ZIMBABWE: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Directorate -Seef-et
Intelligence
Zimbabwe:
Trends and Prospects
r
ALA 84-10027
March 1984
Copy 2 8 7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Zimbabwe:
Trends and Prospects
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Secret
ALA 84-10027
March 1984
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3 ~1
Secret
Zimbabwe:
Trends and Prospects 25X1
Key Judgments Since Zimbabwe gained independence in March 1980, the country has
Information available fared neither as well as its supporters had hoped nor as poorly as its
as of 14 February 1984 detractors had predicted. Prime Minister Mugabe moved quickly in the
was used in this report.
immediate postindependence period to integrate the two former rival
guerrilla armies with the old Rhodesian forces and eased the threat of the
conflagration that many feared was likely. Politically, he pursued a policy
of reconciliation. Former Rhodesian officials were retained in key positions
in the security apparatus, and Mugabe treated the Zimbabwe African
Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo like a coalition partner-
albeit a junior one-when the parliamentary strength of Mugabe's Zimba-
bwe African National Union (ZANU) was sufficient for it to have
governed alone. Undoubtedly influenced by the experience of his neigh-
bors, Mugabe left the preindependence economic structure alone. He also
followed conciliatory policies toward whites, preventing the mass postinde-
pendence exodus of skilled individuals that devastated other African
nations. Internationally, he succeeded in maintaining the confidence of aid
donors in the West.
If Mugabe's fans abroad found much to cheer about during Zimbabwe's
first two years, his detractors have had much to point to since then.
Mugabe ended the political entente with Nkomo in early 1982 when, in our
view, he calculated that ZAPU no longer represented a serious threat.
Since then, Mugabe has been quick to intimidate political opponents, to use
emergency powers inherited from the Rhodesian regime to advance the
interests of ZANU, and to attempt to crush antigovernment sentiment
among the Ndebele minority by military means. The economy has
performed poorly, primarily because of protracted drought and worldwide
recession, but also because foreign investors have been scared off by some
of Mugabe's policies. In foreign affairs, Mugabe has recently pursued
doggedly nonaligned policies, taking anti-Western stances in the United
Nations and engaging in ever sharper anti-Western rhetoric at home.
Finally, Mugabe has made plain by word and deed his determination to es-
tablish a one-party, socialist state in Zimbabwe.
A key determinant of the direction of government policy over the near term
will be the outcome of the ZANU party congress now scheduled for
August-the first full-fledged meeting since the party was organized 20
years ago. ZANU leaders frequently state that the party congress will
position ZANU to implement the one-party state. We believe that intra-
ZANU competition for power will heavily influence nearly all government
iii Secret
ALA 84-10027
March 1984
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
activity until the congress meets and that the tone of political rhetoric will
become more strident as Mugabe and other government leaders strive to
keep themselves in the limelight and to seek support from the generally
militant party rank and file. We believe, however, that Mugabe will not be
challenged as party president and that ZANU will emerge from the
congress intact and determined to implement a one-party state.
Mugabe appears to have no new strategy to reach a political accommoda-
tion with ZAPU that would bring the Ndebele-speaking people that ZAPU
largely represents into the economic and political mainstream. Consequent-
ly, we believe that the antigovernment violence that has plagued the nation
since early 1982 will continue. Although we do not believe the unrest will
develop into a civil war, neither do we anticipate that the government's
military tactics will succeed in suppressing the dissidence.
Although economic revival depends to a large degree on elements beyond
the government's control-the end of drought and the strength of world-
wide recovery-poor economic performance is generating pressures that
could lead Mugabe to alter his moderate economic policies. Zimbabwe is
experiencing a third year of drought, and prospects for the 1984 crop are
dismal. Moreover, we expect only gradual improvement in the prices of
Zimbabwe's mineral exports, and the country has large stockpiles to draw
down once foreign demand picks up. Consequently, Zimbabwe will have to
continue the austerity measures that have generally won approval from
international observers but that are politically risky. If, as we expect, the
pragmatic policies of Finance Minister Chidzero fail to bring economic
dividends over the next year, Mugabe's own socialist predilections as well
as pressure from party militants may cause him to change his heretofore
moderate, cautious approach to Zimbabwe's economic problems.
Mugabe's harsh treatment of his opponents, his socialist principles and
commitment to a one-party state, and his government's tendency to view
the world through Third World lenses will in all likelihood continue to
frighten off foreign investors and from time to time alienate Western
governments and their publics. These occasional strains in relations with
the West will not, in our view, lead Mugabe to turn his back on the West or
to move sharply toward the Soviet Union. Moscow's support for his rival,
ZAPU leader Nkomo; during the civil war left lingering suspicions.
Moreover, we believe that Mugabe has learned from the experiences of
other African states that the Soviets are unable to supply economic aid in
amounts that would compare with aid provided by the United States and
other Western countries.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
Key Judgments
Mugabe's Agenda. 5
Ethnic and Ideological Divisions 10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
Tribal Composition of Zimbabwe
Percentage of Ndebele
and Shona speakers
Ndebele Shona
Q 80-100
60-80
50-60 L~
Less than 50
ZEZURU Major Shona subtribe
--- Province boundary
Road
+-+ Railroad
Makgadikgadi
(pans/
Botswana
Percent
TRIBE of Black
Subtribe Population
SHONA ............. 71
Karanga ......... 16
Zezuru ...........13
Manyika.......... 7
Ndau ............ 4
Korekore ......... 3
Kalanga.......... 2
Other Shona ...... 26
NDEBELE ........... 16
Other (includes Sena,
Tonga, Venda,
Sotho, Hlengwe)... 13
Total black population .... 100
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
Zimbabwe:
Trends and Prospects
Political, security, and economic problems beset Zim-
babwean Prime Minister Robert Mugabe during
1983. Continuing dissident violence, in particular,
sapped government resources, exacerbated tribal ten-
sions, and undermined the confidence of domestic and
international investors. After independence in 1980,
Mugabe pursued conciliatory policies toward Zimba-
bwe's white population and the minority Ndebele
tribe, an approach that earned him a favorable repu-
tation in the West. Over the last year and a half,
however, he has shifted to more hardline tactics in
dealing with internal political and security challenges,
a trend that we believe will continue to lead to
incidents of repression and human rights abuses and,
in turn, to sometimes tense relations with the West.P
This paper reviews political, security, and economic
developments over the past year and assesses the
prospects in these areas over the next year or so. It
focuses on Mugabe's personal agenda for Zimbabwe
and the implications of intraparty politicking as the
ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
approaches its party congress in August. Finally, we
examine why relations between Harare and Western
capitals will remain difficult and consider some of the
implications if they deteriorate further.
