LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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/ Il AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
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STANDING COMMITTEE Law and National Security
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Volume 7, Number 11 John Norton Moore, Chairman
Defectors Paint Grim Picture
Of Human Rights in Nicaragua
The Sandinista government in Nicaragua has com-
plained loudly and to all four corners about the continu-
ing violation of human rights by the United States and
by the contras. Thus far, relatively little has been heard
about the violation of human rights by the Sandinista
government itself. Within the past few months, how-
ever, there have been two high-ranking defections by
Sandinista officials who worked in the fields of law en-
forcement and human rights. The defectors, Mateo Jose
Guerrero, former executive director of the Nicaraguan
Mission for the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights (CNPPDH), and Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles,
formerly chief investigator of the Special Investigations
Commission of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior,
brought with them a wealth of information about the
Sandinistas' massive violations of human rights and
about their deliberate attempts to conceal the truth
about these violations from foreign public opinion.
Their information underscores the fact that the San-
dinista government is rapidly becoming totalitarian.
Whereas previously those Nicaraguans who were genu-
inely concerned with human rights were able to get some
support from the lower courts, their concern has been
progressively frustrated by restrictions on the investiga-
tion of human rights abuses and access to prisons, and
by the fact that court findings were repeatedly overruled
by Sandinista officials. Instead of investigating human
rights, the functions of CNPPDH have been altered so
that they now find themselves reduced to adjuncts of the
Sandinista regime in its efforts to conceal human rights
violations from foreign opinion.
When the CNPPDH was first established in 1980, its
board of commissioners included independents who
were vocal defenders of human rights, including Ismael
Rayes Rojas, a prominent businessman, and Edgard
Macias, a leader of the Popular Social Christian Party.
One by one the independents on the commission were
replaced with new commissioners who were under the
control of the Sandinista regime or sympathetic to it.
In April 1984, an official of the Foreign Ministry in-
structed Guerrero to take charge of a visit by Juan
Mendez of Americas Watch, an American human rights
organization which had previously written favorably
about the human rights record of the Nicaraguan
government.
In November 1984, when Guerrero was preparing to
leave for Spain to attend the first Ibero-American Con-
gress on Human Rights, the Foreign Ministry instructed
him to focus attention on all reports by human rights
groups that were favorable to the Nicaraguan govern-
ment and on U.S. aggression in Nicaragua, particularly
the mining of ports.
Durenberger Raises Questions
About Achille Lauro
Should President Reagan have consulted with con-
gressional leaders, including the House and Senate In-
telligence Committees, before he acted to intercept the
Egyptian plane carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers?
According to Senator Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.),
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the ad-
ministration would have been on much firmer ground if
it had at least consulted a few key congressional leaders.
Senator Durenberger presented this thesis before a
breakfast meeting of the Standing Committee on Law
and National Security on October 22.
Senator Durenberger began his remarks by pointing
out that the framers of the Constitution "took special
pains to ensure congressional involvement in a decision
to take the nation to war." However, he said, "they
also recognized that it would at times be necessary for
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Durenberger on Achille Lauro
Continued from page 1
the president to act with dispatch or secrecy in foreign
affairs." Durenberger said that there is, however, a
twilight zone "in which the president and the Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which the distribu-
tion of power is uncertain." The War Powers Resolu-
tion and the Intelligence Oversight Act were efforts by
Congress to illuminate that twilight zone. [Ed. note:
Apparently more illumination is needed and the Senator
intends to hold "son et lumiere" seminars.]
"Under the Intelligence Oversight Act, the director of
Central Intelligence and the heads of all other in-
telligence community organizations now have the
obligation to keep the intelligence committees fully and
currently informed' of all intelligence activities, in-
cluding `any significant anticipated intelligence
activity.' "
Durenberger went on to detail several possible
scenarios of the manner in which the Achille Lauro inci-
dent or similar incidents could have developed, arguing
that the use of force in a counterterrorist operation
might conceivably have involved the Intelligence Over-
sight Act or the War Powers Resolution or both of
them. He argued that where there is a potential for ex-
change of fire with hijackers, this should be construed
as the introduction of U.S. armed forces into a situation
where there is a potential for imminent involvement in
hostilities.
