opposition would
erode Zia's support and force him from office. The
MRD push coincided with widespread lawyer and
student unrest, but US diplomats report that the
MRD failed to coordinate its efforts with leaders of
these groups. Such weaknesses have continued to
plague the MRD
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On 12 August 1983 President Zia promised to rein-
state the 1973 Constitution, end martial law, and
restore civilian government by March 1985. Zia was
ambiguous who may participate but has since said
that nonparty elections are preferable because the
concept of a ruling party and opposition parties is
contrary to Islam. He would limit popular participa-
tion by licensing candidates of proven personal integ-
rity and religious piety. Zia would also guarantee
interest groups-merchants, landlords, clerics, and
workers-seats in the national and provincial assem-
blies. In any case, elections are unlikely before
October 1984.
enhanced executive power and the creation of a
structure permitting him to run for president.
Zia anticipates remaining
President for at least five more years. He plans to
amend the Constitution and reduce the power of the
prime minister, a move he will justify by citing the
abuses of the late Prime Minister Bhutto.
Zia has also said there will be a presidentially
appointed National Security Council with as yet
undefined powers. Most Pakistani observers expect
the military will have the right to veto legislation.F
Zia hopes to adapt the Turkish model created by
President Evren. Under this formula, the National
Security Council would be headed by the Command-
er in Chief of the armed forces (Zia) and a representa-
tive from each branch
While we believe Zia hopes to exclude the political
parties, he has left room for compromise and could
recognize parties registered under a 1979 ordinance.
This would legitimize the religious parties and per-
mit some moderate MRD representation but would
preserve Zia's objective of excluding the PPP from
national politics.
We believe that many college and university students
are disaffected, but they have been relatively passive
since Zia assumed control and by themselves lack the
strength to threaten the government. Students largely
ignored the MRD civil disobedience campaign. Scat-
tered student protests occurred in Sind, but most
were organized by student groups not sympathetic to
the MRD who were protesting government policies in
Sind.
Most parties, including the PPP and the JI, have
campus wings. These divisions generally have worked
to the government's advantage as internecine battles
have drained energy that might otherwise have been
aimed at the government. Students, however, might
rapidly mobilize against the government under the
right circumstances. These might include serious
police provocations that united opposing student
groups or the emergence of a national issue with
broad-based appeal.
In early 1984 Zia banned student unions in Punjab
and Sind Provinces, prompting protests in Karachi
and Lahore by student activists. Most students, how-
ever, remained quiescent
Zia skillfully exploited MRD mistakes, according to
US diplomats. He quickly labeled the MRD as an
agent for civil unrest threatening Pakistan's security,
a theme soon exploited by the media and the MRD's
conservative opponents. During the unrest in early
1981, Zia also closed the schools and detained key
MRD leaders and party workers, depriving the move-
ment of direction and disrupting its organization.
In March 1981 the faltering alliance suffered a
serious blow when Al-Zulfikar terrorists hijacked a
Pakistani airliner to Kabul and murdered a Pakistani
diplomat on board. Zia capitalized on the incident by
linking Al-Zulfikar to the PPP and by extension to the
MRD. PPP Chairman Begum Nusrat Bhutto played
into Zia's strategy by hesitating to condemn the
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In the Pakistani political context, the A1-Zulfikar
terrorist group is at least as great a threat to Zia's
opponents as to the President. Founded by the late
Prime Minister Bhutto's sons Murtaza and
Shahnawaz, Al-Zulfkar has never abandoned its
avowed goals of violently overthrowing Zia and
avenging the execution of their father. Zia has adroit-
ly exploited Al-Zulftkar terrorism and its foreign ties
to discredit the MRD and the PPP, which he charges
collaborate with it secretly. We believe this tactic has
been particularly effective in undercutting opposition
support in Punjab Province. While Al-Zulfikar has
drawn most of its recruits from the PPP, party
leaders have publicly disavowed any connection.
IMRD parties
are receiving assistance from India and the USSR,
but the extent of this aid is not clear. We judge that
both Moscow and New Delhi have long cultivated ties
to MRD politicians. They were encouraged by the
unrest in Sind to exploit these ties in an effort to
weaken President Zia's position in hopes that a
center-left coalition would come to power. In our
view, these efforts will add to the pressures on Zia
over time but are not likely to strengthen the MRD
sufficiently to cause his fall.
Prime Minister Gandhi is particularly concerned that
may include US basing rights in Pakistan,
Zia's growing cooperation with the United States
She has publicly state her nope
Al-Zulfi-
kar strength at about 1,600 to 1,800, but effective
manpower probably is much lower. Authorities moni-
tor suspected operatives closely and generally have
blocked Al-Zutfikar attempts to infiltrate teams
from India into Pakistan. Nonetheless, the terrorists
have succeeded in murdering several Pakistani offi-
cials and, in September, conducted a bombing cam-
paign in Lahore.
crime. According to an MRD leader, Al-Zulfikar's
act put the Movement on the defensive as Zia was
able to brand it an adjunct to anti-Pakistani terror-
ism, a label Pakistani political observers say the MRD
that is will a rep aced by an elected civilian regime
that will be more stable, peaceful, and receptive to
Soviet media have lauded the MRD and attributed
unrest to massive popular dissatisfaction over Paki-
stan's new military relationships with the United
States and its role in aiding the Afghan insurgency.
Moscow also accused Zia of being unresponsive to
Pakistan's political and economic needs. F
has never escaped.
Organizational problems, a lack of funds, and govern-
ment countermeasures also impair the MRD's effec-
tiveness. Surveillance discourages many second-eche-
Ion politicians from active MRD involvement,
spontaneous support that it had to hire crowds but
lacked the resources. The MRD's poor performance in
the cities in late 1983 suggests that these problems
persist.
