NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA--ATTACHMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 17, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
DRAFT April 17, 1986
Negotiations in Central America--Attachments
Tab I Elements of a Genuine and a False Political
Settlement
Tab II Senator Gramm on the Facts of the 1979 Negotiated
Settlement in Nicaragua
Tab III The Burton Amendment to the 1985 Foreign Aid
Authorization Establishing the Legal Requirement
that the US Seek the Implementation of the 1979
Democratic Commitments by Nicaragua
Tab IV Excerpts from the Formal Policy Directives of the
President
Tab V Public Summary of the President's Negotiating
Objectives and My Personal Comment on the Need to
Avoid A False Political Solution
Tab VI Communist Violation of Four Peace Settlements Since
1953--Synthesis of Communist Obstruction of
Verification
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
DRAFT April 17, 1986
A Genuine Solution for Central America
-- The simultaneous implementation of all 21 Contadora
objectives with effective verification, including imple-
mentation by Nicaragua of the democratic commitments made
to the OAS in 1979.
President Reagan has repeatedly expressed this US objec-
tive in assisting the Central American negotiations. For
example, in his speech of April 4, 1985--see Tab V.
The verification mechanism must be decided through a
process which does not give Nicaragua a veto, and the
verification authority must ultimately rest with a
two-thirds vote of the OAS.
Elements of a False Political Settlement for Central America
-- Separation of the security undertakings and the issue of
implementing democracy in Nicaragua--with the security
actions to be taken first. This long has been recommended
by Mexico, Nicaragua, and behind the scenes by Cuba. It
is a formula for repeating the Sandinista deception of
1979 in which the Carter Administration, Mexico, Panama,
Cos La Rica, and Venezuela acquiesced from August 1979 to
J 17, 1981 when the Carter Administration finally
denounced Sandinista aggression through armed subversion.
A verification mechanism chosen by a process giving the
Sandinistas a veto over membership and/or procedures--Tab
'ICI offers a historical synopsis of how, since 1945, four
war-termination agreements were systematically violated by
the communist side in part through the obstruction of the
international verification institutions.
Verification by the Contadora four or by the Contadora
four plus the support group. These countries do not have
necessary. Verification by these countries wl mean that
the borders will be closed in one direction only--into
Nicaragua--while most of the communist aggression through
armed subversion will continue (some perhaps through
Mexico and Belize temporarily while the Nicaraguan freedom
fighters are being dismantled) with no effective action by
such a verification group.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
. a~aia ? aSuY[ as A fl t1L 1V, 1JVV
PHIL GRAMM
t~.fjf at tjittotutt Ziritco
negotiations
Why haven't worked
J n the debate on aiding the Nica-
raguan freedom fighters, con-
gressional opponents of, the
president argue the key is a ne-
gotiated settlement with the Com-
munist Sandinistas. They are half
right.
The United States, with the Or-
ganization of American States,
achieved a binding negotiated settle-
ment with the Sandinistas in 1979.
The full implementation of this
agreement is, in fact, the key to solv-
ing the Nicaragua problem.
In the 1979 negotiated settlement,
the Sandinistas committed them-
selves to:
1. Genuine "broad-based democ-
racy" and "free elections";
2. "Full guaranty of human
rights" and "fundamental liberties";
Those eager to overlook the San-
dinistas' complete violation of the
1979 negotiated settlement, and to
paper over this fact in new negoti-
ations, have an obligation to state -
what parts of the 1979 agreements
they propose to give up and why.
They should also explain how they
plan to get around the Burton
Amendment.
The 1979 actions by the United
States that led to Mr. Somoza's re-
moval from Nicaragua and the San-
dinistas' taking power were ex-
ecuted by a Democratic president
with the support of a Democratic
Senate and a Democratic House of
Representatives. These actions by
the U.S. government were based on
written commitments to the OAS
made by the Sandinistas in the 1979
negotiations.
The OAS commitments of 1979
demonstrate that a negotiated settle-
ment is half a solution. Enforcing it
is the other half.
The Democrats who produced the
1979 settlement, however, have
worked concertedly to prevent Pres-
ident Reagan from enforcing their
negotiated settlement.
In 1979, the United States joined
in a solemn commitment by the OAS
that the people of Nicaragua would
have a genuinely democratic gov-
ernment. Our government did not in-
tervene in Nicaragua against Mr.
Somoza merely to replace a pro-
Western dictatorship with an expan-
sionist, Communist, pro-Soviet dic-
tatorship. The Carter administration
intervened with a stated goal: true
democracy.