"Despite the difficulties created by timing, secrecy
and deception," said Durenberger, "I believe in the
value of prior consultation between the executive and
legislative branches. I believe that such consultation can
be accomplished in a secure fashion, and that its benefit
to a president, especially in the kind of situations we
have been discussing, outweighs the risks. Consultation
with the legislative branch gives the president valuable
insight into likely public reaction to various alternatives.
More importantly, such prior consultation automatical-
ly lines up support within the Congress, a crucial ele-
ment in influencing public reaction and sustaining
public policy."
Looking at the situation realistically, however,
Durenberger admitted that the administration "may
prefer to do the wrong thing in secret, rather than doing
the right thing with congressional knowledge."
Senator Durenberger's address was followed by a
brief but lively question and answer period. Admiral
Tom Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, raised the question of whether the Achille Lauro
incident left any time for congressional consultation.
Bob Turner, formerly a deputy assistant secretary of
state, raised the question of the constitutionality-or
lack of constitutionality-of the War Powers Act. The
discussion was still waxing hot when John Norton
Moore gaveled the breakfast meeting to a close.
1985 AFIO Convention
The Association of Former Intelligence Officers may
not have a high profile in the news media, but it func-
tions nevertheless as the public conscience of the intelli-
gence community. Intelligence officers, by the nature of
their profession, cannot engage in activities designed to
educate the public about the requirements and interests
of the intelligence community, nor can they publicly
defend themselves when their interests are under attack
in Congress. There are things, however, that retired in-
telligence officers can do-and they do so effectively
through AFIO.
AFIO held its annual convention in Rockville, Mary-
land, on October 4-5. The convention featured a series
of panel discussions dealing with current concerns of the
intelligence community. The connecting thread between
the different panels this year was the foreign intelligence
assault on the United States, the potential effects of this
assault, and what can be done to counter it.
One of the most interesting and timely panels was pre-
sided over by General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.),
chairman of the DOD Security Review Commission
which was set up in the wake of the Walker case. The
panelists were former CIA counterintelligence officer
Newton Miler, and Donald Moore who had previously
been in charge of counterintelligence at the FBI.
In his opening remarks Stilwell spoke about the great
damage done by the Walker case and other recent
espionage cases. He said that personnel devoted in this
country to counterintelligence are outnumbered by
Soviet-bloc personnel engaged in espionage. And he
noted that, while Soviet-bloc diplomatic personnel are
restricted in their U.S. travel (in reciprocation for travel
restrictions imposed on U.S. diplomatic personnel in the
Soviet Union), this restriction does not apply to Com-
munist-bloc personnel associated with the United
Nations.
General Stilwell's commission is studying the entire
security problem. There is no question that as matters
stand today our security machinery is overburdened.
For example, as has been publicly reported, a total of
3.8 million people hold secret or higher clearances as of
October 1985. A large percentage of these are defense
contractor personnel. In order to provide better control
over personnel who have been cleared for access to
classified material, Stilwell's commission is giving seri-
ous consideration to reducing the number of those re-
quiring clearance by enforcing the "need to know" as a
condition of clearance. In addition, the commission is
considering requiring the reporting of all overseas travel
by cleared personnel.
Both the retired counterintelligence panelists ex-
pressed concern over the loss of counterintelligence ex-
pertise, especially in the CIA where much institutional
knowledge had been lost entirely as a result of the
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CIA Director Casey Speaks
On War Against Terrorism
Ed. Note: Terrorism, no matter how repugnant the
word may be, is on everyone's tongue after the Achille
Lauro incident. It was commented on by Senator
Durenberger at the most recent breakfast of the Stand-
ing Committee on Law and National Security (see
separate story this issue) and in our October issue which
reviewed a Senate committee report on terrorism and
briefed a plenary session on "International Cooperation
Against Terrorism" sponsored by the ABA in London.
