USSR-COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES: CAUTIOUSLY INCREASING CONTACTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00799R000200230005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP88T00799R000200230005-1
Seer+r--
USSR-Communist Party of the
Philippines: Cautiously
Increasing Contacts
SOV L 'R 87-008.r/s
October 1987
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/11: CIA-RDP88T00799R000200230005-1
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USSR-Communist Party of the Philippines: Cautiously
Increasing Contacts
Information as of September 1987 was used in this report.
In the last year, the Soviet Union has cautiously
increased its contacts with the Maoist Communist Party of
the Philippines, the country's largest Communist party. The
party, which grew from a split in the Philippine Communist
movement in 1968, has historically been anti-Soviet and
strongly self-reliant. Over the last several years,
however, and especially during the last year, the party
reportedly has decided to seek financial aid from other
countries and to moderate its criticism of the Soviet Union.
Perhaps because they are aware that there is still
resistance within the party to establishing direct ties with
Moscow, the Soviets have tried to establish indirect links
to the party through its labor front-group. We believe that
Moscow has not moved to provide direct financial or military
aid to the party or to its military wing, and that it is
unlikely to do so in the near future. The Soviets are
likely, however, to gradually increase indirect funding to
the party through its labor front group or through third
countries.
in the last year
the Soviet Union has cautiously increased its contacts with
the historically anti-Soviet Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP). (1)
--Soviet and Philippine party representatives
reportedly discussed the possibility of expanded
relations in February at a Soviet-arranged meeting in
Hanoi between the party and the small pro-Moscow
Philippine Communist Party. The Soviets reportedly
said that they would offer the Communist Party of the
Philippines moral and financial, but?not military,
support to help achieve the removal of US bases from
the Philippines.
--Soviet and Philippine party representatives also
reportedly met in June at a cultural conference in
Cuba. The Soviet delegation reportedly agreed to
help the party with aid shipped through Vietnam.
They offered no specific details, however, and the
Philippine delegation reportedly felt the assurances
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of support were merely lip service.
--A Soviet student front group reportedly invited a
Philippine student representative who is also a party
member to attend a meeting in Moscow in September
1987, reportedly to speak with Soviet party
representatives.
Vietnam in a favorable light.
Changes in the Party's Attitude toward Foreign Support
Until recently, the Communist Party of the Philippines
rejected the notion of accepting outside support because it
wanted to be seen as a totally indigenous movement. The
party was able to rely almost entirely on arms captured or
stolen within the Philippines to supply its military wing.
In recent years, however, there has been increasing evidence
that the party has begun to seek arms outside the country--
arms captures have failed to keep pace with the insurgents'
growing strength. In addition, the party appears to be
considering better relations with the Soviets, whom the
party had previously branded as revisionists:
--The party politburo reportedly decided after its
March 1987 meeting to intensify diplomatic efforts
overseas to obtain aid and will work to establish
relations with all communist parties in order to
broaden the "anti-imperialist" camp.
--The party now reportedly regards the Soviet Union as
"socialist" rather than "imperialist", although
Moscow commits acts of aggression and military
intervention in the affairs of foreign states that
are "imperialist" in nature. The party will try to
foster better relations by publishing factual
accounts of events that cast the Soviet Union and
Despite this change in approach, resistance still
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exists in the party to expanded ties with the Soviet Union,
especially among old guard party leaders. Party founder
Jose Sison, Chairman Rodolfo Salas, and Secretary General
Rafael Baylosis reportedly have vigorously opposed in the
past any contact with Moscow, and the decision to consider
the Soviet Union a socialist country was approved only by a
narrow margin in the politburo.
Perhaps because they are aware that there is still
resistance within the party to establishing direct ties with
Moscow, the Soviets have also tried to establish indirect
links with the party through its labor front group, the KMU.
The Soviets have been courting the KMU through the world
Federation of Trade Unions, a Soviet front group. The
Federation invited KMU president Crispin Beltran to a labor
meeting in Moscow in February, and has responded positively
to reported KMU interest in becoming a Federation affiliate.
Some Philippine labor leaders reportedly believe that the
Federation helped to fund Beltran's Senate campaign earlier
this year. The Soviets also reportedly have requested that
pro-Soviet Philippine Communists coordinate their labor
activities as closely as possible with the KMU--a move
designed to curry favor with the KMU.
The Soviets may also be using third parties to
establish contacts with the Communist Party of the
Philippines.
reportedly have been acting as a surrogate for the Soviets
in providing funding for pro-Soviet Philippine Communists
since 1981.
Avoiding Military Aid
Although the Philippine media has abounded with
reports of Soviet aid and training for the insurgents in
recent months, it is believed that Moscow has not yet moved
to provide military aid to the party or its military wing.
The Soviets would be unlikely to risk damaging their
relations with the Aquino government or intensifying
Philippine military concern about the insurgency by sending
military aid that could be traced to Moscow.
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would not be easily traceable to foreign sources.
obtain ammunition inside the Philippines. Such arms also
Moscow is expected to continue to pursue contacts with
the party and to encourage cooperation between the party and
pro-Soviet Philippine Communists. The Soviets for now are
likely to continue funding the party indirectly through its
front groups or through third countries. Eventually the
Soviets might consider supplying the insurgents with
military aid through a socialist client state such as
Vietnam, with which the insurgents reportedly have had
contact. Most Vietnamese aid, however, probably would come
from Vietnam's large stock of captured US weapons, with
which the insurgents are familiar and for which they could
in the Philippines, and have increased their contacts with
labor unions and anti-US groups. Moscow also may believe
that the party's influence is not yet great enough to make
it worth ieopardizing relations with the Aquino aovernment-
Aquino to pursue their goal of the removal of'the US bases
Moscow probably will be careful not to expand its
relations with the party to the extent of alarming the
Aquino government, with which the Soviets have cordial
relations. The Soviets have taken advantage of good
relations with the government and the freer atmosphere under
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regulars and 40,000 militia.
1. Doctrinal differences in the Philippine Communist
Movement split the movement in 1968 into two factions--a
pro-Soviet faction and the Maoist, anti-Soviet Communist
Party of the Philippines. The pro-Soviet faction, with
which Moscow maintains party-to-party ties, has renounced
armed struggle and accepted amnesty from the Philippine
government. It has drifted into relative obscurity. The
Communist Party of the Philippines and its military wing,
the New People's Army, have for the past twenty years waged
war against the Philippine government. The party reportedly
has 45,000 members; the army reportedly has 17-24.00
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Secret -
Secret
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