THE AYATOLLAH'S BIG STING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100240007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 30, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ARTICLE ~PLEI~D
ON PAGE d~..~.
U.S.NEWS F, WORLD REPORT
30 March 1987
THE AYATOLLAH'S
BIG STING
^ It began sincerely enough. Because of Iran's enor-
mous strategic importance in the Persian Gulf, and
because of the uncertainty of Soviet intentions there,
many American foreign-policy planners believed
that an attempt to open a dialogue with leaders of
the Islamic Republic would improve the chances of
the United States gaining some influence after the
death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Through in-
termediaries, the opening was estab-
lished-only to go ter-
ribly awry when an
effort to reach Iranian
"moderates" deterio-
rated into an arms-for-
hostages deal and the
diversion of money to
the Contra forces fighting the Sandinis-
ta regime in Nicaragua.
Those have been the central assump-
tions of the [ran-Contra affair that has
so damaged the Reagan Presidency.
But are they true'? New information
provided by sources in the Middle East, and specifi-
cally in Teheran, seems to indicate a far more trou-
bling scenario. It was not the United States that
made overtures to Iran, but the reverse, these
sources say. And the Iranians had no real interest in
strategic relations with America. Their goal was
simple: They wanted weapons to prosecute their war
with Iraq. [n fact, the sources explain, the Ayatollah
and his men devised what one U.S. investigator calls
"a giant sting" that resulted not only in substantial
sums of arms and money flowing to Iran but much,
much more.
The sting duped not only the Americans but the
Israelis, the middlemen arms dealers and even the
Soviets, and its effectiveness is all the more remark-
able for the simplicity of its conception. Essentially,
the sources say, it worked like this: Through careful-
ly Selected go-betweens, the Iranians put out detailed
reports of Khomeini's failing health and alluded to
an intense factional struggle that was already taking
shape. Among the factions, the Iranians said, was a
group that favored ties with the West. In exchange
for weapons and intelligence information,
which would be regarded as signs of Good
faith. the West. and
specifically the United
States, would achieve a
measure of influ_ensr in
the new Iranian lead-
ership and perhaps
some help in obtaining
the release of the A_ merican hosta?es
beinp~h~ld in Beirut.
As the story was being passed along
to Washington through arms dealers
and credulous Israeli interlocutors, the
Iranians made it known to Soviet oper-
atives within Iran that an opening to the United
States was being considered. The hope was that, at
some point, the Soviet operatives would show their
hand and that the Iranian authorities would then be
able to identify the network of spies and arrest them.
[n fact, the sources say, this is precisely what hap-
pened-thereby seriously damaging Moscow's posi-
tion in Iran.
The following special report is based on extensive
research by a team of reporters and analysts in the
Middle East working with G'. S. .`'ews, the maga-
zine's own reporting and the public record. Where
there are conflicts between U.S. officials and those in
the Middle East, particularly Iran, they are noted in
the text. ^
ri011~1M1~
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MASTERS OF DECEIT
How the Iranians manipulated the U.S., Israel and the Soviet Union
^ Friday-morning prayers had ended just a short time ago
on the broad greensward in front of Teheran University
when an aide to Ayatollah Khomeini summoned the most
powerful men of the Islamic Republic. From different quar-
ters of the city, the clerics, in their robes and turbans,
hurried to the Ayatollah's heavily guarded home in Ja-
maran, in the foothills just north of Teheran. It was a rare
summons; the Ayatollah was accustomed to making almost
all decisions alone. As the clerics waited in an outer room to
be admitted to the inner court where Khomeini lives, they
realized something was afoot. The date was Jan. 25, 1985.
Ushered into the private chamber, with its whitewashed
walls and bright, woven rugs, the visitors quickly took seats.
