LEAKS STATEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88G01116R001402560005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 2, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SUP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X f
3
EXDIR
X 5
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO'
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
X
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
18
C/UDAC
X 18
19
NI0/FDIA
X (2
Cys)9
20
ES
X10
t
D/Exec St
ff
X kk
22
ft
X2
STAT
Egcu v evory
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ER 86-2991
2 July 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director of Public Affairs
Chief, Community CI and Security Countermeasures Staff
General Counsel
Chief, Unauthorized Disclosure Center
NIO for Foreign Denial Intelligence Activities
Assistant NIO for FDIA
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Leaks Statement
1. I need a comprehensive, persuasive and somewhat dramatic statement of
our problem with unauthorized disclosures. I have drafted a lot of paragraphs
and made speeches on the subject. So has George Lauder. But I just have not
been able to find the time or the inspiration to assemble all the facts to
develop the kind of coherent statement needed to make our case. I will give
you here a list of the subjects and points I want to cover.
2. I nominate George Lauder as the principal drafter Bob Gates as the
principal critic, and
s providers of facts and ideas.
writes well and knows the subject thoroughly.
3. I want this statement to be comprehensive--all concerns ideas
arguments, illustrations, etc. I'd like a dramatic star
the missi es and of er weapons a
threaten us. Lots of examples can a use publicly. Don't be too careful
in the first draft; we want to get the reader's attention. We'll decide
what can't be used later.
- Then, what the Soviets and others spend to get this information.
- What we spend to get it--what we've lost.
- Intolerable, unacceptable for American interests and lives to be
threatened and held that cheaply.
- Some investigative reporters--how they work--elicit, put together
details, send out around the world, doing the work of the KGB on
the cheap.
- Describe investigative team of WASHINGTON POST--how they work
damage they've done,
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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- Les Gelb and TIMES team--competition, at our expense, how we handle,
don't sponsor, don't encourage, answer questions, help avoid damage,
mitigate.
- All this developed in my Newspaper Editors and American Jewish
Committee speeches--can develop more fully for this purpose.
- Three levels of protection:
-- Tighten up government.
-- Cooperation of government and media.
-- Adhere to law--identities, photography, COMINT, Justice White's
concurring opinion in Pentagon Papers - his recognition of
responsibility of publishers, assertion that they are on notice.
4. Then lay out what needs to be done to make leaking no longer risk free.
- Kinds of leakers - their reasons - how to limit.
- Authorized spokesman only.
- Investigate.
- Cooperation with media - my copy speeches - Kay Graham
- Law - identities
-- Challenge Bradlee piece - he determines - no way - someone
will leak.
-- Rationale for classification.
-- Penalty for violating trust - history of legislation
(photo, espionage, COMINT, identities) - Congressional
legislative proposals - grand jury.
-- Legislation to put reporters in position of recipient of
stolen goods.
Protection of security, not protection of waste, inefficiency, etc., etc.
No charges of misfeasance.
Press encourages leakers - why not go after misfeasance - trusted
government employees - more damaging than grafters - $600 toilet seats.
George Lauder has good copy on this in letter to Gannett national daily,
USA TODAY.
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- Legislative options.
- Grand jury and other investigative aids - our polygraph record.
- Write using deals colorfully.
5. I have attached some draft material I did together with material
Bob Gates and Bill Odom prepared for our interview with the Associated
Press.
William J. Casey
Attachments
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//2" .1 '3 Z' - P
VA4_~ * e~
DRAFT ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
/~w
IN ADDRESSING THE DAMAGE WHICH COMES TO OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMA ON
THE PLACE TO START IS IDENTIFYING THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON
THIS PROBLEM. THE AREAS OF AGREEMENT ARE MUCH BROADER THAN
THE SOMETIMES HEATED DIALOGUE ON THIS PROBLEM WOULD SUGGEST.
THERE IS LITTLE DISAGREEMENT THAT IT IS A DANGEROUS AND
COMPLEX WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE. WE ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THE
MISSILES, THE-RAMPAGING TERRORISTS, AND THE VAST ARRAY OF
DISRUPTIVE POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA PRESSURES TARGETED AT OUR
INTERESTS AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS, INCLUDING OUR FUNDAMENTAL
AND COMMON SECURITY.
THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT THAT OUR FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
AGAINST THESE THREATS IS SOLID INTELLIGENCE TO ASSESS THESE
THREATS, MEASURE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND DEVELOP COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST THEM, WARN AND TAKE EFFECTIVE STEPS TO DEFEND AGAINST
THEI1, DEVELOP UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS TO LIMIT OR OTHERWISE
MITIGATE THEM, AND MONITOR SUCH AGREEMENTS AS CAN BE NEGOTIATED.
THERE ARE FEW, IF ANY, WHO DO NUT RECOGNIZE AND APPLAUD
THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROVIDING THE PUBLIC
THE INFORMATION IT NEEDS FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT AND ON THE NEED
TO ENCOURAGE THE DILIGENCE AND INGENUITY OF THE WORKING PRESS
IN GATHERING NEWS AND EXPOSING WASTE, INEFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION,
AND OTHER MISCONDUCT.
DC I
23 JUNE 86,1630
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THERE IS A GROWING RECUGNITIUN THAT WHAT WE ARE TALKING
ABOUT IN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS-
NOT MALFEASANCE, WRONGDOING, WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE OR MISMANAGEMENT.
WE ARE TALKING ABOUT UNIQUE FRAGILE SOURCES OF INFORMATION
THAT ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT ITSELF IN A VERY
UNFRIENDLY WORLD. THERE HAVE BEEN NO ALLEGATIONS THAT THESE
COLLECTION ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN MISMANAGED OR THAT ANY WRONGDOING
HAS BEEN INVOLVED. A GREAT MANY JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS IN THE
MEDIA RECOGNIZE THAT THE NATION HAS A PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE
DEALT WITH RESPONSIBLY. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DIFFERENTIATE
BETWEEN THE VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE DUNE TO THE NATION'S SECURITY
THROUGH THE PUBLICATION OF LEAKED SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND
THE NEED FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO POSSESS AS MUCH INFORMATION
AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF
THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS.
FEW QUESTION THAT WE NEED THE HELP AND ASSISTANCE OF
SUPPORTIVE INDIVIDUALS AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE
MUST ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES TO UNDERSTAND AND COUNTER THESE
THREATS. THIS, IN TURN, REQUIRES DENYING OUR ADVERSARIES
INFORMATION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO FRUSTRATE THESE
CAPABILITIES. IT ALSO REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO ASSURE OUR
FRIENDS OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND OUR OWN RELIABILITY IN THE WURK
WE DO TOGETHER TO COUNTER THESE THREATS.