Persistent Dissident Violence
Antigovernment dissidents continue to disrupt the
southwestern provinces of Zimbabwe. Although we
believe the dissidents-estimated at 600 to 1,000
active within the country at any one time-do not now
pose a direct threat to Mugabe's regime, their persist-
ence has sapped scarce government resources, under-
mined the confidence of commercial farmers in the
region, and created tensions with Botswana. More-
over, traditional resentment between the Ndebele-
speaking minority, mainly represented by the Zimba-
bwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the
Shona-speaking majority who dominate the ruling
ZANU party, has deepened and appears likely to
disrupt Zimbabwean politics for some time. F__1 25X1
The cycles of dissident violence and harsh government
reprisals began in February 1982, when Mugabe
expelled ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo from the cabi-
net and had several ZAPU military leaders arrested
for alleged complicity in arms caching. Disaffected
former ZAPU guerrillas who deserted or were demo-
bilized from the new Army after independence have
since committed repeated acts of terrorism and ban-
ditry, finding shelter among the local Ndebele popu-
lace, which is caught between the dissidents and
government security forces. The most widely publi-
cized government repression occurred in early 1983
when the North Korean-trained 5th Brigade, consist-
ing primarily of Shona speakers, killed some 2,000 25X1
civilians. Although the government claims that its
security measures are aimed solely at ending dissident
violence,
the ZANU-dominated government also
is trying to eliminate ZAPU as a political force in the
region.'
The government has made little headway in stemming
the dissident violence, despite its continuous military
presence in Matabeleland North and South and parts
of Midlands Provinces, the areas where dissidents are
active. The number of dissident incidents-attacks on
government facilities and property such as schools and
rail lines, murders of white farmers, increasingly
brutal treatment of local residents who are accused of
"selling out" to the government, and acts of banditry 25X1
and lawlessness-have remained at a fairly high level,
perhaps as many as 100 per month,
Government security forces are
hampered by poor intelligence and communication,
and
the troops are poorly disciplined.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
tween the two governments remains strong,
Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana have
been seriously damaged by the dissidents' use of
Botswana as a staging area and sanctuary. In late
1983, Zimbabwean troops on several occasions
crossed into Botswana to hit suspected dissident en-
campments. Clashes occurred between Zimbabwean
and Botswanan troops, and on one occasion a Zim-
babwean soldier was killed. Representatives of the
two governments have met several times to try to
reach an accommodation, and Botswana has repatri-
ated many Zimbabweans. Nonetheless, mistrust be-
Although Botswana's official
ethnic ties.
policy is to cooperate, the vast border area is difficult
to monitor, and we believe that some Botswanan
residents and officials in the border area sympathize
with the Ndebele dissidents because of historical and
The South African Connection
Top Zimbabwean officials are convinced that South
Africa is responsible for the continued dissident activ-
of terrorism and sabotage in Matabeleland.
October, the government widely publicized the cap-
ture of four dissidents who admitted to being trained
in South Africa and to participating in numerous acts
Mozambique, which plunged Zimbabwe into a severe
fuel crisis. This restraint, in our view, reflects a
perception by South Africa that events in Zimbabwe
are already unfolding according to its earlier predic-
tions-that is, that blacks are incapable of governing
a modern society without succumbing to tribal rival-
ries. Pretoria also is satisfied
that Mugabe is holding to his policy of not
allowing the African National Congress (ANC) or the
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)-the two anti-South
African groups that have unofficial "offices" in
Harare-to stage operations into South Africa from
Zimbabwean territory.
Pretoria's restraint, however, has not softened
Harare's belief that South Africa is Zimbabwe's
number-one enemy nor reduced its fear of South
Africa's capacity to destabilize the country. Pretoria
is the favored scapegoat for many of Zimbabwe's
economic and political woes, and the "racist apartheid
regime" is denounced regularly in the media and by
government spokesmen. South African newspapers
return the fire, and anti-ZANU propaganda is broad-
cast over a clandestine station called Radio Truth.' P
The hostile rhetoric and Mugabe's refusal to accede
to South African demands for ministerial-level meet-
ings remain major irritants to bilateral political rela-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
to make life difficult for Mugabe's regime.
Although we believe that the dissident problem large-
ly reflects ethnic conflicts, South Africa's low-level
support to the dissidents is probably enough to ensure
that the Shona-Ndebele conflict continues to disrupt
Zimbabwean politics. Moreover, we believe that Pre-
toria could easily increase its involvement if it deemed
this necessary or useful. South Africa has demonstrat-
ed frequently its willingness to use covert operations
Nonetheless, Pretoria apparently has not mounted
any direct covert operations against Zimbabwe since
the probable involvement of South Africa in Decem-
ber 1982 in the sabotage of oil storage tanks at Beira,
' Zimbabwean officials believe Radio Truth is located somewhere in
the Transvaal. According to the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, it began operations on 10 March,1983 and over the past
year has generally broadcast twice a day in English, Shona, and
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
South Africa is Zimbabwe's single most important
trading partner and largest foreign investor. The two
countries have exchanged resident trade representa-
tives, and commercial and banking transactions oper-
ate smoothly, according to industry spokesmen. Zim-
babwe also relies on transportation routes through
South Africa because of the shortcomings and insur-
gent disruptions of its alternative routes through
Mozambique. As a consequence, Zimbabwe tries to
keep its economic relations with South Africa di-
vorced from rhetoric and politics, according to US
Embassy reporting, because it recognizes that its
heavy economic dependence on South Africa provides
Pretoria with powerful leverage.
Economic Policy and Performance
Despite the pressures Mugabe feels to meet rising
black expectations from the "revolution" and his
personal commitment to socialism, his economic and
social reforms continue to be cautious. Indeed, his
approach has been a blend of often harsh rhetoric
with a tolerance of the capitalistic economic structure
he inherited at independence and that remains the
backbone of the economy.'
Austerity and Inflation. In spite of following general-
ly pragmatic economic policies, Zimbabwe now faces
its worst economic problems since independence. A
devastating drought-now in its third year-and the
continuing effects of worldwide recession are largely
responsible for a slowdown in real GDP growth from
annual rates of 12 percent in 1980 and 1981 to only 2
percent in 1982 and a decline of about 3 percent last
year. To cope, Harare has had to adopt tough auster-
ity measures that Finance Minister Chidzero has
admitted will delay the government's "socialist trans-
formation."
these exchange
curtailed imports of fuel this year.
ures-required by the IMF guidelines that Harare
accepted in March 1983 in return for a $325 million
standby loan and a $62 million compensatory financ-
ing facility-have included a currency devaluation,
cuts in foreign exchange allocations, reduced consum-
er subsidies, a freeze on government hiring, and
limited wage increases that have not kept pace with
the country's roughly 18-percent inflation rate.
