SIG(I) ON CI AND SECURITY MATTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00342R000100070003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 17, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Tuesday, 17 December 1985, 1600 hours
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Executive Secretariat 17 December 1985
NOTE FOR: DCI
DDCI
RE: SIG(I) on CI and Security Matters
Attached, at tabs, you will find:
TAB A Revised agenda for today's meeting.
(Copies will be provided to attendees by
IC Staff--due late hour, most likely when
they arrive; however, calls have been made
to those being called upon to alert them of
changes.)
TAB B List of those expected to attend.
TAB C Copy of portion of Intelligence Authorization
Act pertaining to "counterintelligence
capabilities improvements report".
TAB D Copies of exchange of correspondence between
DCI and SecState re State lead in
orchestrating overseas physical and technical
security effort.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
A, Agenca
B, List of Speakers
C, Talking Paper
D, NSDD-196
E, NSDD-145
F, IG/CM Minutes
G, IG/CI Minutes
fi. Task Force Minutes
I, NTISSC Minutes
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i -~-~ r~vupwp~p-
?
-- The IG/CI
-- The IG/CM
-- The NTISSC
SIG(I) f~1eeting on Counterintelligence
Tuesday, 17 December 1D85
Community Headquarters Building (Room bW02)
REVIEW OF COMMUNITY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MATTERS
Agenda
I. Introduction
II. Sumrnary of Recent Congressional Hearings
on CI and Security
III. Presentation of Recent Activities/Future
Plans of:
DCI
(3 minutes)
DOC I
(5 minutes)
Judge Webster
(5 minutes)
Craig Alderman
(5 minutes)
t
IV. Plans for Security of Overseas Facilities
V. DoD Actions Flowing from Stilwell Commission
Report
~CvHPusac
'VI. COMSECr Initiatives
VII. Administration Policy on Leaks
VIII. Status of Implementation of NSDD 19G
(Task Force on Hostile Presence Options)
IX. Discussion
X. Summary
Robert Lamb
(5 minutes)
General Stilwell
(5 minutes)
General Odorn
(5 minutes)
Ken deGraffenreid
{5 minutes)
David Major
(5 minutes)
All
(15 minutes)
DCI
(2 minutes)
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Jf_1,1~L i
PROPOSED AGENDA
SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
The SIG-I will review key develapmer;ts relating to:
a, The recent Congressional hearings on
counterintelligence and security, including a possible
Counterintelligence Ccpabilities Irr;pravement F~eport;
b, The activities of varicus Intelligence Comr~unity
components such as the SIG-I/IG system, pertinent DCI
committees, and tree National Telecommunications arrd
Information Systems Security Ccmmittee, with particular
reference to the status of critical CI and security issues
such as the technical surveillance countermeasure upgrade
program and US Embassy security; and
c, The status of the NSC Implementation Task Force,
Representatives of pertinent Intelligence Community
components will assist the SIG-I review by briefing
appropriately on key developments,
Tlie objective is to assist the SIG-I, which is at trie top
of tf~e national CI/CM policymaking pyramid, in its ongoing
integration and policy formulation across the entire
counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum,
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SPEAKERS FOR SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
Judge Webster
Mr, Latham
General Stilwell
General Odom
Mr, Alderman
Mr, Lamb
Mr, deGraffenreid
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IG/CI
NTISSC
Defense Security
NSA
IG/CM
State Security
Options/Leaks
SECOM
Information Handling
Committee
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
A, Agenda
B, List of Speakers
C, Talking Paper
D, NSDD-196
E, NSDD-145
F, IG/CM Minutes
G, IG/CI Minutes
H, Task Force Minutes
I, NTISSC Minutes
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StCKtI
PROPOSED AGENDA
SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
The SIG-I will review key developments relating to:
a, The recent Congressional hearings on
counterintelligence and security, including a possible
Counterintelligence Capabilities Improvement Report;
b, The activities of various Intelligence Community
components such as the SIG-I/IG system, pertinent DCI
committees, and the National Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security Committee, with particular
reference to the status of critical CI and security issues
such as the technical surveillance countermeasure upgrade
program and US Embassy security; and
c, The status of the NSC Implementation Task Force,
Representatives of pertinent Intelligence Community
components will assist the SIG-I review by briefing
appropriately on key developments,
The obJective is to assist the SIG-I, which is at the top
of the national CI/CM policymaking pyramid, in its ongoing
integration and policy formulation across the entire
counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum,
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SPEAKERS FOR SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985
Judge Webster
Mr, Latham
General Stilwell -
General Odom
Mr, Alderman
Mr, Lamb
Mr, deGraffenreid
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IG/CI
NTISSC
Defense Security
NSA
IG/CM
State Security
Options/Leaks
SECOM
Information Handling
Committee
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courses of action or refers issues to the NSC for implementation
decisions,
In my mind, there is no question that the SIG-I structure
not only has the right but the duty to monitor, review, and