1)
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THE NEED FOR SECRECY HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED SINCE THE BEGINNING
OF OUR REPUBLIC. ?THE NECESSITY OF PROCURING GOOD INTELLIGENCE
IS APPARENT AND NEED NUT BE FURTHER URGED,` GENERAL GEORGE
WASHINGTON WROTE TO ONE OF HIS COLONELS IN 1777, "ALL THAT
REMAINS FOR ME TO ADD IS, THAT YOU KEEP THE WHOLE MATTER AS
SECRET AS POSSIBLE. FOR UPON SECRECY, SUCCESS DEPENDS IN MUST
ENTERPRISES OF THE KIND, AND FOR WANT OF IT, THEY ARE GENERALLY
DEFEATED, HOWEVER WELL PLANNED, AND PROMISING...."
TODAY, OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT
OVER MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP
METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES
AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS
AND VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP
EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS
AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS,
AND TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS IN-PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY.
GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY,
INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY
OF AND LIBERTY OF OUR CITIZENS. SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
AS TO HOW AND THROUGH WHOM WE COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL
TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.
THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE NEED FOR SECRECY TO
MAKE IT POSSIBLE AND PROTECT IT REQUIRES THAT WE CLASSIFY
AND RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT HOW AND
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WHERE WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS
BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL OR COMPROMISE
OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN AN EFFORT TO
ACQUIRE THIS INFORI'IATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION
OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR ADVERSARIES ON
A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES, THEIR RESEARCHERS,
AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY TO UNCOVER
AND USE AGAINST US.
THE GOVERNMENT CARRIES THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PROTECTING INFORMATION WHICH HAS TO BE CLASSIFIED. TOO MANY
DOCUMENTS ARE CLASSIFIED AND TOO MANY ARE OVERCLASSIFIED.
THIS CALLS FOR MORE STRINGENT CONTROLS AND CLASSIFICATION
PRACTICES. WE SURELY NEED GREATER DISCIPLINE IN THE HANDLING
AND PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION. FAILURE AND LAXITY
IN RESTRICTING THE AVAILABILITY OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS
DESTRUCTIVE TO THE MORALE OF THOSE KEEPING SECRETS AS WELL AS
DAMAGING SECURITY. EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE MUST
BE STRONG AND CONTINUING.
WE HAVE, UNFORTUNATELY, PERMITTED LEAKING TO BECOME A
WAY OF LIFE IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL BRANCHES
OF OUR GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE MANY REASONS AND RATIONALES FOR
THIS HEMORRHAGE. THEY INCLUDE:
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- INADVERTENCE AND NEGLIGENCE (E.G., NOT OBSERVING
THE NEED TO KNOW PRINCIPLE, POOR SECURITY PRACTICE, "TALKING
TOO MUCH," IGNORANCE OF JOURNALISTS ELICITATION TECHNIQUES,
INFORMING COLLEAGUES OR OTHERS WHO IN TURN LEAK THE INFORMATION).
- MANY IN GOVERNMENT USE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AS A
TOOL TO INFLUENCE POLICY BY LEAKING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO
ADVANCE OR OPPOSE A PARTICULAR POLICY.
- THERE ARE THOSE WHO LEAK FOR "EGO GRATIFICATION"
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE WELL INFORMED, ETC.
- THERE ARE ATTEMPTS "TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT"
ON AN ERRONEOUS, INCOMPLETE, OR DAMAGING UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE. THESE OFTEN OCCUR WHEN INDIVIDUALS BELIEVE THAT
THE "DAMAGE HAS ALREADY OCCURRED" AND, THEREFORE, BELIEVE WHAT
THEY ADD WILL DO NO HARM OR WHEN INDIVIDUALS ATTEMPT TO "LIMIT
THE DAMAGE" CAUSED BY THE ORIGINAL LEAK, BUT WIND UP ADDING TO IT.
- THERE ARE "BACKGROUND LEAKS" BY OFFICIALS WHO
INCORRECTLY BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THEIR POSITION
TO DECLASSIFY INFORMATION AND PROVIDE IT ON "BACKGROUND" TO
THE MEDIA. OTHERS REALLY AUTHORIZED TO DO BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS
DON'T KNOW OR FAIL TO DISTINGUISH WHETHER THEY ARE USING
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR NUT.
JOURNALISTS ARE SKILLED AT PULLING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
OUT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES. THEY EMPLOY A VARIETY OF PLOYS
INCLUDING:
5
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- FALSE ACCUSATION -- IN THIS CASE, THE 'TARGET' IS
FALSELY ACCUSED OR CHARACTERIZED AND DEFENDS HIMSELF WITH
THE TRUTH AND THEREBY PROVIDES THE JOURNALIST WITH THE
INFORMATION HE SEEKS. A VARIATION IS TO FLOAT AN INTENTIONALLY
FALSE STORM AND TO GET TARGETS TO CORRECT IT.
- FALSE CONFIRMATION -- THE JOURNALIST SUGGESTS HE
ALREADY HAS THE INFORMATION AND IS SIMPLY LOOKING FOR
CONFIRMATION. IN FACT, HE DOES NOT HAVE A CONFIRMED STORY.
BY RESPONDING, THE "TARGET" PROVIDES THE STORY WHICH IS LATER
CONFIRMED BY YET ANOTHER TARGET USING THE SAME RUSE.
- REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATION OF A SINGLE FACT -- OFTEN
JOURNALISTS ONLY ASK EACH INDIVIDUAL FOR A SINGLE, AND SEEMINGLY
UNIMPORTANT, ITEM OF INFORMATION. TAKEN TOGETHER THE INDIVIDUAL
FACTS MAKE THE HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AND DAMAGING STORY.