The impact of austerity measures on the standard of
living of rural and urban dwellers alike has been
substantial. The government has drawn sharpest criti-
cism for the steep increases in food prices that
resulted from subsidy cutbacks. The price of corn, the
dietary staple, rose nearly 40 percent in September
1983 alone, for example. The cost of other consumer
goods and household commodities also has climbed in
response to dramatic transport, fuel, and electricity
price increases, reinforced in part by the higher cost of
imports following devaluation.
Production Shortfalls and Falling Exports. Sharp
increases in wages and other costs of production since
independence have combined with shortages of for-
eign exchange, the government's unwillingness to ease
price controls, stiff taxation of profits, and collapsing
domestic demand to threaten the viability of many
industrial producers. According to press reports and
official government statistics, three-fourths of manu-
facturing firms are operating below capacity. The
volume of output in most manufacturing sectors fell
by as much as 16 percent in 1982 and probably by a
similar amount in 1983, despite a roughly 30-percent
devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar since late 1982 25X1
aimed at boosting export sales.
Insufficient foreign exchange has constrained manu- 25X1
facturers, particularly in export industries, by restrict-
ing purchases of imported machinery and spare parts. 25X1
shortages also have recently forced a reduction in
Zimbabwe's emergency fuel stocks and may lead to
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
A second year of severe drought curtailed agricultural
exports in 1983. According to press and Embassy
reporting, agricultural production, which has account-
ed for as much as 47 percent of total exports and 18
percent of GDP, fell by an estimated 25 percent last
year. The decline was led by a 50-percent drop in the
corn crop, which had been a major export earner in
previous years. In the face of dwindling stocks, the
government in October announced Zimbabwe's first-
ever corn rationing and has requested additional food
aid from the United States in an effort to stretch
supplies until the harvest in April. The government
has authorized higher producer prices to stimulate
1984-85 crop production, but this will also push food'
prices upward.
World prices for gold and Zimbabwe's other principal
mineral exports-including chrome and copper-have
recovered only slightly from the lows of recent years.
Mineral production fell in 1983 for the seventh con-
secutive year; as a result, export earnings from miner-
als will show a decline of at least 10 percent for 1983,
according to preliminary projections by the US Em-
bassy. These problems have resulted in several mine
closures and, in a few cases, emergency government
loans to keep mines open and preserve jobs.
Mugabe increasingly has sought scapegoats for the
country's economic problems. At a political rally in
late December, for example, Mugabe charged that
the drought-induced cornmeal shortage was caused by
milling companies owned by whites and foreigners
who wanted to "suck the wealth of the country." The
Finance Minister told US Embassy officials that he
believes such political rhetoric, which he agreed had
taken on a more radical tinge, is in part an attempt to
compensate for the pragmatic economic policies that
are unpopular among members of the government
advocating a more rapid move toward socialism.
Racial Relations: Strained but Stagnant
Harare's efforts to improve the lot of blacks have
shown mixed results so far. A gradual program of
land resettlement-long trumpeted as the main objec-
tive of ZANU's struggle for black rule-was started
soon after independence, but its pace remains slow.
The government has so far resettled only some 40,000
families onto their own farmland, far short of its
planned goal of 162,000 families by 1985. Other
programs designed to benefit blacks have included
higher minimum wages, free health care for the poor,
and free primary education. All these began during
the brisk economic recovery that followed the end of
the civil war but are now constrained because of
budget cuts.
Mugabe's recognition that the white community is a
major source of capital and skills critical to the
country's economy has led him to continue to accom-
modate whites. They continue to hold most key
positions in business and the professions. Whites earn
most of the foreign exchange, and the approximately
4,200 white commercial farmers-who occupy about
one-third of the best farmland-produce 80 percent of
the country's agricultural output, including most of
the country's food and virtually all of its agricultural
exports.
Nonetheless, white emigration has continued at a
steady pace; the white population has dwindled from
about 220,000 at independence and may be as low as
115,000 today. The attitudes of the whites that
remain vary considerably, but in general most are not
sanguine about their long-term future. Although
many have accepted the loss of political power and
probably have become more thickskinned about so-
cialist rhetoric, they are heavily influenced by govern-
ment actions that erode their economic position or
affect such issues as the quality of health care and
schooling. They are quick to seize on rumors-often
fueled by ill-conceived government announcements-
that the government plans to repeal dual citizenship
laws, renege on promises to pay pensions, or to
confiscate land. For example, when the Education
Minister threatened in November to close private
schools that did not meet a 60-percent black enroll-
ment quota, the US Embassy noted that the an-
nouncement, even though the government later back-
tracked, further increased the substantial numbers of
whites who had already made plans to emigrate at the
end of the 1983 school year. The government's inept
handling of such sensitive issues is a frequent occur-
rence.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
Mugabe's Agenda
Mugabe's vision is gradually, under the guidance of
his party, to transform Zimbabwe into a socialist
society. He admits this will take many years; his
short-term goal, therefore, is to establish a one-party
state so that ZANU's stewardship of the transition
can be guaranteed.
Dismissing the failure of other one-party African
regimes, Mugabe claims that a one-party state can be
a democracy if it is run by democrats, a tyranny if led
by a tyrant. He promises that under ZANU there will
be adequate competition for office and that there will
be open discussion within the party's councils. Once a
consensus is reached within the party, however, Mu-
gabe envisions an end to debate.
Mugabe has stated that he will not use extraconstitu-
tional means to establish a one-party state, although
he complains that the constitution for Zimbabwe
agreed to at Lancaster House "does not correspond to
the genuine wishes of the people." Nonetheless, he
intends to move toward a one-party state with or
without the cooperation of opposition parties. He
commented recently that ". . . our position is that they
must accept that the people have chosen.ZANU as
the umbrella," referring to ZANU's overwhelming
1980 electoral victory.
The Tools and Tactics of Transition
Party Politics. Athough Mugabe has often declared
his dedication to democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights, we believe that he views security of the
state and continuation of a ZANU-dominated govern-
ment as higher imperatives. Thus, even as Mugabe
preaches a policy of "national reconciliation," he uses
the political and security tools at ZANU's disposal to
undermine the influence of the opposition.
there is a system-
atic effort to harass and intimidate opposition leaders,
who are regularly denounced for allegedly refusing to
accept ZANU's "hand of friendship" and bitterly
accused of engaging in a variety of subversive activi-
ties and colluding with South Africa against the
regime. Members of ZANU's youth brigade-de-
scribed as the "eyes and ears" of the party by one
government -minister-have disrupted opposition par-
ty rallies and destroyed property. There are credible
reports from Embassy and open sources that residents
in Matabeleland have been forced to obtain ZANU
party cards in order to receive government-supplied
goods and services.