What congressional critics of
President Reagan are asking for -
a negotiated settlement - they al-
ready have. The real question is
whether we live up to that settle-
ment, whether we honor our com-
mitment by aiding those who fight to
make the Sandinistas honor theirs.
The process of negotiation and
-dialogue had begun with an OAS res-
olution on Sept. 23, 1978. Negoti-
ations were substantially advanced
by the OAS resolution of June 23,
1979, which called for the immediate
replacement of Mr. Somoza and
urged member states to facilitate a
settlement that would bring Nicara-
gua "a truly democratic govern-
ment."
The negotiation process reached
its height during June and July of
1979, with public and private assur-
ances exchanged between parties,
including representatives of the
United States, other OAS member
states, Mr. Somoza, democratic op-
ponents of Mr. Somoza, and the San-
dinistas. This included face-to-face
negotiations in Nicaragua, Costa
3. "An independent and non- Rica, Panama, and the United States.
aligned foreign policy" and a "mini- Latin American countries mat par-
mum" permanent military corps; the diplomatic
4. And "cooperation" and non- ticipated actively in
interventionist relations with process included Venezuela, Costa
neighboring states [all of which, it Ric, Panama, and Mexico.
should be noted, are today democra- The Sandinistas, in acknowledge-
cies]. ment of the terms of the June 23,
Based on the Sandinistas' com- 1979, OAS resolution, sent their writ-
mitments, the Carter administra- ten commitments to implement
tion: genuine democracy to the secretary
I. Withdrew its recognition of the general of the OAS on July 12. The
legitimacy of the Somoza govern- final settlement was reached July
ment; 15, 1979, when the United States
2. Exacted Anastasio Somoza's I accepted the. Sandinista-dominated
agreement to resign the presidency Government of National Recon-
and leave Nicaragua; struction junta based on those writ-
3. Conferred legitimacy on the ten commitments, and final agree-
Sandinista-dominated "Government ment was reached on the plan to
of National Reconstruction" when it transfer power to them.
was still based in . San Jose, Costa The commitments made by the
Rica, and while Mr. Somoza was still Sandinistas are binding, and the
in power; Burton Amendment to the 1985 For-
4. Actively assisted the transfer of eign Assistance Act writes these
power to the Sandinistas after Mr. commitments into U.S. law.
Somoza's departure; In fact, however, none of the San-
5. Gave the new Sandinista gov- dinistas' commitments have been
ernment $118 million in direct aid; honored.
6. And helped arrange a $1.6 bil- The Carter administration sus-
lion financial package and debt re- pended aid to the Sandinistas in Jan-
structuring from Western govern- I uary 1981 after it concluded that
ments, banks, and multilateral insti- they were exporting subversion.
tutions. The implementation of the 1979 The United States had cut off mili- OAS commitments by the-Sandin-
~ istas is the needed solution to the
tary aid to the Somoza dictatorship present problems.
in late 1978; economic aid was also
cut off a few months later. Other We cannot, as the opponents of the
Western governments were pres- president's policy now urge, give up
d
sured by the United States to cease
arms shipments to Somoza. During
this time, with the knowledge of the
United States, the Sandinista forces
were receiving weapons and aid
from Cuba Mevirf Panama Van-
any of Lite an
uustas four basic
commitments of 1979. They are all
as essential today as they were in
1979, and cannot be renegotiated
away
ezuela, and Icos Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Excerpts from the new policy language on Nicaragua
Fran Section 722 (c) of the Foreign Aid Authorization of 1985 (PL 99-83).
Signed by President Reagan, August 8, 1985.
"The Congress finds that the Government of Nicaragua ... has flagrantly
violated the provisions of the June 23, 1979 resolution [of the OAS], the
rights of the Nicaraguan people, and the security of the nations of the
region
The Nicaraguan government:
"... is not freely elected ... has taken significant steps towards
establishing a Communist dictatorship ... has committed attrocities against
its citizens ... has aligned itself with the Soviet Union and Soviet allies
.. [has violated] the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the
Organization of American States ... has built up an army beyond the needs
of the of immediate self-defense, at the expense of the needs of the
Nicaraguan people and about which the nations of the regions have expressed
deepest concern ... [and] has lost the support of virtually all independent
sectors of Nicaraguan society"
The Nicaraguan Democratic Opposition:
"on June 12, 1985 ... the political and armed opposition groups
representing the entire democratic political spectrum of Nicaragua formed
the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition and affirmed their 'historical commitment
to achieve for Nicaragua the reconciliation of her children, to establish
the foundation for democracy and the moral and material reconstruction of
the nation'..."
