SYRIA'S ELITE MILITARY UNITS: KEYS TO STABILITY AND SUCCESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP06T00412R000606620001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of `? ~ c^^"^`
Intelligence
Syria's Elite Military Units:
Keys to Stability
and Succession
An Intelligence Assessment
NESA 87-10012
February /987
ropy 2 7 2
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Intelligence
and Succession
Syria's Elite Military Units:
Keys to Stability
Israeli Division, NESA
This paper was prepared by (Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with a
contribution fro Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief Arab-
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 87-10012
February 1987
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Syria's Elite Military Units:
Keys to Stability
and Succession
Key Judgments From the earliest days of President Assad's rule, Syrian elite military
Ir{/ormation available units-especially the praetorian guard responsible for protecting the
as of 2 February 1987 president-have played a crucial role in maintaining Assad's authority
was used in this report.
over the government and the stability of his regime. Assad traditionally has
appointed close relatives to command these forces in an effort to assure
their loyalty. The mission of his elite units is twofold: to act as a last de-
fense around the capital against threats originating outside Syria, such as
an Israeli ground assault, and to defend the regime from dissident groups
within the military and populace. 25X1
The stability of the Assad regime will increasingly depend on the support
of these elite military units-now comprising nearly three divisions-which
are undergoing major reorganization in the wake of Assad's health crisis in
early 1984 and recent shifts in his inner circle. The 1984 crisis precipitated
a power struggle among the elite units, posing a direct domestic challenge
to Assad. Assad's restructuring of these units almost certainly strength-
ened their loyalty to him and their ability to quash attempts by rival power
blocs to challenge his authority. 25X1
In the last few months, high-level personnel changes in the government-
most notably the demotion of longtime Air Force Intelligence Chief
Muhammad al-Khuli-have greatly increased the power and influence of
Brig. Gen. Adnan Makhluf, commander of the elite Republican Guard
force, and Director of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Ali al-Duba-
Khuli's rivals for the privilege of protecting the President and advising him
on intelligence issues. Khuli's loss of power ensures that Duba and
Makhluf will have virtually unrivaled access to Assad and, in close
coordination with him, tight control over military and intelligence activi-
ties. 25X1
During the 1984 crisis, the aggressive, regime-threatening behavior of
Assad's controversial brother, Rif at-who commanded Syria's largest
elite force, the Defense Companies-persuaded the President that he could
not ignore Rif at's continual abuse of power and the risk that other elite
unit commanders also might challenge his authority. Despite his recent
frail health, the President quickly reasserted his control over the rival elite
forces, transformed the oversized Defense Companies into a regular tank
division, and sent Rif at and rival elite commanders into temporary exile.
Secret
NESA 87-10012
February 1987
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A renewed and possibly more violent power struggle involving the elite
units and regular military forces is almost certain if Rif`at, who is still in
exile in Europe, returns and tries to assume significant authority. Many of
the President's most powerful supporters, including the elite unit com-
manders,. most-if not all-of the regular Army division commanders, and
Director of Military Intelligence Ali al-Dubs, bitterly oppose Rif`at's
return to Syria and his assumption of an influential position. Rif`at is a per-
sistent wild card in Assad's usually careful calculations. The extent of
Ri`fat's support in the Syrian military and his intentions regarding his own
political future are unknown
Aside from guarding his tenure in office, Assad almost certainly depends
on his elite military forces to protect the relatively new privileged status of
Syria's Alawi minority. Since he assumed control in 1970, Assad has
enhanced the status of his fellow Alawis, who had endured centuries of
persecution and poverty. Assad probably calculates that Alawi preemi-
nence in Syria is virtually guaranteed as long as he or an Alawi successor
commands the loyalty and protection of the predominantly Alawi elite
military units and the intelligence services
The elite military units will probably play the major role in installing a suc-
cessor government controlled by senior Alawi officers. Assad's efforts to
strengthen the elite military units through reorganization suggest that he
expects them to prevail in any maneuvering to install his successor and to
prevent elite infighting that would threaten Alawi preeminence in a future
government. These judgments are necessarily speculative because informa-
tion about Assad's preferences regarding the succession are a crucial
intelligence gap. The combined strength of the elite units, however, almost
certainly could thwart any attempt by Rif`at to take control of the
government.
