SENATOR NUNN'S VOTE ON CONTRA AID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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United States
.j America
Sam Nunn
MEMO TO: Editors
FROM: Scott Maxwell
DATE: March 28, 1986
RE: Senator Nunn's vote on contra aid
UNrrsn $TATO a...Aa
WA/S.MO7u.( D. C.
(202) *24-3921
Senator Nunn asked me to send you the attached clipping from
the Congressional Record. Included are his floor statement prior
to the Senate's vote on contra aid, his letter to President
Reagan, the President's response and a colloquy between Senator
Nunn and Senator Cohen (R-ME), which collectively outline the
reasoning behind Senator Nunn's vote in favor of military
assistance.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. N'UNN. Mr. President. last year.
Senators LUGAR. BENTSEN, BOREN.
CHILES. JOHNSTON, DOLE. - DQREN-
BERCER, .'DECOVCIN7.- SOCSEYELLER.
.NicxLEs. DixoN, and I introduced an
amendment to provide humanitarian
assistance to the democratic resistance
in Nicaragua.
That amendment was to provide hu-
manitarian assistance to the democrat-
ic resistance in Nicaragua.
That amendment eventually became
the law which provided some $27 mil-
lion in humanitarian assistance to the,
Contras and also provided the basis
for the President to return to Con-
gress and ask for military aid, as he
has now done.
When we Introduced our resolution,
the United States had terminated all
assistance, both military and nonmili-
tary to the Contras. Congress had re-
fused to continue to fund a so-called
covert program of military assistance
to the Contras because of serious con-
cerns about the administration's goals
and the nature of the Contras.
The purpose of our amendment was
to chart a course which would enjoy
the broadest possible support in the
Congress and the American people.
We felt that if the 'United States was
to have any success in confronting the
crisis in Central America, it was neces-
sary to develop a consensus behind a
policy of supporting a genuinely demo-
cratic opposition with humanitarian
aid, while keeping the military option
alive but on the back burner.
At the time, I Said, and I Quote:
U.S. interests in .fie region can be reduced
to two simple objectives: one, we must foster
genuine democratic principles as well as eco-
nomic and social growth. and two, we must
prevent the Soviets or the Cubans or their
surrogates from making Central America a
base for the projection of their power. If we
support dialogue. democracy, and national
reconciliation in El Salvador as we do, we
should also support those goals in Nicara-
gua.
I added. "Congress and the Ameri-
can people must be convinced that we
are supporting the true democrats.
men like Arturo Cruz."
March 27. 1986
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March 27, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3629
Those remain our goals, that goals
that I think we should pursue. We
must now ask, what progress has been
made since we enacted humanitarian
assistance last year?
It is obvious that many people in
this Chamber and in the country con-
tinue to believe that the administra-
tion's only true objective Is a military
overthrow of the government in Mana-
gua. Many also believe that the admin-
Istration has been unwilling to negoti-
ate either bilaterally or through the
Contadora process. I believe the ad-
ministration has to overcome this
widespread skepticism If there is to be
any hope for a sustainable American
policy, whatever happens here today.
With respect to the Contras. linger-
ing doubts remain about whether they
are truly democratic and whether they
respect human rights. It is unclear
who is in control of the Contra organi-
zation. Is it the civilian leadership or is
it the former national guard officers
who make up most of the senior mill-
tary leadership of the Contras?
The Sandinistas have refused to talk
to the Contras and the internal oppo-
sition. They have not negotiated with
lengthy studies which record many al-
leged violations of human rights by
both the Sandinistas and the Contras.
I do not know the truth of the allega-
tions in these reports. but find that
they raise many disturbing questions
which must be answered. In a
thoughtful floor statement on Pebrs-
ary 26. Senator LrAKY summarized
these reports.
All of our offices have been receiving
massive documents prepared by the
Department of State which document
human rights abuses by the Sandinis-
tas. However, almost nothing has been
said by the administration about al-
leged abuses by the Contras. This ad-
ministration attitude must change if
sustainable support for administration
policy is to emerge in Congress and
among the American people.
Mr. President, in deciding this issue,
we are also sending a message to the
people in Nicaragua and Central
America that will have far-reaching
implications. Nor would it be an exag-
geration to say that we are also send-
ing a message to the world. We must
make this message unmistakably clear
and strong.
