NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA--ATTACHMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 18, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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DRAFT April 18, 1986
Negotiations in Central America--Attachments
Tab I Elements of a Genuine and a False Political
Settlement
Tab II Senator Gramm on the Facts of the 1979 Negotiated
Settlement in Nicaragua
Tab III The Burton Amendment to the 1985 Foreign Aid
Authorization Establishing the Legal Requirement
that the US Seek the Implementation of the 1979
Democratic Commitments by Nicaragua
Tab IV Communist Violation of Four Peace Settlements Since
1953--Synthesis of Communist Obstruction of
Verification
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DRAFT April 17, 1986
A Genuine Solution for Central America
-- The simultaneous implementation of all 21 Contadora
objectives with effective verification, including imple-
mentation by Nicaragua of the.democratic commitments made
to the OAS in 1979.
-- President Reagan has repeatedly expressed this US objec-
tive in assisting the Central American negotiations. For
example, in his speech of April 4, 1985--see Tab IV
The verification mechanism must be decided through a
process which does not give'Nicaragua a veto, and the
verification authority must ultimately rest with a
two-thirds vote of the OAS.
Elements of a False Political Settlement for Central America
Separation of the security undertakings and the issue of
implementing democracy in Nicaragua--with the security
actions to be taken first. This long has been recommended
by Mexico, Nicaragua, and behind the scenes.. by Cuba. It
is a formula for repeating the Sandinista deception of
1979 in which the Carter Administration, Mexico, Panama,
Costa Rica, and Venezuela acquiesced from August 1979 to
July 17,1981 when the'Carter Administration finally
denounced Sandinista aggression through armed subversion.
A verification mechanism chosen by a process giving the
Sandinistas a.veto over membership and/or procedures--Tab
IT offers\a-historical synopsis of how, since 1945, four
war-termination agreements were systematically violated by
the communist side in part through the. obstruction of the
international verification institutions.-
the Contadora four or by the Contadora_
- b
y
he support group: These countries do not have
STAT
erification by these countries will mean that
necessary. V
the borders will be closed in one direction only--into
Nicaragua--while most of the communist aggression through
armed subversion will continue.(some perhaps through
Mexico and Belize temporarily while the Nicaraguan freedom
fighters are being dismantled) with no effective action by
such a verification group.
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VVhy negotiations
'kd
havent wore,
n the debate on aiding the Nica- ' The process of negotiation and
I raguan freedom fighters, con-
gressional opponents of , the
president argue the key is a ne-
gotiated settlement with the Com-
munist Sandinistas. They are half
right
The United States, with the Or-
ganization of American "States,
achieved a binding negotiated settle-
ment with the Sandinistas in 1979.
The full implementation of this
agreement is, in fact, the key to solv-
ing the Nicaragua problem.
. In the 1979 negotiated settlement,
the Sandinistas committed them-
selves to:
1. Genuine "broad-based democ-
racy" and "free elections";
2. "Full guaranty of human
rights" and"fundamental liberties";
3 "An independent and non-
dialogue had begun with an OAS?res
olution on Sept. 23, 1978. Negoti-
ations were substantially advanced
by the OAS resolution of June 23,
1979, which called for the immediate
replacement of Mt: Somoza and
urged member states to facilitate a
settlement that would bring Nicara-
gua "a truly democratic govern'ment"
The negotiation process reached
its height during June and July of
1979, with public and private assur-
ances exchanged, between parties,
including representatives of the
United States, other OAS member
states, Mr. Somoza, democratic op-
ponents of Mr. Somoza, and the San-
dinistas. This included face-to-face
negotiations in Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, Panama, and the United States.
aligned foreign policy" and a "mini- i tin American countries mat pm-
mum" permanent military corps; ticipated actively in the diplomatic
4. And -cooperation" and non- process included Venezuela, Costa
interventionist relations with Rica, Panama, and `lexico.
neighboring. states [all of which, it The Sandinistas, in acknowledge-
should be noted, are today democra- ment of the terms of the June 23,
cies]. 1979, OAS resolution, sent their writ-
Based ' on the Sandinistas' com- ten commitments to implement
mitments, the Carter administra- - genuine democracy to the secretary
lion: general of the OAS on July 12. The
L Withdrew its recognition of the final settlement was reached July
legitimacy of the Somoza govern- 15, 1979, when the United States
ment; accepted the Sandinista-dominated
2. Exacted Anastasio Somoza's Government of National Recon.
.agreement to resign the presidency struction junta based -on those writ-
and leave Nicaragua; ten commitments, and final agree-
3. Conferred legitimacy on the merit was reached on the plan to
Sandinista-dominated "Government transfer power to them.
of National Reconstruction" when it The commitments made by the
was still based in .San Jose, Costa Sandinistas are binding, and the
Rica, and while Mr. Somoza was still Burton Amendment to the 1985 For-
in power, Assistance Act writes these
4. Actively assisted the transfer of eign eign A into U S. law.
power to the Sandinistas after Mr. commitments In fact, however, none of the San-
SoS G ve departure;
new ~Sandinista gov- dinistas' commitments have, been
ernment S118 million in direct aid; honored.