According to Iranian sources, they were Hashemi Rafsan-
jani, Speaker of the Iranian parliament, or Majlis, and head
of the Iranian War Council; Mir Hossein Moussavi, the
Prime Minister; Mohsen Rafiq-Doust, minister of the feared
Pazdaran, or Revolutionary Guards; Mohammad Rey-
Shahri, head of internal security, and Foreign Minister
Akbar Velayati. Ahmed Khomeini, the Ayatollah's son and
closest confidant, completed the group. These were the men
that Khomeini trusted most; several are thought to be related
to the ruler. In time, the old man spoke. Iran desperately
needed weapons and military spare parts, he said, but only
the United States could provide the amounts required for a
knockout blow against Iraq. But Khomeini, the cunning
manipulator despite his advanced years, could not reach out
to America-the "Great Satan." Instead, a trap must be laid
to draw the U.S. to him. And the ruler would settle for
nothing less than a direct link to the White House.
AN AMBITIOUS PLAN
Jamaran is a small village that squats uncomfortably in the
lee of a hulking mountain called'Tuchal. In 1980, a wealthy
admirer made a gift of his villa to Khomeini, and since then
he has spent almost all his time there. Now, on this freezing
night in January, in the shadow of Tuchal, Khomeini and his
aides plotted. Reports of his impending death and an incipi-
ent power struggle must be planted among Iranian exiles in
the United States and Europe. Then the hook would be set.
To entice the Americans still further, three pieces of bait
would be dangled. Well-placed American authorities would
be supplied with the names of officials in the one faction
said to be interested in establishing better ties with the
West, leading them to believe that they might establish their
first small toehold in Iran since the overthrow of the Shah
in 1979. In exchanpte for weapons and perhaps more-exten-
sive coo ration on milita and intelli ence matters, partic-
ulaxJy in the war aaatnst ragLthe o cta s to t e so-ca e
moderate >it~D would help the U.S. supply Afghan rebels
ough openinrts in the long Iran-Afghan border. Furt er,
as a token of their willingness to work with the est, the
"moderates" would endeavor to obtain the release of the
few U.S. hostages held in Lebanon at the time. It was
assumed that the Americans knew too little about internal
Iranian politics to spot the deception.
It was an ambitious plan, particularly considering its
multiple goals. It is obvious that the Iranians sorely needed
the spare parts for the U.S.-built weapons purchased under
the Shah. At one point in 1985, 300 American-made air-
craft-roughly 85 percent of the entire Iranian fleet-were
reportedly grounded for lack of replacement parts. As dire
as the need was for weaponry and air defenses for Iranian
The parliament's Speaker,
Rafsanjani, may have made
huge profits on the deals
.Z.
The Ayatollah's son, Ahmed,
was present at key meetings
where sting was discussed
cities, however, sources in Teheran with knowledge of the
Jamaran conversations say that the procurement of arms
and antimissile defenses was only one of the goals of the
Ayatollah; another was to strike at the Soviet Union, patron
and No. 1 armorer of Iraq. The ultimate goal, of course,
was to defeat Iraq.
Khomeini has long feared an effort by Moscow to under-
mine his own regime. In 1983, pearl 200 I 'ves
were executed and the ommunist Tudeh Partv was dis-
banded 'ter t e .Central Intelli ence A enc secretl
rovided t e ometm re ime~ wtth in onnation obt in d
rom rifts sources on t e 's s network in Iran.
Theo eration was a bi setbac or t e KGB but it did not
result in the loss o al its a ents to Te eran. And since then,
accordin to t e sources in
a eran and tntelli ence offi-
cis s esew ere to t o t
e
ast, t o ad begun to
rem trate an un etermm~ num e~i~' new dents tnto
Iran. especially within the Air Force. How far the infiltra-
tion proceeded is a matter of dispute in the West. The CIA
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3
?and most academic experts doubt there is a si nificant KGB into two days of violent street demonstrations after a soc-
presence to rant ay, a t oug as recent y as t e s~nn~o ~ cer match in Teheran. Air defenses for the cities were
1985 menu assess t e 'oviet t reaTi - t as serious Both j clearly a pressing need.