On Monday, October 14, your editor was invited to
sit in on a conference entitled "International Terrorism:
The Threat to Industry." The audience was comprised
primarily of American businessmen who have to cope
with terrorism here and in foreign countries-be it kid-
napping or attacks on their factories or banks.
The conference was sponsored by Stanford Research
Institute International in cooperation with the World
Power and Terrorism Project, Georgetown Center for
Strategic Studies, and the State University of New
York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism.
That's quite a mouthful for multiple sponsorship but let
me hasten to add they brought together some of the
world's experts on the organization, training and ex-
ecution of terrorist acts. They ranged from Sir John
Hermon, Chief Constable for Northern Ireland, to the
former Governor for Civil Administration, Basque,
Spain, and included two Israelis who have experience
with terrorism.
The attention of the businessmen was captured
straight off by the keynote speaker, Joel Lisker, chief
counsel and staff director of the Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. He told the businessmen that the infrastruc-
ture to implement terrorism in the United States exists
today and only awaits a Shiite signal to go into action. If
that didn't grab their attention a statement by Dr.
Yonah Alexander did-that of 2,781 terrorist incidents
between 1968 and 1985, 1,698 were directed against
businessmen!
There will be more reported on this conference when
the transcript is available. This brief description is
meant to serve only as an appetizer to the "piece de
resistance" which was served up at lunch by Bill Casey,
the director of Central Intelligence. With his permis-
sion, excerpts from his text are reprinted below. No one
can fail to understand the threat of terrorism to our
country after reading it.
In this conference, we have undertaken examination
of one of the critical issues of our day, for perhaps no
other topic poses as much of a threat to the orderly
functioning of democratic societies as does international
terrorism. The grim reality is that terrorism is on the rise
worldwide, and we can expect only more violence and
death during the closing years of this century.
Whatever his specific political program, the terrorist
always pursues one general goal-to fix in the public
consciousness a sense of the terrorist's omnipotence and
the public's helplessness. To do this, the terrorist takes
advantage of the very civilization he seeks to destroy.
Factors Favoring Terrorism
The terrorist depends upon two factors for success in
conducting his war on the mind. Both of these factors,
ironically, are found only in the urban centers of open
societies like ours and those of our friends around the
world. The first, and most important of these, is cover-
age by the media. In this decade more people can be ad-
dressed by newspaper, television, radio, and magazines
than ever before in history. What is more, the media is
so effective that millions of people may learn of a ter-
rorist attack that has taken place half a world away in a
matter of minutes-or at most, hours.
The terrorist hopes that his deeds will be bannered on
the six o'clock news throughout most of the developed
world, will be commented on at length in the world's
leading newspapers, and perhaps become the subject of
everyday conversation.
Even if an attack fails, as in the case of the assassina-
tion attempt on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the
terrorist will nonetheless gain the maximum psychologi-
cal impact of his deed by a bold public threat. As many
of you may recall, the I.R.A. in a public notice told
Mrs. Thatcher that, "This time you were lucky. But you
have to be lucky all the time. We only have to be lucky
once."
The second factor that aids terrorists in their cam-
paign is the nature of modern urban society. The con-
centration of population offers anonymity to the ter-
rorist. Weapons and money can be obtained through an
infinite number of channels, thus preserving the ter-
rorist's operational security. The variety and efficiency
of transportation enhances the terrorist's mobility.
Moreover, industrialized societies have more vulnerable
high-value targets-such as computer centers, airlines,
factories, shopping arcades, and even apartment com-
plexes.
The Importance of Defense
Moreover, for the first time, terrorist attacks directed
at American private businesses and businessmen over-
seas outnumbered terrorist attacks against U.S. military
and diplomatic facilities. I speculate that this shift may
be due in part to the greatly improved physical security
measures taken by the State and Defense Departments.
Terrorist groups may have concluded that American-
owned businesses present "softer targets" that nonethe-
less yield very high-visibility headlines when hit.