ZANU has also promoted its candidates in local
elections through questionable means, according to
US Embassy reporting. For example, ZANU candi-
dates won several contests by wide margins in tradi-
tional ZAPU strongholds during the past year. Even
though the.government defended its legality, voters
were almost certainly intimidated by having to line up
behind the candidate of their choice instead of casting
secret ballots. Nevertheless, opposition parties are still
25X1
represented in Parliament and criticize the govern- 25X1
ment openly in the Assembly, where lively debate on
controversial issues is still common.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
The Military and Security Forces. ZANU also has
increased its influence over the military, according to
the US defense attache in Harare. The demobilization
exercise begun at independence, while aimed at re-
ducing the overall size of the Army, has resulted in an
officer corps and rank and file that are dominated by
former ZANU guerrillas. The government also has
created two all-ZANU units in the Army: the 5,000-
man 5th Brigade-which Nkomo had prophetically
charged when it was created in 1981 would be used to
suppress the Ndebele-and a 3,000-man Presidential
Guard; both units have been trained by the North
Koreans.
The police force too has been politicized by favoring
police intelligence unit, created in 1982 by former
Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze, has sparked
controversy by engaging in unlawful searches and
detentions.
A people's militia, organized in 1982 in response to
the worsening security situation in Matabeleland, has
a dual political-military role. According to a pub-
lished government report, the militia was created to
mobilize peasants against bandits and dissidents, to
gather intelligence, and to serve as a reserve adjunct
to regular police and army forces. An article in the
Zimbabwe press openly stated in September 1983
that candidates for the militia are selected with the
help of local ZANU leaders to ensure that only those
loyal to the Prime Minister and government are
allowed to join. According to a government spokes-
man, 1,500 instructors, most of whom were trained by
the North Koreans, have been deployed all over the
country to train 2,500 men and women in each of
Zimbabwe's eight provinces.
Emergency Powers and Other Measures. Mugabe has
periodically renewed, purportedly to combat dissident
violence, the emergency powers regulations that Zim-
babwe inherited from the Rhodesian regime. The
government's use of these powers, which confer exten-
sive detention authority upon the Home Affairs Min-
ister and the police that overrides several constitution-
al guarantees, has led to numerous human rights
violations over the past two years.
Security Minister Munangagwa told Parliament in
July 1983 that 1,334 people had been detained on
recommendation of the country's intelligence service
over the preceding. year. Of that total, 49 were held
indefinitely without trial under the emergency powers
regulations; others were either released or turned over
to police or Army custody. At the same time, how-
ever, then Home Affairs Minister Ushewokunze re-
fused to reply to the parliamentary request about the
fate of those in police custody, citing "security rea-
sons." The US Embassy estimates that several hun-
dred people, primarily Ndebele, are currently being
Particularly damaging to Zimbabwe's international 25X1
image has been the government's use of emergency 25X1
powers to overrule unpopular judicial decisions in
several widely publicized, security-related trials. Dur-
ing 1983, at least 12 individuals considered to be
security threats by the government were rearrested 25X1
The government's impatience with its independent
judiciary has been mirrored in its attitude toward the 25X1
press. Harare's main newspaper, which is owned and
administered by an autonomous, government-appoint-
ed and government-financed trust, as well as the
country's radio and television stations, are increasing-
ly parroting the official line of the ruling party. The
government has also stepped up its campaign against
the foreign press, which government spokesmen
charge is biased and presents a distorted view of
events in Zimbabwe. The government expelled several
foreign journalists during the year.
Most recently, Harare used its emergency powers in
late 1983 to prohibit temporarily media reporting on
acts of terrorism or sabotage and on government
countermeasures "in designated areas" unless it has
been cleared by the government. The ban effectively
curtailed reporting on such activities in Matabeleland
during November and December before it was al-
lowed to expire.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
The Withering of Opposition Parties
Nkomo and ZAPU
The government's harassment of ZAPU, the main
opposition party, and its leader, Joshua Nkomo,
climaxed in March 1983 when Nkomo fled the
country during government antidissident operations
in Matabeleland, claiming that his life was in danger.
Nkomo's fligh t left ZAPU in disarray, with many of
its officials following Nkomo out of the country.
Others were detained or killed, and ZAPU offices
were closed.
Although Nkomo returned from exile five months
later, he has remained politically isolated, his party
financially crippled and its leadership divided.
according to US Embassy reports. Several Zimba-
bwean officials admitted that Muzorewa's detention
reflected ZANU's suspicions about his links with
South Africa and was meant to teach him and other
political opponents a lesson.
Muzorewa was arrested following a trip to Israel,
where he urged closer relations between that country.
and Zimbabwe, and government officials say they
subsequently discovered he had been planning a trip
to South Africa. Mugabe publicly charged that Mu-
zorewa was conspiring with South Africa, with the
Ian Smith and the Republican Front
Like other opposition figures in the country, Republi-
can Front (RF) leader and former Prime Minister Ian
Smith was the target of government harassment on
several occasions over the last year. Government
security officials questioned him and temporarily
confiscated his passport following a foreign trip dur-
ing which he denigrated Mugabe's government.
assistance of Israel, Zaire, and the United States, to
destabilize Zimbabwe. Since independence in 1980,
the government has consistently claimed-without 25X1
justification, in our view-that Muzorewa has 5,000
troops receiving military training in South Africa.
APU leaders believe that Nkomo is an
obstacle to any reconciliation with the government
and would like him to step down
We believe these lead-
ers will continue to pursue unity talks with ZANU,
but reporting indicates that they do not reflect the
views of or have much influence over the party's rank
and file in Matabeleland.
In any event, ZANU leaders, including Mugabe, have
taken a hard line toward accommodating ZAPU. The
majority of ZANU leaders believe that the best
policy toward ZAPU is one of "benign neglect,"
hoping eventually that
some prominent ZAPU members will defect to
ZANU.
Muzorewa and the UANC
The arrest in November 1983 of Bishop Abel Mu-
zorewa focused attention on the former Prime Minis-
ter and United African National Council (UANC)
leader. His party holds only three seats in Parlia-
ment, which it is likely to lose in the next election,
Smith's Republican Front party lost two parliamen-
tary byelections during 1983-the RFsfirst defeats
by the white electorate since 1962-and did not even
contest another local election in February 1984.
Independents now hold 12 of the 20 seats reserved for
whites in the House of Assembly, where they oppose
the RF's obstructionist tactics and occasionally vote
with the government. Although white voter turnout in
25X1
25X1
25X1
the byelections has been low, the victories of the 25X1
independents, in our view, suggest that many hardline
Smith supporters were among those who emigrated.
Moreover, there may be a growing belief among
whites that independents may be better able to defend
their interests by not antagonizing the government.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
JCl"fCl
Table 1
Zimbabwe House of Assembly (Parliament)
The Party Congress
Preparations for the ZANU party congress now
scheduled for August-the first full-fledged meeting
since the party was organized 20 years ago-will, in
our view, generate an intense competition for influ-
ence within the party, and the results will determii
the future direction of government policy. ZANU
leaders frequently state that the party congress wil
position ZANU to implement the one-party state.
long-overdue congress climaxes ZANU's campaigi
launched in 1981 to reorganize and strengthen the
party at the local level and improve party finances.