Amencan and key Iranian~to tcta~~[ieve, owever, that j These were just some of the concerns among the Iranian
the downfall of the Ayatollah could result in a Soviet power ; leaders as they left Khomeini's home in Jamaran that cold
grab in Iran. Khomeini hoped that by luring the United j January night. They could not have known it as they passed
States into providing weapons, he could simultaneously ~ through the electronic gate outside the Ayatollah's resi-
effect a double sting, drawing KGB operatives out into Bence and back down the poplar-lined road to Teheran, but
the open and rolling up the Soviet spy network. these top officials, who were entrusted with carrying out the
But would such a plan work? And who would carry it ambitious double sting, would find an unusually receptive
out? Quietly, as his senior aides sat around him in Ja- audience in Washington, where interest in opening up a
maran, Khomeini uttered a name: Mohammed Karubi. All channel to Iran had already been kindled. Only a few
around, there was general agreement. For weeks, the Irani- months before the Jamaran meeting, a member of the White
an leadership had been abuzz with speculation about Kar- House National Security Council staff, Howard Teicher,
ubi, an eminent member of the Majlis widely regarded as had prepared a long interagency memorandum exploring
one of the most brilliant men in Teheran. Also, through his the possibilities and the strategic potential of re-establishing
brother, Mehdi Karubi, who has been linked to the hijack- relations with Iran, possibly using the sale of arms as an
ing of TWA 847 and a 1983 attempt to seize Mecca, he opening gambit. At the time, the proposal went nowhere.
was allied with figures in Iranian terrorist organizations. ' However, the germ of the idea expressed in the memoran-
For the two weeks before the January 25 meeting, Karubi Bum had been planted.
LI
Prlme Mlnleter Moueeavl
asked Ghorbanlfar to Iran,
setting plan In motlon
Khomelnl waa reported Haar .
death; In fact, ha waa healthy
for an elderly man
had been invited to Friday prayers in Khomeini's private
mosque, a rare honor. On the morning of the meeting,
Karubi received the ultimate honor-Khomeini invited
him to conduct part of the service. Karubi, the Ayatollah
said, would be the lure for the U.S., traveling from Iran to
meet with foreign emissaries. As one Iranian source put it
later, Karubi was to be "the cheese in the trap."
Though it was Khomeini who announced the selection
of Karubi for the key role, Rafsanjani may well have been
the original architect of the plan. As far back as 1984, he
had spoken publicly of his willingness to purchase arms
from the United States. And in 1985, he turned up in
Japan and later Kuwait, dropping broad hints of Iran's
willingness to restore some form of relations with the Unit-
ed States. The war with Iraq was taking an increasingly
heavy toll on the Iranian economy. But according to intel-
ligence officials in the Middle East, Iraqi bombings on
civilian-population centers were creating even greater prob-
lems for the government, with unrest erupting at one point
Because of its enormous oil reserves, its long border with
the Soviet Union and the potential impact of its Islamic
fundamentalism on neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan and
the Moslem republics of the U.S.S.R., Iran looms large in
any calculation of U.S. interests in that part of the world.
Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, U.S. intelligence agencies
have lost valuable listening posts from which to spy on the
Soviet Union. The fall of the Shah also left the United States
without a reliable ally in t e regton, as well as a gaping hole
m us uman mte tgence-ga enng ne wor n er the
Sha rantan an tnte t ence o rattves ad shared
valuab a to ormatton on g antstan, t e Soviet Union and
a host o of er su sects.
Brae ,too, a a een appreciation for the importance of
Iran. As was the case in the U.S., there was great interest on
the part of the Israelis in the future of Iran after Khomeini,
as well as in the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War. Israel deeply
feared a victory by Iraq and historically had maintained
cordial business relations with Iran, which is not an Arab
country. Moreover, the Israelis were concerned about the
fate of an estimated 25,000 Iranian Jews.
In early 1985, however, it was not all that difficult to
stir fears of Khomeini's faltering health. In Washinggton, as
well as in Jerusalem, the intelligence a enciesTa~been
recetving pen'o is eat u et~ins on ometnt a most
stnce the ver da t e a fled. The information was
almost a ways s etc y, tfioug ost o en, it was reported
that the Ayatollah was suffering from degenerative heart
disease, but at least one report speculated about intestinal
cancer. Middle East sources now say that Khomeini was
diagnosed in 1984 as having prostate cancer, not uncom-
mon in a man his age.