provide integrating policy guidance across the entire
counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum,
So much for the larger picture, What I propose to do now in
furtherance of my objectives for this meeting is to touch
briefly and summarily on some of the key counterintelligence and
countermeasure/security developments which have occurred during
the past year or so, Then I would like representatives of
pertinent Intelligence Community committees to assist by further
briefing us appropriately,
4
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VL.V1 ~1_ 1 yO~36y
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET ATTACHMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 1, 1985
Executive Repl~try
85- 419 5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
DIRECTOR, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
COMMANDER, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
COMMANDER, US AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAI,
INVESTIGATIONS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, DIPLOMATIC
SECURITY SERVICE .
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS
SUBJECT: NSDD on Counterintelligence/Countermeasures
Implementation Task Force
The President has signed the attached National Security Decision
Directive calling for the establishment of a task force to
implement a number of policy decisions designed to limit. the
hostile intelligence presence in the US and place greater
controls on movements. This task force will be chaired by
David G. Major, Director of Intelligence and Counterintelli-
gence Programs, National Security Council Staff.
Each recipient should designate a representative to participate
on the task force and notify Mr. Major by November 8, 1985.
i
___.
Robert C. McFarl~ine
Attachment
NSDD -196
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET ATTACHMENT
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W A S H I N G T O N
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 796
November 1, 1985
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE/COUNTERMEASURE IMPLEMENTATION
TASK FORCE (U)
Intelligence collection by foreign intelligence officers and
agents operating in the United States presents the greatest
counterintelligence (CI) threat confronting the United States.
Under cover of diplomatic establishments, foreign-owned commer-
cial entities and exchange student programs, the Soviet, Soviet
Bloc, Peoples Republic of China and other criteria countries
have emplaced large numbers of professional intelligence
officers and other intelligence collectors (economic, scientific
and technical, and military) in the United States. The numbers
of foreign intelligence officers far surpass the counterintelli-
gence assets the US Government has been able to deploy against
them, and the number has been increasing over the years. This
issue has been studied extensively by the Interagency Group on
Counterintelligence (IG/CI) and a series of recommendations
were forwarded to and endorsed by the Senior Interagency Group
for Intelligence (SIG/I). These recommendations were reviewed
and endorsed by the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) on
August 7, 1985. I have decided it is in the national interest
to implement each of these proposals. (U)
The NSPG also recommended that the US Government adopt, in
principle, the use of aperiodic, non-life style, CI-type
polygraph examinations for all individuals with access to
US Government Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI),
Communications Security Information (COMSEC) and other special
access program classified information. I have decided this
policy should be established. (U)
In order to facilitate the implementation of these decisions, I
am directing the establishment of a~task force to develop the
time table, procedures and method to implement this Decision
Directive. This implementation task force will be chaired by a
representative of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs. The task force will be composed of a repre-
sentative of each NSPG principal: Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence,
and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the task
force will include a representative of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and a representative from
Department of State/Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). (U)
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The following agencies will provide an observer to this imple-
mentation task force since the timing and method of implementa-
tion may have an impact on one or more of them: Diplomatic
Security Service (Department of State), Office of Foreign
Missions (Department of State), Department of the Treasury,
Department of Commerce, US Army Intelligence and Security
Command, Naval Intelligence Command, US Air Force Office of
Special Investigations, National Security Agency, and thE~
Immigration and Naturalization Service. (U)
The Intelligence Community Staff Secretariat will provide'
necessary administrative support. (U)
The purpose of this task force will be to make recommendations
on the method, timing and procedures to implement the SIG(I)
options; establish implementation policy for the national
polygraph program and implement other counterintelligence and
countermeasures improvements which have appropriate national
policy level implications. Final implementation decisio~zs will
be made by the President. (U)
The SIG(I) options to be implemented are:
Option #1: Equality in US and Soviet Bilateral Representation
Eliminate the disparity in US-USSR representation by July 1988.