1
'he
According to Embassy reporting, the congress plans to
adopt a new constitution that will institutionalize the
party's predominance in the government. It will also
elect a new central committee, which will be enlarged
from its present size of 28 to at least 60 and possibly
as many as 100, according to several reports. With the
expansion of the Central Committee, however, the
principal policymaking function will be entrusted to a
smaller group of about 15, a move that is likely to
arouse stiff competition for these spots. The coveted
post of secretary general-now occupied by Mugabe
in an acting capacity-already has generated consid-
erable rivalry between several candidates and their
supporters.
Embassy reporting suggests that it was Mugabe's lack
of confidence that he could manage the process of
enlarging and staffing the Central Committee that
largely accounted for the repeated postponements of
the congress over the past several years. Now that the
dates have been publicly announced and preparations
are well under way, we believe this signals that
Mugabe is more confident of the outcome and that his
position as party president will not be challenged.
Mugabe's Role in Party Politics
Mugabe, in our view, is a solitary and strong-willed
man who has demonstrated himself to be skillful at
balancing competing interests within the party and
government. He encourages consensus decisionmak-
ing within the party's Central Committee
Mugabe's approach is often attributed to Shona tradi-
tion; his style is to move slowly and cautiously on
controversial issues, delaying decisions until he has
ability to get his way is reflected in the number of
technocrats without strong party ties retained in the
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
z3ecre[
Table 2
Zimbabwe Cabinet
Tribal
Affiliation
ZANU Central Committee Members a
Prime Minister and Minister of Defense
Robert Mugabe
Zezuru
Deputy Prime Minister
Simon Muzenda
Karanga
National Supplies
Enos Nkala
Ndebele
Trade and Commerce
Richard Hove
Karanga
Education
Dzingai Mutumbuka
Karanga
Community Development and Women's Affairs
Teurai Ropa Nhongo
Zezuru
Justice, Legal, and Parliament Affairs
Eddison Zvobgo
Karanga
Transport and Road Traffic
Herbert Ushewokunze
Zezuru
Health
Sydney Sekeramayi
Zezuru
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Industry and
Technology)
Kumbirai Kangai
Manyika
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Security)
Emmerson Munangagwa
Karanga
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Defense)
Ernest Kadungure
Zezuru
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Political
Affairs and Provincial Development Coordination)
Maurice Nyagumbo
Manyika
ZANU Non-Central Committee Members
Finance, Economic Planning, and Development
Bernard Chidzero
Zezuru
Local Government and Town Planning
Enos Chikowore
Zezuru
Lands, Resettlement, and Rural Development
Moven Mahachi
Manyika
Foreign Affairs
Witness Mangwende
Zezuru
Construction and National Housing
Simbarashe Mumbengegwi
Kalanga
Information, Posts, and Telecommunications
Nathan Shamuyarira
Zezuru
Labor, Manpower Planning, and Social Welfare
Frederick Shava
Zezuru
Youth, Sport, and Culture
Simba Makoni
Manyika
Home Affairs
Simbi Mubako
Karanga
National Resources and Tourism
Victoria Chitepo
Identifies with Manyika
Minister of State in the Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Energy
Resources and Development)
Oliver Munyaradzi
Karanga
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Public Service)
Chris Anderson
ZAPU
Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Water Re-
sources and Development)
Minister of State to the Deputy Prime Minister
John Nkomo
Kalanga
Minister Without Portfolio
Daniel Ngwenya
Ndebele
a There are 28 Central Committee positions, but several of them are
officially listed as vacant. According to Embassy and press report-
ing, other ZANU Central Committee members include: Robson
Manyika, Deputy Minister of Labor; Mark Dube, Deputy Minister
of Lands, Resettlement, and Development; Robert Marare, Deputy
Minister of National Housing; William Ndangana, Deputy Minis-
ter for Paramilitary Training; Rex Nhongo, Commander of the
Army; Joshia Tungamirai, Air Force Deputy Commander; Didy-
mus Mutasa; Justin Chauke; Sarudzai Chinamaropa; Sally Mu-
gabe; Don Muvhuti; Mayor Urimbo; and Sheba Tavarwisa.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
secret
Cabinet, such as Finance Minister Chidzero and
Agriculture Minister Norman, and in the demotion of
Ushewokunze, who is popular among party militants.
Members of the third-largest subtribe, the Manyika,
also are concerned with maintaining their unity so as
not to lose any more influence in the party and
government relative to the Zezurus and Karangas,
The election last fall of
Although Mugabe's caution has sometimes been criti-
cized as weakness, he is capable of acting more
decisively on issues he believes have limited political
ramifications at home. Foreign policy questions in
particular seem to fall into this category.
Ethnic and Ideological Divisions
The party factions that Mugabe has to contend with
were forged during the war years and generally are
the product of subtribal affinities, ideology, and per-
sonal rivalry. The cleavages are not always clear cut,
however, and we do not fully know just how these
internal party dynamics ultimately affect government
policy.
ZANU's leadership mirrors in microcosm the subtri-
bal makeup of the Shona-speaking people. Although
Karangas constitute the largest subgroup, non-Karan-
gas have traditionally banded together to deny the
Karangas the top ZANU positions and otherwise to
prevent them from dominating the party. Indeed,
Mugabe is a member of the second-largest Shona
subgroup, the Zezurus. Several Zezurus who lack
strong party roots seem to be influential with
Mugabe: Mangwende, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs; Shamuyarira, the Minister of Information; and
Chidzero, the Minister of Finance.
Karangas in the party feel threatened by the Zezurus'
dominance,
there is a general belie within
ZANU that many Karangas are more sympathetic
toward reconciliation with ZAPU because they see
the Ndebele as potential allies if the Karanga-Zezuru
rivalry ever splits the party. The Karangas are
plagued, however, by their own internal rivalries,
epitomized by the bitter dispute between Simon
Muzenda, the recognized leader of the Karangas, and
Eddison Zvobgo, the politically ambitious Minister of
Justice.
former ZANU secretary general, Edgar Tekere, as
the party's chairman in Manicaland Province-even
though ZANU's central leadership favored another
candidate-was, due
largely to support from his tallow anyi ca.
Tekere may be backed by the
Manyika as their candidate for secretary general,
which may be another reason Mugabe would like to
abolish the position. The controversial Tekere was
fired from his Cabinet post and suspended from his
party position in 1981 following involvement in a
murder for which he was subsequently acquitted on a
technicality.
