BEIRUT AS A TERRORIST CENTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97R00694R000700030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -'~-
Intelligence
Beirut as a Terrorist Center
-s~~
GI 87-10008
January /987
Copy 3 7 4
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t~E~s~~E~:, Directorate of Secret
'~' ~~ Intelligence
~~ _ >~ i~~
Beirut as a Terrorist Center
This paper was prepared by
Counterterrorist Center, with contributions from the
Offices of Global Issues, Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis, It was
coordinate6 with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Operations and Analysis Group,
CTC,
Secret
GI 87-10008
January 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of l November 1986
was used in this report.
Beirut as a Terrorist Center) 25X1
terrorist groups while maintaining plausible deniability.
The rise of Beirut as a terrorist center is one of the principal byproducts of
Lebanon's political upheaval. The continuing power struggle between and
among Lebanon's Christian and Muslim militias has transformed the city
into a lawless, militarized zone-an ideal setting for international terrorists
to meet, prepare, and from which to stage terrorist operations. The city is
an open arena in which extremists of various affiliations can operate
without strictures or fear of being apprehended by government authorities.
Moreover, Beirut offers the major state sponsors of terrorism-Iran, Syria,
and Libya-an operating environment for supporting or tasking various
violent activities.
Given the continuing security conditions in Beirut, the city's role in
international terrorism is unlikely to change. A generation reared in the
Lebanese civil war is coming of age-young Christians and Muslims who
view fighting as a part of everyday life. Living conditions, especially in
West Beirut, contribute to the radicalization of the inhabitants. Finally,
Lebanon's growing unemployment contributes to the disaffection of the
younger generation, which sees few alternatives or costs to participation in
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' The Operating Environment
Key Ingredient in State Support 1
Recruitment 2
A Meetingplace for Terrorists 4
Transit 4
Weapons Trafficking 5
Financial Linkages to Terrorism 5
A. Hijackings Involving Beirut International Airport
B. Other Terrorist Activities Involving Beirut
International Airport
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Figure 1
Ports in the Greater Beirut Area
...
Christian
d
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In effect, Beirut has been a divided city since late
1975. The Christian-controlled East continues to pay
at least nominal allegiance to the government and the
presidency. There is some degree of law and order-
much of it enforced by the Christian Lebanese Forces
militia-but frequent bursts of violence occur as rival
Christian groups struggle for power. The Muslim
West and especially the Shia-dominated southern
suburbs are, in the words of Druze warlord Walid
Junblatt, a "desert stalked by ravenous wolves."
Except for a brief interlude between 1982 and 1983,
West Beirut has been without effective government
for a decade. Most of the terrorist activities described
in this paper occurred in the western part of the city.
In a city where no law prevails and civil war has raged
for more than a decade, violence is routine. Kidnap-
ings, in particular, have become a way of life. Since
1984 approximately two dozen US and French na-
tionals have been taken hostage in Beirut. Although
some of the hostages may have been moved to the
more remote al Biqa` (Bekaa Valley) at times, many
have remained in Beirut where their captors have
little fear of discovery. Anti-Western sentiments and
propaganda have grown as extremists have tightened
their grip on the city, but Westerners are not the
only~r even primary-victims of the violence. Car
bombings, kidnapings, and assassinations are the
common instruments of dialogue between militias,
but, with the departure of most of the Western
presence from Beirut, such incidents garner little
notice.
Within this context, Beirut provides a hospitable
environment in which terrorists can carry out logistic
activities to support their terrorist operations beyond
Lebanon and even outside the Middle East. The city's
former status as one of the Arab world's major
commercial, transportation, and communications cen-
ters has contributed to its ongoing use as a crossroads
and safehaven for terrorists. In particular, the city
offers a fertile recruitment ground for various terror-
ist organizations, as well as a major transit point-
especially for those Middle Eastern groups that in-
creasingly choose to operate in Western Europe.