Accomplish this by undertaking a combination of initiatives to
reduce the official Soviet presence in the US and increase the
official US presence in the USSR. The Department of State will
develop a plan to accomplish this objective. The NSC will
review the schedule established to implement this plan and
achieve equivalence. Advise the USSR that this is our policy
and consider seeking agreement on the manner in which both
aspects will be implemented. In the absence of agreement,
implement the policy unilaterally to replace Soviet support
personnel employed in the US establishments in the USSR and
deny entry visas for replacement support personnel employed in
Soviet establishments in the US until a balance is achieved
between the number of US and Soviet ersonnel with di lomatic
immunity.
(S~
Option #2: Expulsion of Soviet intelligence Personnel
US policy shall be to reduce the Soviet official personnel
quota by the number of individuals expelled for espionage or
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04PY`~.~.~OPIES
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other intelligence-related activity. The Department of State
shall give the Soviets notice that the US reserves the right to
reduce the personnel ceiling of the Soviet Embassy and Consulate
General by the number of persons expelled for espionage or
other intelligence-related activity. Decisions on whether to
expel personnel and/or reduce the personnel ceiling in specific
cases shall be made by the Secretary of State or his designee,
after consultation with the Department of Justice, and taking
into consideration all relevant foreign policy and counter-
intelligence factors. Implementation procedures for this
option shall be developed by the CI/CM implementation task
force. (S)
Option #3: Staffing of Proposed New York and Kiev Consulate
In negotiations with the Soviets concerning reopening of their
consulate in New York City in return for a US Consulate in
Kiev, agreements on manning of the two consulates will be
consistent with the plan developed for Option #1. (S)
Option #4: Demarche to Peoples Republic of China
(b)(4)
Option #5: Increase Funding for INS Computer System
The Department of Justice and the Office of Management and
Budget are to provide increased funding in the FY 1987 budget
for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to expe-
dite installation and operation of an INS computerized system
to record more effectively arrivals, departures, and locations
of foreign nationals visiting the US. (S)
Option #6: UN Secretariat Travel Through the OFM Service
Bureau .