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The US Consulate General in Karachi reports that
the leftists have been more aggressive than the moder-
ates, thereby gradually winning a disproportionate
role in decisionmaking within the organization. In
1982 they engineered the creation of an MRD steer-
ing committee and promptly took control of it. Work-
ing from this base, MRD radicals-including leaders
of the PPP's left wing-disregarded moderate senti-
ment and shifted the Movement from its original
neutrality on political issues. Under leftist influence,
the MRD condemned Pakistan's growing economic
and military ties to the United States, endorsed direct
talks with the Kabul regime, and supported women
activists protesting moves to amend Pakistan's law of
evidence along traditional Islamic legal lines to re-
strict women's testimony in court.
The leftist ascendancy provoked two conservative
parties, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI) and the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), to reduce their support for the
MRD in 1983 and to consider leaving, reports the US
Consulate General in Lahore. We believe the subse-
quent civil disobedience campaign prompted leaders
in the two parties to postpone a final decision but will
not halt their drift from the Movement. One or both
parties probably will defect in 1984.
Diplomatic reporting suggests that Tehrik leaders
oppose the MRD's steering committee and suspect
that the PPP is exploiting the Movement to advance
its own fortunes. JUI leaders, US officials report,
were most unhappy that they were not consulted
before the decision was made to support the women
activists-whose goals the party found objectionable
on religious grounds. JUI strategists also opposed the
August agitation campaign. The JUI eventually gave
it formal support, but the party's Punjab faction
continues to show little enthusiasm for the MRD.F_
We believe the MRD's decision to challenge Zia in
August was prompted by a realization that Zia had
MRD leaders Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi (left) of the PPP and Meraf
Mohammad Khan (right), president of the National Liberation
captured the political initiative and was gaining popu-
lar support. Zia's successful spring tour of the major
cities in Baluchistan and Sind and the MRD's repeat-
ed failure to rally the public probably heightened
these concerns.
many MRD moderates-particularly within the
P~-feared Zia would beat a direct challenge, but
the radicals prevailed by arguing that inaction risked
losing any prospect of mobilizing the public. Finally,
Zia threw down the gauntlet on 12 August when he
announced his blueprint for institutional reform that
appears to exclude the traditional parties from mean-
ingful political participation
to join the protests.
MRD organizers urged the public to repudiate Zia by
refusing to pay taxes, striking, and demonstrating.
Party members and professionals were urged to flout
the ban on political expression and to court arrest. We
believe MRD strategists hoped their tactics would
polarize politically conscious Pakistanis, creating a
groundswell that would force anti-MRD conservatives
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Government authorities-except in rural Sind-an-
ticipated and thwarted the MRD's moves.
Lawyers and Women Activists-
Interest Groups on the Defensive
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Concurrently, the regime detained or restricted
t ctivities of many MRD leaders outside Sind,
disrupting their efforts to organize grassroots support.
The results of the "fill the jails" campaign were
mixed, but the public's generally tepid response bodes
ill for the MRD's hopes of removing Zia. The cam-
paign showed unexpected strength in rural Sind, but a
strong flavor of provincial-even separatist-senti-
ment undercut efforts to capitalize on the momentum
generated there. Zia was able to weaken the MRD
among non-Sindhis by accusing the Movement's lead-
ers of cultivating violence and undermining national
security, according to US
diplomats.
When MRD leaders suspended the agitation in De-
cember, they had not achieved their stated objectives
of disrupting local elections and forcing Zia to recog-
nize all political parties. Zia began a dialogue with
rightists-leaving MRD leaders more isolated than
ever-but he showed no inclination to modify his
August plan. Press and Embassy reporting also sug-
gests that the agitation has aggravated sectional
tensions in the MRD. Sindhi MRD activists who
courted arrest and went to jail charge their Punjabi
associates left them to bear the brunt of government
retaliation, the US Consulate General in Karachi
reports.
The MRD, moreover, does not appear to have in-
creased its popular support. The religious and con-
servative parties are still alienated. Among interest
groups, only Western-oriented lawyers and activist
women-both persistent Zia critics joined the civil
disobedience campaign, and we judge that their con-
tributions did not greatly augment MRD strength.
Most students and labor groups stayed on the side-
lines, say US diplomats, and merchants and bureau-
crats also exhibited little support for the MRD. Most
importantly, although the civil disobedience campaign
prompted some senior officers to urge that Zia negoti-
ate with the MRD, the Army backed Zia's refusal to
Pakistan's lawyers have a tradition of political activ-
ism and have often opposed Zia, but the bar confronts
Zia from a weak base. The law is an elite and
increasingly isolated profession. Many Pakistanis
admire Zia's legal reforms for increasing judicial
economy and swiftness. They believe the attorneys'
objections are motivated by financial considerations
rather than principle and see little incentive to sup-
port them, note Embassy sources in the legal profes-
sion. The profession is overcrowded, and many law-
yers are either financially strapped or heavily
dependent on government patronage.
A small, but vocal number of politically organized
and socially active Pakistani women have achieved
international notice by opposing policies of President
Zia, notes a recent Embassy assessment. These activ-
ists are primarily associated with the MRD. Their
impact is countered by equally vocal and better
organized pro-Zia conservatives and by the inertia of
the majority of Pakistan's women, most of whom are
tied to the home, poorly educated, and politically
inactive. Anti-Zia women activists played little role
in the recent agitation, except in Sind, where they
were visible in support of the MRD but generally
ineffective,
make concessions,
Zia 's scan mg may even
have risen because the Army credits him with cleverly
handling the MRD.
The PPP-Zia's Principal Opponent
By all accounts, the PPP dominates the MRD. The
PPP has fomented anti-Zia opposition since he de-
posed it in 1977. Despite Zia's efforts to suppress it,
the PPP remains the only party with a sizable national
following and the capability to challenge him. PPP
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strength is constricted by organizational and leader-
ship problems, however, and it is distrusted by those
Pakistanis-including the military-that it does not
represent, report US diplomats.