The United States Congress:
"condemns the Government of Nicaragua for violating its solemn commitments
to the Nicaraguan people, the United States, and the Organization of
American States"
"affirms that the Government of Nicaragua will ... [achieve]. political
legitimacy when it fulfills its commitments [by holding] genuinely
democratic elections ... in which all elements of the Nicaraguan resistance
can peacefully participate ..."
"supports the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in its efforts ... to
achieve the fulfillment of the Government of Nicaragua's solemn
commitments"
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
T BURTON AMENII1EN IN BRIEF
(Amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization H.R. 1555,
Title VII, section on "Peace Process in Central America")
-- In 1979, The U.S. voted with the majority of the Organization
of American States to "replace" the Somoza regime and "install" a
democratic government
-- the new Nicaraguan government, by accepting the OAS
resolution, committed itself to creating democracy in Nicaragua
-- the Sandinistas have since grossly violated these commitments
and are turning Nicaragua into an expansionist communist
dictatorship
-- now the same people who we supported against Somoza are once
again fighting again against dictatorship, and have recently
shown an unprecedented' degree of unity
T EREFORE -- the U.S. won't consider the Sandinista regime
legitimate until it fulfills the commitments that won it the
support of the free world
-- the U.S. will support the efforts of the Nicaraguan people to
regain their democratic revolution and attain fulfillment of
their governments commitments to the Organization of American
States, the U.S., and their own people.
PURPOSES
o to solidify the bipartisan consensus in the House against
abandoning American interests and values by abandoning the
contras
o to reassure the freedom fighters and our Central American allies
that the Congress is now committed to supporting the Nicaraguan
resistance
o to show the justification for support for the Nicaraguan
resistance-
o to give recognition to the new unity among the Nicaraguan
opposition
"`~ =`-=' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2 -
 10 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
(1) Despite positive actions by the Iongress signaling support
for negotiated solutions to conflicts in Central America, there
are disturbing trends in Nicaragua's foreign and domestic poli-
ties. including-
(A) President Daniel Ortega's April 1985 trip to the
Soviet Union at a time when the Congress signaled its
strong disapproval of increasing Nicaraguan-Soviet ties;
(B) the Sandinista governments close military ties with
Cuba, the Soviet Union, and its Warsaw Pact allies; the
disappointing' and insufficient reduction of the number of
Cuban advisors in Nicaragua by only 100 out of an approxi-
mately 2,500; and the continuing military buildup that
Nicaragua's neighbors consider threatening;
(C) the Sandinista goveMment's curtailment of individual
liberties, political expression, freedom of worship, and the
independence of the media;
(D) the subordination of military, judicial, and internal
security functions to the ruling political party; and
,,,-(E) the Sandinista government's efforts to export its influ-
ence and ideology.
addressing these concerns, the Congress will expect prompt and
significant initiatives by ,the Government of Nicaragua such
as-
(A) the removal of foreign military advisors from Nica-
ragua;
(B) the end to Sandinista support for insurgencies in
other countries in the region, including the cessation of
military-supplies-to-the -rebel-forces-fighting-the -democrat-
ically elected government in El Salvador;
(C) restoration of individual liberties, political expression,
freedom of worship, and the independence of the media;
and
(D) progress toward internal reconciliation and a plural-
istic democratic system, including steps to liberalize institu-
(A) should through 'appropriate regional organizations,
such as the. Organization of American States, seek to main-
tain multilateral pressure on Nicaragua to address these
concerns; and
(B) should, if called upon todo so,-give serious consider-
ation to supporting -,any sanctions adopted by such an
organization.
(3) In assessing whether or not progress is being made in
(2) If Nicaragua does not address the concerns described in
paragraph (1), the United States has several options to address
this challenge to peace and stability in the region, including
political, diplomatic, and trade sanctions. In addition, the
United States-
tions in order to allow the internal opposition in Nicaragua
to become a viable partner in the Nicaraguan political
process.