United Nations Secretariat employees in New York City whose
national missions to the United Nations are required to use the
Office of Foreign Missions travel service bureau for both
official and unofficial travel within the United States shall
be also required to use that service bureau for all travel~to~,,
the United States. (S)
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Option #7: Require East European Officials to Arrange Travel
Through the OFM Service Bureau
Require East European hostile country officials to use the OFM
service bureau to book commercial transportation and publi~~
accommodations unless expressly waived in specific instances by
the Secretary of State. (S)
Option #8: Close Areas of the US to East European Travel
Following Espionage Activity
Place the East European allies of the Soviet Union on notice
that areas of the United States now closed to travel for the
Soviets may also be closed to them if any of their personnel
are detected in espionage or intelligence-related activity in
those areas. The decision to close an area shall be made by
the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central
Intelligence. In the event the Secretary and Attorney General
cannot agree, the NSC shall act as final arbiter. The closing
of an area should be made on a selective basis, i.e., six
months/one year, and should apply to the offending country
officials only. (S)
Option #9: Close East European Commercial Offices Following
Espionage Activity
Place the East European allies of the Soviet Union on notice
that if a representative of their official commercial offices
is detected in espionage or intelligence-related activity, that
particular office may be closed. The decision to close the
office shall be made by the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Attorney General. In the event the Secretary and
Attorney General cannot agree, the NSC shall act as final
arbiter. The Department of State shall test and/or expand
legal authorities as necessary. (S)
Option #10: Controls on Foreign Corporations
Subject hostile country-owned/controlled corporations to t:he
same controls and restrictions that the Office of Foreign
Missions applies to the missions of foreign governments, t:o the
extent authorized by the Foreign Missions Act. The Department
of Justice and the FBI will study the activities of corpora-
tions individually and develop an implementation plan with
immediate attention to be given those corporations preseni:ing
the greatest counterintelligence threat. The Department of
Justice shall complete its study plan by December 31, 198!i.
(S)
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Option #11: Diplomatic Property Rights and Consolidated
Offices
All legal means, including OFM authorities, other Federal,
state, and local laws, as well as legislative initiatives,
shall be employed to achieve the objective of controlling
future hostile foreign government lease or ownership of real
property within the US. The OFM shall work toward physical
consolidation of the offices of Soviet as well as Soviet Bloc
countries whenever feasible and legal. (S)
Option #12: Increase Denials of Soviet Military Attache Travel
Refuse travel requests by Soviet military attaches if their
trips exceed those made by U.S. military attaches in the :>oviet
Union to enforce strict reciprocity. (S)
The task force should submit an initial report on the implemen-
tation of this NSDD no later than February 1, 1986. (U)
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT
September 17, 1984
Executive Rer;~try
~- 9216/1
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
TAE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
T8E CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
TAE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
SUBJECT: National Policy on Telecommunications and
Automated Information Systems Security (U)
The President has approved and signed the attached National
Security Decision Directive which establishes initial national
objectives, policies aad an improved organizational structure
for protecting US telecommunications and automated information
systems from exploitation by hostile intelligence activities.
(U) _ maent
systems as well as those which process the private or
proprietary information of IIS persons and businesses can become
targets for foreign exploitation. (II)
Within the government these systems process and communicate
classified national security information and other sensitive
information concerning the vital interests of the United
States. Such i,aformatioa, even if unclassified in isolation,
often can reveal highly clatasi?ied and other sensitive
information when~~aken in aggregate. The compromise of this
information, especially to hostile intelligence services, does
serious damage to the United States and its national security
interests_ A comprehensive and coordinated approach must be
taken to protect the government's telecommunications and
automated information systems against current and projected
threats. This approach must include mechanisms for formulating
policy, for overseeing systems security resources programs, and
for coordinating and executing technical activities. (U)
This Directive: Provides initial objectives, policies, and an
organizational structure to guide the conduct of national
activities directed toward safeguarding systems which process
or communicate sensitive information from hostile exploitation;
establishes a mechanism for policy development; and assigns
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responsibilities for implemeatatfoa. It is intended to assure
. iFuII participatfoa and cooperation among the various existing
centers of technical expertise throughout the Executive Branch,
to pro?ote a whereat and coordinated defense against the
hostile tntelligeace threat to these systems, and to foster an
appropriate partaershfp between government and the private
sector fo attaining these goals. This Directive specifically
recognizes the special requirements for protection of
intelligence sources and methods. It is intended that the
mechanisms established by this Directive will initially focus
on those automated information systems which are connected to
telecommunications transmission systems. (Q)~
I. Ob ectives. Security is a vitat element of the
operationa a ectiveness of the nat3bnal security activities
of the government and of military combat readiness. Assuring
the security of telecommunications and automated information
systems which process and ca?nuaicate classified national
security information, and other sensitive government national
security information, and vfferiag assistance in the protection
of certain private sector information are key national
responsibilities. t, therefore, direct that the government's
capabilities for securing teleco?m~uaicatioas and aatomated
information systems against technical exploitation threats be
maintained or improved to provide for:
.t
a_ A reliable and continuing capability to assess
threats and. vulnerabilities, and to implement appropriate,
effective countermeasures.
b. ~ A superior technical base within the gove**~~+p~t
to achieve this security, and support for a superior technical
base within the private sector in areas which co?plement and.
enhance government capabilities.