- REQUEST FOR HELP ON "POLICY QUESTIONS" -- IN THIS
TECHNIQUE THE JOURNALIST DISCLAIMS ANY DESIRE FOR CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION, BUT IS MERELY SEEKING THE GENERAL CONCLUSION OR
POLICIES. AS THE TARGET PROVIDES THESE, HE ALSO PROVIDES THE
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
HIGHLY EXPERIENCED AND SKILLED JUURNALISTS USE MORE SUBTLE
METHODS TO EXTRACT INFORMATION. EXAMPLES INCLUDE:
- EXCHANGING INFORMATION -- MANY POLICY-LEVEL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS ARE TOO BUSY TO STAY INFORMED ON EVERYTHING OF INTEREST
(o
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OR EVEN OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM. JOURNALISTS CAN CULTIVATE THEM
BY PROVIDING TIDBITS OF INFORMATION THAT THE MEDIA HAS ACQUIRED
AS LEAKS OR AS UNPUBLISHABLE BACKGROUND SUPPLIED PURPOSEFULLY
BY OTHER OFFICIALS. ONCE A CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP IS
ESTABLISHED, THE FLOW OF INFORMATION CAN BE TKO WAYS, LEADING
TO THE REPORTER'S GETTING A KIND OF OVERVIEW OF SUBJECTS AS WELL
AS SPECIFIC FACTS THAT MIGHT NOT BE OTHERWISE AVAILABLE. WHILE
MAJOR, DAMAGING LEAKS PROBABLY RARELY OCCUR THIS WAY, BECAUSE
A REGULAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN OFFICIAL AND A REPORTER MIGHT
BE TOO WELL KNOWN FOR THE OFFICIAL TO RISK PASSING CLASSIFIED
MATERIAL, A LOT OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION REACHES THE PUBLIC
BY SUCH A ROUTE.
- APPEALING FOR HELP IN UNDERSTANDING A COMPLEX
SUBJECT AFTER INDICATING WHAT THEY ALREADY KNOW, POSSIBLY
FROM PUBLIC MATERIAL OR FROM FRAGMENTARY LEAKS FROM OTHER
SOURCES. MANY MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE
ONLY A VAGUE IDEA OF HOW MUCH MATERIAL ON THEIR SUBJECT IS
ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, SO THEY CAN BE READILY SURPRISED
BY EVEN A CAREFUL COMPILATION OF OPEN LITERATURE. SURPRISE
CAN LEAD TO TALKING.
- PROFESSING A DESIRE TU BE RESPUNSI~PLE -- REPORTERS
MIGHT CONTENT THAT OTHERS ARE WORKING ON A STORY BUT ARE LIKELY
TO DISTORT IT, AND THEREFORE IT WOULD BE SETTER FOR A SOURCE
TO HELP GET IT PRESENTED IN AN ACCURATE, RESPONSIBLE FORM.
q
jp-c
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- AS A VARIATION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY APPROACH,
WARNING THAT THE STORY IS GOING TO BE PUBLISHED REGARDLESS
OF WHETHER A SOURCE HELPS, AND IT WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL
INTEREST TO STEER THE REPORTER ALONG CORRECT LINES BY GIVING
MORE INFORMATION OR CONFIRMING WHAT THE REPORTER ALREADY HAS.
THIS AMOUNTS TO A MILD FORM OF BLACKMAIL, WRAPPED IN APPARENTLY
HIGH MOTIVES.
- CLAIMING, TRUTHFULLY OR OTHERWISE, THAT THEY ALREADY
HAVE INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES ABOUT WHICH THEY HAVE DOUBTS,
AND ASKING FOR SOMEONE TO TALK BECAUSE HE IS KNOWN TO BE MORE
ACCURATE AND TRUSTWORTHY.
ANOTHER METHOD IS TO LEAD GULLIBLE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
TO BELIEVE THAT THE SECRETARY OR SOME OTHER AUTHORITATIVE
PERSON HAS CLUED HIM IN AND IS HELPING THE REPORTER WRITE A
STORY TO CREATE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUE OR THE
ORGANIZATION.
TWO WORDS ARE KEY TU CURBING LEAKS OUT OF THE GOVERNMENT.
THEY ARE RISK AND DISCIPLINE. PLAYING FAST AND LOOSE WITH
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS BECOME CLOSE TO A RISK-FREE
ENTERPRISE IN OUR GOVERNMENT. MANY BELIEVE THAT EVERYBODY
DOES IT SO WHY DU I HAVE TO BE SU CAREFUL. IT MUST BE PERCEIVED
THAT THERE IS INDEED A RISK AND PENALTY FOR THOSE WHO BETRAY
THEIR TRUST WITH RESPECT TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
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THERE IS NO ADEQUATE CONTROL ON WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO SEE
WHAT, OR WITH RESPECT TO WHAT INFORMATION MAY BE MADE PUBLIC.
AGAIN, TWO WORDS DESCRIBE WHAT IS NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY. ONE IS AUTHORIZATION.
THE OTHER IS INVESTIGATION. THERE HAS BEEN A LAXITY AND A
LETHARGY IN INVESTIGATING UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND-*-NEAR
CHAOS WITH RESPECT TO WHO IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK TO PRESS
REPRESENTATIVES AND WHAT INFORMATION THEY ARE AUTHORIZED TO
USE. RECORDS SHOULD BE KEPT OF CONTACTS WITH MEDIA
REPRESENTATIVES. PRINCIPAL OFFICERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AND LEADERS IN CONGRESS SUPPORT A CLEARER DESIGNATION OF
AUTHORIZED SPOKESMEN AND EITHER REQUIRING AUTHORIZATION AND
PLACING LIMITATIONS UN PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY OTHERS. THEY ALSO
SUPPORT MORE SHARP AND MORE PROMPT INQUIRY INTO UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES AND MORE VIGOROUS INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED
LEAKERS. THIS SHOULD INCLUDE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT OF FULL
ACCESS BY INVESTIGATORS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND STAFFERS
IN THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRIES INTO LEAKS. SPECIFIC RULES ON
THESE POINTS MAY BE ADAPTED TO DIFFERENT AGENCIES DEPENDING
ON THEIR NEED TO EXPOUND POLICY TO THE MEDIA ON THE SIZE, AND
AMOUNT OF INFORMATION THEY NEED TO PUT OUT, AND SO ON. IN
THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, ONLY A VERY FEW PEOPLE ARE AUTHORIZED
TO SPEAK TO THE MEDIA WITHOUT APPROVAL. ACCESS TO NEWS MEDIA
PERSONNEL CAN BE LIMITED TO SPECIFIC LOCATIOtJS AND ESCORTS
CAN BE REQUIRED FOR THOSE MOVING IN AND OUT OF THIS SPECIFIC
AREA.
a
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IT IS CLEAR THAT EVEN WITH THE MOST EFFECTIVE INTERNAL
DISCIPLINE THERE WILL STILL BE THOSE WHO VIOLATE THEIR TRUST
AND THERE WILL BE SITUATIONS WHERE INATTENTION OR CARELESSNESS-
RESULT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE
VERY DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION
THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NEEDED
TO AVOID SERIOUS DAMAGE.