Our message must be that the
nations In good faith, and they have United States is ftrmly committed to
continued their military buildup and the cause of democracy in the Ameri-
intensified their repressive domestic cas and that we are determined that
policies. Whatever one may think of democratic movements in this hemi-
the Contras and the Reagan adminis- sphere will not be crushed by armies
tration policy, it is clear that the San- and police power, whether of the left
dinistas are repressing their people, or the right.
damaging their economy and making What then is the solution to this di-
efforts to destabilize their neighbors. lemma and how do we convey the mes-
All of this confronts us with a tern- sage of our support for democracy?
ble dilemma. A strong message in support of de-
I am convinced that Americans will mocracy will not be conveyed if aid to
support genuine democratic resistance the resistance squeaks by the Congress
movements. Recent events In the Phil- on a narrow vote.
ippines show the enthusiasm that In developing our policy we must
Americans have for those committed demonstrate the United States neither
to democratic principles. wishes to restore the old regime in
To criticize the Contras as they cur- Nicaragua nor wishes to impose its
rently exist does not mean we should own will upon Nicaragua. The resist-
abandon them. The road to democracy ance forces. must be an authentic and
where there is meager democratic tra- democratic national liberation move-
dition to follow is not smooth or ment or they do not deserve our sup-
simple. The recent steps toward de- port. The message we send will be a
mocracy In the rest of Central Amer- clear one, The United States supports
Ica, principally in Guatemala. Hondu- democracy in Nicaragua, not a return
rss, and EI Salvador are evidence of to the Somoza era.
this. Yet we must support these fledg- I am encourgedby the appointment
ling efforts, as we are. We owe our of Ambassador Habib as the Presi-
support to those governments as well dent's Central America negotiator. But
as to the genuine democrats who are we need more than a man, we need a
in the Contra leadership. plan.
A closely allied issue is whether the We face a difficult and demanding
Contras adequately respect human task. But there is reason to believe
rights, that this approach can succeed. Five us in this Chamber. I am grateful for
President Carter set in motion a years ago Nicaragua's neighbor, Eh the leadership of Senators COBEN.
policy which emphasized respect for Salvador, seemed destined toward RUnMAtt and KASsIZAOM in this regard.
human rights as a key element in U.S. greater bloodshed and repression. Specifically, section 9(f) prohibits ex-
foreign policy. Although he was much But out of our debate here in Con- penditure of the funds until the Presi-
criticized at the time, his policies have grew a two-track policy for El Sawa- dent determines and reports to Con-
proven a rallying cry for those who dor evolved: we gave military aid, but gress that. the Contras "have agreed to
champion freedom. liberty, and de- we also insisted upon democratization and are beginning to implement":
mocracy around the world. and reconciliation within Salvadoran Broadening their leadership base: coordi-
Mr. President, there are simply too society. The American public-and the nation of efforts: elimination of human
many questions about the human Central American public-stood rights abuses: pursuit of a program to
rights record of the Contras. For ex- behind this sometimes slow-moving achieve democracy in Nicaragua. and subor-
ample. Amnesty International and the and imperfect policy. El Salvador today dination of military forces to civilian leader-
Americas Watch have just released still has many difficulties. But the ship.
levels of civil violence have dimin-
ished, $ democratically elected govern.
ment is in place, and the country has
begun to rebuild.
Nicaragua. of course. is not El Salva-
dor. It is today ruled by Marxists-Len-
inists: home-grown. but foreign spon-
sored. But this is another reason why
our Nicaraguan policy is so important.
The United States has shown-in El
Salvador, in the Philippines and in
Haiti-that we can help change repres
sive regimes. We must also find poli-
cies that enable us to respond to the
challenge of Communist totalitarian-
ism.
Accordingly. I have written the
President a letter. - -
In that letter. I state that unless the
Contras are perceived in the United
States and Central America as a genu-
ine democratic movement. it is unlike-
ly that American aid can be sustained
or that the Contras will attract much
support in Nicaragua. Therefore. I
asked the president to give assurances
on several points which are spelled out
in my letter. let me summarize them:
First. aid should be given only to ci-
vilian political leaders who respect
human rights. are genuinely democrat-
ic, and have not engaged in criminal
activity; no aid should be given direct-
ly to military leaders:
Second, this political leadership
must form a genuine democratic move-
ment.