Since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution in 1979, the
PPP has lacked a strong leader, a problem we believe
greatly hampered the organization during the recent
agitation. The titular leader of the PPP is Bhutto's
widow, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, who was elected chair-
man after his death.
she has failed to unite the party. Many
Punjabi party members complain that Begum Bhutto
refuses to delegate power, and their grievances have
grown since she left Pakistan in November 1982 for
medical treatment for cancer.
Punjabi party members also believe
Begum Bhutto and her advisers react slowly to events
in Pakistan and scorn new party leaders who have
shown popular appeal.
Begum Bhutto's daughter Benazir-who was exiled in
January 1984-could rally the party, in our opinion.
she is a dynamic speaker
with a strong intellect and considerable courage.
Identified with the PPP's left wing, Benazir inherited
both her father's arrogance and his autocratic streak,
qualities that have hindered her in uniting the party
or extending her appeal beyond the PPP,F-
Benazir has been working to improve her image and
may be moderating her political platform. A close
confidant of Benazir told US diplomats recently that
she now believes the PPP must cultivate Army sup-
port against Zia, a shift from her previous denuncia-
tion of the generals for ousting her father.
Zia respects and fears Benazir's ability to appeal to
diverse elements of society and has long been con-
cerned that she could rally a strong separatist move-
ment in Sind Conse-
quently, Zia has worked to isolate Benazir, keeping
her under house arrest from March 1981 to January
1984 and then allowing her to leave for Europe. Zia
probably expects that once out of Pakistan, Benazir's
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popularity will gradually wane. We believe, however,
that she will remain a factor in Pakistani politics for
the foreseeable future. Benazir's press conferences in
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The PPP has no other clear leader. When Begum
Bhutto departed Pakistan, party chiefs formed a 12-
member steering committee, but this compromise
solution apparently has failed.
illness, travel absences, and arrests had immobi-
lized the committee. the
committee could be quickly reconstituted or that
Begum Bhutto would delegate her authority as party
leader.
The PPP to battle Zia,
indhis-particu-
larly leftists-favor an activist approach. Many court-
ed arrest and were jailed during the disobedience
campaign. Their activism may have reflected their
opposition to "Punjabi rule." Sindhi PPP leaders,
including the former provincial governor Ghulam
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Mustapha Jatoi, also have been under greater politi- format or a PPP/MRD boycott. We speculate other
cal and economic pressure from the government than MRD parties would follow Tehrik's lead.
those in Punjab,
Punjabi PPP leaders, on the other hand, argue that
their party should not confront Zia until sentiment
against him can be broadened. Most prominent Pun-
jabi party members took no active role in the recent
agitation, notes the US Consulate General in Lahore.
local leaders
in one-third of Punjab's districts ignored party direc-
tives to court arrest.
the violence in Sind dismayed Punjabi leaders, who
feared an anti-PPP backlash.
The Sind and Punjab wings also diverged over partici-
pation in nonpartisan local elections in September
1983. The Punjabis argued that the party should
participate because it needed to control development
aid funds channeled through the local bodies and
cultivate "grassroots" power. The Sindhis-who prob-
ably anticipated that the authorities would bar them
from office-championed an election boycott. The
steering committee, pressed by Jatoi and Begum
Bhutto, overruled the Punjabi faction and committed
the party to the MRD boycott,
Election policy continues to bedevil the party
significant
support now exists in all provinces-including Sind-
for participation in subsequent elections regardless of
government restrictions or an MRD boycott. Begum
Bhutto, however, still opposes participation, and PPP
leaders reportedly fear the issue could split the party,
The PPP's relationship with the MRD is ambiguous.
arty leaders view the
MRD as a use u device to rally the public against Zia
but a potentially dangerous rival, and the PPP has
little interest in formulas that would guarantee assem-
bly seats to other MRD parties. The PPP may also
have reason to distrust its allies. The US Embassy
reported in late November that Tehrik leaders pri-
vately said a PPP electoral boycott would be a golden
opportunity to win a larger share of National Assem-
bly seats. They will run regardless of the election
The Right-Coexistence With Zia
The tacit support of several religious and conservative
parties strengthens Zia. We anticipate that their
acquiescence will continue to undercut the center and
left's ability to oppose Zia. The right participated in
government during 1977-79, and most rightist parties
accepted Zia's invitation in October 1983 to open
unofficial talks. We believe two parties in particular,
the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Pagaro faction of the
splintered secular Pakistan Muslim League, are draw-
ing closer to Zia. Both are banned, but their activities
are less circumscribed than other parties. Candidates
backed by each were unofficially allowed to enter the
local elections in September 1983 and did well
We believe the Jamaat is the most important rightist
party and the group most supportive of Zia. The
Jamaat officially disassociated itself from the govern-
ment in 1979, complaining that Zia was too slow to
Islamize Pakistan's institutions,' but members contin-
ue to serve on advisory boards and in the Federal
Advisory Council. Most Pakistani political observers
conclude that the Jamaat still influences government
policy
JI leaders endorse civilian rule but do not insist upon
participation of the traditional parties, suggest press
accounts. According to Embassy reports, they would
prefer to limit participation to persons of good "Islam-
ic" character-a formulation Zia voices. This would
exclude the PPP, whose anti-Islamic nature JI mem-
bers say has remained unaltered since Bhutto's ouster.
JI leaders privately tell US diplomats that Zia is the
best available leader. We believe the JI would shift
against Zia only if public opinion begins to run
decisively against him and it was necessary to aban-
don him to preserve the party.
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Organized labor does not pose a threat to Zia in the
near term. A recent Embassy survey concluded that
moderate labor federations have no plans to re-create
the Pakistan Labor Alliance, which was an important
element in Bhutto's downfall. The Embassy noted the
government has encouraged the fragmenting of
unions, and most members are apolitical and unpre-
pared to confront either management or the govern-
ment.