The regime that succeeds Assad most likely will be a collegial grouping of
senior Alawi military commanders and intelligence chiefs, but it will not be
able to count on the same dedication that the elite military units show
Assad. Without Assad's skillful hand and broad support, the successor
regime probably will crumble under the pressures of competition among
Alawis for power. After Assad, therefore, Syria probably will have to
endure at least one weak and troubled regime before another strongman
emerges from the fray of Alawi rivalries.
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Key Judgments
New Guards Facing Old Threats
Assad's Motives for Reorganizing the Elite Military Units 2
Alawi Military Support: Assad's Critical Prop 3
The Defense Companies' Rise and Fall 5
The Republican Guards' New Look 9
The Intelligence Magnates 13
The New Army Corps: Improving Regime Protection 15
Capabilities 15
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Syria's Elite Military Units:
Keys to Stability
and Succession
Syria's elite military units, including the Special
Forces, the Republican Guards, and, until the spring
of 1984, the Defense Companies, deserve much of the
credit for the longevity of President Hafiz al-Assad's
regime.' They have prevented serious coup plotting
and ruthlessly quashed internal dissent. Without the
protection of these units, the Assad government prob-
ably would have long since fallen prey to the internal
maneuvering that brought down so many Syrian
governments before Assad came to power in 1970.
In recent years, rivalry among the elite forces has
endangered Assad's grip on power and compelled the
President to make sweeping changes in their organiza-
tion and leadership. Within this still evolving struc-
ture, Assad has reinforced the loyalty of his key
protectors and made them answerable solely to the
presidential palace. In making these changes, Assad
probably did not limit himself to the immediate need
of reinforcing his regime's stability but anticipated
the political turmoil that is likely to accompany the
presidential succession. He undoubtedly calculates
that the reorganized elite units will play a decisive
role-upon his sudden incapacitation or death-in
determining the composition of a new government and
whether the transition will be violent.
Assad ordered major changes within Syria's elite
military units to reinforce his hold on power in the
wake of a health crisis in early 1984. At that time
Assad repudiated rumors that he was near death by
swiftly taking control of the elite units-including his
brother Rif at's Defense Companies-which were on
the verge of battling each other for control of the
government. To prevent a recurrence, the President
directed fundamental changes in the distribution of
power among these units. Among his most dramatic
moves were the reduction of the powerful Defense 25X1
Companies to the size of a regular armored division,
the exiling of his controversial brother from the 25X1
country, and the reassignment of the crucial job of
protecting his regime to the much smaller Republican
Guards. He also moved quickly to balance the power
blocs behind other Alawite leaders
forces against each other since he staged the coup in
1970 that consolidated his control of the country and
brought the traditionally impoverished Alawite mi-
nority to the forefront of Syrian politics. In recent
years, in particular, Assad has shown this skill in
dealing with challenges to his regime. The power
struggle in early 1984 between rival blocs of his
supporters, for instance, seriously threatened his con-
trol of the government and spurred Assad to reorga-
nize the elite units. 25X1
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We believe another crucial factor behind Assad's
long-lived regime has been his shrewd manipulation of
the various power blocs within the Syrian officer
corps-particularly the elite units charged with pro-
tecting him. He has deftly played potentially rival
' In this assessment, the term elite is used to describe those units
with long-established or growing commando (paratrooper, urban
warfare, hand-to-hand combat) capabilities. These units are
charged with defending the Assad regime and the Damascus area
from external threats, such as an Israeli ground assault, and
internal threats posed by armed dissident groups. The 3rd Armored
Division also is considered an elite unit because it has played this
dual role in recent years. Syria's traditional praetorian guard
forces, the Republican Guards and the recently dismantled Defense
Companies, are included because of their responsibility for the
New Guards Facing Old Threats
In our view, Assad's restructuring of his praetorian
guard almost certainly strengthened its ties to him
and its ability to deter other groups from challenging
his authority. Even these elite forces-though assisted
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by an extensive and heavyhanded intelligence sys-
tem-may not be sufficient to meet the persistent
domestic challenges to the Assad regime.