Third, the resistance forces must in-
vestigate and prosecute individuals re-
sponsible for human rights abuses.
Fourth. all intelligence and other
nonmateriel assistance should also be
funneled through the civilian leader-
ship.
Fifth. strict accounting measures
over our aid muss. be adopted.
And. sixth, humanitarian aid should
Include education in reading, writing,
health care and agricultural and voca-
tional skills that will foster economic
and political growth.
The President has now responded to
my letter. In his response, I am
pleased that the President has pledged
to meet these concerns and states that
he fully agrees with the objectives of
my letter.
I am also pleased that the resolution
which has been-will be-introduced
by Senators Lucnrt, Dots and BsxrssN
contains provisions reflecting these
concerns which are shared by many of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 27, 198e
In addition, the Commission estab-
lished by section 11 is required to
report to Congress by June 30, 1986 on
whether the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance has agreed to, and are be-
ginning to, implement these measures.
Finally, Mr. President and this is
very important. Congress must exert
vigorous oversight over all aspects of
this program. We must investigate
carefully the allegations of human
rights abuses by the Contras. We must
oversee this program to assure that
the administration is making a good
faith effort to negotiate and to build a
democratic center. We must also care-
fully monitor progress of the negotia-
tions. The Commission, which will be
established by section 11, will provide
us with the facts upon which we can
conduct this oversight.
Mr. President, if we adopt the pro-
posal we are debating, including the
provisions I have discussed, and if the
President adheres to the pledges made
in his letter to me, I believe it will go a
long way toward developing a consen-
sus behind a sustainable policy of mili-
tary pressure on the Sandinistas to ne-
gotiate while at the same time build-
ing a genuine democratic movement
which will enjoy the support of the
American people and of the other gov-
ernments in the region.
I have spend a good deal of time
talking to the administration's top of-
ficials about this. including the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State. I
would like to close by quoting from my
exchange of letters with the President
on this subject.
Mr. President. my letter stated a
number of goals. The main goal I will
state very briefly:
All aid should be given only to civilian po-
litical leaders that are genuinely democrat-
ic. respect human rights and have not or are
not engaged in criminal activity, such as
drug trafficking. No aid should go to the
military leaders except thrqugh civilian
leadership committed to these goals and
principles.
Mr. President, I would like to read
one part of the letter I received from
President Reagan in response to my
letter. This statement is on the second
page of the President's letter. I think
It is the most important commitment
that we could have now in terms of
the future of this Contra program. I
quote from the President's letter.
Please be assurred that I will implement
this mandate from the Congress in a
manner which gives primacy to civilian lead-
ership and democratic development within
the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will
work with the leadership of the Nicaraguan
opposition to establish a council which, like
our own National Security Council. ensures
that military activities are conducted under
the guidance of responsible civilian leaders.
It is our intention that this body will be re-
sponsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is
fairly and properly administered.
I ask unanimous consent that the
letters be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
UNITED STATES SENATE.
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVIC s.
Washington, DC, March 26, 1986.
The PRESIDENT.
The White House.
Washington, DC.
DEAR Ma. PREsIDExr. Last year when Sen.
ator Lugar and I. and a number of our col-
leagues. sponsored an amendment which
provided humanitarian assistance for the
democratic resistance in Nicaragua. we
sought to develop a consensus behind a sus-
tainable policy that would promote the
growth of democracy in Nicaragua and sup-
port negotiations. One of the central pur-
poses of our amendment was to foster the
growth of democracy and respect for human
rights within the democratic resistance.
I agree with your view that the establish-
ment of a consolidated. Marxist-Leninist
regime in Nicaragua, allied with the Soviet
Union and Cuba. represents a potential
threat to the security of the United States.
The Sandinistas have steadily tightened
their grip on the people of Nicaragua. They
have violated the human rights, and denied
fundamental freedoms, of the Nicaraguan
people. Moreover. the evidence is incontro-
vertible that the Sandinistas have continued
to support guerilla movements and terror-
ism outside Nicaragua and that the Soviet
and Cuban presence and influence has
grown.