Neither the MRD nor its constituent parties have
attracted significant labor backing. Most unions ig-
nored the political parties' appeal to support the
MRD's national civil disobedience campaign last
summer. Moderate labor leaders doubt that the
rewards of political activity outweigh the risk, ac-
cording to Embassy reports. Pakistan's labor leaders
charge that their movement supported and trusted
Bhutto, who then turned upon it, and these leaders
say they will not repeat that error
In our estimate the JI, which claims 10 percent of the
electorate, is Pakistan's best organized political move-
ment. It has strong support among students, profes-
sionals, and business groups in Karachi and Punjab
Province, who have prospered under Zia and are not
inclined to oppose his rule. Benefiting from govern-
ment help, the Jamaat has also taken control of
several labor unions and greatly expanded campus
strength through its student wing, the Islami Jamiat
Tulaba (IJT), according to diplomatic reporting. F_
IJT leaders are critical of
Zia-whom they charge is insincerely exploiting Is-
lam-but we doubt they are prepared to combine with
the MRD parties. During the height of the MRD
agitation, the US Consulate General in Lahore pre-
dicted that if a serious showdown between Zia and the
MRD developed, the IJT would support the govern-
ment to preserve Zia as the lesser evil. Zia's decision
in February 1984 to ban student unions has enraged
IJT activists, US diplomats report, but Jamaat lead-
ers have continued to urge nonconfrontation
In a rare display of labor support, radical labor
activist Gulzar Begum is arrested while leading a
Karachi pro-MRD civil agitation demonstration
(30 August 1983)
The JUI and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)
are much less able to muster their supporters, accord-
ing to US diplomats, and lack the cohesiveness of the
Jamaat. Their relations with the government are more
ambiguous. They appear open to compromise with
Zia but have not ruled out agitation if he excludes
them from a direct role in the prospective civilian
government.
The JUI's course during the civil disobedience cam-
paign reflected internal disarray. Pro-MRD leaders
opposed the campaign and initially did not court
arrest, while anti-MRD leaders remained aloof. Even
after the JUI announced its support for the tactic,
only a few members responded, US diplomats say.
The JUI dodged Zia's invitation to discuss Pakistan's
political structure by claiming that a key leader was
ill. Most Pakistani observers rejected this explanation,
according to Embassy reporting, and believed the
party could not arrive at a consensus on a negotiating
position.
The JUP was also indecisive. The Karachi-based
party president Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani pub-
licly advocated support for the MRD to force recogni-
tion of the parties by Zia, but, the US Embassy notes,
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the party's strong Punjab wing-which has benefited
from Zia's Islamization program-balked. Noorani
joined Zia's talks in October but told reporters Zia
was only trying to buy time. He later launched an
often postponed "direct action" campaign but limited
his activities to sermons appealing for an end to
martial law. Not surprisingly, authorities do not
participation. In that event, the JUT and the JUP,
which are least contented with Zia, might be goaded
into active opposition. Without JI support, we believe
their opposition would scarcely increase pressure on
Zia. We doubt that the Jamaat will confront the
government as long as Zia continues efforts to Islam-
ize institutions in Pakistan.
consider the JUP a serious threat,
Outlook
In our judgment, Zia has won the first round against
the opposition and is in a strong position to implement
the transition to civilian government on his terms. He
has prevailed by setting the tone of political debate,
exploiting his opponents' fragmentation, maintaining
military support, and retaining the acquiescence of
most Pakistanis.
By contrast, opposition party leaders seem no more
inclined than before the civil disobedience campaign
to put aside their differences and unite against Zia.
We believe the moderate JUT and Tehrik parties
probably will defect from the MRD in 1984 after
failing to reconcile their differences with the PPP and
the left. The leftist parties-which have benefited
from MRD affiliation-distrust the PPP and the
moderates. Their failure to mobilize labor or the
urban poor during the agitation shows that they will
not seriously threaten the government.
We do not believe the PPP will split, but we doubt it
will act as a cohesive body. Benazir Bhutto's unex-
pected departure from Pakistan probably will prove to
be unsettling and could prompt a battle over party
leadership. We predict that during 1984, moderates
will argue-with little success in the face of counter-
arguments by Begum and Benazir Bhutto-that con-
frontation is unproductive and will urge negotiation
with Zia. The Bhuttos' absence may embolden some
to enter into secret arrangements with the govern-
ment, further weakening the party.
Most conservatives probably will continue to believe
that Zia, with all his faults, is a lesser evil than a PPP
or left government. Their view could change, however,
if Zia implements his plan for nonpartisan govern-
ment and it becomes clear that the right, even in an
unofficial capacity, will be excluded from political
We anticipate that political apathy in the Punjab will
persist as a major impediment to any party's hopes.
With 65 percent of Pakistan's population, much of its
wealth, and most of its Army and civil servants,
Punjab is by far the dominant province. If the Army
were called out to suppress widespread violence by
fellow Punjabis, we believe Zia would become vulner-
able to replacement by another general who might be
willing to preside over a transfer of power to the
politicians.
We believe this is not likely to occur. Most Punjabis-
including key interest groups such as bazaar mer-
chants, local clerics, Islamic-minded students, and
rank-and-file labor-seem to believe Pakistan's inter-
ests are better served by tolerating Zia than by joining
political disturbances that could benefit India or the
Soviet Union. Having outlined a plan for restoring
civilian rule and initiated discussions with some politi-
cians, Zia can plausibly claim his course is an alterna-
tive to continued martial law or a return to the chaotic
parliamentary politics of the Bhutto era.