ENTER THE MIDDLEMAN
Whatever the true state of Khomeini's health, the plan set
in motion at Jamaran began to evolve through a series of
unusual meetings and diplomatic gambits. Before long, the
Americans, the Israelis and even the Soviets were being
drawn into the Iranian snare. Just a few weeks after the
Jamaran meeting, in the middle of February, 1985, Prime
Minister Moussavi invited a man named Manucher Ghor-
banifar to Teheran for talks. Ghorbanifar is a wealthy
Iranian arms dealer who has a wide network of contacts in
Continued
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the United States and Israel. He also has awell-refined
' instinct for money. So when Moussavi began telling Ghor-
banifar of the Iranians' interest in an arms deal worth
somewhere in the neighborhood of 32.5 billion, the arms
dealer shifted his thinking into high gear. He explained that
his good friend, another arms dealer named Adnan Kha-
shoggi, also had very good contacts that could be useful in
developing interest on the part of the Israelis and the Amer-
icans. Moussavi approved, and even offered Ghorbanifar
the use of an Iranian office in Hamburg.
Ghorbanifar left Teheran immediately for West Germa-
ny, and through March and April he and Khashoggi
worked on a plan to begin talks directly with the United
States. Ghorbanifar had tried in the past to deal directly
with U.S. officials in a variety of negotiations, but he was
not trusted and so had little success. This time, Ghorbani-
far asked Khashoggi what tack should be taken, and Kha-
shoggi advised that an overture be made to the Americans
through the Israelis. "Having failed to reach us at the front
door," Michael Ledeen, a consultant to the National Secu-
rity Council staff, told the Tower review board, "Ghorban-
ifar went around to the side door." He also asked Kha-
shoggi to forward a memorandum on the situation in Iran,
dated July 1, 1985, directly to Robert McFarlane, the
White House national-security adviser. Then, the two arms
dealers sat back to see what would happen. They would
not have long to wait.
A MULLAH IN HAMBURG
At 7 p.m. on July 8, 1985, an unusual party began to
assemble in a luxury suite of the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten in
Hamburg. The two arms dealers had not yet achieved their
goal of direct talks with the United States. But they had
succeeded in bringing Iranians and Israelis together-no
small feat-and they had set the stage for direct involve-
ment of the U.S. and, ultimately, the shipments of the
weapons Teheran so desperately needed.
Present at the meeting were three Israelis: David Kimche,
then director general of the Foreign Ministry; Al Schwim-
mer, an arms dealer, and Yaacov Nimrodi, another arms
dealer and former Israeli intelligence official. On the Saudi
side were Khashoggi, his son and an unidentified business
associate. A Lebanese named Nael Assad, a member of one
of the leading Shiite families who is married to Khashoggi's
sister, also was in attendance. Representing the Iranians
wire Ghorbanifar and a bearded cleric, whom no one
seemed to know. After the usual pleasantries were ex-
changed, the talk turned quickly to the machinations of
Iranian revolutionary politics. As the debate ebbed and
flowed around him, the cleric in the black robe and white
turban sat impassively, without speaking. Obviously a mul-
lah of high rank, the man was thin, of medium height, with
sharp features; his beard was scanty and deep black. At
length, Khashoggi explained to the others that the cleric
had come from Teheran and had firsthand knowledge of the
factional disputes there. The man's name, Khashoggi said,
was Mohammed Karubi-the Ayatollah's designated point
man in the big sting.
With Ghorbanifar translating when needed, Karubi,
speaking Farsi and sometimes lapsing into Arabic, talked
for 3!n hours, outlining his view of Iran after Khomeini.