Although some progress has been made in
forming a democratic political leadership
for the contras. the American people and
the Congress are reluctant to support the
contras because they are not convinced that
they are truly a democratic movement. The
Congress, and I believe the American
people, are prepared to support an authen-
tic broad-based democratic resistance move-
ment fighting for freedom and human
rights in Nicaragua. -
Our policy must indicate clearly not only
what the United States opposes-a Marxist-
Leninist repressive regime in Nicaragua-
but also what we support, democracy and
human rights. As we learned in El Salvador,
the most effective force to prevent a com-
munist success is a strong, principled, demo-
cratic movement which represents the real
aspirations of the people. Similarly; in the
Philippines we recently saw the enormous
force generated when people want democra-
cy and believe that there are leaders with
integrity ? and courage who support demo-
cratic goals.
Unless the contra movement is perceived
in the United States and Central America as
an effort to bring democracy to Nicaragua.
it is unlikely that American aid can be sus-
tained or that the contras will attract the
kind of. political support required to bring
about changes In Nicaragua.
Unfortunately. the contras have yet to
become this force. Their political program
and goals remain unclear. The various
forces opposing the Sandinistas are divided.
The power within the FDN. the largest
contra force. still does not appear to be
under civilian control. Although the United
Nicaraguan Opposition has recently formed
a Human Rights Commission, the contras'
record and commitment on human rights re-
mains unacceptable.
In El Salvador. we have used our military
and economic aid effectively with bipartisan
support. to strengthen democratic forces
committed to human rights. We should
follow a similar course in providing military
assistance to the democratic resistance in
Nicaragua.
I agree with the recent suggestion of Sen-
ators Cohen, Kassebaum and Rudman that
the contras must agree to broaden their
base. eliminate human rights abuses, and
develop and pursue a program for achieving
democracy in Nicaragua. I suggest a number
of measures to insure that U.S. aid is de-
signed to bring about these goals which are
essential for success.
First, all aid should be given only to civil.
ian political leaders that are genuinely
democratic. respect human rights and have
not or are not engaged in criminal activity,
such as drug trafficking. No aid should go to
the military leaders except through civilian
leadership committed to these goals and
principles.
Second. the civilian political leadership of
the opposition movements must form a gen-
uine democratic movement. The United
States must insist that they work together
and that they broaden their base so as not
to exclude Nicaraguans who are committed
to democratic principles. This does not
mean that they must all adhere to a
common political approach, but only that
they embrace democratic principles.
Third, vigorous action must be taken to
enforce respect for human rights including
investigation and prosecution of individuals
within the resistance responsible for human
rights abuses.
Fourth. all intelligence and other non-ma-
teriel assistance and cooperation should also
be funneled through, or at least controlled
by. the democratic civilian political leader-
ship.
Fifth, strict accounting measures must be
adopted to insure that all aid is being prop.
erly administered and accounted for.
Sixth, humanitarian aid should include
basic education for the democratic resist.
ance fighters and their families. We should,
for example, teach reading, writing, health
care, and other basic courses in agricultural
and vocational skills which will foster politi-
cal and economic growth.
It is my firm belief that these assurances
would go a long way toward satisfying
doubts that linger in the minds of the Con-
gress and the American people as to wheth-
er the contras truly represent a democratic
force worthy of our support. I hope you will
be able to provide me with these assurances.
Mr. President, I have one final but impor-
tant point. The foreign policy of the United
States toward Nicaragua cannot succeed if
the only way it can be sustained is by re-
peated. razor-thin votes of the Congress. We
need to develop a bipartisan, sustainable
policy toward Nicaragua that enjoys the
long-term support of the Congress. the
American people and of the governments
and the people of Central and South Amer-
Ica. I applaud the efforts of Senator Sasser.
Senator Byrd. Senator Lugar and Senator
Dole in seeking to develop such a policy. I
hope you will support them in that effort
and join in developing such a policy.
THE WHITE HOUSE.
Washington, March 27, 1986.
Hon. SAM Nuxx.
U.S. Senate.
Washington. DC.
DEAR SAM: Thank you for your letter this
morning regarding our need to move in a bi-
partisan,manner on forging a policy which
will lead to a democratic outcome in Nicara-
gua. I fully agree with your objective of en-
suring that everything we do diplomatically,
politically, economically, and, especially.
with our aid should contribute to the goal
of a truly democratic solution.