_ .. ~. _ __
c_ A. more effective application of goverment
resources and encouragement of private sector security initia-
tives_
d. S'up~ort and-E~ahancemeat of other policy objec-
tives for national 'telec~~~~cations anti. automated information
syatems.1 (II1
2. Policies.- Ia support of these objectives, the
following po icier are established:
a. Systems which generate, store, process, transfer
or communicate classified information in electrical form shall
be secured by such means as are necessary to prevent compromise
or exploitation.
b. Systems handling other sensitive, but unclassi-
fied, government or government-derived information, the loss of
which could adversely affect the national security interest.,
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sDaII be protected in proportion to the threat .of esploitat3oa
aaa the associated potential damage to the national security.
...
c. The government shall encourage, advise, sad, -
whara appropriate, assist the private sector to: identify
systems which handle sensitive son-government information, the
loss of which could adversely affect the national security;
determine the threat to, and vulnerability of, these systems;
sad formulate strategies and measures for providing protection
in proportion to the threat of exploitation and the associated
potential damage. Information and advice frc~ the perspective
of the private sector will be sought with respect to
implementation of this policy. In cases where implementation
of security measures to aoa-governmental systems Would be fa
the national security interest, the private sector shall be
encouraged, advised, and, where appropriate, assisted is under-
taking the application of such measures.
d. Efforts and programs begun under PD-24 which
support these policies shall be continued. (Q)
3. Im~lemeatatioa. This Directive establishes a senior
level steering group: as interagency group at the operating
level; as executive agent and a national manager tQ implement
-;~;, .
these objectives and policies.; (O) _? ~ _ ? ~`';
'
'
~,
Securit Steerin Gr ~ .: '~
4. Systems y 4 ~P _ ~_
Q. A' V j v r ~.~~~~~ i r _"
of-the Secretary o? State, tha Secretary of the Treasury,-the "
--"--
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the IIi=ector of
the Office of Management and Bndget,.the Director of Central
ZYttelLigence, and chafred by the Assistant to the President for
pational Security Affairs .is established. The Steering Group
shall : _ ~ ~ .
(lj:. overaee:this Directive sad ensuie its
implementation. It shall. provide guidance to the Ezecutive
Agent and through him to the National Manager with respect to
the activities underta~kea tb"implement this Directive.
...
,~ ?- ~ - (Z?~. Monitor the activities of the operating
level National Teleccma~mfcatioas sad Information Systems
Security Committee and provide guidance for its activities is
accordance witty tha objectives snot policies contained is thus
Directive. -- .
(3) Review and evaluate the security status of
those telecommunications and automated information systems that
handle classified or sensitive government or government-derived
information with respect to established objectives and
priorities, and report findings and recommendations through the
National Security Council to the President.
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(4) Review consolidated resources program and
budget proposals for teleco?munications systems security,
including the COMSEC Resources Program, for the US Government
and provide recommendations to OMH for the normal budget review
process.
(5) Review in aggregate the program and budget
proposals for the security of automated information systems of
the departments and agencies of the government.
(6) Review and approve matters referred to it
by the Executive Agent in fulfilling the responsibilities
outlined in paragraph 6. below,
(7) On matters pertaining to the protection of
intelligence sources and methods be guided by the policies of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
(8) Interact with the Steering Group on
National Security Telecommunications to ensure that the
objectives and policies of this Directive and NSDD-97, National
Security Telecommunications Policy, are addressed in a
coordinated manner.