Our understanding of the ideological divisions within
ZANU is much more limited than our knowledge
about its tribal dynamics. We believe that many in the
leadership can be characterized either as "moderates"
or "militants" on important policy matters, particu-
larly those relating to the pace of Zimbabwe's transi-
tion to socialism and the extent to which Zimbabwe
should rely on the West for economic and security
assistance. The stance of many individuals, however,
appears to vary from issue to issue, making it difficult
for outside observers to determine the state of play in
Central Committee and Cabinet deliberations. F_
Moreover, ideological differences and tribal subdivi-
sions within ZANU do not neatly coincide. Although
many Karangas appear to take generally pragmatic
positions on most issues, someKarangas, such as
Justice Minister Zvobgo, take militant positions, at
least in public. Similarly, while many Zezurus-for
example, Ushewokunze, Mangwende, and Shamuyar-
ira-often appear militant, others like Chidzero hold
moderate views; Chidzero, however, probably has
little influence on noneconomic issues.
Although we have been able to identify more pragma-
tists than militants in important government posts, the
militants, in our judgment, have an influence that
outweighs their actual numbers in the leadership.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
They espouse views that are popular among the rank
and file, many of whom are former guerrillas-and
Mugabe seems well aware of them. Ushewokunze and
Tekere, both of whom at one time or another have
been demoted by Mugabe, are cases in point. While
both have been outmaneuvered by Mugabe in the
past, they have considerable latent support at the
grassroots level that has forced Mugabe to treat them
gingerly and has enabled them to make political
comebacks. In addition, although Mugabe frequently
has followed pragmatic policies, we believe many of
his personal beliefs are those of a party militant.
Consequently it is often difficult to tell the extent to
which his actions reflect pressure from party hard-
liners or his own predilections.
We believe that Mugabe's socialist leanings and
ZANU's origins as a liberation movement have set
the tenor of Harare's attitudes toward the West and
have contributed to the strained relations over the last
year. The long struggle to overthrow the white minor-
ity regime, which most black Zimbabweans believe
was supported by the West, colors their world view,
according to US Embassy reporting. We believe it
causes the country's leaders to define their foreign
policies dogmatically on the issues of nonalignment
and sovereignty and to side automatically with any
group calling itself revolutionary or "progressive."
Mugabe, for example, strongly identifies with the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua and insists that Zimbabwe's
votes in the United Nations are not meant to be anti-
US, but are made consistently on the basis of princi-
ple, according to Embassy reporting.
Mugabe, in addition, is especially proud of Zimba-
bwe's independence and is especially prickly on issues
that he perceives as meddling in the country's affairs.
He has stated repeatedly in public and private that he
will not alter Harare's policies or actions to please aid
donors and that Zimbabwe will reject aid rather than
accede to any conditions. A senior Zimbabwean offi-
cial described the Prime Minister as a man who
stands on principle, regardless of the consequences.
Thus, we believe that Mugabe's moral posturing often
conflicts with his generally pragmatic political style
and causes him to take actions that to Western
observers sometimes seem counterproductive.
In addition, we believe that institutional biases and
bumbling within Zimbabwe's Foreign Ministry have
contributed importantly to recent strains with the
West. The US Embassy reports that the Foreign
Ministry is staffed by many officials who lack experi-
ence, are bureaucratically inept, and display both
considerable naivete about international affairs and
an anti-Western bias. There is ample evidence that
Foreign Minister Mangwende and Information Min-
ister Shamuyarira, who appears to be influential with
Mugabe on foreign policy issues, along with other
advisers and Foreign Ministry officials put proposals
forward in a manner that portrays the West or the-
United States in a bad light and that plays to
Mugabe's own suspicions of the West.
Embassy reporting also indicates that, in advocating
policy options, these officials fail to warn Mugabe of
the implications or repercussions of specific actions.
For example, after the Ministry unofficially boycotted
a memorial service for US and French servicemen
killed in the October 1983 Beirut bombing, Mugabe
seemed surprised by the generally negative reaction of
the diplomatic community. Moreover, even though
Mugabe appears to be consulted on broad policy
questions, the Foreign Ministry seems free to imple-
ment policy in its own way.
We believe that Mugabe desires good relations with
Washington and the West, in large measure because
he recognizes that Western aid and investment are
vital to Zimbabwe's economic success. Harare ap-
peared to be somewhat shaken by the US decision to
cut fiscal year 1984 aid from a proposed level of $75
million to $40 million, and there are signs suggesting
that Mugabe wants to prevent further isolating him-
self from the United States. For example, Mugabe's
public reaction to the, aid cut was moderate and
restrained; he said he was grateful for US aid to date,
but opposed linking aid to Zimbabwe's foreign poli-
cies. Moreover, there has appeared, according to
Embassy reporting, a new attitude of cooperation
within the Foreign Ministry, while the Zimbabwean
Information Minister visited the United States in
early February to explore ways to improve Zimba-
bwe's image in this country.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
Zimbabwe's relations with the United States soured
in the fall of 1983 as Harare, took a number of
actions that put it at loggerheads with Washington.
The US reactions to these incidents aroused particu-
lar concern in Harare because many Zimbabweans
believed that there already had been growing senti-
ment in Washington to cut aid to Zimbabwe. Several
of the incidents coincided with, or shortly followed,
Mugabe's unsuccessful fence-mending visit to the
United States in September:
? Zimbabwe cosponsored a Nicaraguan resolution in
the UN Security Council and General Assembly
condemning the US invasion of Grenada. Reporting
on Grenada by Zimbabwe's semiofficial news media
was also harshly anti-US.
? Zimbabwe had earlier abstained on the Security
Council vote deploring the shooting down of a
South Korean civilian airliner by the Soviet Union,
despite a direct US appeal to Mugabe, who was in
the United States at the time. He defended his
country's position by insisting that Zimbabwe's
abstention represented the views of other states in
the region and that the incident had taken on
overtones of East-West confrontation.
? Zimbabwe switched its vote in both the Security
Council and General Assembly on Kampuchea,
from supporting Vietnam's withdrawal to absten-
tion. According to US officials at the United Na-
tions, no other Frontline or leading nonaligned
states changed their votes. Zimbabwean officials
later claimed the switch had been an error and that
Zimbabwe continued to oppose all such cases of
interference in another country's affairs.
Zimbabwean Foreign Ministry officials discour-
aged members of the diplomatic community in
Harare from attending a memorial service arranged
by the French and US Embassies for members of
their contingents to the multilateral force killed in
the bomb attacks in Lebanon in October 1983. In a
series of telephone calls to all diplomatic missions
and international organization offices, the Foreign
Ministry stated that it had not been consulted
about the event and would not be sending a
representative.