(C) RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA.-
(1 I BASIS FOR Pol-Icv.-The Congress finds tbat-
(A) the people of Nicaragua are suffering the horrors of a
fierce armed conflict that is causing grave hardships and
loss of life, has thrown the country into a serious political,
social, and economic upheaval, and is of serious concern to
the nations of the region and to the United States;
PUBLIC LAW 99-83-AUG. 8, 1985
2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
(B) this conflict is fundamentally a continuation of efforts
of the Nicaraguan people to attain a representative govern-
ment at peace with its neighbors, efforts which began under
the Somoza regime; and
(C) the United States recognized these noble aspirations
of the Nicaraguan people in the June 23, 1979, resolution of
the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States,
which reads as follows:
"WHEREAS:
"The people of Nicaragua are suffering the horrors of a fierce
armed conflict that is causing grave hardships and loss of life.
and has thrown the country into a serious political, social. and
economic upheaval;
"The inhumane conduct of the dictatorial regime governing
the country, as evidenced by the report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, is the fundamental cause of the
dramatic situation faced by the Nicaraguan people; and
"The spirit of solidarity that guides Hemisphere relations
places an unavoidable obligation on the American countries to
exert every effort within their power; to put an end to the
bloodshed and to avoid the prolongation of this conflict which is
disrupting the peace of the Hemisphere;
"THE SEVENTEENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF
MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
"DECLARES:
"That the solution of the serious problem is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the people of Nicaragua.
"That in the view of the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs this solution should be arrived at
"1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza
regime.
"2. Installation in Nicaraguan territory of a democratic
government, the composition of which should include the
principal representative groups which oppose the Somoza
regime and which reflects the free will of the people of
Nicaragua.
"3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all
Nicaraguans without exception.
"4 The-holding-of-free elections as soon as- possible, -that
will lead to the establishment of a truly-democratic govern-
ment that guarantees peace, freedom, and justice.
"RESOLVES:
"1. To urge the member states to take steps that are within
their reach to facilitate an enduring and peaceful solution of the
Nicaraguan problem on the bases set forth above, scrupulously
respecting the principle of nonintervention and abstaining from
any. action that might be in conflict with the above bases or be
incompatible with a peaceful and enduring solution to the
problem.
To commit their efforts t promote humanitarian assist-
ance to the people of Nicaragua and to contribute to the social
and economic recovery of the country.
"3. To keep the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation of Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs open while the present situation
continues.".
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2 .__.,~
 .T. 252 PUBLIC.LAW 99-83-AUG. 8. 1985 PUBLIC LAW 99-83-AUG. 8. 1985 99 STAT. 253
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
(2) THt< GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA.-The Congress further professional sectors) and who still seek democracy, reject
finds that- the rule of the Frente Sandinista, and seek the free elec-
finds the Government of National Reconstruction of Nica- tions promised in 1979;
ragua formally accepted the June 23, 1979, resolution as a (B) the he Nicaraguan political opposition has joined with
basis for resolving the Nicaraguan conflict in its "Plan to the armed opposition groups in issuing the San Jose Mani
Achieve Peace" which was submitted to the Organization of festo of March 1, 1985, calling for a national dialogue under
American States on July 12, 1979; mediation by the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference to peace-
(B) the June 23, 1979, resolution and its acceptance by the fully attain the fulfillment of the Government of
Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua was Nicaragua's commitments to the Organization of American
the formal basis for the removal of the Somoza regime and States, including "the democratization of Nicaragua, con-
the installation of the Government of National Reconstruc- scious that democracy is the only means to carry out an
tion; authentic revolution and secure our national identity and
ghta. (C) the Government of National Reconstruction, now sovereignty",
known as the Government of Nicaragua and controlled by (C) on June 12, 1985, in San Salvador, El Salvador, the
the Frente Sandinista (the FSLN), has flagrantly violated political and armed opposition groups representing the
the provisions of the June 23, 1979, resolution, the rights entire democratic political spectrum of Nicaragua formed
of the Nicaraguan people, and the security of the nations in the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition and affirmed their
the region, in that it- "historical commitment to achieve for Nicaragua the rec-
(i) no longer includes the democratic members of the onciliation of her children, to establish the foundation for
Government of National Reconstruction in the political democracy and the moral and material reconstruction of
process; the nation"? and
(ii) is not a government freely elected under condi- (D) the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition further declared
tions of freedom of the press, assembly, and organiza- its intention to "give priority at all times to a political
tion, and is not recognized as freely elected by its Solution which will ease the suffering of our people".