Beirut has also emerged in recent years as a terrorist
supply and communications center. The city serves as
a financial mecca, an open arena for weapons traffick-
ing, acenter for procurement of documentation, and
the locale of choice for terrorists issuing claims of
responsibility. In addition, many groups probably plan
their operations from Beirut, although, except in cases
where there are surviving terrorists in custody, infor-
mation on such activity is scanty.
Key Ingredient in State Support
Beirut offers the major state sponsors of terrorism-
Iran, Syria, and Libya-an operating environment for
supporting or tasking various terrorist groups while
maintaining plausible deniability. Iran and Syria, in
particular, have ample room to maneuver given their
presence in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. Libya
is attempting to increase its terrorist options by
reopening a People's Bureau in Beirut and by using
the nation's largely uncontrolled financial system to
transfer funds to terrorist operatives. The large num-
ber of groups-and freelance terrorists as well-that
transit or are headquartered in Beirut ensures that
state sponsors have access to terrorists of all stripes;
conversely, terrorist groups seeking support can readi-
ly find willing sponsors in Beirut
Iran's influence in Beirut rests largely on its deep and
longstanding relationship with the radical Lebanese
Shia organization Hizballah. Iran does not control the
group, but it maintains a significant degree of influ-
ence through the provision of funds and training.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards provide training at
camps located in the Bekaa Valley. Syria provides
support to various militias in Beirut, according to the
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dictates of Syrian policy. Syria's presence in Beirut-
and its dominance in the Bekaa Valley-ensures that
Damascus is in frequent contact with those terrorist
groups whose interests dovetail with those of Syria.
Libya has provided financial backing to radical
Nasserist groups in Lebanon and is seeking to estab-
lish adeeper foothold in Beirut
Recruitment
A generation reared in the Lebanese civil war is
coming of age-young Christians and Muslims who
view fighting as a part of everyday life. Living
conditions, especially in West Beirut, contribute to the
radicalization of the inhabitants; Palestinians living in
refugee camps-Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al Bara-
jinah-and Shia living in the Muslim slums surround-
ing the camps are ready targets for terrorist recruit-
ment. The only authority these youths have known is
the militias that dominate the neighborhoods around
them. Lebanon's growing unemployment-estimated
at more than 35 percent of the active labor force-
contributes to the disaffection of the younger genera-
tion, which sees few alternatives or costs to participa-
tion in violent activities.
We have been able to establish that several terrorists
who participated in the most dramatic attacks during
the past year grew up in either the Palestinian camps
or the Shia slums in Beirut:
? One of the terrorists in the 5 September 1986
hijacking of Pan Am flight 73 grew up in the Sabra
camp in Beirut, where he was probably recruited for
the operation.
? One of the Abu Nidal terrorists who survived the
December 1985 attack on the Vienna airport has
said that he received instructions in Beirut-where
he grew up in the Shatila camp-to go to Austria to
participate in an operation.
? The Abu Nidal member who was arrested for the
September 1985 bombing of the British airline
office in Rome confessed that he was recruited for
that mission in Beirut and traveled directly from
there to Rome.
Beirut serves as a crossroads for many terrorist
organizations. Although most groups are headquar-
tered elsewhere, many maintain a presence in the
city-especially in the Palestinian refugee camps.
The following groups have resident members or oj=
.feces in Beirut:
? Hizballah organization. Cells are located in nearly
every neighborhood west of the green line. Each cell
maintains a bureau in its area of responsibility.
Planning for clandestine operations almost certain-
ly is not done in these public offices, but probably is
handled in the homes of Hizballah members. The
organization completely dominates the Harat Hur-
ayk and Bir al Abid sections of Beirut.
? Abu Musa. The group is not headquartered in
Beirut but has a presence in the city, especially in
the Burj al Barajinah refugee camp.
? Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command (PFLP-GCS. The group is active
in the Sabra refugee camp.
? Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(DFLP~. The group operates in several areas but is
particularly active in the Shatila refugee camp.
? Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP~ The group has o,~ces in the refugee camps.
? Saiga. The group is active in the Sabra refugee
camp.