Your observations, regarding the Nicara-
guan opposition and its need to broaden its
appeal to the Nicaraguan people. are entire-
ly accurate. I agree that we need to do more
to ensure that the Nicaraguan democratic
resistance is, indeed, a representative move-
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March 27, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - SENATE S 3631
menu. responsive to civilian leadership Mr. President, the present episode in efforts by our Latin American neigh-
which is. in turn. committed to the ideals of the long-rumung, debate over U.S. aid bors to ensure regional security.
democracy. human rights. the rule of law, to the Contras has been marred and To meet the latter goal. I believe we
and a better life for-the Nicaraguan people. clouded by intemperate rhetorft. We must vigorously Support the efforts of
It Is because I believe so deeply Ins truly seem at times to be focussing more on our Latin American neighbors to ors ttic in o worveendorsed o rsed a n nuu mbear of proposals made
h en outcome Nicaragua that a tMiCtftsi-.slogans and allusions aimed at out diplomatic solutions through the
by thoughtful members of Congress. region- inspiring the desired response-than Contadora negotiating process.
al leaders, and the leadership of the Nicara- substance. This can also be advanced through
guan opposition itself. which are designed to It is imperative that we move beyond measures to promote democratization
further that end. The legislation that we this. There are some critical issues in Nicaragua- Here, then, we must
have discussed with the Senate leadership which must be eareiully considered if turn to consideration of the Contras.
and which I find acceptable. reflects this we are to arrive at ? responsible policy. White there has been increasing
advice and Includes the following provisions I believe that. a key to developing a agreement among the public and
intended to sore effect to the objectives
Identified in your letter. sound, long-term approach lies in a Members of Congress concerning the
"The President shall use the authority careful consideration of the principal nature of the Sandinista regime and
provided by this Joint Resolution to ... en- parties in Nicaragua, the threat that it poses both to its
courage the Nicaraguan democratic resist- Unfortunately for the Nicaraguan neighbors and to the United States,
ance to take additional steps. strengthen its populace, the Sandinista government there is still no consensus over the
unity. pursue a defined and coordinated pro. has removed lingering doubts about its character of the Nicaraguan rebels.
gram for representative democracy in Nics- nature and intent In the pall year. Indeed. the term "Contras" is mislead
satin. and otherwise increase its appeal to Last October. the Nicaraguan Govern- ing to the extent that it implies a
the Nicaraguan people."
Please be assured that I will implement menu suspended fundamental civil single source of armed opposition to
this mandate from the- Congress in a rights of its citizens, including the the Sanelin ?tas. We know that there
manner which gives primacy to civilian lead- right to form unions and to strike; the are is fact numerous groups battling
ership and democratic development within right to be presumed innocent until the Sandinistas. groups which do not
the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will proven guilty-, freedom of movement: always share the same methods or ed
Rork with the leadership of.the Nicaraguan right of peaceful assembly; freedom of Jectives.
opposition to estabbah a council which, like information- and the right to a trial.
We need to address a number of nn
that our miownlitary National activities are Security Council. conducted eruur under er These and the continuation of other resolved questions concerning the the guidance of responsible civilian leaders. human rights abuses underscore more than ever the antidemocratic Courts, wore we embark on a policy
It is our intention that this body will be re- clearly that will deepen our involvement with
sponsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is nature and intent of a force which Lh~Eae groups. need ensure ~ that
fairly and properly administered. I have also once promised to embody the hopes of their gaols coincide with our that owix
endorsed language in the legislation which the Nicaraguan people. their methods are consistent with
provides not less than $3 million for It is also clear that the Sandinistas them ~4. dand s that they have a pro
..strengthening prograass and activities of have Interfered to the internal affairs and organisation which promises
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance for of their neighbors. and have encour-' gram
the observance and advancement of human to garner significant popular support
rights." Training and democratic principles aged the consolidation of Cuban and among their countrymen in Nicaragua.
will be an Important part of our program. Soviet presence and influence. Last The United States bathed Contras
Finally. I am committed to ensuring that no year. we were surprised at Daniel Or- d accused of human rights abuses
aid be provided to those groups that retain tega's Indelicate visit to Moscow on K uncertain roertain whether they
in their ranks individuals who engage in the heels of the votes in the House of hei.