neighbors, Costa Rica,, Honduras, and El Salvador; (4) CONCERNS IN THE REGION AND UNITED STATES RESPONSIBIL-
(iii) has taken significant steps towards establishing a [TIES.-The Congress further finds that-
totalitarian Communist dictatorship, including the (A i Nicaragua's neighbors. Costa Rica, El Salvador, and
formation of FSLN neighborhood watch committees Honduras, have expressed, individually and through the
and the enactment of laws that violate human rights Contadora process, their belief that their peace and free-
and grant undue executive power; dom is not safe so long as the Government of Nicaragua
(iv) has committed atrocities against its citizens as excludes from power most of Nicaragua's political leader-
documented in reports by the Inter-American Commis- ship and is controlled by a small sectarian party, without
sion on Human Rights ofthe Organization of American regard to the will of the majority of Nicaraguans; and
States; (B) the United States, given its role in the installation of
(v) has aligned itself with the Soviet Union and the current Government of Nicaragua, has a special respon-
Soviet allies, including the German Democratic Repub- sibility regarding the implementation of the commitments
lic, Bulgaria, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation made by that Government in 1979, especially to those who
nl Organization; fought against Somoza to bring democracy to Nicaragua
(vi) has committed and refuses to cease aggression in with United States support.
the form of armed subversion against its neighbors in (5) RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.-The Congress-
violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Charter of the (A) condemns the Government of Nicaragua for violating
Organization of American States, the its solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and
the 1965 United Nations General Assembly Declaration (B) United affirms mss, and the Organization of American States;
on Intervention; and rms that the Government of Nicaragua will be
(vii) has built up an army beyond the needs of imme- regarded as having achieved political legitimacy when it
fulfills its
diate self-defense, at the expense of the needs of the is 1919 m lement genuinely the Orga democratic l Amer-
Nicaraguan people and about which the nations of the zar States to implement democratic elections,
region have expressed deepest concern. under the supervision of the Organization of American
St
(3) THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSrON.-The Congress States, in which all eipments de rho Nicaraguan resizednas
further finds that- can peacefully participate under conditions recognized as
(A) as a result of these violations, the Government of necessary for free elections by international bodies;
Nicaragua has lost the support of virtually all independent to u nc ialo nthe as Government of Nicaragua to enter a na moc sectors of Nicaraguan society who initially supported the resistance San in San Jose, se, Costa by Ricatae Nicaraguan d 5, un nde er
removal of the Somoza regime (including democratic politi- mediation aqu, on March e c ur
cal parties of the left, center, and right; the leadership of to peacefully y the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference in order
the Church; free unions; and the business, farmer and to resolve the current crisis thr:~ut:h intern inc.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 STAT. 254
JSC 2151
!SC 2751
rnational
ements.
:five date.
ropriation
.orization.
PUBLIC LAW 99-53-AUG. 8, 1955 PUBLIC LAW 99-83-AUG. 8. 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
ally recognized elections in which all elements of ivica- (4) The President shall establish appropriate procedures to ensure
(D) supports the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in its
efforts to peacefully resolve the Nicaraguan conflict and to
achieve the fulfillment of the Government of Nicaraguas
solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the United
States, and the Organization of American States;
(E) supports efforts by the Contadora nations, the
Organization of American States, and other appropriate
regional organizations to maintain multilateral pressure on
Nicaragua to fulfill its commitments; and
(F) requests that the Secretary of State transmit the text
of this subsection to the Foreign Ministers of the member
states of the Organization of American States.
(d) PROHIBITION RELATING TO MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY OPER-
ATIONS IN NICARAGUA.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
no funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available
by this Act (except the funds authorized to be appropriated in this
section), by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or by the Arms
Export Control Act shall be used to provide assistance of any kind,
either directly or indirectly, to any person or group engaging in an
insurgency or other act of rebellion against the Government of
Nicaragua. The United States shall not enter into any arrangement
conditioning, expressly or impliedly, the provision of assistance
under this Act or the purchase of defense articles and services under
the Arms Export Control Act upon the provision of assistance by a
recipient to persons or groups engaging in an insurgency or other
act of rebellion against the Government of Nicaragua.
(e' LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS AGAINST NICARAGUA.-None of
the funds authorized to be appropriated in this or any other Act can
be used to fund directly, or indirectly, activities against the Govern-
ment of Nicaragua which have not been authorized by, or pursuant
to, law and which would place the United States in violation of our
obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American
States, to which the United States is a signatory, or under inter-
national law as defined by treaty commitments agreed to, and
ratified by, the Government of the United States.
(0 FOOD AID TO THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE.-In cooperation with
Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo and private and voluntary
organizations, the President'should explore and promote means for
providing food aid to the Nicaraguan people through private and
voluntary organizations and the Catholic Church.
(g) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC
RESISTANCE.-(1) Effective upon the date of enactment of this Act,
there are authorized to be appropriated $27,000.000 for humani-
tarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Such
assistance shall. be provided to such department or agency of the
United States as the President shall designate, except the Central
Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.