There are, he said, three factions within Iran, each desper-
ately angling against the other. The first, said Karubi, is a
radical group that favors ties with the Soviet Union. It is
led by the President, Ali Khamenei, and Prime Minister
Moussavi. The second group, Karubi told his listeners, is
led by Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, and it favors Marxist-
oriented domestic policies, but believes Iran should not cut
off relations with the West. The third faction is the most
moderate, Karubi said, and it holds that Iran's most dan-
gerous enemy is the Soviet Union. At this point in his talk,
Karubi reached into his robe and pulled out a sheet of
paper with the names of 50 religious and military leaders
who belong to the latter faction. Other sources with knowl-
edge of the meeting in Hamburg say that the document
was actually 30 pages long, "raw data" containing names
and affiliations of many Iranian politicians. Some form of
the document was turned over to the Middl on
Qf the CIA or analysis; it was deemed to be accurate.
Karubi also described Iran's terror network in Western
Europe and the Middle East, strengthening his bona fides
with his audience. And before the meeting in the Hamburg
hotel broke up late in the evening, he provided his views of
the prospects for Iran, hinting cryptically that it was he
who led the third faction. Once Khomeini was gone, Kar-
ubi warned, it would be "every politician, mullah and gen-
eral for himself." If the struggle was not resolved quickly.
Karubi said. Iran would disintegrate. "We are here to
discuss the Soviet threat," he said, according to a partici-
pant in the meeting. "If you don't help, Iran will turn into
a second Lebanon. [And] if it does, it will be a lot worse."
Karubi's conclusion: The West, specifically the United
States, must intervene; it must come to the aid of the
moderates, supplying both arms and money. The meeting
finally ended sometime near midnight. And within 24
hours, a summary had been carried to Washington by one
of the Israelis, probably Schwimmer, sources say. The bait
was now in place.
Things then began to move quickly. Less than a week
after the Hamburg meeting, Israel received an "all clear"
from the United States to keep talking with the Iranians. A
three-cornered dialogue now began among the Iranians,
U.S. officials and the Israelis. A few weeks after that O. K.
from the United States, Ronald Reagan, as a gesture of
good faith, approved the first shipment of arms to Iran by
the Israelis, according to the Tower Commission report.
And sometime during the last week of August, 1985-
Iranian sources say August 25, not August 30, as in the
Tower report-Manucher Ghorbanifar flew from Israel to
the Iranian city of Tabriz with 100 U.S.-made TOW anti-
tank missiles. The arms dealer was greeted with kisses and
given what might have passed for a hero's welcome. He
was flown on Prime Minister Moussavi's Falcon jet back
to Teheran. And less than 24 hours after landing in Tabriz,
he found himself sitting in the Ayatollah Khomeini's con-
crete encampment at Jamaran. The next mark in the Aya-
tollah's big sting was about to be ensnared.
THE SEDUCTION
y
At 11 a.m. on August 26, with only an olive-green door
separating him from the private quarters of the Ayatollah,
Ghorbanifar sat facing two of the most powerful men in
the Islamic leadership-Rafsanjani, the Majlis Speaker,
who may be a cousin of Khomeini, according to Middle
East sources, and Moussavi, the Prime Minister. Also pre-
sent was a man named Mohammed Kangarlou, Moussavi's
chief deputy, and, as always, Ahmed Khomeini, the Aya-
tollah's son and confidant. How had the arms been deliv-
ered? Who authorized the sale? Was it
possible to get more? The men were
full of questions. And Ghorbanifar,
pleased at their deference and blan-
dishments, was only too happy to re-
ply, recounting his talks in Hamburg
and Israel, and taking few pains to
conceal his role as deft and daring in-
termediary. Why had the Americans
agreed to the arms sale, Rafsanjani ~~~
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and the others asked. According to
sources in Teheran, Ghorbanifar re-
plied briefly: "The Russians." The
Americans and the Israelis were fear-
ful, Ghorbanifar explained, that after
Khomeini's death the Soviet Union
would gain influence in Iran and per-
haps take it over.