Assad's health will continue to be the elite units'
primary concern. As the 1984 crisis showed, any
suggestion that his health has deteriorated-such as
extreme pallor, a poorly delivered speech, or a long
absence from public view-is likely to spark renewed
jockeying for power within military and intelligence
circles. The elite units also must be wary of each
other's aspirations for greater power, while keeping an
eye on known opposition groups within the general
population.
Antiregime groups continue to agitate against the
Assad government, posing the threat of assassination,
which is difficult for the elite units to target. The
wave of bombings in early and mid-1986 indicated
that at least some of the Sunni fundamentalist dissi-
dents have recovered from the brutal "Hamah solu-
Pervasive corruption within the government is partly
responsible for Syria's grave economic problems
and-of particular concern to Assad's elite units-
growing public discontent.
Syrians are beginning to express their
frustration openly regarding corruption among senior
government officials, shortages of basic commodities,
and austerity measures, such as the daily power
outages throughout Damascus. Such a discontented
public, although far from an organized opposition to
'Assad sent elements of several of his key elite forces-Rif`at's
Defense Companies, the 3rd Division, and the Special Forces-to
Hamah in February 1982 to rout out Sunnis who were members of
the dissident Muslim Brotherhood. Thousands of civilians were
the regime, might be increasingly receptive to recruit-
ment by dissident organizations-a pervasive trend
that Syrian military and intelligence units could not
easily check. If acts of antiregime violence become
more frequent, the President will rely heavily on the
ability of the Republican Guards and the Special
Forces to protect him.
Assad's Motives for Reorganizing
the Elite Military Units
The power struggle in 1984, although staged by fellow
Alawis, represented the most direct internal challenge
to the regime since Assad assumed the presidency,
and it compelled him to address issues causing discon-
tent among the senior officer corps. Although the
crisis stemmed primarily from a misreading by Rif`at
of the state of Assad's health, it also indicated a
dangerous rift among the President's supporters and
anxiety among Alawi leaders about their privileged
status in the event of Assad's death.
The crisis was sufficient warning to Assad that
Rif at's Defense Companies-manned by troops ap-
parently more loyal to Rif`at than to the regime-had
to be disbanded. Assad evidently calculated that, by
banishing Rif at temporarily from the country and
dismantling his power base, he could calm his broth-
er's enemies in the senior Alawi officer corps. In the
place of Rif`at's large units, Assad resolved to create a
new guard force using his brother-in-law Adnan
Makhluf's small but trustworthy Republican Guards.
We believe Assad also redoubled his efforts to moni-
tor the power balance among other Alawi officers,
apparently mindful that any of them-with sufficient
support~ould pose a similar threat to him or the
regime. By briefly exiling 3rd Division Commander
Shafiq Fayyad and Special Forces Commander Ali
Haydar-key protagonists in the power struggle-
Assad attempted to clear the way for a new elite force
that would protect his regime, not weaken it through
infighting.