Over the longer term, we believe the greatest danger
Zia faces is his reluctance to reach an accommodation
with Sindhis, particularly the moderate PPP leaders
who represent the landowners and families who tradi-
tionally dominate politics in that province. Zia seems
determined to exclude them from exercising power at
any level. In contrast to Punjab, Islamabad has made
no ad hoc arrangements with local Sindhi PPP politi-
cians. Zia may be counting upon the Pagaro faction of
the Muslim League and local JI leaders to fill the
vacuum. We speculate, however, that the more likely
benefactor will be radical and separatist movements
including the Sindhi Awami Tehrik, which can exploit
the hostility created by government sweeps in rural
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The long-term danger? Sindhis
alienated from their govern-
ment cheer the death of a po-
licerhan killed during the MRD
civil agitation (September 1983)
Sind. We believe prospects for a serious separatist
movement in Sind will grow, but the full impact is
unlikely to be felt during the next year. If Zia cannot
preserve order in Sind, we believe he would face
serious erosion of his crucial military support.
The economy probably will continue to be a positive
factor for Zia. He will benefit from the economic
stimulus of remittances from Pakistanis working
abroad, completion of large-scale public projects be-
gun under Bhutto, and business confidence that his
economic course is predictable. Economic gains real-
ized during Zia's tenure are real but fragile. If the
economy sours, Zia's foes will have an issue with the
potential to cut across partisan lines.
Zia's closer ties to the United States are another
potential danger point. Through 1983 the rapproche-
ment has worked to Zia's advantage. He can point to
tangible defense and economic benefits gained with-
out compromising Pakistan's nonaligned status. Many
Pakistanis, however, are suspicious of US reliability,
If promised assistance does not fully
materialize, Zia's credibility will be weakened.
Zia could also suffer if the Afghan resistance goads
Moscow or Kabul to attack insurgent camps in Paki-
stan. Zia would seek to use the attacks to rally the
nation against the external enemy-a time-tested
tactic-but he could be vulnerable to charges he had
unnecessarily exposed Pakistan in the service of US
policy interests. MRD leftists who have consistently
criticized the President's US and Afghan policies
would particularly benefit.
The Army will remain Zia's power base. We believe
some senior officers question whether Zia's plan to
restore civilian rule can succeed without party partici-
pation, but the Army will back Zia over the politi-
cians out of reluctance to remove one of its own to
relieve political pressure. We believe that only a
general breakdown of law and order-for which Zia
was blamed-would provoke a reassessment of sup-
port for Zia within the Army. We do not believe
either the MRD, the PPP, or the right has the
organizational strength and popular backing to create
such conditions in 1984.
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In our view, three major alterations in the Pakistani We anticipate a left-dominated PPP government
political landscape would be necessary before the would pursue improved relations with the USSR and
opposition could challenge Zia successfully. First, the India at the expense of those with the United States,
political parties would have to lay aside their differ- particularly if it attained power because Zia's Afghan
ences and unite against the President. Second, the policy had failed. Although Benazir Bhutto
parties would have to convince at least the urban (would
populace that their policies are preferable to Zia's and not radically alter Zia's Afghan policy, the PPP's
are worth fighting for. Finally, the politicians would repeated condemnation of his refusal to recognize the
have to convince the Army, most probably through Afghan Government suggests otherwise.
urban riots, that Zia's continuation in power threat-
ened Pakistan's security and only his removal and a
return to party government would reunite the country.
Implications for the United States
We believe the Army values good relations with the
United States and will attempt to preserve them. In
the unlikely event that the politicians can undermine
Zia's credibility with the military, we believe that the
Army would install a moderate-conservative coalition
excluding the PPP and that relations with the United
States would not greatly suffer. The new government
probably would share Zia's suspicion of the Soviet
Union and would be unlikely to soften Pakistan's
present Afghanistan policy. Moreover, if the religious
right, particularly the JI, dominates such a coalition,
Islamabad might favor even greater assistance to the
Afghan resistance. Such a government probably
would be more critical of US Middle Eastern policy as
too supportive of Israeli objectives, but such a shift
probably would be only an irritant.
Although less likely, escalating violence in Punjab
Province might force the Army to accept a civilian
government with PPP or MRD participation. In these
circumstances, we believe Pakistan's ties with the
United States would weaken, and its Afghan policy
could become more ambiguous as the new government
tried to steer Pakistan along a nonaligned course.
MRD leaders have maintained ties with Kabul, and
some almost certainly would advocate quick recogni-
tion of the Communist regime. An MRD government
might initially be inclined to repatriate the Afghan
refugees, arguing that their presence endangers secu-
rity and undermines the economy. In our view, this
inclination would be constrained by Islamic state and
Chinese misgivings and by the reality that no party
government is likely to long survive if it ignores either
the Army's interests or conservative opinion in Punjab
Province.
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Appendix
Pakistan's Major Political Parties
The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
(MRD)
The MRD was formed in 1981 as a nine-party
alliance to force Zia to restore parliamentary govern-
ment and resign.' The MRD's manifesto of February
1981 demands: Zia's resignation and an immediate
end to martial law; free, fair, and impartial provincial
and National Assembly elections under the 1973
Constitution; and, after this, return of power to the
elected representatives of the people. A fourth point
calls in general terms for restoring and protecting the
labor support, but we believe the powerful interests
Bhutto offended continue to oppose the PPP's return
to power.
Bhutto seems to have regarded the PPP as his private
vehicle for gaining and holding power. He neither
encouraged strong party leaders nor built a grassroots
political structure. Instead, he relied upon charismatic
appeal and ties to local leaders and landlords who
were loyal to him but not to each other or to the PPP
interests of Pakistan's provinces
Principal MRD Parties
Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Most Pakistani politi-
cal observers believe that the PPP, which dominates
the MRD and is Pakistan's largest party, would be
the likely victor in a free election.