(2) The assistance authorized by this subsection is authorized to
remain available for obligation until March 31, 19S(i.
(3) One-third of the assistance authorized by this subsection shall
be available for obligation at any time after the appropriation of
funds pursuant to such authorization, an additional one-third shall
be available for obligation upon submission of the first report re-
quired by subsection (j), and the remaining one-third shall be avail-
able for obligation. upon submission of the second such report.
Government to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is used only
for the intended purpose and is not diverted (through barter, ex-
change, or any other means) for acquisition of weapons, weapons
systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or material
which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.
(5) As used in this subsection, the term "humanitarian assistance"
means the provision of food, clothing, medicine, and other humani-
tarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons,
weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles, or
material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death.
(h) ASSISTANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A CONTADORA AGREE-
MENT.-Effective upon' the date of enactment of this Act, there are
authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000, which are authorized to
remain available until expended, for payment by the Secretary of
State for the expenses arising from implementation by the
Contadora nations (Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela) of
an agreement among the countries of Central America based on the
Contadora Document of Objectives of September 9, 1983, including
peacekeeping, verification, and monitoring systems.
(I) POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NICARAGUA.-The President is
hereby urged and requested-
11' to pursue vigorously the use of diplomatic and economic
measures to resolve the conflict in Nicaragua, including si-
multaneous negotiations-
(A) to implement the Contadora Document of Objectives
of September 8, 1983; and
(B) to develop, in close consultation and cooperation with
other nations, trade and economic measures to complement
such policies of the United States and to encourage the
Government of Nicaraguzsa take the necessary steps to
resolve the conflict;
(2) to suspend the economic sanctions imposed by the Presi-
dent on May 1, 1985, and the United States military maneuvers
in Honduras and off the coast of Nicaragua, if the Government
of Nicaragua agrees-
(A) to a cease fire,
(B) to open a dialogue with all elements of the opposition,
including the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, and
(C) to suspend the state of emergency in Nicaragua;
(3) to call upon the Nicaraguan democratic resistance to
remove from their ranks any individuals who have engaged in
human rights abuses; and
(4) to resume bilateral discussions with the Government of
Nicaragua with a view to encouraging-
(A) a church-mediated dialogue between the Government
of Nicaragua and all elements of the opposition, including
the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, in support of in-
ternal reconciliation as called for by the Contadora Docu-
ment of Objectives; and
(B) a comprehensive, verifiable agreement among the
nations of Central America, based on the Contadora Docu.
ment of Objectives.
(j) REPORTS.-The President shall submit a report to the Congress President of U.S
90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days
99 STAT. 25
Effective date.
Appropriation
authorization.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
The President February 7, 1984, reaffirmeo
the four objectives of the US :ith respect to l:ica_ acua and
his Exact words were as follows:
Il1'icaraoua: Our approach to the Nicaraguan Government
must locus on achievinc the following:
(1) "Impl e en tation of the democratic cc-,wit
ments made by
the Sandinistas to the OAS in 1979.
.~
(2) Je=.iriation of 1cicaraeua',_ support to 7m,arxist/leninist
Subversion and cuerrllla -activity in any foreign
COL; ry.
(3) "Removal of Soviet. Bloc/Cuban personnel and an end
to 1:icaraouan military cooperation with-communist,
ccsun,ries.
(4) Reduction in the Sandinista military apparatus to
parity within the region."
The Meeting of June 25 resulted in the decisions
contained in memorandum of the same date. INW
memorandum directed:
"Reaffirmation of our four goals as stated in Elm
genuine implesnentat'o of democracy(werified end to
export of subversion verified removal of Soviet
bloc/Cuban personnel verified reduction of Nicaraguan
forces to regional pa it
J
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Negotiationaf President Reagan
`Hy Administration has continually pursued a realistic diplomat-
is solution. which would accomplish the four objectives which we
have clearly expressed.