? Abu Nidal. Reportedly, the group has offices in the
refugee camps.
? Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Arme-
nia (ASALA~ Elements of this organization are
located in West Beirut, although its headquarters is
in the Bekaa Valley.
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Figure
Selected Militia-Controlled Areas in Beiru
Mediterranean Sea
WEST
BEIRUT,
Shia Amal
Shia Amal (contested)
Hizballah
Hizballah (contested)
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) / Druze
Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP)
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP)
Bath Party
Arab Democratic Party (ADP)
Palestinian refugee camp
0 1 Kilometer
0 1 Mile
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? At least one of the radical Shia hijackers of TWA
flight 847 in June 1985 was recruited from the
Muslim slums in Beirut. The operation probably
was planned in Beirut by Hizballah officials.
A Meetingplace for Terrorists
Because of the many terrorist organizations that have
a presence in Beirut, the city plays a key role in
facilitating relationships among terrorist groups-
relationships that initially may be a "feeling out" of
the other terrorist players, but ultimately could lead
to operational cooperation among groups. In fact, in
recent months we have seen signs that individuals who
may be affiliated with different terrorist organizations
have increasingly been in contact with one another:
? Senior Abu Nidal and Hizballah officials in Leba-
non reportedly meet weekly, alternating between
Beirut and Ba`labakk.
Fatah and Hizballah coop-
erate on several key issues in Beirut. Many current
Hizballah leaders reportedly were former members
of Fatah.
Libya
has initiated contacts with Hizballah members in
Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. Libya reportedly
has asked Hizballah to provide security should the
Libyan People's Bureau in Beirut be reopened.
Transit
Beirut's role as a land, air, and sea transportation hub
for terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and
Europe also reflects its pre-civil-war status as the
leading international transit point within the Middle
East. The city is only about three hours by road from
Damascus and within easy access of major Palestinian
and Shiite strongholds in the Bekaa Valley. By air,
Beirut is only four hours from Paris, and travel time
to other European capitals is even less. Beirut's
unregulated ports give terrorist groups and state
supporters an easy and untraceable way to move
personnel, weapons, and logistics between Lebanon
and key points elsewhere in the Middle East, as well
as to Europe.
Table 1
Air Travel Time From Beirut
to Selected Cities
3 30
1 OS
1 20
Only Middle East Airlines (MEA), the Lebanese-flag
carrier, flies a regular schedule out of Beirut to a
variety of European and Middle Eastern cities. Syrian
Arab Airlines flies weekly between Damascus and
Beirut, but no other Arab or Western airline services
Lebanon. Aeroflot and three East European airlines
fly to Beirut once a week. Three Western airlines
(British Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair) and two
African airlines have arrangements with MEA where-
in MEA provides aircraft and flightcrews for flights
between Europe and Beirut.
Security at Beirut International Airport is controlled
by Amal There are no indica-
tions that any meaningful attempt has been made to
hinder terrorist use of the airport. The airport is
surrounded by Shia Muslim slums in which pro-
Iranian extremists operate virtually at will and the
radical Hizballah organization is strong in most of the
areas adjacent to the airport. Approximately 15 per-
cent of all skyjackings that have occurred outside the
United States during the past 15 years began, passed
through, or ended at the Beirut airport, far exceeding
the number of incidents at any other airport (see
appendixes A and B). May Mansour, who placed the
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Table 2
Air Carriers That Fly Into/Out of
Beirut International Airport
Airline Flights
Per Week
bomb that exploded aboard TWA flight 840 and
killed four Americans last April, flew from Beirut to
Cairo. She boarded flight 840 in Cairo and flew to
Athens, leaving the bomb under the seat when she left
the aircraft. Mansour returned to Beirut from Athens.
Seven ports-two official and five unofficial-serve
Beirut and are operated by Christian, Shia, and
Druze militias. Nearly all terrorist groups have access
to the sea through arrangements with the proprietors
of these ports. Although most terrorists apparently
travel in and out of Beirut by air or land, the ports
probably are used for the importation of large ship-
ments of weapons, as well as narcotics and other
contraband.