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Casey Speaks on Terrorism
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In my view, the Congress acted very wisely when it
voted $360 million to improve security at our various
facilities around the world in the wake of the October
1983 tragedy at the marine barracks in Beirut. Clearly,
thought needs to be given to assisting U.S. businessmen
to improve physical security at their facilities as well.
The risks and difficulties associated with terrorism
are greatly diminished when regimes like those of
Colonel Qadhafi's Libya and Ayatollah Khomeini's
Iran actively involve themselves in the planning, financ-
ing, training, documentation, and providing of safe-
haven for terrorist groups.
With the help of a sponsoring state, terrorist groups
are able to use more sophisticated techniques because of
state-funded training programs and technical expertise.
Moreover, the groups can employ more deadly, more
difficult to detect equipment and arms such as remotely
detonated devices. They also receive intelligence, and
get official travel documents-sometimes used as diplo-
matic cover-to hide their true identities. This support
makes it easy for terrorists to mask movements and
munitions deliveries-and then find safehaven in a
sponsoring state after an attack. So the backing of
governments enormously escalates the scope and power
of even the smallest terrorist groups.
Now I want to outline for you a strategy for dealing
with this problem. Basically, there are three broad
fronts on which we can challenge the terrorist. First, we
can improve our intelligence capabilities and work to-
gether more closely with other countries victimized by
terrorism. Second, we can work toward a stronger legal
framework to deal with terrorist acts. Third, the inter-
national community can work together to isolate ter-
rorist gangs and the states that sponsor these gangs. In
this way, the community of civilized nations can more
effectively prevent terrorist violence, preempt plans and
operations, and-when we can-respond swiftly and
appropriately to attacks.
The Role of Intelligence
Now, terrorist groups are very tough nuts for in-
telligence to crack. That is almost self-evident. They are
small, not easily penetrated, and their operations are
closely held and compartmented. Only a few people in
the organization are privy to specific operations.
Moreover, terrorists move quickly and place a very high
premium on secrecy and surprise. Yet prompt reporting
and follow-up action does frequently forestall terrorist
incidents. The most common example is forewarning to
U.S. and foreign embassies or other institutions of ac-
tual threats, or strong indications of planning for at-
tacks on institutions and individuals. The usual re-
sponse to this kind of knowledge is heightened alert, in-
creased protective measures, or changes in plans and
schedules which frequently disrupt the terrorists' plans
and result in a failure or a decision not to make the at-
tempt.
Recently, for example, intelligence on a threatened hi-
jacking of a foreign commercial airliner, combined with
effective police work, resulted in a change of travel
plans which prevented the intended hijacking. In other
instances, in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America, U.S. officials and businessmen directly tar-
geted by terrorists have been temporarily removed from
their posts.
Through intelligence exchanges, training and opera-
tional cooperation and technical support, we have, with
the intelligence, security and police organizations of
scores of countries around the world, developed a wide-
spread counterterrorism network which needs to be
strengthened and improved upon. American intelli-
gence, as the only worldwide apparatus other than the
KGB, is at the heart of this. So far this year there were
something like 80 terrorist acts around the world where
preventive action was taken based on advance informa-
tion from U.S. intelligence.
The Role of Law
The second major part of our program is to continue
working-as a community of nations subject to law-to
construct a viable international legal framework for
dealing with terrorists and their sponsors. This frame-
work must be transnational in character and supported
by vigorous legal action.
International law requires a state to control the ac-
tivities of persons within its jurisdiction or territory
which cause injury to the citizens of other states, and to
punish any persons engaging in such activities.
During the last two decades, international agreements
have repeatedly restated and expanded this basic duty of
all countries. For example, the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, otherwise
known as the Hague Convention, imposes obligations
on states to establish criminal jurisdiction over the of-
fense of air piracy and requires that countries extradite
hijackers or submit hijacking cases to competent
authorities.
Despite these agreements, the existing legal obliga-
tions by themselves are insufficient to thwart terrorism.
First, not all states are signatories to these conventions.