THIS CALLS FOR IMPROVED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MEDIA
AND THE GOVERNMENT IN AVOIDING DAMAGE FROM "ISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. HAPPILY MORE IN THE MEDIA RECOGNIZE
THIS. KATHARINE GRAHAM RECENTLY CALLED FOR "...FULL COOPERATION
WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN
THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE
WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT
WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE
FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS
ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE MEDIA] WANT
TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR NATIONAL
SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE AUTHORITIES
IN WITHHOLDING INFURMA11ON THAI COULD HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES."
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS
OF REPORTERS AND EDITORS TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES
WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE
NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER
WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE
AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. WE ARE ALWAYS
READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.
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THE CONGRESS HAS TAKEN STEPS TO DETER THE UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY ESTABLISHING AND
ENFORCING APPROPRIATE PENALTIES. CONGRESS, SHORTLY AFTER IT
ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TO GATHER SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE, IN 1950 ENACTED A LAW WHICH PROHIBITS THE
PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD VIOLATION OF THAT LAW OVER RECENT
WEEKS AND MONTHS. MUCH DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE. DURING WORLD
WAR 11, ALLIED ABILITY TO READ GERMAN AND JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS
SHORTENED THE WAR AND SAVED AND INCALCULABLE NUMBER OF LIVES.
A SINGLE MEDIA STORY COULD HAVE TAKEN THAT ADVANTAGE AWAY
FROM US OVERNIGHT.
IN 1950, CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THIS BY ENACTING RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST PUBLISHING INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE CAREFULLY LIMITED THE APPLICATION
OF THIS PROHIBITION TO INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
WHICH IT TERMS: "A SMALL DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER, A CATEGORY
WHICH IS BOTH VITAL AND VULNERABLE TO ALMOST A UNIQUE DEGREE U
THE GROWING WILL AND ABILITY OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO
COUNTER TERRORISM AND OUR OWN ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS
DEPENDS VERY HEAVILY ON THIS PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY.
IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED TO JUSTIFY FAILURE TO USE A
LAW ENACTED BY THE CONGRESS FOR THAT SPECIFIC PURPOSE TO DETER
FURTHER DAMAGE TO A CAPABILITY SO CRITICAL AT THIS POINT IN
HISTORY.
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COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE IS PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE
AND PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. A GREAT MANY LIVES AND YEARS OF
FIGHTING HAVE BEEN SAVED BY OUR SUCCESS IN READING MESSAGES -
BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
MILITARY COMMANDERS DURING WORLD WAR II. ONE WHISPER OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION COULD HAVE DEPRIVED US OF THAT INTELLIGENCE AND
MANY LIVES WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST AND FURTHER YEARS OF FIGHTING
REQUIRED.
WE ARE CONFRONTED BY PRECISELY THE SAME PROBLEM TODAY.
OVER RECENT WEEKS, PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR
INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES HAS DEPRIVED US OF WARNING AND
INFORMATION ABOUT TERRORIST ATTACKS AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS
AND AMERICAN EMBASSIES AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS. ALSO,
INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE MEDIA HAS PUT IN JEOPARDY ONE OF
OUR BEST INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES, PROBABLY OUR BEST HOPE
OF LEARNING ABOUT MILITARY PLANS AND GETTING ADVANCED WARNING
OF MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST US.
AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE BYRON WHITE AUTHORITATIVELY
EXPLAINED IN HIS 1971 CONCURRING OPINION IN THE PENTAGON PAPERS
CASE, 798 "IN PRECISE LANGUAGE, PROSCRIBES KNOWING AND WILLFUL
PUBLICATION OF ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS OR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS... NEWSPAPERS ARE PRESUMABLY
NOW ON FULL NOTICE OF THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
MUST FACE THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY PUBLISH."
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THE QUESTION LEGITIMATELY HAS BEEN ASKED WHY WE HAVE
RAISED THIS 1950 STATUTE AFTER SO LONG A PERIOD OF DISUSE.
THE HONEST ANSWER IS THAT THE AVALANCHE OF COMPROMISES IN
RECENT MONTHS, INCLUDING SOME OF THE MOST SENSITIVE COLLECTION
TECHNIQUES AVAILABLE TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, HAS FINALLY
PROMPTED US TO TURN TO ALL POSSIBLE LEGAL REMEDIES TO TRY TO
STAUNCH THE DAMAGE BY DISMISSAL AND PROSECUTION OF LEAKERS
AND USE OF ALL AVAILABLE STATUTORY AUTHORITIES.
AGAIN IN 198_, THE CONGRESS ENACTED LEGISLATION PROHIBITING
PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE
OFFICERS OPERATING UNDER PSEUDONYM. IT TOOK THE KILLING OF
ONE OF OUR OFFICERS TO BRING ABOUT THIS ADDITIONAL PROTECTION.
DICK WELCH, THE CIA STATION CHIEF IN ATHENS, WAS MURDERED
OUTSIDE OF HIS HOME (? CHECK THIS) AS A RESULT OF A DELIBERATE
DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF A NUMBER OF SUCH CIA OFFICERS.
(ROUND THIS OUT AND DEVELOP THIS STORY A LITTLE.)
THUS, WE HAVE LEGISLATION TO PROTECT AGAINST THE PUBLICATION
OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION, I.E., COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE, THE IDENTITY OF AGENTS, [ARE THERE OTHERS?).
THE FACT IS THAT THE PUBLICATION OF ANY KIND OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION CAN CAUSE SEVERE DAMAGE. IN RECENT YEARS,
PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION REPORTED BY MEN AND WOMEN WHO RISK
THEIR LIVES TO GET THIS INFORMATION HAS RESULTED IN SWEEPING
INVESTIGATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, IT HAS PUT THE LIVES OF
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THOSE AGENTS AT RISK, IT HAS CAUSED SOME OF THEM TO STOP HELPING
US, IT HAS EMBARRASSED OUR DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER WORKING RELA-
TIONSHIPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IT HAS CAUSED THEM TO DISCONTINUE
SUPPORTING US IN VITAL UNDERTAKINGS, IT HAS LED PEOPLE TO
ATTRIBUTE TO OUR GOVERNMENT THE KILLING OF OTHER PEOPLE AND
THIS, IN TURN, HAS BEEN USED TO JUSTIFY THE MURDER OF AMERICANS
BY TERRORISTS.
THE TEMPTATION TO GO BEYOND THE FACTS AND PIECE TOGETHER
AND STRETCH FRAGMENTS OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A
PUBLISHABLE STORY AND SOMETIMES IN ORDER TO SENSATIONALIZE
IS A DANGEROUS THING. IT CAN AND HAS COST LIVES. IT CAN
WRONGLY IMPAIR REPUTATIONS AND DISRUPT RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL
TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WITH A TRUE STORY.