Beirut is particularly important as a transit point for
terrorists traveling to the Bekaa Valley for training at
various facilities there. Land access to Beirut from the
north and east is controlled almost exclusively by
Syria. Terrorists frequently use the Beirut-Damascus
highway when traveling out of Lebanon to Syria.
t e contmumg sectarian con tcts, t e
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history of Palestinian guerrilla activity, foreign in-
volvement, and the decline in government authority
since 1975 have combined to turn Beirut into an
"open market" for weapons.
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general availability and the relative lack of govern-
ment control on arms possession facilitate the pro-
curement of terrorist weapons. The enormously large
number and diversity of weapons captured by the
Israelis in 1982 illustrate the magnitude of the flow of
covert weapons into Lebanon.
Recent arms shipments to the Lebanese Government
suggest a high level of weapons "seepage" to the illicit
arms market and probably to terrorists:
? The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have purchased
more than 50,000 assault rifles and 1,100 machine-
guns in the last 10 years, suggesting that Lebanon
has had to completely replace its small-arms inven-
tory at least once because of loss or theft. Many of
these weapons are likely to have found their way
into the hands of terrorists.
? The LAF has also purchased large quantities of
grenades, ammunition, explosives, and antitank
rockets and launchers from Western and Bloc sup-
pliers since 1980. Some of the materiel has probably
reached Beirut's arms market.
The Libyan Government reportedly has provided
large shipments of arms and ammunition through the
Beirut port of Khaldah for several Palestinian organi-
zations. The USSR also provides weapons to Leba-
nese militias, either indirectly through the Syrians or
directly through the ports. Other weapons are smug- 25X1
gled in by Lebanese returning to Beirut from abroad.
Financial Linkages to Terrorism
Beirut has emerged in recent years as a financial
center for aiding terrorists. The principal financial
agent appears to be Libya, which funnels money
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Table 3
Lebanon: Air Serrice To/From Beirut
Country
City
Airline
Flights
Per Week
Bahrain
Bahrain
Middle East Airlines
2
Belgium
Brussels
Middle East Airlines
1
Bulgaria
Sofia
Balkan (Bulgaria)
1
Cyprus
Larnaca
Middle East Airlines
6
Czechoslovakia
Bratislavia
CSA (Czechoslovakia)
1
Frague
CSA (Czechoslovakia)
1
Denmark
Copenhagen
Middle East Airlines
1
Egypt
Cairo
Middle East Airlines
4
France
Nice
Middle East Airlines
1
Paris
Middle East Airlines
2
Germany, East
East Berlin
Interflug
1
Germany, West
Frankfurt
Middle East Airlines
1
Middle East Airlines/Lufthansa
1
Greece
Athens
Middle East Airlines
5
India
Bombay
CSA (Czechoslovakia)
1
Indonesia
Jakarta
CSA (Czechoslovakia)
1
Italy
Milan
Middle East Airlines
2
Rome
Middle East Airlines
2
Jordan
Amman
Middle East Airlines
3
Kuwait
Kuwait
Middle East Airlines
2
Liberia
Monrovia
Middle East Airlines
1
Nigeria
Kano
Middle East Airlines/Nigeria Air
1
Oman
Muscat
Middle East Airlines
2
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Chronology ojTerrorist-Related
Use of Ports in the Beirut Vicinity,
May 1985 to October 1986
? In June 1985 aLibyan-flag vessel unloaded arms
and ammunition at Khaldah port, probably for use
by Palestinians in the refugee camps in Beirut.
? In July 1985 one Cypriot and one Greek ship were
reported to have delivered Soviet-originated arms
to Fatah loyalists through the port of Khaldah.
? During August 1985 an unnamed Syrian vessel
delivered a variety ojSoviet-made weapons to
Amal fighters, then engaged infighting with Pales-
tinians in Beirut refugee camps, via the port of
Awza `i.