And Carter administration sus-
and a d debt r re-- pended aid to the Sandinistas in Jan-
lion6. Cusancial package A ancial ge arrange
structuring from Western govern- i uary 1were 98 1981 after it exporting cunonccluded
merits, banks, and multilateral insti- The implementation of the 1979
tutions. OAS commitments by the-Sandin-
The United States had cut off mili- istas is the needed solution to the
tary aid to the Somoza dictatorship present problems.
in late 1978; economic aid was also We cannot, as the opponents of the
cut off a few months later. Other president's policy now urge, give up
Western governments were pres- any of the Sandinistas' four basic
srred by the United States to cease commitments of 1979. They are all
arms shipments to Somoza. During as essential today as they were in
this time, with the knowledge of the 1979, and cannot be renegotiated
United States, the Sandinista forces away
were receiving weapons and aid
Those eager to overlook the San-
dinistas' complete violation of the
1979 negotiated settlement, and to
paper over this fact in new negoti-
ations, have an obligation to state
what parts of the 1979 agreements
they propose to give up and why.
They should also explain how they
plan to get around the Burton
Amendment.
The 1979 actions by the United
States that led to Mr. Somoza's re-
moval from Nicaragua and the San-
dinistas' taking power were ex-
ecuted by, a Democratic president
with the support of a Democratic
Senate and a Democratic House of
Representatives. These actions by
the U.S. government were based on
written commitments to the OAS
made by the Sandinistas in the 1979
negotiations.
The OAS commitments of 1979
demonstrate that a negotiated settle-
ment is half a solution. Enforcing it
is the other half.
The Democrats who produced the
1979 settlement, however, have
worked concertedly to prevent Pres.
ident Reagan from enforcing their
negotiated settlement
In 1979, the United States joined
in a solemn commitment by the OAS
that the people of Nicaragua would
have a genuinely democratic gov-
ernment. Our government did not in-
tervene in Nicaragua against.Mr.
Somoza merely to replace a pro-
Western, dictatorship with an expan-
sionist, Communist, pro-Soviet dic-
tatorship. The Carter administration
intervened with a stated goal: true
democracy.
What congressional critics of
President Reagan are asking for -
a negotiated settlement - they al-
ready have. The real question is
whether we live up to that settle-
ment, whether we honor our com-
mitment by aiding those who fight to
make the Sandinistas honor theirs.
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Excerpts from the new policy language on Nicaragua.
Fran Section 722 (c) of the Foreign Aid9 Authorization of 1985 (PL 99-83).
Signed by President Reagan, August 8
I'The Congress finds that the Government of Nicaragua ... has flagrantly
violated the provisions of the June 23, 1979 resolution [of the OAS), the
rights of the Nicaraguan people, and the security of the nations of the
region ...
The Nicaraguan government:
is not freely elected ... has taken significant steps towards
establishing a Cawmunist dictatorship ... has committed attrocities against
its citizens ... has aligned itself with the Soviet Union and Soviet allies
[has violated] the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the
???
organization of American States ... has built up an army beyond the needs
of the of immediate self-defense, at the expense of the needs of the
Nicaraguan people and about.which the nations of the regions have expressed
deepest concern ... [and] has lost the support of virtually all independent
sectors of Nicaraguan society"
The Nicaraguan Democratic opposition:
"on June 12, 1985 ... the political and armed opposition groups
representing the entire democratic political spectrum of Nicaragua formed
the Unified Nicaraguan opposition and affirmed their historical commitment
to achieve for Nicaragua the reconciliation of her children, to establish
the foundation for democracy and the moral and material reconstruction of
the nation'..."
The United States Congress:.
"condemns the Goverment of Nicaragua for violating its solemn cozmmitments
to the.Nicaraguan people, the United States, and the organization of
American States"
"affirms that the Government of Nicaragua will ... [achieve]. political
legitimacy when it fulfills its commitments [by holding] genuinely
democratic elections ... in which all elements of,the Nicaraguan resistance
can peacefully participate ..."
"supports the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in its efforts ... to
achieve the fulfillment of the Government of Nicaragua's solemn
commitments"
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11iE BUM A?' D' t IN BRIEF
.
(Amendment to the Foreign kid Authorization H.R.. 1555,
Title VII, section on "Peace Process in Central America")
-- In 1979, The U.S. voted with the majority of the Organization
of American States to "replace" the Somoza regime and "install" a
democratic goverrunent
-- the new Nicaraguan government.' by accepting the QAS
resolution, comitted itself to creating democracy in Nicaragua
-- the Sandinistas have since grossly violated these commitments
and are turning Nicaragua into an expansionist communist
dictatorship
-- now the same people who we supported against Somoza are once
again fighting again against dictatorship, and have recently
shown an unprecedented' degree of unity
TORE -- the U.S. won't consider the Sandinista regime
legitimate until it fulfills the commitments that won it the
support of the free world
-- the U.S. will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to
regain their democratic revolution and attain fulfillment of
their governments commitments to the organization of American
States, the U.S., and their own people.