The crisis almost certainly reminded Assad that the
unresolved issue of his succession meant that any
visible weakness in his leadership could precipitate
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Table 1
Syrian Elite Military Units: Personnel Strength,
Equipment, and Mission
Personnel Major Equipment
Strength Inventory (approximate)
(approximate)
Republican Guards 10,000 215 T-72 tanks; 140 BMP
IFVs a; 18 BM-21 multiple
rocket launchers; 6 160-mm
mortars; 4 2S1 122-mm self-
propelled howitzers
Special Forces 15,000 93 BMP IFVs; 126 120-mm
(Of the seven regiments, mortars; 126 107-mm multiple
three [41st, 45th, and 54th] rocket launchers; 84 antiair-
are BMP-equipped) craft-machineguns (14.5
mm/ 12.7 mm)
14th Special Forces Division 6,000 93 BMP IFVs; 18 122-mm
howitzers; 54 120-mm mortars
569th Armored Division 15,000 330 T-72 tanks; 210 BMP
IFVs; 75 BTR-60 APCs b; 18
BM-21 multiple rocket launch-
ers
Has primary responsibility for protecting President
Assad and visiting dignitaries. Will constitute inner-
most band of defense in event of an Israeli ground
assault on Damascus or domestic insurrection.
Primary responsibility currently is to maintain Syri-
an control in sectors of central and northern Leba-
non, especially around Beirut and Tripoli. Also has
an important counterinsurgency role in Syria. Mech-
anization of several regiments with BMPs will enable
them to maneuver with regular Army units.
Probably assigned to take up blocking positions in the
central Bekaa Valley in the event of an Israeli ground
assault up the valley toward Damascus. Also proba-
bly charged with defending the Beirut-Damascus
highway approach to the capital.
Probably charged with augmenting Republican
Guards' defensive belt around Damascus in the event
of an Israeli ground assault on the capital.
3rd Armored Division 15,000 342 T-72 tanks =; 210 BMP Charged with acting as the Army's strategic reserve,
IFVs; 75 BTR-60 APCs; 18 to be deployed where needed in event of war. Also
BM-21 multiple rocket might be used to augment defensive ring around
launchers Damascus or to suppress domestic insurrection.
IFV=Infantry fighting vehicle.
s APC=Armored personnel carrier.
One of the division's armored brigades probably is still converting
from T-62 tanks to T-72 tanks.
another-possibly more violent-battle to replace
him. Assad's moves to undercut the Defense Compa-
nies and upgrade the Republican Guards indicate that
he wanted to quell high-level Alawi anxieties about
the most immediate internal threat to his regime:
Rif`at's undisguised ambition to succeed him. Assad's
decision to form a third Army corps responsible for
protecting his regime from internal threats would
represent additional insurance against a repetition of
the events of early 1984. Finally, although Assad may
have a successor in mind-such as his son Basil-his
public reticence on the subject may be part of a design
to maintain equilibrium between potentially competi-
tive Alawi factions.
Alawi Military Support: Assad's Critical Prop
We believe the longevity of the Assad regime attests
to the President's skill and long experience in main-
taining acareful balance among the power blocs
behind his senior military commanders. As a young
officer during the Bath revolution in 1963 and
successive coups, Assad became well acquainted with
the crucial role military support plays in Alawi poli-
tics. The fact that Assad engineered the overthrow of
his predecessor and fellow Alawi Salih Jadid in 1970
conditioned him to pay close attention to the strength
and political loyalties of the military units under the
command of even his most trusted officers. Clearly
recognizing that the source of his strength-Alawi 25X1
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The Spring 1984 Crisis
President Assad s heart attack in November 1983
and his subsequent frail health set of.I'a power
struggle in the spring of 1984 between his ambitious
brother RiJ"at and other powerful Alawi commanders
who have long disliked the President's brother. Rif`at
moved his tank forces to cordon off some of the roads
leading into Damascus and deployed the SA-8 sur-
face-to-air missiles under his control to the top of
Jabal Qasiyun, a hill overlooking Damascus. Rif'at's
intentions remain unclear.
His chief opponents-nota y
Special Forces Commander Ali Haydar, 3rd Division
Commander Shafiq Fayyad, and Republican Guards
Commander Adnan Makhlul=clearly feared that
Rif'at aimed to topple the government and immedi-
ately moved their forces to block him.