Second, state signatories face little or no possibility of
being penalized for failure to adhere to their interna-
tional obligations. Libya, for example-one of the
world's leading fomenters of terrorist violence-
hypocritically is a party to the Montreal, Hague and
Tokyo Conventions.
Third, there has been no appropriate articulation of a
formal definition of terrorism. Efforts to obtain general
acceptance of the 1972 U.S. Draft Convention on Ter-
rorism were linked to an intentional avoidance of the
issue of definition and thus focused only on a narrow
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common interest among nations. However, even this
focus has not led to formal adoption of the convention.
The legal framework is there. What is needed is the
will to make use of it-the will to put teeth into these in-
ternational agreements by severely punishing violations.
Many nations have been slow on this.
And there are still other initiatives that might be taken
bilaterally and multilaterally if we are to deal with ter-
rorism effectively. For example, we should review inter-
national treaties and agreements that define diplomatic
privilege to identify standards of diplomatic practice
and behavior which should be vigorously enforced. We
may need new international measures to counter misuse
of diplomatic privileges by those regimes sponsoring ter-
rorist activities. We should think about developing
multilateral treaties whereby persons who commit ter-
rorist acts against citizens of any signatory state could
be routinely extradited or perhaps tried by an interna-
tional tribunal. Rules also should exist whereby in-
dividuals known to be involved in terrorism can be
prevented from entering any signatory state or ap-
prehended on an international arrest warrant.
Isolating the Terrorists
The third major part of our program requires that all
victimized governments should impose political and
economic isolation on states like Iran and Libya that
sponsor terrorism. I find it incredible that certain of our
friends and allies still have dealings with these criminal
states, while at the same time suffering terrorist
atrocities cooked up in Tehran, Tripoli, and other such
centers. And, as long as they permit Libyan and Iranian
agents to move about freely-and indeed pay huge sums
into the treasuries of those two countries-we have no
leverage whatsoever. Simply put, states that sponsor ter-
rorism must be quarantined from the rest of the interna-
tional community until their behavior changes.
We must deny the terrorist the fruit of his labors-
namely, the ability to exploit the media to instill in the
public feelings of uncertainty and fear. The media itself
must play the leading role in this effort by treating news
of terrorist incidents in a more reserved fashion. Im-
agine if you will the terrorist's reaction if he and his ex-
ploits were downplayed or even ignored!
If we can do this, the terrorist will watch in frustra-
tion as his power over the media dries up and, with it,
his power to assault the mind. If cut off from his spon-
sors, the terrorist will watch with growing apprehension
as he learns that the costs and risks of his operations
skyrocket while the impact of his actions plummets. In
my view, the futility of terrorism will at last be made ob-
vious to the terrorist himself, and his devastating war on
the mind will slowly come to an end.
You might well ask the very pertinent question: But
does all this work? I believe it does. And I can mention
two success stories in the war on terrorism.
It may surprise you to know that the country having
the highest number of terrorist incidents during the late
1970s was not Lebanon or Israel, but Italy. The wanton
murder of Premier Aldo Moro and the kidnapping of
General Dozier galvanized the Italian government into
action. Italian courts have stepped up their effort at
prosecuting and convicting captured terrorists, and
handing down stiff sentences. The Italian National
Police and Security Services have stepped up their ac-
tivities targeted at penetrating terrorist units or other-
wise spoiling terrorist operations. Moreover, European
services have been active in sharing information on
these terrorists, subsequently leading to the capture of
some of those involved.
As a result of excellent intelligence work, vigorous
police anti-terrorist activities, and increased court ac-
tions, Italy since the early 1980s has been one of the
countries in Europe least affected by terrorism. A key
factor in this effort was the turn-around in support for
the Italian Security Services by most parties in the
Italian Parliament and the general public.
Another success story is the Republic of El Salvador.
That small country-the victim of both externally-
supported aggression and terrorism-has risen to grave
challenges posed by purveyors of violence who receive
their orders from Managua and Havana.