--"Nicaragua's implementation of its commitment to democracy
made to the Organization of American States;
--An end to Nicaragua's aggression against it s neighbors;
--A removal of the thousands of Soviet bloc, Cuban, PLO
(Palestine Liberation Organization), Libyan, and-other
military and security personnels and
--A return of the Nicaraguan military to a level of parity
with their neighbors.' (From President's -speech of April
4, 1985)
Draft Proposed Language Rejecting a False Political Solution
These four objectives are totally consistent with the simulta-
neous implementation of the 21 Contadora objectives with real
verification. However, my Administration will not support a
false political solution in which the. communist regime in
Nicaragua is permitted to continue its failure to implement
real democracy as required by the OAS while neighboring
countries receive nothing more than a verbal promise that
communist Nicaragua will cease its aggression through armed
subversion. The communist regime in Cuba made the 'same promise
in 1962 to President Kennedy and, Castro has nevertheless, .
continued his aggression--on three continents. :-The actions of
the Sandinista regime make clear' that only a genuinely demo-
cratic Nicaragua will bring about a -realisticand stable peace
in the region.
Nicaragua has an obligation to implement genuine democracy
because that was the condition for diplomatic recognition of
the current government by the OAS in June 1979. Any genuine
political. solution can only occur when Nicaragua has been
certified by a. 2/3 vote of the-OAS to have implemented genuine
democracy. And let me remind the Congress that the Burton
Amendment of the 1985 Foreign Assistance Act which is the law
specifies that the United States Government must seek the
implementation of the OAS democratic commitments in Nicaragua.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
LESSONS FROM THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AND INDOCHINA PEACE ACCORDS
St cp)hcn T. Hosmer
The )acid Corporation
The U.S. experience with war termination agreements in ):ores and
Indochina provides some cautionary -lessons on negotiating such
agreements with communist belligerents in the Third %orld. The
com..nunist signatories have consistently and massively violated the 3953
Korean Armistice, the 1954 Geneva Accords on lndochina, the 3962
Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, and the 3975 Paris Agreements on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.
MASSIVE AND PREPLANNED COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS
Despite the supervisory and control mechanisms designed to deter
breaches of these agreements, the communist signatories were able to
circumvent key provisions of all the agreements with relative ease and
at little political cost. They began the most massive ahd militarily
significant violations immediately after the agreements went into
effect, suggesting that they were planning the infringements even as
they were negotiating. For example:
? They started to violate subparagraph 33d of the l:orean
Armistice, which prohibited the introduction of war materiel
into Korea except on a "piece-for-piece" replacement basis,
within days of the truce signing, when communist ti3Gs began a
major staging from Manchuria onto hastily reconstructed
airfields throughout North Korea.
? North Vietnam made only the barest pretense of complying with
Article 2 of the 3962 Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos,
which required the--withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos
"in the shortest time possible." Of the estimated 6,000 to
l0,OD0 NVA forces in Laos in 1962, only 40 left the country
through International Control Commission checkpoints.
? North Vietnam reneged immediately on its obligations under the
1973 Paris Accords to cease firing in South Vietnam, withdraw
its forces from Cambodia and Laos, and refrain from introducing
additional troops and war materiel into South Vietnam except on
a one-for-one replacement basis. North Vietnam never observed
the cease-fire and troop withdrawal requirements, and within
little more than two months after it had signed the peace
agreements, it had already infiltrated some 30,000 additional
troops and over 30,000 tons of military equipment into South
Vietnam.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
2
THE FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE OR DOCUMENT VIOLATIONS
While omissions, arbigultics, end other weaknesses in treaty
language sometimes facilitated communist evasions, they Vert not the
motor cause. Rather, the failure to officially monitor, investigate,
and document violations es massive as those cited above was directly
Attributable to
]? The representation of Last European states on the supervisory
bodies and
2. The systematic obstructionism of the local communist
signatories.
Last European states were represented on all the so-called neutral
nation and international supervisory commissions charged with
facilitating and overseeing the execution of the l:orean and Indochina,
tsar termination agreements. Because of the voting rules and/or
numerical balance of the commissions, the East European-.states had a
veto over nearly all icportant natters involving the commissions. And
since the East Europeans acted as agents for their Asian communist
clients, they invariably vetoed or otherwise attempted to obstruct any
investigation, ruling, or other supervisory and control activity that
might militarily hinder or politically embarrass their clients. At the
same time, the East Europeans proved zealous in opposing any commission
actions that might ease constraints on noncommunist forces and in urging
the investigation of all possible violations by the noncommunist
signatories.
212ssive and systematic violations also went unmonitored,
uninvestigated, and undocumented by the supervisory bodies because of
the noncooperation and active obstructionism of the local communist
signatories. Among the stratagems and evasions employed to thwart
investigations and monitoring were the Asian communists' refusal to:
? Use the 'CbeckpDints designated in the agreements for
cortro]]ing and monitoring the introduction of arms or
witted: as:al of forces.