PURPOSES
o to solidify the bipartisan consensus. in the House against'
abandoning American interests and values by abandoning the.
contras
o to reassure the freedom fighters and our Central American allies,
that the Congress is now caunitted to supporting the Nicaraguan
resistance
o to show the justification for support for the Nicaraguan
resistance-
to give recognition to the new unity among the Nicaraguan
opposition
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 WQ-
PUBLIC LA~V !-:~=t~s 0i
(it Despite positive actions by the Cungrens signnlinK support . the for negotiated solutions to conflic n Central dAmerica omestic pore
are disturbing trends in Nicaragua's gforeign a
ties. including-
(A) President Daniel Ortega's April 1985 trip to the
Soviet Union at a time when the Congress signaled its
strong disapproval of inereasirI Nicaraguan-Soviet ties;
(B) the Sandinista governments close military ties with
Cuba. the Soviet Union. and its Warsaw Pact allies; the
disappointing' and insufficient reduction of the number of
Cuban advisors in Nicaragua by only 100 out of an that
mately 2.500; and the continuing military buildup
Nicaragua's neighbors considgr threatening;
4C) the Sandinista govetrnment's curtailment of individual
liberties, political expression. freedom of worship. and the
independence of the media; l, and internal
tDi the subordination of military. judicial. and
security functions to the ruling poical party;
(E) the Sandinista government's efforts to export its influ-
erice and ideology.
421 If Nicaragua does not address the concerns described in
paragraph i1 1 . the United States has several options to address
this challenge to peace and stability in the region. including
political. diplomatic. and trade sanctions. In addition.. the
United States-
iAi should through appropriate regional organizations.
such as the Organization of American States, seek to main-
tain multilateral pressure on Nicaragua to address these
concerns: and
iB, should. if called upon do so. give serious consider-
ation to supporting .any sanctions adopted by such an
organization. es is being made in
431-In assessing whether or not progress prompt and
addressing these concerns. the Congress will expect
significant initiatives by the Government of Nicaragua such
(A) the removal of foreign military advisors from Nica-
r 4B) the end to Sandinista support for insurgencies in
other countries in the region. including the cessation of
military supplies to the rebel forces righting the
democrat- ically elected government in El Salvador.
(C) restoration of individual liberties. political expression.
freedom of worship. and the independence of the media;
and toward internal reconciliation and a plural.
1D)
ID) democratic esystem. including steps to liberalize institu-
?tions in order to allow the internal opposition in Nicaragua
cto become a viable partner in the Nicaraguan Political
process.
Ic) REsO00TION or THE CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA.-
(It BASIS FOR eo of Nicaragua urare suffering the horrors of a
tpitar people rave hardships and
fierce armed conflict that is causing ), litical,
loss of life. has thrown the country into a serious po
social. and economic upheaval, and is of serious concern to
d to the United Stairs;
. the notiunr of the region an
011/06/041: CIA-RDP88BOO44ci3ROO040y1950005-1 ..lion of effort=
this conflict is runamemalt u Ive
of the ent at ipeacegwithitts neighbors efforts whichabegan under
m
the Somoza regime; and irations tC) the United States co n June n23. oble
resolution of
of the Nicaraguan people
the Seventeenth Meeting, of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States.
which reads as follows:
"WHEREAS:
"The people of Nicaragua are suffering the horrors of a fierce
of and
armed conflict that is causing go av se hardships s cand al, social
and has thrown the country economic, upheaval;
"The inhumane conduct of the dictatorial regime governing nter-
American the country, e mn Rights. bthies threpofundart of the natal cause of the
Commission on n Huma and
dramatic situation faced by the Nicaraguan people:
"The spirit of -solidarity that -guides Hemisphere. relations rican places an unavoidable obligation on the Ao Put an end tri the
exert every effort within their power,
bloodshed and to avoid the, prolongation of this conflict which is
disrupting'the peace of the Hemispphere:
"THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
"DECLARES: problem is exclusively
"That the solution of the serious 'V,caragua.
within the jurisdiction of the people
"That in. the view of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs this solution should be arrived at
on the basis of the following:
"1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza
regime. Cerrito of a democratic
"2. Installation in Nicaraguan
government, the composition of which s ould include the
principal representative groups which oppose the Somoza
regime and which reflects the free will of the people of
Nicaragua.
"3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all
Nicaraguans without exception. able, that
. "4. The holding of free elections as soon as poi
will lead to the establishment of a truly democratic govern-
ment that guarantees peace, freedom. and justice.
"RESOLVES:
"1. To urge the member states to take steps that are within
their reach to facilitate an enduring and peaceful solution of the
Nicaraguan problem on the bases set forth above, scrupulous m
respecting the principle of nonintervention and abstaining o
any action that might be in conflict with the above bases or be
incompatible with a peaceful and enduring solution to the
problem. a promote humaniuiri;in usy
"2. To commit their rit'urt, W once to the people of Nicaragua and to contribute to the social
and economic recovery of the country.
"3. To keep the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Mint
isters of.Foreign Affairs open while the present situation
continues-"-
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