(9) Recommend for Presidential approval addi-
tions or revisions to this Directive as national interests may
require.
(10) Identify categories of sensitive
non-government information, the loss of which could adversely
affect the national security interest, and recommend steps to
protect such information. (II)
b. The National Manager for Telecommunications and
Information Systems Security shall function as executive
secretary to the Steering Group. (II)
5. The National Telecommunications and Information
Systems Security. Co?mittee._ , _
.~,
a. The National Telecommunications and Informat.ion
Systems Security Conmtittee (NTISSC) is established to operate
under the direction of the Steering Group to consider technical
matters and develop operating policies as necessary to imple-
ment the provisions of this Directive. The Committee shall. be
chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence) and shall be composed of a
voting representative of each member of the Steering Group and
of each of the following:
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
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Chafnaaa, soiat Chiefs of Staff ?
Administrator, General Services Ac~inistration
Director, Federal 8urean of Investigation
Director, Federal F~ergency Management Agency
The Chief of Staff, waited States Array
The Chief of DTaval Operations '
The Chief of Staff, Onited States Air Force
Commandant, Qnited States Marine Corps
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Manager, National Communications System (II)
b. The Committee shall:
(1) Develop such specific operating policies,
objectives, and priorities as may be required to implement this
Directive.
(2) Provide telec~~*+~catioa and automated
information systems security guidance to the departments and
agencies of the-government.
X32 ?Submit annually to the Steering Group as
evaluation of the status of national telecommunications and
automated information systems security with respect to esta6--
lished objectives and priorities.
? ~ (4) Identify systems which handle sensitive, -
non-government infozmatioa,.the.loss and ezploitatioa of which
could adversely, affect the national security interest, for the
purpose of encouraging, advising sad, where appropriate,
assisting the private sector is applying security measures.
~Sl Approve the release of sensitive systems
technical security materials information, and techniques to
foreign governments or internatioaaF organizations with the
concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence for those
activities which he manages.
.,. ..
..- - -
(6~"'~ Hatablish and maintain a national system
for pzomulgatiag the operating. policies,~directives, and
gufdance?'which mug be i.asned pursuant to this Directive.
~'T2, Establish permanent and temporary subcom-
mittees as necessary to discharge its responsibilities.
{8) Make recommendations to the Steering Groug
on Committee membership and establish criteria and procedures
for permanent observers from other departments or agencies
affected by specific matters under deliberation, who may attend
meetings upon invitation of the Chairman.
(9) Interact with the National Communications
System Committee of Principals established by Executive Order
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-~ ~
;Z4?Z to ensure the coordinated execution of assigned responsi-
bilities. (O}
c_ Tbs Cama,ittee shall. have two subcommittees, one
focusing oa telecon?-uaications security and one focusing on
automated information systems security. The two subcommittees
shall interact closely and nay recom?endations concerning
implementation of protective measures shall combine and coordi-
nate both areas where appropriate, while considering any
differences is the level of maturity of the technologies to
support such implementation. However, the level of maturity of
one technology shall not impede implementation in other areas
which are deemed feasible and important- (II)
d. T2Le Committee shall have a permanent secretariat
composed of personnel of the National Security Agency and such
other personnel from departments and agencies represented as
the Committee as are requested by the ~aSrman. The National
Security Agency shall provide facilities and support as
required. Other departments and agencies shall provide
facilities and support as requested by the Chairmaa.(II)
6. The- E~cecutive S eat of the Government for
Teleco~~**~cations and In orma oa Systems Secvr ty. .The _.
~ s s.~.a..~- nr rn~+ Government:
Secretary o De ease is tue ~~~~~~~ A~~--~
for communications Security-under authority of Executive
Order 12333_ Hy authority of this Directive he shall serve as
expanded role as Executive Agent-af the Government for
Telecaa;t?r,~nicptions and Automated Information Systems Security
and shall be responsible for.-implemeatiaq~ under his signature,
the policies developed by the NTISSC. Ia this capacity he
shall, act is accordance with~g ~ t~ NTISSC ton ,
established by the Steeling
a. Eaaure.ths'development, is conjunction with.