? During late August 1985 the Israeli naval forces
(INF) intercepted the yacht Casselredit at sea be-
tween Cyprus and Lebanon. Aboard was a Force 17
squad.
? In October 1985 weapons for pro-Arafat Palestin-
ians were found in containers marked food at
Khaldah.
through Beirut banks to support a variety of militias,
groups, and individuals in Lebanon and elsewhere.
Iran also disburses millions of 25X1
dollars each year to the Hizballah operating in Beirut.
We believe that only a small portion of the money is
spent by these entities on terrorist operations, howev-
er, and that the bulk is expended on arms, salaries,
and refugee aid, among other things.
Since the US freeze of Libyan assets, Tripoli has had
to replace US banks as the principal intermediaries
for Libyan funding of terrorism.
Libyan Government accounts in the Arab-
Libyan Tunisian Bank (ALTB~60 percent of which
is owned by Libya-have been used to transfer funds
to groups, such as the Abu Musa and Saiqa, and to
some individuals who, we believe, are involved in
terrorism. The bank's location probably provides
proximity and ease of transfer to known terrorist bank
accounts at commercial banks in Damascus, Cyprus,
and Paris.
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Documentation
Although Beirut is by no means the only place where
terrorist groups can obtain false documentation, the 25X1
absence of effective government authority ensures
that the manufacturing and sale of such material can
proceed unimpeded. Although some groups produce
false documents only for terrorist operations, other
organizations sell such documentation on the black
market to any individual able to pay their asking
price:
? In July 1986 the INF intercepted the Cypriot-Rag
vessel Anton with.five Fatah persons aboard while
in transit from Cyprus to Khaldah.
? On 30 August 1986 the INF once again intercepted
a vessel in transit from Cyprus to Khaldah. Aboard
were approximately 200 each RPGs, RPKs, and
Kalishnikovs, along with a speedboat, all intended
for pro-Arafat personnel in the refugee camps in
Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre
Communications
Beirut has long been an international news media
center. It has become a communications center for
many Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, whose 25X1
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spokesmen call Beirut news agencies or the Voice of
Lebanon to assert responsibility for terrorist attacks
and to issue threats against their chosen enemies.
Although some of these claims are authentic, many of
them represent attempts by groups seeking to take
advantage of others' "successes." Most of the inci-
dents for which credit is claimed via the media in
Beirut occur outside Lebanon. The number of extrem-
ists of various stripes living in the area and the lack of
any investigative authority contribute to the ease with
which terrorists can use Beirut to communicate with a
wider international audience:
? The Hizballah cell holding the US and French
hostages, under the covername Islamic Jihad, al-
ways releases statements, threats, photos, and video-
tapes to news agencies in Beirut.
? The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
(LARF) always issues communiques in Beirut to
claim responsibility for its attacks. It sometimes
duplicates those claims in other countries. LARF
has also used the media in Beirut to issue threats
against the French and Italian Governments.
? The Unified Nasserite Organization-believed to be
affiliated with Libya-issued a press statement to a
Beirut newspaper claiming responsibility for the
August 1986 attack on the British airbase at Akro-
tiri, Cyprus.
? Abu Nidal, using the covername Arab Fedayeen
Cells, claimed responsibility in Beirut for the 1985
attacks at the El Al ticket counters at the airports in
Rome and Vienna.
? Following the hijacking of the Egyptair flight from
Cairo in November 1985, Abu Nidal and the
"Organization of Egypt's Revolutionaries" issued a
joint communique in Beirut claiming responsibility
for the incident.
? Abu Nidal has used the Voice of Lebanon to issue
threats against King Hussein and Yasir Arafat.
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Appendix A
Hijackings Involving Beirut International Airport
14 June 1985 TWA flight 847 from Athens to Rome was diverted to Beirut. After two round
trips to Algiers, during which some hostages were released and a US Navy
serviceman was murdered, elements of Hizballah and Amal took control of the
operation in Beirut. The rest of the hostages were released on 30 June through the
intercession of the Syrian Government.