In the past 12 months, we have witnessed an increase
in Marxist-directed terrorism that has included bomb-
ings of civilian installations, the mining of public roads,
armed robberies, brutal kidnappings, and assassina-
tions. This increasing turn to terrorism has come about
in part because of the growing popular support for
President Duarte's government and in part because of
the rapidly faltering political and military fortunes of
the rebels. The insurgents increasingly have fallen back
on dramatic acts of violence to draw attention to their
cause and force President Duarte's popularly-elected
government to share political power.
You may recall that last June a gang of Marxist thugs
staged a bloody machinegun slaying outside a sidewalk
cafe of 13 unarmed people-including four off-duty
U.S. Marines and two U.S. businessmen. The so-called
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party-
which claimed "credit" for the June slayings-is a
member in good standing of the five-group Salvadoran
Marxist Alliance and has its command headquarters in
Managua, Nicaragua.
The Salvadoran government responded quickly and
decisively to this urban terrorist threat. Since the June
massacre, the Salvadoran Army has launched opera-
tions against these terrorists and other Marxist base
camps in the central and eastern mountains. The army's
offensive has proved quite successful as a large number
of insurgents-including some field comman-
ders-were killed, communication lines were disrupted,
and supplies captured. Captured documents and
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Casey Speaks on Terrorism
Continued from page 5
prisoners, in turn, provided valuable intelligence which
the security forces promptly used in rounding up some
40 urban terrorists, including two of the actual trig-
germen involved in the June killings. The triggermen
will be tried for murder.
The Role of Terrorism
I believe that this network if not a component of, still
works in unison with, what the Soviets have developed
into the most powerful weapons system the world has
ever seen. It consists not only of the missiles capable of
striking at the United States and most of its allies plus
the overwhelming conventional strength which can be
projected into Europe and toward the Persian Gulf, but
also of the weapons of aggressive subversion. It has suc-
ceeded in installing Communist governments in Angola,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, Cambodia and
Nicaragua, and has sent its conventional forces for the
first time over the border of the Soviet Union to occupy
Afghanistan. It consists also of the system of the com-
bination of active measures, political action and pro-
paganda which the Soviets use to influence and
manipulate popular opinion and political processes in
the open societies of the world.
International terrorism plays a role in this weapons
system. A Soviet connection may seem shadowy to
some, but it seems very real to me. Iran and the Soviet
Union are hardly allies, but they both share a fun-
damental hostility to the West. When Libya and the
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) provide arms
and training to the Communists in Central America,
they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to
undermine America's security in that vital region.
Moscow and its allies allow radical groups to main-
tain offices in Eastern Europe and to grant safe passage
to operatives traveling to Western Europe or elsewhere
to commit terrorist acts. No one can seriously believe
that these activities-which have gone on for at least 15
years-have escaped the notice of the Communist
authorities.
The creation and training of terrorists is the primary
measure of how severe this problem will be for us during
the remainder of this century. This will be determined
by the six hundred or so young men who are brought into
Moscow every year to be indoctrinated to serve as or-
ganizers in other countries around the world and how
many other young men are brought into terrorist and
paramilitary training camps. Where are the training
facilities located? They are heavily concentrated in the
Soviet bloc-in the Soviet Union itself, in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany-in South Yemen,
Cuba and, increasingly, Nicaragua, and in the radical
entente countries of Syria, Libya, and Iran. So as we
fight the terrorist threat directly on the ground we also
need to bring out the ultimate source of much of this
activity.
The reality-the bottom line-is that terrorism aims
at the very heart of civilization. We have no realistic
choice but to meet it, and that means head on. Nothing
else will work. In the absence of a national will to fight
terrorism at its roots, we must be content only to cope
with terrorism's effects-not its cause. And that will not
be enough.
Book Review
By the Editor
Teaching Intelligence in the Mid-1980s-A Survey of
College and University Courses on the Subject of In-
telligence, Marjorie W. Cline, editor, National In-
telligence Study Center, Suite 1102, 1800 K Street N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006. (Free on request.)