Professing astonishment at this axi-
omatic information, Rafsanjani, Mous-
savi and the others asked that Ghor-
banifar put his thoughts on paper,
according to an Iranian source with information about the
events of that day. The report completed. the four Iranians
debated its merits for ?hours as Ghorbanifar sat silently in
their midst. By 3 p.m., Ghorbanifar told others later, the
four men had reached a conclusion: They would present
Khomeini with a plan by which he could obtain arms from
Israel and the United States. But would the Ayatollah
approve it? Would he deal with the Great Satan and the
hated Israelis''
With much trepidation, Ghorbanifar recounted to
sources afterward, the four Iranian leaders went in to see
Khomeini. The arms dealer, left sitting outside the green
door, settled in for a long wait. However, within 15 min-
utes, he said, the four were back, and they were in high
good humor. The Ayatollah, they said, had given his bless-
ing to the enterprise. Ghorbanifar, no doubt with delusions
that he personally had convinced the old man to buy arms
from the Great Satan, was dismissed from the residence at
Jamaran, praise still ringing in his ears. And apparently, as
he returned to deal for more arms for Iran, he had no idea
that his entire interview had been
staged from the first moment to the
last. The Iranians, it seems, wanted
Ghorbanifar to go back to the Ameri-
cans and the Israelis convinced that
Khomeini was now? behind the plan.
EXPANDING LOOP
If Ghorbanifar was taken in, as the
Iranian sources say, he can take some
solace in the fact that he was not alone.
Even as he was preparing for his visit to
Teheran in early August, 1985, key offi-
cials in the U.S. were scrambling to take
advantage of what they viewed as the
"Iranian opportunity." According to the
report of the Tower Commission, David
Kimche, who had by then resigned as
director general of Israel's Foreign Min-
istry, told Robert McFarlane, the na-
tional-security adviser, of three new
meetings in which "the Iranians said
Iran was in shambles and a new govern-
ment was inevitable." The Iranian peo-
ple, Kimche reportedly said, are "still
pro-American" and "want a dialogue
with America." As it turned out, all they
really wanted were arms and money.
But because McFarlane, Marine Lt.
Col. Oliver North and Ledeen (who once
posed as an Israeli in a meeting with the
Iranians) were relying on the likes of
Ghorbanifar and his misleading infor-
mation from the Iranians, the United
States w?as easily played for a fool. In a
hectic sequence of meetings in Europe
and Israel (U.S..~'ews has learned some
Iranian clerics traveled secretly to Tel
Aviv to discuss the arms shipments).
North, Ledeen and others attempted.
through the fall of 1985, to arrange
further discussions with [ran of their
mutual strategic interests. But even as
they scrambled from one meeting to the nest, the L.S. officials
had no idea that Khomeini was in no danger of dying: in fact.
he was in good shape for a man who was then 85 years old.
[f the White House was misled over the prospects for a
post-Khomeini Iran in the fall of 1985, the Kremlin was
equally convinced of the Ayatollah's rapidly failing health.
~~t only. that~but .according to sources in Teheran and
intelligence officials elsewhere in the Middle East, the KGB
had learned. through a source in the Iranian leaders .that
Iran had been negotiating through intermediaries to obtain
arms from the United States. The Soviet source is identified as
Abbas Zamani, a former ambassador to Pakistan in the early
1980s who is currently the depun? head of Iranian intelli-
ence; his re uted alias is Abu Sharif, and Middle E n
sources _de_scn a tm as__ t e Quiet "resident" in Teheran. a
.term that refers to the position of KGB station chief. The
information regarding Zamani's KGB rank could not be
rmed br, Western intelligence agencies, but his~olitics
appear to be markedl ? ro-Soviet. In an ? event the sources
say, Zamani w?as broug t to to assist with "technical" asFects
of the arms-procurement effort dis-
cussed at the Ayatollah's residence in
Jamaran, with the ex ectation that
eventually, when t e arms arrived in
Iran, he would activate other KGB o -
erattves, at w tc ttme t ev would be
identified, arrested and executed. In ef-
fect, these sources sa ,the Iranians were
erectin~t ~e arc ttecture o a grand
sting, in whicTi ~i wouTd-become
yet another mark.