4 December 1984
31 July
21 July
A Palestinian protesting the hijacking of a Jordanian flight the previous day seized
a plane on aBeirut-to-Cyprus flight after it landed in Larnaca, Cyprus. He was
talked out of the hijacking by authorities.
Six gunmen from the "Suicide Brigade Imam al-Sadr" stormed a Jordanian
airliner while it was on the ground at the Beirut airport and forced the crew to fly
to Cyprus, Italy, and back to Beirut before releasing the passengers and blowing
up the plane.
A lone gunman commandeered a Middle East Airlines flight from Beirut to
Jiddah. The plane continued to Jiddah where the hijacker was persuaded to
surrender.
A Lebanese Druze, protesting the high cost of living, seized an aircraft on the
ground in Beirut and forced it to fty to Larnaca and then back to Beirut, where he
came under the protection of Druze leader Walid Junblatt. One person was killed
and seven wounded.
A group of Shias from the Musa Sadr Brigade seized a Cypriot airliner at the Bei-
rut airport and demanded that the Cypriot Government release two colleagues
held for an earlier hijacking. Apparently, after receiving the assurances sought,
they departed the plane. The Cypriots later released the two prisoners.
The four Lebanese Shias who hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner from Dubayy to Tehran
began their mission from the Beirut airport. Two Americans were killed in Tehran
by the hijackers.
Radical Shias diverted an Air France flight from Frankfurt to Beirut before
heading to Tehran, where they released their hostages and blew up the plane's
flight deck.
An Abu Dhabi-to-Beirut flight was hijacked by a Lebanese Shia who demanded
to hold a press conference to denounce the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.
24 February 1982 Terrorists from the Musa Sadr Brigade commandeered a Kuwaiti airliner in
Beirut.
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7 December 1981 A Libyan flight from Zurich to Tripoli was hijacked by Amal members
demanding information concerning the Imam Musa Sadr. The plane was forced to
fly to Beirut, Athens, Rome, and back to Beirut.
24 July 1980 Two Jordanians, attempting to collect a debt from a Kuwaiti merchant, hijacked a
Kuwait Airways Beirut-to-Kuwait flight to Bahrain, then to Tehran.
10 March
31 January
A man with a toy pistol attempted to hijack an Amman-to-Beirut flight to focus
attention on the Imam Musa Sadr's disappearance in Libya in 1978.
Three Lebanese Shias armed with pistols and grenades were arrested at the Beirut
airport trying to board a flight to Paris.
28 January Alone hijacker diverted to Beirut a Middle East Airlines flight leaving Baghdad.
He was arrested by Lebanese authorities after he read a statement about the
disappearance of the Imam Musa Sadr.
18 January A Shia gunman demanding the return of the Imam Musa Sadr attempted to divert
a Middle East Airlines flight to Tehran. After allowing the plane to land in Beirut
for refueling, he surrendered to Lebanese authorities.
7 September 1979 An Alitalia Tehran-to-Rome flight was hijacked by three Lebanese Shia students
demanding information about the Imam Musa Sadr.
16 January Six Lebanese Shias demanding the release of the Imam Musa Sadr hijacked a
Middle East Airlines plane in Beirut and diverted it to Jordan and Cyprus.
6 May 1978 A Swiss woman planning to hijack aZurich-to-Cairo flight was arrested after
receiving explosives in the transit lounge at the Beirut airport. She had planned to
demand the release of Palestinian terrorists.
8 July 1977 Six Palestinians demanding the release of 300 prisoners in Arab jails hijacked a
British Midlands plane bound from Beirut to Kuwait.
19 March
Two Arabs hijacked to Kuwait a Middle East Airlines flight en route from Beirut
to Baghdad. After the plane landed in Kuwait, government commandos overpow-
ered the skyjackers.
Two Turks diverted to Beirut a Turkish airliner on a domestic flight. Upon
landing, they surrendered to authorities.
4 October 1975 Four Palestinian terrorists killed three and wounded 14 while trying to hijack a
plane bound from Beirut to Cairo.