DURING 1985, A NEWSPAPER HEADLINE AND STORY CREATED THE IMPRESSSION
THAT OUR GOVERNMENT WAS INVOLVED WITH THE SECURITY SERVICE OF
A FRIENDLY NATION IN A CAR BOMBING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY
TO A LARGE NUMBER OF RESIDENTS AND PASSERS-BY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD.
OUR INFORMATION OFFICER, WHEN QUERIED, SAID THAT THE INFORMATION
WAS INCORRECT AND THAT THE CIA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AND NO
INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE ATTACK AND THAT IF
US INVOLVEMENT WAS REPORTED, THE LIVES OF AMERICANS COULD BE
JEOPARDIZED. THE STORY WAS RUN AND IT CREATED AROUND THE WORLD
A FALSE IMPRESSION OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING. A MONTH
LATER WHEN THE HIJACKERS SHOT AND KILLED AN AMERICAN SERVICEMAN,
THEY CLAIMED IT TO BE IN RETALIATION FOR THE BOMBING IN BEIRUT.
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THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED
THE MATTER AND CONCLUDED THAT "NO COMPLICITY OF DIRECT OR
INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE
MARCH 8 BOMBING IN BEIRUT."
I BELIEVE THAT WE'RE ALL WORKING TOWARD THE SAME GOAL --
MAINTAINING THE BEST AND MOST FREE COUNTRY IN THE WORLD.
WE IN GOVERNMENT FULLY SUPPORT AND ADMIRE THE COMMITMENT OF
THE PRESS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC AND THE DEDICATION AND INGENUITY
WITH WHICH THIS COMMITMENT IS CARRIED OUT. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE
WE ALL HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WE MUST BALANCE. ADMITTEDLY, IT
IS A VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE TO STRIKE, BUT WE NEED
HELP FROM THE PRESS IN PROTECTING THE NATION'S LEGITIMATE
INTELLIGENCE SECRETS. PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT WE CAN
WORK TOGETHER WITHOUT VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF A FREE PRESS.
IT IS TIME TO MOVE BEYOND SHRILL ACCUSATIONS AND THE ATTRIBUTION
OF BASE MOTIVES AND TO BEGIN A GENUINE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE
MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. WE ARE EAGER TO
DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND CLOSER COOPERATION IN AN
EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT EVEN WHILE PROTECTING A FREE PRESS, THE
NATION'S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES CAN CARRY OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY.
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DC I
20 JUNE 86, 1600
SPEECH ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
I THINK IT CAN NOW BE SAFELY SAID THAT THERE IS
WIDESPREAD CONCERN IN THE GOVERNMENT, IN THE MEDIA, AND
AMONG THE PEOPLE THAT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION ARE RAPIDLY DIMINISHING OUR ABILITY TO COPE WITH
THE FULL RANGE OF THREATS FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW AIMED AT
US ALL THE WAY TO THE NEW THREAT OF STATE-SPONSORED INTER-
NATIONAL TERRORISM.
OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES ARE THE FIRST LINE OF
DEFENSE AGAINST THESE THREATS. OUR ABILITY TU DETER THE
HOSTILE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO MONITOR ARMS CONTROL
AGREEMENTS AND ALSO OUR ABILITY TO ABORT OR WARN OF TERRORIST
PLANS AIMED AT INNOCENT CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND
THE WORLD DEPENDS ON OUR INTELLIGENCE.
WE HAVE ALREADY LOST CAPABILITIES CRITICAL TO PROTECTING
INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND OUR INSTALLATIONS OVERSEAS FROM
TERRORIST ATTACKS. OVER RECENT YEARS WE HAVE SPENT BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS AND TRAINED THOUSANDS OF SPLENDID PEOPLE TO RESTORE
THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. YET EVERY
METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE OUR AGENTS, OUR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC,
ELECTRONIC AND COMMUNICATIONS TRACKING CAPABILITIES -- HAS
BEEN DAMAGED AS DISCLOSURES OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION ENABLES
OUR ADVERSARIES TO DEFEAT OUR GROWING CAPABILITIES.
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STORIES IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECT-RONIC MEDIA HAVE
SHOWN, SOMETIMES IN GREAT DETAIL, HOW TO COUNTER INTELLIGENCE
IN WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MANY YEARS
OF CREATIVE TALENT AND EFFORT. THIS, TIME AND TIME AGAIN,
HAS ENABLED THOSE HOSTILE TO US TO ABORT HUGE INVESTMENTS,
TO CONCEAL AND OTHERWISE DENY US INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR
DEFENSE, AND TO DEPRIVE US OF THE ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR
CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. LEAKERS ARE COSTING THE
TAXPAYERS MILLIONS AND EVEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS -- AND,
MORE IMPORTANT, PUTTING AMERICANS ABROAD AS WELL AS OUR
COUNTRY ITSELF AT RISK.
TODAY, THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND
MITIGATING THE DAMAGE OF ITS UNCLASSIFIED DISCLOSURE IS A
CRITICAL AND URGENT TASK WHICH CONFRONTS US WITH A VERY
DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE TO STRIKE. WE NEED TO ADDRESS
THEM WITHOUT INFRINGING ON THE-ESSENTIAL ROLE OF THE MEDIA
IN PROVIDING THE PUBLIC THE INFORMATION IT NEEDS FOR THE
SELF GOVERNMENT OF OUR NATION. WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE THE
DILIGENCE AND INGENUITY OF THE WORKING PRESS IN GATHERING
AND PUBLISHING NEWS. WE NEED TO SUPPORT ITS EXPOSURE OF
WASTE, INEFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION AND OTHER MISCONDUCT.
WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IN UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS NOT MALFEASANCE, WRONGDOING, WASTE,
FRAUD, ABUSE OR MISMANAGEMENT. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT UNIQUE
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FRAGILE SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT ENABLE THE UNITED STATES
TO PROTECT ITSELF IN A VERY UNFRIENDLY WORLD. THERE HAVE
BEEN NO ALLEGATIONS THAT THESE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES HAVE
BEEN MISMANAGED OR THAT ANY WRONGDOING HAS BEEN INVOLVED.
A GREAT MANY JOURNALISTS AND OTHERS IN THE MEDIA RECOGNIZE
THAT THE NATION HAS A PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE DEALT WITH.
RESPONSIBLY. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE
VERY SERIOUS DAMAGE DONE TO THE NATION'S SECURITY THROUGH
THE PUBLICATION OF LEAKED SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND THE
NEED FOR THE AMERICAN PUBLIC TO POSSESS AS MUCH INFORMATION
AS POSSIBLE TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF
THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS.
OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT OVER
MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP
METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES
AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, 'TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS
AND VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP
EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS
AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS,
AND TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS. GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE
CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF
EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY OF AND LIBERTY OF OUR
CITIZENS. SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO HOW AND THROUGH
WHOM WE COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.
FROM THE INCEPTION OF OUR REPUBLIC, WE HAVE RECOGNIZED THE
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VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE AND THE NEED FUR SECRECY TO MAKE IT
POSSIBLE AND PROTECT IT. TO DO THIS WE MUST CLASSIFY AND
RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT HOW AND WHERE
WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS AND ASSESSMENTS
BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL OR COMPROMISE
OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN AN EFFORT TO
ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION
OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR ADVERSARIES ON
A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES, THEIR RESEARCHERS,
AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A DAY TO UNCOVER
AND USE AGAINST US.
"THE NECESSITY OF PROCURING GOOD INTELLIGENCE IS APPARENT
AND NEED NOT BE FURTHER URGED," GENERAL GEORGE WASHINGTON
WROTE TO ONE OF HIS COLONELS IN 1777, 'ALL THAT REMAINS FOR
ME TO ADD IS, THAT YOU KEEP THE WHOLE MATTER AS SECRET AS
POSSIBLE. FOR UPON SECRECY, SUCCESS DEPENDS IN MOST ENTERPRISES
OF THE KIND, AND FOR WANT OF IT, THEY ARE GENERALLY DEFEATED,
HUWEVER WELL PLANNED, AND PROMISING....'
u
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RGATES TALKING POINTS -- 29 May 1986
While General Odom has been discussing the background of'the
statute concerning communications intelligence and much of the
focus in recent days in the newspapers has been on that
particular source' of intelligence, we are deeply concerned about
revelations-of a?nuinber.of other sources of intelligence as
well. These include both imagery and human agents. As a result
of revelations, we have?lost?human sources, fear for the lives of
others and have seen the Soviets increasingly resorting to
camouflage and other denial techniques as they learn more about
our capabilities.
L - 4 - "
Because the Congress protected only one. type of intelligence
source by specific statute, we have td .rely on other measures to
help protect other sources. Our efforts along these lines have
taken two forms. First, we are attempting to tighten discipline
within the Executive Branch. Second, we are attempting to
initiate a dialogue with various elements of the media in an
attempt to help them understand the fragility and importance of
the sources that are being revealed. Moreover, we are hoping to
persuade them that they too have a responsibility to their
country and should do what they can to help us protect these
intelligence sources.
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-- If we lose both our\technical and human sources, our ability to
protect the country aad the first amendment are endanger.
-- Some of the media have i\i fact demonstrated a considerable sense
of responsibility and recognition of this separate but mytual
obligation. We applaud this,. and also would point out that this
voluntary restraint has not endangered the freedom of the press.
The sources that have already been revealed in the press have
significantly degraded our ability to provide advance warning of
terrorist attacks and to track the activities of these groups.
Additionally, information appearing in the press on some
technical collection systems has gone beyond what we believe the
Soviets have learned through other means and has contributed
significantly to the far reaching measures they are carrying out
to deny us knowledge about new weapon systems and other
activities. Similarly, the revelations have contributed to our
weakening ability to monitor Soviet compliance with arms control
measures.
-- What we are talking about here is not malfeasance, wrong doing,
waste, fraud, abuse or mismanagement. The press should be
encouraged to go after those and we strongly support that. We
are talking about unique fragile sources of information that
enable the United States to protect itself in a very unfriendly
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world. There have been no allegations that these collection
activities have been mismanaged or that any wrong doing has been
involved. The only reason that they are being revealed in the
press is because they are sensational. As a nation we are paying
a heavy price for such sensationalism.
-- The decision by the President to use intelligence information to
inform the American people is not on a par with unauthorized
disclosures nor does it represent some sort of unfair unilateral
advantage on the part of the government. Under the Constitution
the President is charged with conducting foreign policy and
providing for the national defense in cooperation with the
Congress. He and they are elected by the people to do that, and
when he makes his decisions it is his responsibility to educate
and inform the American people as to the reasons behind his
policies. To the degree that other classified information is
needed to provide a check on the President in this regard, the
Congress fulfills that function. And virtually all intelligence
assessments provided to the President are provided also not only
to the Intelligence Oversight Committees but also the Foreign
Relations, Armed Services and Appropriation Committees. These
are the Constitutionally mandated authorities for carrying out
these responsibilities.
When the decision is made to declassify information for these
purposes, a process is initiated that involves a careful review
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of the information by intelligence professionals to minimize the
damage to intelligence sources and methods. In the final
analysis, it is the President that must weigh the potential gain
against the potential loss and whether in a prosecution or to
explain policy to sacrifice some information - but virtually
always in a way that does not reveal the source itself.
- The Communications law has not been used in more than 35 years in
intelligence were relatively rare and the government understood
that the decision to act would be controversial. However, in the
last two years the veritable avalanche of revelations of
sensitive communications intelligence sources has become so
devistating that those of us in the intelligence business have
concluded, with support in the Administration, that the cost to
our intelligence capabilities now requires that this statute be
applied.
-- It is sometimes said that the Russians already know what is being
published in the press and that therefore the government is
seeking to keep its secrets only from Americans. But how does
the press know what the Russians know? Does it have penetrations
of the KGB or the GRU? How is it in a position to judge the
degree to which revelations confirm, update or amplify
information that the Russians may have acquired from other means
including spies? Moreover, does the press presume that these
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intelligence capabilities have no other application except
against the Soviet Union in terms of protecting our interests?
Members of the press make bold assertions on these matters but in
fact do not know.
Members of the press are prepared to go to jail to protect their
sources. They know that such protection is fundamental to their
work. Why, then, cannot the media understand the need, for the
sake of the whole country, -for the protection of the nation's
sources of information on our adversaries?
We raise these issues not to chill a free press" but because we
are genuinely alarmed by the progressive neutralization of the
nation's first line of defense: our intelligence capabilities..
While the 1950 statute can help us protect communications
intelligence, the problem is much broader and therefore we need
the cooperation of the press. We can't force it and thus we
would like to see the media calm down and discuss with us what is
a serious problem -- and, we hope, recognize its own
responsibilities and the need for voluntary restraint on
intelligence sources.
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TALKING POINTS FOR INTERVIEW WITH AP
1. The series of recent SIGINT leaks in last six months
is more serious than ever before. They have already done great
damage to our capabilities. The damage is of two kinds:
-- Sources dry up, leaving us unable to provide support
for protection of Americans, particularly against
terrorism.