Allow supervisory teams access to communist-controlled
checkpoints or military bases. North Korea, for example, never
permitted Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission teams to
monitor the ports of entry designated for all replacement arms
transfers to North Korea.
? Provide the local transport or liaison officers necessary for
supervisory team inspections in communist-controlled arees.
? Guarantee the safety of supervisory teams in communist-held
areas.. International Commission of Control and Supervision
te`s were forced to withdraw from several monitoring sites in
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
South Vietnam in 1973 because their aircraft or team memLers
were fired on !torn, communist-controlled arias.
Numerous other dodges and delaying tactics could be cited, but It
should suffice to say that the Asian'
sian communist signatories were capable
of impeding or blocking any supervisory or control activity that _
required their active or passive cooperation..
THE FAILURE TO DETER VIOLATIONS
Except where the agreements were to the communists' advantage or
unimportant to the achievement of their long-term objectives, they
complied only with those provisions of the agreements that the United
States and its allies appeared wi))ing to enforce and capable of
enforcing on the battlefield. For example, while the North Koreans and
the Chinese communists knew that a resumption of attacks across the
Demilitarized Zone would invite a devastating (and probably nuclear)
U.S. military response, they also realized that the United States and
the other United Nations cobelligerents were unlikely to abrogate the
Korean Armistice or resume hostilities simply to enforce the provisions
constraining arms shipments to North Korea.
Similarly, once the North Vietnamese found that the United States
would not mount a military response to their initial breaches of the
1973 Paris Accords, rrassive communist violations were inevitable. In
short, the United States was unrealistic to assume that it- could obtain
terms from the peace table that it was unable or unwilling to enforce on
the battlefield.
OFFENSIVES AS A PRELUDE TO AGREEMENT
Prior to the conclusion of the Korean Armistice and the various
Indochina agreements, communist forces launched major attacks in an
attempt both to strengthen their bargaining leverage in the negotiations
and to improve their comparative battlefield position for a later
resumption of the struggle. Thus, we-saw communist forces suffer
135,000 casualties in a series of offensives during the weeks
immediately preceding the July 1953 Korean truce; the Vietminh overrun
Dien Bien Phu during the 1954 Geneva conference; the Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese rout the rightist Lao forces at Nam Tha in early 1962
during the final phases of the Geneva conference on Laos; and the North
Vietnamese invade and launch a country-wide offensive against Soutb
Vietnam in spring and summer 1972. The Vietnamese communists also
mounted a series of land grabbing attacks throughout Soutb Vietnam both
before and after the 1973 cease-fire was scheduled to take effect.
In the event that the United States again participates in
negotiating a war termination agreement with communist belligerents in
the Third World, decisionmakers must remember that
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
1 If the agreement is to succeed, the United states 07 its allies
must have (or be.`perccivcd to have) the capabi)ity and Lill to
enforce the agreement on the battlefield.
2 Even in the absence of East European or other communist states
on the supervisory body, the local communist authorities wial
be capable of frustrating any enforcement activities that
require their active or passive cooperation.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2
(A) On June 23, 1979, the United States called for the
'immediate and definitive replacement' of the Sonioza
government, through a resolution of the XVI1 Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
Organization of American States, %,hich reads as follows:
'tiJF1ERFA.S :
"The people of Nicaragua are suffering the horrors
of a fierce armed, conflict that is causing grave
hardships and loss of life, and has thrown the country
into a serious political, social, and economic
upheaval ;
"Ibe inhumane conduct of the "dictatorial regime
governing the country, as evidenced by the report of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, is the
fundamental cause of the dramatic situation faced by
the Nicaraguan people and;
'lbe spirit of hemispheric solidarity that guides
INemisphere relations places an unavoidable obligation
on the American countries to exert every effort within
their power, to put an end to the bloodshed and to
avoid the prolongation of this conflict i nich is
disrupting the peace of the Hemisphere;
of- THE SEIF_NTEEflI 1' TING OF CCI SULTATION OF
.MlN1STERS OF FDREIC AFFAIRS,
"DECLARES :
"That the solution of the serious problem is
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the the people
of Nicaragua.
"That in view of the Seventeenth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs this
solution should be arrived at on the basis of the
f of l owing :
1. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza
regime.
2. Installation in Nicaraguan territory of a democratic
government, the composition of chi ch should inclu3e the
principal representative groups -ich oppose the Somoza
regime and which reflects the free will of the people
of Nicaragua.
3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all
Nicaraguans without exception.
4. The holding of free elections as soon as possible,
that will lead to the establishment of a truly
democratic government that guarantees peace, freedom,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950004-2