This book is an update of a previous survey conducted
in 1980 by Wilfred Koplowitz for the National Intelli-
gence Study Center. It might be called Koplowitz II, ex-
cept for the fact that this quadrennial survey was con-
ducted by Marjorie Cline, the wife of NISC President
Ray Cline. All the editorial comment is hers as well, and
she has done an outstanding job.
To illustrate the importance of this book to those who
teach intelligence in our colleges, your editor was at a
conference in New York recently and fell into conversa-
tion with Dr. Adda Bozeman, Ph.D., J.D., formerly of
Sarah Lawrence College, a pioneer in the field of
teaching intelligence. On seeing the book, Adda in-
troduced me to a young professor who is just starting
such a course at Sarah Lawrence. His name is Jefferson
Adams (a good beginning for the subject) and he needs
materials and help. As has happened in other colleges,
his class is oversubscribed. He wanted to keep my
review copy but Adda assured him she knew the Clines
and would get one for him. In addition, he is, as of now,
a subscriber to this Intelligence Report.
The most notable statistic of the book is the fact that
the survey discovered the number of whole intelligence
courses had more than doubled in four years, from 24 to
54. All are listed in the back of the book, as well as those
with a somewhat narrower concept, called component
intelligence courses. Marjorie Cline concludes in a
postscript that "the subject simply cannot any longer be
ignored academically."
One of Marjorie Cline's general observations is that
"overall coverage of the subject of intelligence in col-
leges and universities remains at a rudimentary stage."
Dr. Cline then develops an eight-point agenda of what is
needed to upgrade and expand the teaching of in-
telligence. Those eight points are as follows:
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1. Steps should be taken to improve general
access to the useful bibliographies already in cir-
culation. However, a teaching oriented bibli-
ography is needed.
2. The perceived textbook gap should be filled
on several tracks.
3. A basic intelligence documents file should
be compiled covering the American experience.
4. Case studies enjoy high priority on
everyone's list of desiderata, and new ones
should be constructed.
5. Intelligence game scenarios should be
developed, highlighted with intelligence inputs to
inter-state conflict situations and with in-
telligence actors playing leading roles.
6. The receptivity of academic course direc-
tors to contributions by outside experts serving
as visiting lecturers should be exploited.
7. A master list of "intelligence visuals"
should be compiled.
8. A colloquium on "Teaching Intelligence"
should be convened at an early date.
Your editor is reminded by this book of his own ex-
perience, when in 1951 he became head of the Navy's
law school-the School of Naval Justice. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice had just been passed by the
Congress and an explanatory guidebook issued. There
were virtually no supplementary materials and no cases
decided, so one could not follow the doctrine of "stare
decisis." The teachers came from varied legal back-
grounds and, like Professor Adams, were groping for
precedent.
The teaching of law in this country went through a
period of evolution not unlike that which the teaching
of intelligence is now experiencing. In the beginning we
had the apprenticeship system, next a so-called broadly
synthesized course of instruction, and finally the case
system described by Professor Langdell of Harvard as
"printed books made up of selected cases beyond which
the student had no need to look further."
What a novice teacher of law or intelligence needs is
help-lots of it from many sources. Marjorie Cline's
book goes far toward filling that need for teachers of in-
telligence. In your editor's experience in 1951, a similar
book was published entitled Legal Education in the
United States by Dean Harno of the University of Il-
linois School of Law. The two books have astonishing
parallels. For instance, none other than Woodrow
Wilson, then president of Princeton, urged that law
studies be established as a university discipline. Mar-
jorie Cline makes the same recommendation with re-
spect to the teaching of intelligence.
Finally, both books recognize that the success or
failure of any course in either law or intelligence
depends in large measure on the teacher. Harno,
quoting Thayer, puts it this way: "Every teacher, in
law, as in other things, has his own methods, deter-
mined by his own gifts or lack of gifts-methods as in-
communicable as his temperament, his books or his
manners." Cline is more subtle. She says success
depends on "the knowledge, ingenuity and open-
mindedness of course directors ...."