Can hagree an er a toe ~~ with
human rights violations. drug smuggling, or Representatives to deny aid to the other resistance groups WOrdite
mouse of resistance funds. Contras. This week lightning struck I believe that these commitments are re- again in the form of a significant San- their activities.
sponsive to your concerns and those of U etct goal is to bring pressure to
other members of Congress who are as dedi- dinista incursion into Honduras as the bear on the Sa 1stas to move
cited as you and I to a sustainable biparti? Senate prepared to debate the merits democratization and regional
ran and truly democratic solution to the of further aid to the Contras. It would toward demOCZaL
de-
them the t need to del
turmoil in Central America appear that Mr. Ortega thought he security, a, common act 09 objeeUves, i~ tras. need to along
Sincerely, could vanquish any claim the Contras with a program and organisatfonsl
RONALD REAGAN might have as a fighting force; In
NUNN. Mr. President. there are stead, he suffered a serious, self-in- structure for implementing them.
a number of other statements that I flicted head wound. They also need to develop recognition
think are important in President Rea- As a result of the Sandinista's Inter- as legitimate and representative
gan's letter. Time does not pei-mit me nal policies and International designs. spokesmen for large segments of the
to read them there appears to be little remaining population inside Nicaragua. Internal
Let me close by saying that I am doubt about the nature of their rule. and international support for the Corr
pleased that the resolution, the Dole- As the distinguished Senator from teas will crow only when it is clear
Lugar-Bentsen resolution. which I Tennessee stated in the Democratic re. that they are not CIA mercenaries or
intend to vote for, contains provisions spouse to the President's televised ad- es-eomoza national guardsmen intent
reflecting these concerns which are dress on aid to the Contras: On returning' Nicaragua to the authori-
shared by many in this Chamber. We agree that the Sandinista government tartantsm o1 the past.
I am grateful to the leadership of has betrayed the promise of its own revohr- In short, support for the Contras
Senators CoHEN. RUDILAN, and ISessc- lion. has suppressed the freedom of its own will not prove effective unless we
SAUM in this regard. people.. and has supported subversion make it clew to them that our support
I congratulate Senator Couss for his against its neighbor is El Salvador. . Is contingent on reforms that will pro-
leadership and I assure him that I - The principal differences of view mote the formation of a confederated.
agree completely with the goals that arise over the question of what to do broadly based, coordinated, democratic
he has been effective in pursuing. about this. In my view, the United opposition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who States does have an inescapable inter- It Is for this reason that I joined
yields time? est in problems and events in Latin with my colleagues, Senator Kasss-
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if I have America. Regional security is a valid sets and Senator RUDMAN, in pressing
time. I yield whatever time I have re- concern an& tempting as it may seem, ,for legislation linking assistance to the
maining to Senator COHEN. . we cannot simply turn away from the Contras to concrete measures to devel-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The situation in Nicaragua. Our objectives op and implement a reform program.
Senator has 3 minutes and 50 seconds. in this situation should be to help ad- Specifically, we have argued that addi-
Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator vance the democratic aspirations of tional aid beyond the initial outlay be
for yielding. the Nicaraguan people and to support prohibited unless and until the Con-
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S 3632 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
tras have agreed and have begun im-
plementing:
Confederation and reform measures
to broaden their leadership base:
The coordination of their efforts;
The elimination of human rights
abuses:
The pursuit of a defined and coordi-
nated program for achieving repre-
sentative democracy in Nicaragua: and
The subordination of military forces
to civilian leadership.
Notificatioh that these conditions
have been satisfied would be provided
through Presidential certification.
We have also insisted that an inde-
pendent commission, established
under the legislation, prepare and
transmit to the Congress a report on
whether the Contra groups have car-
ried out these obligations.
Our purpose in this legislation is not
to raise unworkable obstacles, but.
rather, to establish a rational frame-
work for ensuring that U.S. assistance
promotes the objectives for which it is
intended. Hence, we envision detailed
reporting on the reform efforts of the
Contras, including relevant informa-
tion relating to the degree of success
achieved in meeting the goals of the
legislation:
I am pleased to note that these
reform provisions have been included
in the legislation we are considering
today. I am hopeful that their enact-
ment will give impetus to a healthy re-
structuring of the Nicaraguan opposi-
tion forces. In any case, the message, I
trust, will be clear. The United States
will not indefinitely funnel assistance
to disparate, fractious forces with
questionable human rights practices.
What we demand is a broad-based, co-
ordinated, democratic force with a
popular program for promoting de-
mocracy in Nicaragua.