The United Kingdom was also the target of Zimba-
bwean anti-Western actions:
? In September, at a press conference in Harare,
Mugabe lashed out at the British for "interfering"
in Zimbabwean affairs, and anti-British demonstra-
tions were staged in Harare. British criticism of
Mugabe's decision to redetain six white Air Force
officers after they had been acquitted by the courts
on charges that they participated in the sabotage of
Thornhill Air Force Base in July 1982 (the officers
have since been released and have left the country)
led to Mugabe's claim that the British Government
had orchestrated a public and diplomatic campaign
to gain the officers' release. Mugabe threatened
that, if London cut its assistance to Zimbabwe, he
might confiscate white-owned farmland or default
on his pledges to pay pensions to civil servants and
military men who served under the Rhodesian
regime. London reassured Mugabe that it had no
intention of cutting aid and launched a concerted
effort to mend fences, which culminated in a meet-
ing between Mugabe and Prime Minister Thatcher
in December that seemed to heal the breach. F_
moderates in the government, aside from their con-
cern about the economic consequences of the aid cut,
also believe that their position has been weakened by
lingering resentment over what is widely viewed as the
political motivation behind the.US move. Mugabe
left long-lasting scars.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
could find it difficult to stem this trend without
jeopardizing the delicate balance of factions in his
party or sacrificing his proclaimed'principles.F__
political mainstream. Moreover, the military cam-
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Political and Security Prospects
We believe that preparations for the ZANU party
congress will heavily influence government activity.
Government leaders seem increasingly preoccupied
with party business, and behind-the-scenes maneuver-
ing is likely to increase as ZANU leaders hammer out
areas of compromise and mutual support. We agree
with the Embassy that the congress is likely to
endorse the outcome of this political power struggle
rather than serve as a genuine forum for spontaneous
Efforts to bully the
debate on personnel or policy.
In general, we expect the tone of political rhetoric to
become more strident as government leaders strive to
keep themselves in the limelight. We believe that
Mugabe in particular will not let himself be out-
flanked by party militants. He already has begun to
create scapegoats, such as Zimbabwe's white busi-
nessmen and South Africa in general, in an effort to
deflect criticism for the country's economic and secu-
rity problems. Such statements, which are likely to be
picked up by the Western press, will continue to cause
concern among foreign investors and Western
governments.
Mugabe and ZANU probably will emerge from the
party congress strengthened and more confident, if
only because the party infighting that preceded the
congress will be over. We expect that Mugabe's
personal grip on the party will be tighter than ever
and that no damaging fissures will appear within the
party on most issues. We also believe that ZANU's
tolerance for dissenting views and opposition figures
will lessen as the momentum toward a one-party state
Ndebele into not supporting the dissidents, however,
will only entrench the cycle of violence and antigov-
ernment sentiment in Matabeleland.
Although we believe dissident activity is short of that
necessary to spark a civil war, the dissidents probably
can continue to deny the government firm control of a
large area of the country. While the government has
the ability to mount sporadic large-scale military
operations, such as the one in early 1983, security 25X1
forces do not appear to us capable of ending the
violence. If the dissidents were to receive substantial
outside support, more violence over a larger portion of
the country would be likely, in our view.
South African actions will continue to be the unpre-
dictable factor in the already turbulent situation. We
believe that for now Pretoria's objectives are limited
to keeping Mugabe's regime weak and disrupted, both
politically and economically. Consequently, we do not
expect that South Africa will back Ndebele dissidents
to the extent that it has supported insurgencies in
Angola and Mozambique. A resumption of more
covert pressure against Zimbabwe is possible if rela-
tions between the two countries deteriorate; Zimba-
bwean control of the ANC is a touchstone for the
South- Africans in this regard.
We expect more violence in Zimbabwe, and we see
little prospect that the government will relinquish its
use of emergency powers. As a consequence, human
rights abuses, especially in Matabeleland, are likely to
occur. In late January the government again renewed 25X1
the state of emergency for another six months, the
eighth renewal since independence. 25X1
The ruling party appears to have no new strategy to
try to reach a political accommodation with ZAPU
that would bring the Ndebele into the economic and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
One positive step Mugabe has taken is the appoint-
ment of Simbi Mubako, a lawyer and known moder-
ate, to replace the controversial Ushewokunze as
Home Affairs Minister. Mubako has stated that he
intends to urge colleagues in other ministries not to
resort to emergency powers when ordinary laws could
be used; the US Embassy noted that the government
has grown increasingly dependent on emergency pow-
however, may have little power or inclination to
prevent politically motivated arrests, such as that of
former Prime Minister Bishop Abel Muzorewa in
November 1983.
Economic Prospects
We doubt that Zimbabwe's economic performance
will improve significantly in the near term, although it
may do better than it did in 1983 when there was
negative growth. Although the economy is basically
sound, according to Embassy and other reporting,
recovery depends to a large degree on elements be-
yond the government's control: the end of drought and
the strength of worldwide economic recovery.
Zimbabwe is experiencing a third year of drought,
and the prospects for 1984 crops are dimming. Ac-
cording to the Embassy, the government has already
begun to discuss drought contingency measures.
Moreover, we expect only gradual improvement in the
prices of Zimbabwe's mineral exports, and the coun-
try has large stockpiles to draw down once foreign
demand picks up.
Mugabe, in our view, will continue to rely on the
private sector to provide jobs, exports, and growth, but
potential investors both at home and abroad are likely
to remain discouraged by socialist rhetoric, lack of
government incentives, and the absence of precise
investment guarantees. Moreover, any deepening of
the foreign exchange crisis could prompt the govern-
ment to enact measures-already hinted at publicly
by Chidzero-to restrict dividend and pension remit-
tances abroad, resulting in a further weakening of
both investment incentives and morale among whites.
are growing.
Even the resumption of economic growth is likely to
create problems, in our view. ZANU is politically
committed to expanding the public sector as well as
social welfare measures, objectives that would conflict
with and could quickly stifle any renewed growth.
Mugabe will continue to come under strong political
pressure to increase wages and to maintain or restore
consumer subsidies, particularly if the economy picks
up, but social programs are likely to continue to be
underfunded, especially since military expenditures
Mugabe's challenge will be to bring greater economic
benefits to black Zimbabweans, who form the base of
his support, while not disrupting the private sector.
The problems are not only racial, but reflect a
growing divergence between the poor-who have in-
flated expectations-and a burgeoning black middle
class-which bears the brunt of higher prices and
taxes.
We expect continued tension between pragmatists and
ideologues over the pace and form of Zimbabwe's
socialist transformation. The austerity measures that
have generally won approval from the business com-
munity and international observers are especially
risky politically. If they fail to bring economic divi-
dends over the next year, Mugabe will come under
more pressure to abandon his slow, cautious approach
toward reforming the economy, and Finance Minister
Chidzero may be increasingly isolated. Mugabe's
retention of him in the January Cabinet shuffle
suggests that the Prime Minister remains confident in
Chidzero's counsel, but the Minister's departure from
the scene (Chidzero has sometimes talked of resign-
ing) could presage the unraveling of pragmatic
policies.