-- Millions of dollars must be spent to recover what
leaks cause us to lose as sources. -
Our national interests suffer in the first case; our taxpayers
suffer in the other. Both the leaker and the press are shirking
responsibility to society and the economic interests of citizens.
2. Clarification of a recent case is important because the
press reporting to date has wholly misled the public. The
President did not disclose details of our alleged "intercepts"
of Libyan communications in Berlin. Many articles alleged the
details of intercepts several days before the President spoke.
When he did, he did not mention SIGINT or intercepts. The press
could tell the American public the truth about this matter. To
date it has confused them.
3. Do we have any legal recourse to these developments?
Yes, there is a statute written to cover precisely these kinds of
cases. A tradi on of laxity x enforcing i has grown up since
1950, usually as a esult of extre a deference t the first
amendment and press f edom and as a sult of a ca ulation of
the consequences of call'ng so much atten 'on to a leak by
prosecution of the offende
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3. Let me tell you a littIe about the origins of the
statute, 18 USC 798.
-- It was enacted in 1950 after long consideration of
the value of SIGINT in WW II and with keen awareness
of the impact of SIGINT disclosures that had occurred
before the war.
-- Both the Senate and House reports to the floor mentioned
the 1931 publication of Yardley's book, The Black Chamber,
detailing our success in code-breaking during the
Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22. The book prompted
the Japanese to take better COMSEC measures which
hampered our intelligence reporting on Pearl Harbor.
A second book by Yardley was successfully impounded
by the U.S. Government on the eve of WWII.
-- The Congress struck a balance between the First
Amendment and protection of security information by
rejecting a broader bill and narrowing the statute
to COMINT and its full and unambiguous protection.
-- The law prohibits commmunicating, furnishing, trans-
mitting, or otherwise making available this information
to an unauthorized person; it also prohibits publish-
ing or using in any manner prejudicial to the safety
or interest of the U.S.
-- Professors Edgar and Schmidt have spoken well of the
law, and Justices White and Douglas have recognized its
soundness.
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4. It is with great reluctance that I recommend prosecution
of publishers and journalists under this law. NSA does not want
to be at odds with the press. At the same time, NSA has a duty
to the American people and the security of the state, which
makes the First Amendment possible, to protect our SIGINT
equities under the full powers granted by the Congress:-
5. Recent press discussion of this statute is confusing
the Public about the culpability of several journalists, publishers,
and TV commentators. -
6. I believe the press should challenge the offenders,
holding them as much to account as it does all other violators
of the law of the land. The silence of all but a few voices in
the press on the irresponsibility of others in the press, not to
speak of their criminal violations of the law, does not speak well
for the institution that professes such great regard for law and
accountability.
7. To date, many press spokesmen have misled the public on
this matter, and they have refused to criticize lawbreakers among
them.
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DCI
29 May 1986
1300 hours
We have offered to have this interview because all of us, all of
the American Intelligence Community, are gravely concernef about damage
being done to our intelligence capabilities by unauthorized disclosures
of sensitive information. We have already lost capabilities critical to
protecting innocent civilians, personnel and embassies and other" installations
overseas from terrorist attacks. We can tell you that there are many, many
of us in the Intelligence Community who fear that if we do not establish
greater discipline over the flow of sensitive information to the whole world we
will no longer have an adequate intelligence agency. That's what we are to
Over recent years we have spent billions of dollars and trained thousands
of splendid people to restore the finest intelligence service in the world.
Yet every method we have of acquiring intelligence -- our agents, our
relationships with other intelligence services, our photographic, electronic,
and communications tracking capabilities -- has been damaged as disclosures
of sensitive information enables our adversaries to defeat our growing
capabilities.
Stories in both the print and electronic media have shown, sometimes
in great detail, how to counter capabilities in which we have invested
billions of dollars and many years of creative talent and effort. This, time
and time again, has enabled those hostile to us to abort huge investments,
to conceal and otherwise deny us information critical to our defense, and
to deprive us of the ability to protect our citizens from terrorist attack.
Leakers are costing the taxpayers millions and even billions of dollars -- and,
more important, putting Americans abroad as well as our country itself at risk.
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Certainly our nation cannot permit this to continue to occur. To do so
would be to undercut our national security, personal safety and hopes for
arms codtrol and our efforts to establish and maintain peace in the world.
What. we hope to get out of this interview is not headlines or an exciting
story but a sober analysis of what is at stake in this issue and how it can
be addressed without infringing on the essential role of the media in
providing the public the information it needs for the self government of
our nation. We would first like to establish that we yield to no one in our
admiration for the diligence and ingenuity of the working press in gathering
and publishing news. We applaud its exposure of waste, inefficiency,
corruption and other misconduct. We hope to reduce the level of intensity
of the charges by providing every assurance that we are not out-to undercut
the First Amendment or muzzle the press.
What we are talking about here is not malfeasance, wrong doing, waste,
fraud, abuse or mismanagement. We are talking about unique fragile sources
of information that enable the United States to protect itself in a very
unfriendly world. There have been no allegations that these collection
activities have been mismanaged or that any wrong doing has been involved.
The only reason that they are being revealed in the press is because they
are sensational. As a nation we are paying a heavy price for such sensationalism.
We believe a great many journalists and others in the media recognize
that the nation has a problem which must be dealt with responsibly. It
is essential to differentiate between the very serious damage done to the
nation's security through the publication of leaked sensitive intelligence
and the need for the American public to possess as much information as
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possible to make informed judgments about the conduct of the government's
business.
STAT
The Publisher of The Washington Post stated correctly the responsibility
of the media in such matters in her recent talk. She called for "...full
cooperation wherever possible between the media and the authorities. When
the media obtains especially sensitive information, we are-willing to tell
the authorities what we have learned and what we plan to report. And while
reserving the right to make the final decision ourselves, we are anxious to
listen to arguments about why information should not be aired. (The media)
want to do nothing that would endanger human life or national security.
We are willing to cooperate with the authorities in withholding information
that could have those consequences."
We have been gratified by the readiness of many reporters and editors
to carefully consider sometimes withholding publication of information which
could jeopardize national interests or to treat or present a-story in a
manna" Whi.-h meets +k_ nool,lir? nncd vn+ M4_;_;- ...,?.,..~;~1 .1....._,.., a-
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intelligence sources. The trick is to recognize the potential-for damage
to consblt on how it:znight be minimized.. We are always ready and available
on short notice to help on that and we are prepared to intensify this kind
of cooperation.