Mr. President. after years of debate
and discussion, we are still groping for
a policy toward Nicaragua. I believe it
is essential that we define our objec-
tives clearly and develop a carefully
drawn plan to implement them. When
a policy is ambiguous or opaque. ef-
forts to rally support-especially
through verbal bullying-will fail.
Casting aspersions is not a substitute
for the heavy responsibility and diffi-
cult task of persuading a free people
to open their eyes and minds to near-
or long-term dangers. We must instead
define the problems, propose clear and
specific policies to deal with them, and
seek to convince the country and the
Congress to support those policies.
The problems of Nicaragua and its
relations with its neighbors do not
lend themselves to quick or easy solu-
tions. I believe that only through a
multitrack approach which includes a
Contra reform element can pressure
be effectively brought to bear on the
Sandinista government to move
toward pluralism and democracy and
to cease being a threat to regional se-
curity.
Mr. President, earlier this afternoon.
I heard some of the debate character-
ized as a message to the Sandinistas or
a message to the American people and
our allies: that if we were not willing
to support this assistance package.
that America was not willing to stand
up for her friends. A question came to
my mind: Who are our friends? The
enemy of my enemy is not necessarily
my friend. .
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may we
have order? I am trying to listen to
the Senator ftom Maine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will be in order.
Mr. COHEN. One of the major con-
cerns Senator KASSESAUM, Senator
RUDMAN and I had was that we have
no chance of success, any long-term
chance of success, unless we are able
to forge a bipartisan consensus in Con-
gress and in the country.
We can only do that if we have a
group that we can support that would
be not only an effective military force
but an effective moral force, as well: a
force around which the people, the
disenfranchised people of Nicaragua.
could rally to say "these people now
embody our aspirations"-the aspira-
tions that have been, in fact, aban-
doned by the Sandinistas.
And it was for what reason that Sen-
ator KASSEBAUM, SENATOR RUDMAN,
Senator NUNN, myself and others be-
lieved that it was important that we
not support any package that did not
call for a reform of the Contras to pro-
mote the formation of a confederated,
broadly based, coordinated, democratic
opposition. Right now, it consists of a
number of disparate groups. They are
not effectively organized. They do not
adequately subordinate military forces
to civilian rule. They stand accused of
human rights abuses, and we simply
could not continue to support a group
on a long-term basis under such cir-
cumstances. -
For that reason, we proposed an
amendment-it was accepted-that
would condition any additional aid,
beyond the initial outlay, upon the
Contras agreeing to implement a con-
federation and reform measures to
broaden their leadership base, to co-
ordinate their efforts, to eliminate
human rights abuses, to pursue a pro-
gram for achieving representative de-
mocracy in Nicaragua, and to subordi-
nate military forces to civilian leader-
ship.
Mr.'NUNN. The Senator says, as I
understand It-this is my view, and I
am sure it is the view of the Senator
from Maine-that this is not simply an
altruistic principle of human rights-
and democratic principles, although
that is part of it. It is really the key as
to whether this policy we are pursuing
has any chance of success, in terms of
being sustainable in this country,
which is in doubt now, and in terms,
most importantly of being supported
by the people of Nicaragua. which, in
the final analysis, will determine the
outcome.
Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct.
March 27, 1986
If these groups do not organize, do
not coordinate their activities, do not
engage in promotion of the democratic
reforms that are essential, they will
lose the support of the Nicaraguan
people, and we will face ultimate
defeat. This is the key to a reform
package.
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from
Maine agree with the Senator from
Georgia in the observation that now
that we have the President's letter,
and that we also have the language of
the Senator from Maine in this resolu-
tion, we have something by which to
fudge the Contra movement? There
will be no more debates in a vacuum
18 or 12 months from now. Either they
move in this direction or, in my view,
this will not be a program sustainable
-by the United States.
Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 15
minutes to the distinguished Senator
from Connecticut. [Mr. DODD).
Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I urge both my good
friends from Georgia and Maine to see
last week's interview on "Front Line,"
conducted by Judy Woodruff on
Public Broadcasting. The person being
interviewed thought the cameras and
tape recorders were off. He made com-
ments about who would be in control.
I wish them well. I hope they are right
in this. but I am suspicious that his
statements may have been more re-
flective of the realities.
Mr. NUNN. I take that point well. I
know about that interview, and that
strengthened my conviction that there
has to be civilian control by people
who are committed to democratic prin-
ciples.
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