President Zia shares
The PPP was founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
who appealed to nationalism and popular sentiment in
favor of political and economic equality. He built a
coalition of peasants, rural tenants, urban migrants,
industrial workers, professionals, wealthy landlords,
and some industrialists. While in power (1971-77),
however, Bhutto alienated the military, bureaucracy,
urban middle class, bazaar merchants, religious con-
servatives, and the labor unions. These opponents
exploited election fraud during the National Assem-
bly elections in 1977 to unite with center and Islamic
parties to undermine and topple Bhutto. The PPP has
since forged an uneasy alliance with some of its
political foes and appears to have regained limited
6 The eight parties now comprising the MRD are: the PPP, the
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI), the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), the
National Democratic Party (NDP), the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam
(Rahman faction), the Pakistan Muslim League (Khairuddin
Group), the Qaumi Mahaz-e-Azadi (National Liberation Front),
and the Pakistan Mazdoor Kissan Party (Peasants-Workers Party).
The Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference withdrew in April
1981 after MRD leaders refused to expel the PPP for its alleged
as an institution.
Since Bhutto's execution, these structural weaknesses
have encouraged party fragmentation along personal
and ideological lines. Loyalty to Bhutto's memory and
the anticipated electoral appeal of his widow and
daughter hold the factions together, but no leader
capable of truly uniting them has yet emerged. The
failure of PPP leaders in Punjab to generate support
for PPP-encouraged mass agitation in rural Sind in
1983 is likely to aggravate tensions between the
Sindhi and Punjabi wings of the party
In power, the PPP satisfied best its poorest and least
articulate constituents: peasants, tenant farmers, and
urban laborers, who form a broad-based, loyal constit-
uency that most observers believe would actively
support the PPP in an open election. The party most
successfully transcended economic class lines in Sind,
where Bhutto exploited his origins and persuaded his
fellow Sindhis that he could protect their interests
against the Punjabi majority. According to a recent
analysis by the US Consulate General in Karachi, the
growing legend of Sind's "Golden Era" under Bhutto
has been an important factor in shaping Sindhi
resentment of the Zia government.
The PPP's ability to exploit its membership to mount
a successful civil disobedience campaign is question-
able. Rural members are scattered and easily neutral-
ized by authorities. In rural Sind, PPP anti-Zia
demonstrators showed unexpected persistence last
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Begum Nusrat Bhutto, exiled PPP chairman and
widow of Prime Minister Zu ikar Ali Bhutto
Student
Wing
Hafiz Pirzada (Sind, allied to Mumtaz
Ali Bhutto, exiled in London, former
Law Minister).
Farooq Leghari (President for Punjab)
Sheikh Mohammed Rashid (Punjab,
leftwing leader with ties to Begum and
Benazir Bhutto).
Ghulam Mustapha Khar (Punjab Gover-
nor in Bhutto era, exiled in London,
alleged conduit for Libyan funding to
PPP left wing in Punjab, accused by
government of working with India to
encourage military dissaffection).
Aftab Sherpao (President for North-
West Frontier Province, where party is
weak, moderate).
Masoud Kasur (North-West Frontier
Province, President of Peshawar High
Court Bar Association, considered close
to Begum and Benazir Bhutto).
Yahya Bakhtiar (President for Baluchi-
stan, party weak in province).
(February 198
year, but their demonstrations were isolated and
sporadic. Outside Sind, party discipline appears weak,
and we believe most PPP members lack both the
economic independence and the depth of commitment
to risk regime retaliation. Nonetheless, the PPP's
ability to mount large protests in inner Sind last
summer and fall shows the party can still challenge
Zia and remains his strongest opponent.
Principal Party Leaders
Chairman Begum Nusrat Bhutto (In Europe since
November 1982)
Secretary Dr. Ghulam Hussain (a leader of the
General Punjabi left wing, in Europe since mid-
1983).
Prominent Benazir Bhutto (Sind, under house
Leaders arrest March 1981-January 1984, in
Europe since).
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi (president for
Sind, moderate).
Mumtaz Ali Bhutto (Sind, strong rural
ties, a rival of Jatoi).
Makhdum of Hala (Sind, important re-
gional religious leader).
People's Student Federation (PS F).
National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP is the
dominant party in the North-West Frontier Province.
It has little strength elsewhere following a split in
1979 with its Baluchistan wing. Founded in 1975 by
Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari, then an independent
member of the National Assembly, the NDP is a
moderate, left-of-center party. Diplomatic observers
say that Mazari is a weak leader and that the party's
real leader is Abdul Wali Khan, a former National
Awami Party leader who brought many of his sup-
porters into the NDP.
IHe has
been critical of Zia's Afghan policy, calling frequently
for direct negotiations with Kabul. Wali Khan long
has been a vocal advocate of greater autonomy for
Pushtunistan, a murky term usually embracing the
North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.
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NDP relations with the PPP have long been strained.
Prime Minister Bhutto dissolved NDP provincial gov-
ernments in the North-West Frontier Province and
Baluchistan and jailed many leaders including Wali
Khan. Wali Khan has told US diplomats that Bhutto
ordered assassination attempts against him and has
implied he distrusts the Bhutto women. Friction be-
tween the NDP and PPP may have seriously undercut
MRD efforts to organize anti-Zia agitation in the
North-West Frontier Province last summer. Accord-
ing to widely publicized Pakistani press accounts,
NDP leaders announced shortly before the agitation
that they were withdrawing from the MRD because
they believed the PPP planned to renege on its
agreement to join in a general boycott of the local
elections. Although the rift was patched up, NDP
members do not appear to have vigorously participat-
ed in the civil disobedience campaign.
Principal Party Leaders
President Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari.
Secretary Zahrul Haq.
General
Prominent Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Nasim Wali
Leaders Khan (Wali Khan's wife and effective
party leader in his absence), Abdul Kha-
liq Khan, Safdar Hussain Siddiqi, and
Abid Zuberi.
Student Pushtun Student Federation (PSF)-
Wing strong in North-West Frontier Prov-
ince.