Six Palestinians reportedly belonging to the PFLP were arrested while attempting
to smuggle weapons and explosives aboard a KLM aircraft in Beirut.
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3 March 1974
27 April 1973
29 October 1972
16 September
8 September
10 September 1970
9 September
22 July
22 June
9 January
Two men claiming membership in the Palestine Liberation Army and demanding
release of terrorists held in Athens hijacked a British Airways flight out of Beirut
and forced it to land in Amsterdam.
Two Palestinians and one Lebanese about to board an Air France flight from
Beirut to Nice were arrested after their luggage was found to contain explosives
and timing devices.
A Lufthansa flight from Beirut was hijacked and forced to fly to Munich, Nicosia,
Zagreb, and Tripoli by two Palestinians who demanded and obtained the release
from West German imprisonment of the surviving members of the Black
September terrorist group that had conducted the Munich Olympics massacre.
A Beirut-to-Cairo flight was hijacked to Libya by Palestinians seeking political
asylum.
Lebanese sky marshals prevented a member of Fatah from hijacking aBeirut-to-
Amman flight.
A Fatah lieutenant was granted political asylum in Libya after hijacking aBeirut-
to-Amman flight.
Three Arabs attempting to hijack aBeirut-to-Cairo flight were overpowered by
security officers.
A Bombay-to-London flight was diverted to Beirut and then to Jordan by three
PFLP members demanding the release of other PFLP members from prison.
A Beirut-to-Athens flight was hijacked by six Palestinians from the Popular
Struggle Front who demanded release of comrades in Greek jails.
An Albanian-born American hijacked to Cairo aBeirut-Rome-New York flight
to protest US involvement in Vietnam.
A lone gunman diverted aParis-to-Rome flight to Beirut to protest US assistance
to Israel.
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Appendix B
Other Terrorist Activities Involving
Beirut International Airport
May Mansour flew from Beirut to Cairo where she boarded TWA flight 840. She
disembarked in Athens, after leaving a bomb on the plane. Mansour returned to
Lebanon via Beirut International Airport.
December 1985 One of the Abu Nidal operatives involved in the Vienna airport attack flew from
Beirut to West Germany and then to Budapest, where he took a train to Vienna.
1 September
9 June
23 May
of the British Airways office there on 25 September.
American University of Beirut official Thomas Sutherland was kidnaped by
several carloads of gunmen after arriving at the airport.
A French journalist and researcher was kidnaped while driving into Beirut from
the airport.
Fall 1984 Fatah loyalists began reentering Lebanon via the airport. Personnel working at the
airport have reportedly assisted Palestinian operatives entering and leaving
Lebanon.
18 November A. Lebanese Shia terrorist carrying explosives in his luggage was arrested in
Zurich after arriving from Beirut on a Middle East Airlines flight. He was linked
to seven Lebanese arrested in Rome on 24 November for conspiring to bomb the
US Embassy.
25 July 1983
February 1982
February 1980
6 May 1977
13 November 1975
Armenian terrorists flew from Beirut to Lisbon where they took part in the seizure
of the Turkish Embassy.
European dissidents traveled to Beirut for training in Palestinian camps. Many
instances of such travel have been reported.
Numerous members of Latin American insurgent groups were spotted flying to
Beirut for meetings and possible training with Palestinian groups.
A Norwegian was arrested when explosives were found in his luggage. He was en
route to Frankfurt.
Two members of the Palestinian group Saiqa held five persons hostage at the Pan
Am hangar, demanding jeeps and trucks.
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29 June 1975 Two US businessmen were kidnaped from a taxi en route from the airport to
downtown Beirut. They were released four days later minus their money and
passports.
28 April 1973 Palestinians placed a bomb in an airport restroom to force the release of three ter-
rorists arrested the day before for a hijacking attempt at the airport.
5 October 1970 Forty-three Palestinian guerrillas held an airport official hostage until they
received guarantees that they would not be forced to leave Lebanon.
25X1'
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Secret
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