Assad s decisive intervention almost certainly was
responsible for preventingjighting between his key
supporters, according to the US Embassy in Damas-
cus. In addition to ordering a reorganization of the
elite forces, Assad attempted to defuse the crisis by
appointing his brother as one of three vice presidents
and sent him and his main adversaries, Haydar and
Fayyad, out of the country into what he probably
viewed as temporary exile. Although Haydar and
Fayyad returned in a short time, Rif'at, except for a
brief visit, has reJ'used to return permanently until the
President puts him in overall charge of Syria's
intelligence services.
Syrian population. (About three-fourths of the Syrian
population is Sunni.) Alawis command most Syrian
Army divisions and all elite units, such as the Special
Forces and the Republican Guards. The Air Force
and Military Intelligence services also are headed by
Alawis who are trusted advisers of the President. Also
among Assad's coterie are several Sunnis-Vice Pres-
ident for Foreign Affairs Khaddam, Defense Minister
Tlas, and Army Chief of Staff Shihabi-long among
his most loyal supporters. Embassy reports
indicate that, like other Sunni offi-
cials in Syrian military and government circles, none
of these highly placed Sunnis has a real power base.
Although these officers are longtime acquaintances or
even close relatives of the President, Assad guards
against any one of them becoming too powerful by
limiting their access to him and encouraging them to
report on each other's misdeeds.
The President also periodically conveys
his displeasure, usually through Chief of Staff Hik-
mat Shihabi, to individual Alawi commanders who,
he believes, have acquired too much visibility or
independence. On several occasions in early 1986, for
instance, Shihabi reprimanded Alawi commanders at
Since early 1986, Assad appears to have delegated
more authority to his Alawi lieutenants than he had
previously, possibly because of periodic lapses in his
military support--could also be his downfall, Assad health. The El Al incident in April, in which a
continues to rely almost exclusively on advisers of terrorist bungled an attempt to smuggle a bomb
demonstrated loyalty who have worked closely with aboard an Israeli passenger jet in London, and the
him since 1970. subsequent trial implicated Chief of Air Force Intelli-
gence Muhammad al-Khuli and fueled widespread
academic studies show that speculation that Assad was losing control of his
Alawis significantly outnumber other sectarian
groups in the Syrian officer corps and in senior
intelligence positions, even though the Alawi commu-
nity as a whole represents less than 12 percent of the
intelligence services.
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In addition to guarding his tenure in office, Assad
seeks to use Alawi domination in the military to
protect the relatively new privileged status oI the
Alawi minority in Syrian society. For centuries, the
Alawis were a persecuted and impoverished religious
sect living in the largely uncultivatable mountain
areas near the Syrian port ojLatakia. Stronger
Islamic and Christian groups traditionally prevented
Alawis Jrom moving into urban areas, allowed them
only the most menial jobs,. and barred them Jrom the
better schools. Assad grew up in the Alawi heartland
during the 1930s and 1940s and experienced the
majority Sunni population's discrimination
firsthand.
During their rule in Syria (1920=46J, the French
encouraged young Alawis-Assad among them-and
other Syrian minority groups to enter military service
as part ojParis's strategy to gain control over the
more rebellious Sunni majority. Academic studies
note that, as Sunnis generally tried to avoid enlist-
ment in the French-directed forces, Alawis used the
military, with its educational and command opportu-
nities, as a means o./'improving their lot. Through
this avenue, and the emergence of the Bath Party-
which emphasized rural social and economic
changes-in the early 1950s, growing numbers of
almost certainly deepened the rifts between various
Syrian military and intelligence leaders-especially
the longstanding rivalry between Khuli and Chief of
Military Intelligence Ali al-Dubs-and probably was
the primary factor, if not the sole cause, of Khuli's
demotion in January 1987.
Assad has begun to
take measures to reshuflie Alawi alliances and pre-
vent any power bloc from becoming too independent.
According to the US Embassy in Damascus
Assad removed
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