Mugabe may, in any event, move to put his personal
stamp on some aspects of economic management. For
example, he recently expressed his dissatisfaction with
the level of state participation in industry, and in the
Cabinet shakeup he moved the minister responsible
for this issue into the Prime Minister's office.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
Mugabe, in our view, will play a critical personal role
in determining the course of events in Zimbabwe over
the next few years, with the result that" our projection
of trends would change significantly if he were sud-
denly removed from the political scene. Mugabe's
position as head of the party and government current-
ly appears secure to us, and we believe that he
remains vulnerable only to unexpected death by
accident, natural causes (although we believe the 60-
year-old Prime Minister is in good health), or assas-
sination.
Under such circumstances, we believe that ZANU is
well enough entrenched that the transition would
occur relatively smoothly and in accord with consti-
tutional provisions. Under these provisions, President
Banana would probably appoint Deputy Prime Minis-
ter (and ZANU Vice President) Simon Muzenda to
succeed Mugabe, who would retain domestic and
foreign policy continuity. The character of the new
government, however, would be colored by the man-
ner of Mugabe's death. If he were assassinated by an
embittered white or an Ndebele dissident, we would
expect any new leadership to follow severely repres-
sive policies against Zimbabwe's minorities.
We also believe that an intense and possibly pro-
longed power struggle within ZANU would ensue-
one that Muzenda, in our view, would have difficulty
controlling. Uncertainties raised by Muzenda's ascen-
dency would, at a minimum, sharpen subtribal rival-
ries within ZANU.
Further, we believe that party militants .frustrated
by Mugabe's cautious approach-would probably
view his passing as an opportunity to move more
aggressively to install ZANU as the single party, to
Prospects for Relations With the West
On balance, we see little prospect for change in the
dynamics that have strained relations between Harare
and the West during the past year. Occasional out-
bursts of anti-Western sentiment, often stemming
from internal tensions, seem unavoidable as long as
Mugabe is committed to a one-party, socialist state
socialize the economy, and to reduce remaining white
privilege. Pressure to quicken the pace of land redis-
tribution by confiscating property or to take over
critical industries such as corn milling could become
self-generating as those competingfor power tried to
outbid each other for popular support. Moves in these
directions, although politically rewarding in the short
run, would lead to white slight and economic havoc.
We believe that a somewhat similar scenario would
unfold if our assessment of the outcome of the party
congress proved incorrect and Mugabe emerged
weaker rather than stronger. It is possible, although
not likely, that a personality such as Tekere or
Ushewokunze could prove capable of mobilizing
rank-and-file support for populist and radical poli-
cies. Under these circumstances, we would expect a
reinvigorated, and more radical, Central Committee
to assert policy primacy over a weakened Prime
Minister Mugabe.
Under either scenario, a breakdown in Mugabe's
modus vivendi with South Africa would be likely.
The pitch of anti-South African rhetoric from Har-
are would increase and pressure could grow for
increasing Zimbabwe's assistance to anti-South Afri-
can groups like the ANC. South Africa, always ready
to anticipate the worst from its black-ruled neigh-
bors, would probably need little provocation to in-
crease its support for Zimbabwean dissidents or to
strangle the Zimbabwean economy. The radicaliza-
tion of the regime's domestic policies alone, with its
adverse effects on Zimbabwe's economy and human
rights record as well as on regional stability, would
have damaging repercussions on Harare's relations
with the West.
with a doggedly nonaligned view of the world.
Harare's actions, both domestically and in interna-
tional forums, probably will continue to alienate
Western governments and their publics, raise human
rights concerns, and frighten off foreign investors. F-
Although Mugabe apparently has reined in some
Foreign Ministry officials who recently have been
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
Secret
more cooperative in consulting with US representa-
tives, we believe a major shift in foreign policy is
unlikely. Foreign Minister Mangwende was retained
in the January Cabinet shuffle, and, in our view, the
Foreign Ministry is carrying out-albeit clumsily and
without tact-a foreign policy that is sanctioned by
the country's leadership and that reflects Mugabe's
deep commitment to nonalignment and to a jealous
defense of Zimbabwe's sovereignty.
Mugabe's Limited Options. We do not expect Zimba-
bwe to seek significantly closer ties to Moscow just
because relations with the West have cooled. In
principle, Mugabe distrusts both superpowers. So far,
he has been content to manifest his nonaligned cre-
dentials mainly by maintaining warm relations with
those Eastern Bloc countries, such as Romania and
North Korea, that supported ZANU during the war
and with those socialist states that he believes can
serve as a model for the kind of economic and social
development he believes is appropriate for Zimbabwe.
Moreover, in our view, he is aware that Moscow and
its allies have been unwilling and increasingly unable
to match the West in supplying economic aid to
Africa.
Relations with Moscow developed slowly because of
the USSR's support for Nkomo and ZAPU during
the war and Harare's nagging worry
that Moscow might be covertly aiding the dissidents
on ZAPU's behalf. During the past year, Zimbabwe
took delivery of a shipment of small arms from the
Soviets, accepted a number of scholarships, signed a
trade agreement with Moscow, and sent several minis-
ters to the Soviet Union to explore party-to-party
relations. We believe that Mugabe will continue to
move cautiously to expand ties with Moscow. Other
tangible signs of improving relations might include a
firm scheduling of Mugabe's visit to Moscow-which
was postponed several times last year, according to
Embassy reporting-the opening of a Zimbabwean
Embassy in Moscow, and further low-level military
cooperation.
A sharp deterioration in the security situation could
nevertheless drive Zimbabwe further from the West.
The government's record so far suggests that ZANU,
if threatened, would pursue repressive measures to
maintain control, which could initiate another round
of misperceptions and hostility between Harare and
Western capitals. Diminished Western support, re-
duced aid, and lack of foreign investment could
reinforce the government's reliance on coercion to
quell antigovernment forces or to stifle growing do-
mestic pressure for economic relief. Zimbabwe proba-
bly would then look to the East for military assistance
it believed it needed-an area where the Soviet Union
and its allies have a comparative advantage over the
West.
Deteriorating relations with the West also could tend
to encourage the regime's internal and external oppo-
nents. Dissidents probably would see it as a sign that
their activities were paying off and would be encour-
aged to step up the pressure. If South Africa believed
that the West no longer viewed Zimbabwe as a model
for a democratic, multiracial society in southern
Africa, it could be tempted to renew its pressure on
the regime either in the form of increased support to
anti-ZANU dissidents or economic strangulation
tactics.
Finally, Zimbabwe's reduced reliance on the West
would almost certainly further strengthen the hand of
party militants and could lead to more precipitous
moves to socialize the economy or to impose the one-
party state. We doubt that Mugabe, in the long run,
could stand up to leftist pressure from within ZANU
in the face of a deteriorating security situation,
declining economic resources, and sharp Western
criticism.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84S00897R000200150008-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/30: CIA-RDP84SO0897R000200150008-3