As the events of the arms negotiations
played themselves out in the fall of 1985,
it is clear that the Iranians were suc-
ceeding in changing the terms of the
talks, at least partially because of the
increasing preoccupation on the part of
President Reagan with the fate of the
American hostages in Lebanon. No lon-
ger was the U.S. speaking as much and
as often about strategic interests;
McFarlane had effectively lost the bat-
tle. In many ways, it had come down to
a crude bargain of arms for hostages.
~Al1~IM19d
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Only more hostages had been taken. There were some
tactical foul-ups that may have caused the negotiations to fall
through. On Sept. 14, 1985, the Israelis, with the blessing of
the United States, sent a second shipment of TOW missiles to
Iran. But the Iranians wanted more, and the Americans and
the Israelis hastened to respond. In late November, however,
two senior Israeli defense officials in Tel Aviv took it upon
themselves, without consulting their superiors, to fill a third
Iranian order with 18 outdated Hawk ground-to-air defense
systems. The Iranians, architects of their own big sting,
would not be taken in by others. They were furious and
threatened to break off all talks with the U.S. and Israel.
Tu salvage the negotiations, U.S. officials blamed the
Israelis for the foul-up and dispatched McFarlane to London
to meet with the representatives of Iran and Israel. On Dec. 8,
1985, McFarlane and the others sat
down in the London office of the Israeli
arms dealer Yaacov Nimrodi. The for-
mer national-security adviser told the
Tower board-and other U.S. officials
have insisted-that no promise of weap-
ons was made. But one of the Iranians
and another person who attended the
meeting insist that, in pleading for re-
lease of the U.S. hostages, McFarlane
upped the arms ante, offering Iran "far-
more-advanced systems and spare
parts."
Whatever the case, four more Ameri-
can hostages had been kidnapped in
Beirut since January, 1985. One of the
hostages, Benjamin Weir, had recently
been released, but the U.S. was pressing
hard for the freedom of the others, and
the feeling among some U.S. officials
was that more arms would finally free
the hostages. In February, 1986, two
shipments totaling 1,000 TOW missiles
were sent from the United States to Iran.
It was the first direct shipment by the
Americans. The Iranian sting, at least as
SO
Unfortunately, they never actually closed the purse. And
when Karubi and Ghorbanifar passed along fresh reports in
March of 1986, saying the pro-Western faction in Iran was
growing, U.S. interest was piqued once again. If the United
States could provide 80 Hawk missiles, the Iranians said, it
was very likely a delegation of American officials could be
received in Teheran to begin talks with ministerial-level
people. The stage was now set for McFarlane's May. 1986,
visit to Teheran.
The visit was an utter failure. With the ludicrous stage
props of a Bible and a cake shaped like a key, McFarlane's
Boeing 707 touched down in Teheran un May 25. McFar-
lane had undertaken the mission at the request of his succes-
sor in the White House, Vice Adm. John Poindexter. Gh~r-
banifar had taken care of preliminary arrangements fur the
As McFarlane prepared to leave Teheran after three days of unsuccessful negotiations,
demonstrators massed about 3 kilometers away in preparation for storming the hotel.
Revolutionary Guards turned back the crowd, arrested most near Teheran Univeralty.
it was being applied to the U.S., was working very well indeed.
But finally the Americans were beginning to get wise. They
had never fully trusted Ghorbanifar, who had failed at least
two CIA-admtntstered te- elector tests. ow, t ey were
growtn-~ g-~ee~y-o aru t, t e tgnt ed cleric. At one point,
the Middle East sources say, Karubi was disguised and
brought to Washington, where he was sharply questioned by
unidentified U.S. officials. Apparently, he gave the right
answers because the flow of arms and money continued.
PRELUDE TO TEHERAN
The money trail is still the most confusing part of the Iran-
Contra scandal, but it is now clear that, in addition to their
interest in arms, some of the Iranians involved were at least
as interested in money. Sources with knowledge of the
negotiations say that, from the very beginning, the Iranian
representatives had expressed a desire that money be sent
back to [ran, suggesting that a portion of the huge profits
from the arms sales be returned to the putative pro-Western
factions. [t may have been this unseemly interest in money,
particularly by the seemingly otherworldly Karubi, that
caused the Americans to tighten the purse strings.
visit, and they were woefully inadequate. Despite U.S. ex-
pectations that Rafsanjani himself would show up, no Irani-
ans met McFarlane and his party at the airport. And within
a few minutes of their arrival, Soviet informers among the
airport personnel had identified the passengers as Ameri-
can. When an Iranian delegation did show up at the airport,
90 minutes late, nu ministerial-level officials were present.