NTISSC member departmeata and agencies, of plans and programs
tv fulfill the objectives og this Directive, including the
development of necessary security architectures.
. ,.,
b. Pioaure for and provide to departments and
agencies of the governeat and. ,where appropriate, to private
instftut}oaa Excluding govermaeat contractors} and foreign
governments, technical secnritg material, other technical
assistance, and other related.se=vices of common concern, as
required to accomplish the objectives of this Directive.
c_ Approve and Provide minimum security standards
and doctrine, consistent with provisions of the Directive.
d. Conduct, approve, or endorse research and
development of techniques and equipment for telecommunications
and automated information systems security for national
security infoanation.
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f. Review and assess for the Steering Group the
proposed telecommunications systems security programs a~td
budgets for the departments and agencies of the government for
each fiscal year and recommend alternatives, where appropriate.
The views of all affected departments and agencies shall be
fully expressed to the Steering Group.
q. Review for the Steering Group the aggregated
automated information systems security program and budget
recommendations of the departments anii agencies of the QS
Government for each fiscal year. tII)~
?. The National Mara er for Telecommunications Securit
and Automate In ormation stems Security. T e Director,
Nations Security Agency is designated the National Manager for
Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security
and is responsible to the Secretary, of Defense as E~cecutive
Agent for ca=ryiag out the foregoing responsibilities. Ia
fulfilling these responsibilities the NationaS. Manager shall
have authority is the name of the Executive Agent to.
meat technical centers related to telecommunications and
automateed information systems security.
A~,f t;tom t~ hostile intercectfoa~ and esploitati.oa. AaY such
anct aatOmatea In=G,tmauQII systems auci Cves.iuaz.c .u~ii v~a.ua~- .="'~.ss_=::y~,~
a _ Examine cov+ernineat ~ t~eleco?miunicationa systems ~ _'~ ~ ~-~-
Directives. No monitoring shall be performed without advising
the. breads of the agencies~.d~epartments, or services concerned.
b..: ...Acts as?the gov~e=ameat focal point for cryptag-
raphg, telecommn,aicatiQas'systems security, and automated
information systems secwcitg. ~ '
c. - Conduct,. approve, or endorse research and
development of techniques aac~ equipment for telecommunications
and automated information systems security for. national
secarity?infosmatioa. _.
dom. Review and approve all standards, techniques,
systems and equipments for telecommunications and automated _
information systems security.
e. Conduct foreign communications security liaison,
including agreements with foreign governments and with
international and private organizations for telecommunications
and automated informaatioa systems security, except for those
foreign intelligence relationships conducted for intelligence
purposes by the Director of Central Intelligence. Agreements
shall be coordinated with affected departments and agencies.
telecommunications, shall be conducted in strict compliance. ; . ; ;;Y _
with law, Executive Orders surd applicable PresidentfaL ~ -~.; -'
activities, incluaznq uzose_ =,avoiving mou~rvr~ v= vrricia~ v ~. ~~~:
f =' -
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e. Operate, ox coordinate the efforts of, .govern-
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f. Operate such printing and fabrfc8tioa facilities
as may be required to perform critical functions related to the
provfsioa of cryptographic and other technical security
material or services.
g. Assess the overall security posture and .
disseminate information oa hostile threats to tele-
communications and automated information systems security.
h. Operate a central technical center to evaluate
and certify the security of telecommunications systems and
automated information systems.
i. Prescribe the mir;m?~ tandards, methods and
procedures for protecting cryptographic and other sensitive
technical security material, techniques, and information.
i. Revievr and. assess annually the
telecommunications systems security programs and budgets of-the
departments and agencies of the government, and recommend
alternatives, where appropriate, for the FScecative Agent and
the Steering Groug.
k. Reviear annually the a9.gregated automated
i.aformation systems. sectsrtty pmgram