We are pleased and honored that NISC has recog-
nized our Intelligence Report with an award for con-
tributing to the literature of intelligence.
Human Rights in Nicaragua
Continued from page 1
In January 1985, the Foreign Ministry ordered the
CNPPDH to cease investigating all cases of human
rights abuses, including the forced relocation of Indian
communities.
In March 1985, a disappointed and frustrated Guer-
rero defected to the United States.
Baldizon, the most recent defector, provided much
more detail about the violation of human rights by the
Sandinista government. A Sandinista since early '79,
Baldizon became chief of police of Ciudad Sandino, was
sent to the Soviet Union for special training, and in 1982
joined the office for internal investigations of the San-
dinista police. A few months later he was appointed
chief investigator.
At that time the Sandinista government was still sen-
sitive to the many reports on the violations of human
rights which reached it from the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights (IACHR). The basic job of
Baldizon's office was to investigate each report of viola-
tions in an effort to give the Sandinista government a
clean bill of health. However, the Special Investigations
Commission, which began operations in January 1983,
soon concluded that 90 percent of the denunciations
which reached it from the IACHR were substantially
correct.
The summary of Baldizon's information, put out by
the Department of State Office of Public Diplomacy for
Latin America and the Caribbean, said that Mr. Baldi-
zon had described:
a. The Nicaraguan government's policy of
human rights abuses and cover-ups of those
abuses, linking such figures as Interior
Minister Borge and Vice Minister Luis Car-
rion with the executions of political op-
ponents to the Sandinista regime. How the
Nicaraguan government (GON) uses murder
and torture as a regular and approved way to
control the internal opposition and to con-
front the armed opposition.
b. Methods used by the Nicaraguan govern-
ment to dupe visiting international delega-
Continued on back page
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Human Rights in Nicaragua
Continued from page 7
tions as to the true nature of the Sandinista
regime.
c. The involvement of Interior Minister Tomas
Borge and others with international drug
trafficking.
d. The Nicaraguan government's use of
criminals within the government.
e. How the more than 200 Cuban advisers in
the Interior Ministry are involved in the day-
to-day operation of the ministry.
f. The Nicaraguan government's training of
foreign guerrilla groups.
The way the government of Nicaragua uses
the "turbas divinas" as shock troops to
neutralize opposition demonstrations.
h. How the Nicaraguan government attempts
to intimidate the Catholic Church and other
religious groups.
Numerous case histories supporting these allegations,
replete with details, are described in the 28-page (single
spaced) document put out by the Department of State
on the Baldizon defection.
Readers who are interested in obtaining the complete
documents should write to the Public Information Of-
fice, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520, and ask for copies of "Inside the Sandinista
Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective," and
"Inside the Sandinista Regime: Revelations by the Ex-
ecutive Director of the Government's Human Rights
Commission."
1985 AFIO Convention
Continued from page 2
wholesale termination of counterintelligence staff per-
sonnel in the mid-1970s. Counterintelligence had also
suffered because what happened in the mid-1970s made
this area of specialization less attractive to intelligence
personnel. This compounded the problem of drawing
bright young people into what Newton Miler described
as a "mundane, grubby profession," which dealt in
human activities of a lower type.
In the panel which followed the Stilwell panel, Phil
Parker, FBI deputy assistant director for intelligence,
spoke about the need for freeing counterintelligence
from some of the restrictions that have limited pene-
tration of potential espionage and terrorist organiza-
tions.
Standing Committee on Law and National Security
Chairman: John Norton Moore. Members: Richard E. Friedman, Ronald A. Jacks, Robert M. Kimmitt,
Monroe Leigh, John B. Rhinelander, John H. Shenefield, Daniel B. Silver,
Victoria Toensing, Raymond J. Waldmann, R. James Woolsey.
Advisory Committee Chairman: Morris I. Leibman.
The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the American Bar Association or the Standing
Committee on Law and National Security. Questions or comments should be directed to W. C. Mott, Editor, 217 9th
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003, Tel. [phone].
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