And when McFarlane and the others were finally installed
on the top flour of the Esteglal Hotel (formerly the Teheran
Hilton), their movements were circumscribed and their ac-
tivities monitored by informers on the cleaning and mainte-
Hance staff.
Nothing was accomplished. The Americans never suc-
seeded in meeting with Rafsanjani or any other high-level
Iranian official. When they raised the issue of the hostages
in Lebanon, their hosts strung out the negotiations as if they
i were in a rug shop in downtown Teheran. And McFarlane
received no reaction whatsoever when he dropped hints
about how useful it would be for the U'.S. and Iran "to
it exchange information about Soviet intentions and capabili-
ties in the Middle East." [n short, when it came to re-
establishment of the once intimate intelligence links be-
tween Washington and Teheran, the Iranians stonewalled.
For their part, the Iranians griped that McFarlane had
failed to bring the full complement of military spare parts he
had promised, as well as radar elements essential to their
Continued
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operation. Even more trying from Teheran's point of view, he
did not come with the computer-software catalog for the
military-parts warehouse. It had been missing since Ameri-
can technicians fled Iran after the fall of the Shah.
DANGEROUS INTRIGUE
McFarlane had arrived in Teheran with Colonel North;
Howard Teicher, the NSC staff member; George Cave, a
former CIA officer who is fluent in Farst, and Amtram
. ir, a counterterrorism adviser to the Israeli government.
All were traveling with Irish passports. Iranian sources sa
that the passports were provided by the rish Re u~can
Army (IRA) with whom Iran maintains warm tiec? ii C.
sources flatly deny it. saving that the IA camp ~~i ~i?'?-!:
the phony Irish passports. Those in the McFarlane party
had a good view of the surrounding streets from their top-
floor suites in the hotel, but it is possible that they never
fully realized the potential danger they were in during their
brief stay in Teheran.
Iranians familiar with the details of the McFarlane mis-
sion say that. within 3 kilometers of their hotel, inspired by
Zamani, Hashemi and other pro-Soviet leaders, demonstra-
tors were massing near Teheran University in preparation
for an attack on the group. Had McFarlane and his party
been taken into custody, as the demonstrators apparently
planned, it could have seriously weakened the Khomeini
government, and almost surely it would have led to the
ouster of some members of the regime's leadership.
The demonstration, according to Iranian sources, began
at a heavily guarded seven?story building that serves as the
headquarters for a group called the Followers of the Imam's
Line. An influential student organization that is described
by some as a front for the KGB, the group is said to have
been instrumental in the storming of the U.S. Embassy in
Teheran in 1979. Whatever its motivation, the group's pub-
lic demonstration seemed to jibe with
the second part of the Ayatollah's
grand sting-to expose Soviet sympa-
thizers within Iran.
In the early hours of May 28, McFar-
lane and his party prepared to leave
Teheran after a series of frustrating and
inconclusir?e meetings in which the Ira-
nians failed to provide ministerial-level
negotiators or secure the release of hos-
ta?es. Afew hours earlier, about 400 or
500 demonstrators were marching to-
ward the hotel along a street called
Enghelhab Avenue to the corner of Sha-
hid Chamran, formerly John F. Kenne-
dy Avenue. Approximately 1 !n kilome-
ters from the hotel, the demonstrators
were stopped by the troops of the Revo-
lutionary Guards (who had received the
weapons shipments, instead of the
Army). It was the Guards who forced
the demonstrators back down a street
called 16 Azar Avenue and cordoned
them off on the broad front lawn of the
university, where the Friday prayers are
held. Rafsanjani spoke to the group.
Then, one by one. Iranian sources say,
the demonstrators were taken into custo-
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