We recognize that the first line of defense and the most effective way
of preventing these types of leaks is to increase discipline within the
government itself. The inability to control sensitive information is
destructive of the morale of people who do keep secrets, as well as damaging
to our security. During the last several years, the President has emphasized
the special obligation federal workers have to protect the classified
information with which they are entrusted.. We have increased and must
intensify our efforts to uncover those who violate this trust.--We are
studying procedures and possibly new laws needed to deal with federal
employees who decide on their own to disclose classified information.
We ask that the press work with the American Intelligence Community
and the other national security organizations in protecting this nation's
legitimate secrets. Some organizations and individual journalists already
do. We strongly encourage the other members of the press to do so too.
There can be freedom of the press and a sensitivity by the press to
the need to protect military, diplomatic and intelligence activities that
defend this nation. The nation can have both freedom and security, but
without security it will have no freedom.
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Over the past weeks and months, the ability of American intelligence
to protect life and limb against terrorism-and, indeed, to help protect
the security of the nation itself against our adversaries has been
gravely weakened by revelations of sensitive intelligence collection
techniques and information. jrtually every method we have of acquiring
intelligence -- our human agents, our relationships with other
intelligence services, our photographic, electronic, and communications
tracking capabilities -- has been damaged as disclosures of sensitive
information have enabled our enemies to defeat our capabilities Concern
in the Executive Branch and the Congress -- and I believe among the
public at large -- has become deep and widespread. We cannot permit this
progressive n of America's first line of defense to continue.
Regrettably, some treat our expressions of concern and determination
to halt the damage as a threat to a free press. This is not only untrue
but misses the point. It is one thing to expose waste, inefficiency,
mismanagement, corruption, and other misconduct -- an effort we must
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encourage and where we should applaud the diligence and ingenuity of the
press. Similarly, however discomforting it may be, coverage of
differences within the Executive Branch and between the Executive Branch
and the Congress are certainly legitimate subjects for the attention of
the media. But, the wanton and willful disclosure of intelligence
capabilities by those inside government who violate their trust as well
as the publication of information about those sources must be stopped.
Granted, the government has a responsibility to use the
classification system more judiciously and to enforce discipline within
its own ranks more vigorously. At the same time, however, it is
imperative that the media recognize it too has responsibilities
concerning the security of our country as well. The continued security
and freedom of the nation is essential to the existence of a strong, free
press. It is essential that the media recognize the difference between
the very serious damage done to our security through the publication of
information revealing sensitive intelligence capabilities and the
legitimate need to report critically on government and for the American
public to possess as much information as possible to make informed
judgments about the conduct of the government's business. The truth is
that our most costly and important intelligence assets have been
compromised not to expose wrong doing, fraud or mismanagement but simply
because they represent sensational information. Extraordinary
intelligence collection techniques have been divulged for nothing more
than cheap titilation.
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The government and the media have separate but equally important
responsibilities. The protection of genuinely sensitive intelligence
sources and methods is a challenge that we must deal with together. It
is time for a rational discussion of these responsibilities. An agenda-
for dialogue would have at least four components:
(1) Enforcement within the Executive Branch of more stringent
controls on the classification of information. There'-is no
question but that there is abuse: too many documents are
classified and too many are over classified. As long as there
are abuses in this arena it is difficult to get anyone, in or
out of government, to take seriously that information which,
genuinely affects our national security and must be protected.
a
(2) Establishing greater discipline in the handling and protection
of sensitive information within the government. The most
effective way of curtailing damage is to increase discipline
within the government. The inability to control sensitive
information is destructive to the morale of people who do keep
secrets, as well as damaging to our security. During the last
several years, the President has emphasized the special
obligation federal workers have to protect the classified
information with which they are entrusted. We have increased
our efforts to uncover those who violate this trust.
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(3) Improved cooperation between the media and the government in
avoiding damage from disclosure of classified information.
Katharine Graham recently called for "... full cooperation
wherever possible between the media and the authorities. When
the media obtains especially sensitive information, we are
willing to tell the authorities what we have learned and what we
plan to report. And while reserving the right to make the final
decision ourselves, we are anxious to listen to arguments about
why information should not be aired. [The media] want to do
nothing that would endanger human life or national security. We
are willing to cooperate with the authorities in withholding
information that could have those consequences." We have been
gratified by the readiness of some reporters and editors to
carefully consider sometimes withholding publication of
information which could jeopardize national interests or to
treat or present a story in a manner which meets the public
need, yet minimizes potential damage and to consult on how it
might be minimized. We are always ready and available on short
notice to help on that.
(4) Deter the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by
establishing and enforcing appropriate penalties. Congress,
shortly after it established the National Security Agency to
gather signals intelligence, in 1950 enacted a law which
prohibits the publication of information about communications
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a Q
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d r a
intelligence. There has been widespread violation of that law
over recent weeks and months. Much damage has been done.
During World War II, allied ability to read German and Japanese
communications shortened the war and saved an incalculable
number of lives. A single media story could have taken that
advantage away from us overnight.
In 1950, Congress recognized this by enacting restrictions
against publishing information about communications
intelligence. The House Judiciary Committee carefully limited
the application of this- prohibition to information about
communications intelligence which it terms: "a small degree of
classified matter, a category which is both vital and vulnerable
to almost a unique degree."
The growing will and ability of our friends and allies to
counter terrorism and our own ability to protect our citizens
depends very heavily on this particular intelligence
capability. It would be very difficult indeed to justify
failure to use a law enacted by the Congress for that specific
purpose to deter further damage to a capability so critical at
this point in history.
The question legitimately has been asked why we have raised
this 1950 statute after so long a period of disuse. The honest
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a .,
t`S r
0 a6 d
answer is that the avalanche of compromises in recent months,
including some of the most sensitive collection techniques
available to the American government, has finally prompted us to
turn to all possible legal remedies to try to staunch the damage
by dismissal and prosecution of leakers and use of all available
statutory authorities. We were aware of the potential for
misunderstanding and of the sensitivity of the media to the
issues these measures raise. But the legal authority:.is there,
and for good reason, and it is imperative that the Executive
Branch use itj
r'
believe i~k that we're all working toward the same goal --
maintaining the best and most free country in the world. We in
government fully support and admire the commitment of the press to inform
the public and the dedication and ingenuity with which this commitment is
oWcb
carried out. But I As believe we all have responsibilities we must
responsibility to protect the country.
balance. Admittedly, it is a very delicate and difficult balance to
strike, but we need help from the press in protecting the nation's
legitimate intelligence secrets. Past experience has shown that we can
work together without violating the rights of a free press. It is time
to move beyond shrill accusations and the attribution of base motives and
to begin a genuine exchange between the media and the government on this
subject. We are eager to develop better understanding and closer
cooperation in an effort to ensure that even while protecting a free
press, the nation's intelligence services can carry out their
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