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The only religious
party in the MRD, the JUI is beset by internal
dissension. JUI strength is confined largely to Push-
tun tribesmen residing in parts of the rural North-
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. The US
Consulate General in Lahore notes that the party
derived much of its appeal from former Secretary
General Maulana Mufti, who died in 1980. It adds
that the party has never resolved the leadership issue
between Mufti's son, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, and
Secretary General Obaidullah Anwar. Both apparent-
ly lack the skill to mold the JUI into a strong political
organization
(1971)
The JUI's ambivalent position in the MRD has
exacerbated party tensions, according to US diplo-
mats. The JUI previously was part of the anti-PPP
Pakistan National Alliance, and party members
served under Zia in a previous cabinet. Rahman says
he joined the MRD because he believed Zia's Islamic
measures and commitment to them were only half-
hearted. He hoped the MRD might force elections in
which the JUI could "encourage the selection of
proper religious elements" who would peacefully re-
place Zia and set Pakistan on a proper Islamic course.
Prior to joining the MRD, Rahman did not consult
the Punjab wing, which was skeptical of the Move-
ment and feared it was too secular and vulnerable to
leftist domination. Rahman and other pro-MRD lead-
ers increasingly have come to share this view, reports
the US Consulate General in Lahore. In line with
their efforts to heal the party split, they have gradual-
ly detached the JUI from the MRD.
Principal Party Leaders.
Secretary Maulana Obaidullah Anwar.
General
First Maulana Fazlur Rahman.
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Student Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islami (active in Sind
Wing and Baluchistan with primary appeal to
Pushtun students).
Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (TI)-Movement for Integrity.
Founded in 1970 by former Chief of the Pakistani Air
Force Asghar Khan, the TI has been characterized by
US Embassy observers as progressive with an Islamic
tint. Tehrik leaders have indicated a willingness to
accord Pakistan's provinces greater authority. Recent
press accounts indicate, however, that the party has
misgivings about provincial autonomy, and some TI
leaders have threatened to withdraw from the MRD if
its leaders commit the Movement to autonomy. Diplo-
matic reporting suggests that the party draws most of
its strength from urban intellectuals and profession-
als, especially lawyers. It is poorly organized with
little rural support and is very weak in Baluchistan.
Asghar Khan's reputation as an honest, independent-
minded politician is the Tehrik's strongest asset. He
emerged as the leading politician in the Pakistan
National Alliance in the election campaign in March
1977 and was a key figure during the subsequent
protest campaign against the Bhutto government.
Asghar Khan has consistently refused to reach an
accommodation with Zia, saying that, while the Army
should be permitted an honorable exit, it must go and
should hold elections as soon as possible. In 1979
Asghar Khan was widely rumored to be a leading
candidate for Prime Minister had Zia not canceled
elections. He has been under house arrest since 1980.
According to the US Embassy, a Zia intermediary
met with Asghar Khan in October 1983, but the
meeting does not appear to have been fruitful. ~
Principal Party Leaders
Chairman Air Marshal (Retired) Asghar Khan.
Vice Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri.
Chairman
Secretary Mushir Pesh Imam (acting party leader
General since Asghar Khan's detention)
chairman of the Tehrik-i-Istiglal party (1981)
Associated Party: Pakistan National Party (PNP).
Since September 1983 the PNP has been associated
with the MRD. Failure to reach an accommodation
with NDP leaders over personal conflicts and the
MRD's position on regional autonomy have derailed
several efforts to incorporate the PNP into the MRD
formally. The PNP is an offshoot of the NDP and was
founded in 1979. It is the predominant party in
Baluchistan and stands for complete provincial auton-
omy with only defense, foreign affairs, and communi-
cations being left to Islamabad. The party seeks to
restructure Pakistan's administration on the basis of
culture and linguistic affinity and geographic contigu-
ity.
Party founder and President Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo
is radical in outlook and has a reputation for oppor-
tunism. His opponents charge that he tailors his
beliefs to retain office, citing his willingness to serve
as governor under Prime Minister Bhutto even though
he was adamantly opposed to provincial autonomy.
Principal Party Leaders
President Ghaus Bux Bizeujo.
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Baluch activist Ghaus Bux Bizenfo, president of
the Pakistan National Party (1981
cohesive core highly resistant to outside influence or
penetration. Associate members-who number about
500,000-pledge obedience to the JI but are not held
to the strict standards of Islamic conduct required of
full members. They may not hold party office or vote
in internal elections. The JI claims about 3 million
supporters. These have no formal party ties but are
counted upon for votes and money. Their contribu-
tions and foreign assistance probably make the JI the
most financially sound party in Pakistan.
According to the US Consulate General in Lahore,
most Jamaat supporters are urban and lower middle-
class men drawn from business, the professions, and
the bureaucracy. These groups generally have benefit-
ed economically under Zia
JI with playing an important role in limiting anti-Zia
demonstrations last summer and fall in Sind's major
cities. The JI reportedly has few, if any, supporters
within the landed or big business elites and has had
Secretary Kaswas Gardezi.
General
Prominent' Abdul Hamid Jatoi
Leader
Religious Parties
Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The Jamaat-i-Islami is Paki-
stan's most tightly organized political movement.
Strongly anti-PPP, the Jamaat was a major factor in
Zia's rise to power. Its street agitation against Bhutto
began the breakdown of public order that eventually
convinced the military he had lost the ability to
govern.
The JI is based on an ideological commitment to
transform Pakistan into an Islamic state governed by
orthodox Sunni precepts. Traditionally, the JI has
functioned as an elite institution seeking to shape
Pakistani politics and-except in 1970-has not par-
ticipated in elective politics at the national level.
Candidates identified with the Jamaat ran in local
elections in 1983 and did well, according to US
diplomats.
little success in recruiting rural migrants to the cities,
where the PPP traditionally has been strong. The JI
does not appeal to Pakistan's Shia minority, who fear
that a JI-dominated government would attempt to
coerce them into observing Islamic practices they 25X1
charge are actually Sunni accretions, according to the
US Consulate General in Karachi
We believe JI support among students and labor is
growing. The Jamaat has been particularly successful
in attracting students in Punjab and is strong in urban
Sind schools and the North-West Frontier Province.
A Jamaat student organizer has told US diplomats in
Lahore that many student recruits are villagers at-
tracted by financial and tutorial aid. Benefiting from
government help, the JI has taken control of several
important labor unions, including Pakistan's largest
steel union, and has built impressive support in the
railroads and national airline, according to a recent
Embassy estimate.
Information is limited on the Jamaat's inner work-
ings. The US Consulate General in Lahore has identi-
fied three leadership factions. A Lahore faction under
Amir Mian Tofail Mohammed predominates and
favors a cooperative but critical relationship with the
Full members are admitted only after a carefully
monitored apprenticeship. US diplomats estimate
they number less than 5,000 but give the Jamaat a
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Secret
government. It is highly vocal in condemning the
MRD. A Muhajir (Muslim immigrants from India)
faction based in Karachi is more critical of Zia, has
informal contacts with the MRD, and is next in
importance. In 1981 its leader told US diplomats he
had argued for joining the MRD as a means of
limiting PPP influence in the Movement but was
overruled by the Punjab faction. A third group in the
North-West Frontier Province reportedly holds a
middle position, according to US diplomats, but also
spurns cooperation with the MRD.
Amir. Mian Tofail Mohammed (leader of the
Punjab faction).
Vice Amir Professor Ghafoor Ahmad (leader of the
for Sind Muhajir faction and a party moderate).
Secretary Qazi Hussain Ahmed (leader of the
General center North-West Frontier Province
faction).
Student Islami-Jamiat-Tulaba (strongest in
Wing Punjab, where it dominates student
politics at most major universities).[
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP). The JUP has
been a vocal but inconsistent regime critic under its
president Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani. JUP lead-
ers declined to join the MRD because its organizers
would not endorse intensifying Islamization. Noorani,
however, has established informal ties with the Move-
ment and held out the prospect of joining it at some
point if Zia continues to procrastinate in restoring
civilian rule. At the same time, Noorani has kept open
channels to the government and participated in Zia's
October talks. According to the US Consulate Gener-
al in Karachi, Noorani might collaborate with Zia
under a power-sharing arrangement even if the MRD
parties are excluded
We believe Noorani is attempting to exploit threats of
possible support for the MRD to extract concessions
from Zia. Noorani probably is reluctant to mobilize
his party against Zia until he determines that Zia is in
serious trouble and until Noorani has secured the
support of other conservatives. This elusive goal is
complicated by his reluctance to associate with the JI,
whose leaders, he charges, ignore the legal traditions
of Islam. He also dislikes the Pir of Pagaro, who
dominates the Muslim League
JUP strength is difficult to gauge. Most supporters
are illiterate villagers in Sind and parts of Punjab
mobilized by local religious leaders (pirs), reports the
US Consulate General in Karachi. Noorani is a
dynamic speaker who can draw large, enthusiastic
crowds. The JUP fared best of the religious parties
during local and provincial elections in Punjab and
Sind in the 1970s but was a poor second to the PPP.
In 1979 US diplomats estimated JUP strength was
growing, but in 1982 it suffered a partial split when
Information Secretary Zahoorul Hassan Bhopali de-
fied Noorani and joined Zia's Federal Advisory Coun-
cil. AI-Zulfikar terrorists killed Bhopali in September
1982, but we presume some of his supporters are still
estranged from Noorani.
Secretary Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi.
General
Senior Vice Syed Barkat Ahmad.
President
Vice Hamid Ali Khan.
President
Vice Mufti Mohammad Hussain Qadri.
President,
Sind
Vice Mian Jamil Ahmad Sharaqpuri.
President,
Punjab
Vice Chadhury Mohammad Sarfraz Khan.
President,
NWFP
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A gadfly on the right. President Shah Ahmed
Noorani of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan
he plans only 25X1
to incorporate League members into the nonpartisan
political structure of the new civil government.
The Pir of Pagaro-the most prominent of Sind's
traditional religious leaders-heads the League and
its strongest faction. A traditional opponent of the
PPP,
The US Consulate General in Karachi reports
that Pagaro exploited the PPP's boycott of local
elections in Sind in 1983 to increase his faction's
representation on local councils but still has much less
popular support in Sind than the PPP. We believe that
the Pir expects to be rewarded politically, possibly
with an appointment as Prime Minister. He could
repudiate Zia if his expectations are not satisfied.
Major PML Factions
25X1
25X1
(February 1982)
Vice Qari Abdul Rehman.
President,
Baluchistan
Student Arjuman-i-Tulaba-i-Islam (strong in
Wing urban Sind, but weaker than IJT or
center and left student groups, strength
growing in Punjab.
.Conservative Secular Party
Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The PML follows a
conservative, secular line. It is a remnant of the
coalition that led the anti-British agitation for the
formation of Pakistan but proved too brittle to survive
the strain of parliamentary politics in the early 1950s.
A small Karachi faction led by Khwaja Khairuddin is
in the MRD, but we believe most members are either
neutral or anti-MRD. Although diplomats note that
PML leadership is aging and the party has little
popular support, its members include some influential
landlords in Sind, Punjab, and the North-West Fron-
tier Province.
Zia drew heavily from the League in naming the
Federal Advisory Council, prompting speculation that
he intends to revitalize the League and give it a major
government role under his leadership.
Pagaro Group (Pro-Zia) Leader Pir of Pagaro,
Principal Adviser Makhdumzada
Hassan Mahmud.
Khairuddin (MRD member) Leader Khwaja
Group Khairuddin.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Qayyum (Neutral) No dominant figure 25X1
Group since death of Khan Abdul
Qayyum Khan.
Independents Shaukat Hyat Khan.
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Secret
Secret
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