CUBA: PROTECTING THE ARMED FORCES FROM AUSTERITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000300290001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba: Protecting the Armed
Forces From Austerity
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
ALA 86-10030
June 1986
Copy 398
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba: Protecting the Armed
Forces From Austerity
An Intelligence Assessment
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This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American
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Analysis
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. Comments and queries
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are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief,
Middle America Caribbean Division, ALA
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Secret
ALA 86-10030
June 1986
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Scope Note
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Cuba: Protecting the Armed
Forces From Austerity
This paper examines the pressures on the Castro regime to reduce military
expenditures as a result of Cuba's deteriorating economic situation. It
examines the fragmentary evidence of limited spending cuts noted inter-
mittently in 1985 and evaluates the possible types of cutbacks that Castro
may institute in an effort to limit the impact of austerity on the military. It
also assesses the impact of any spending limitations on the Cuban armed
forces and assesses the implications for the United States.
111
Secret
ALA 86-10030
June 1986
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 April 1986
was used in this report
Cuba: Protecting the Armed
Forces From Austerity
The deterioration of Cuba's economy since 1982 has forced Cuba to impose
wide-ranging austerity measures. Although most of these actions have been
directed at the civilian sector, there is evidence that some limited spending
cuts were undertaken by the military in early 1985. So far, however, these
cuts have had no significant impact on the operational capabilities of the
Cuban armed forces, nor are there present indications of military plans for
additional cuts that would significantly affect internal defense or Castro's
ability to project power into areas of US foreign policy concern.
The issue of spending cuts probably will continue to arise in Castro's inner
circle, however, as Havana is likely to face economic difficulties for some
time. Cuba is unlikely to earn enough hard currency to replace aid
shortfalls, and its prospects for persuading Moscow substantially to
increase economic aid to Cuba remain doubtful. The Castro regime is
therefore likely to examine which categories of military spending?
construction, personnel, procurement, operations and maintenance, or
overseas activity?it can best afford to cut back.
Even if major adjustments are not made, there are a number of areas
where relatively easy savings can be realized. Cuts in military construction
appear to offer Havana the most attractive means to hold down spending?
most of the major airfield, naval base, and underground bunker construc-
tion projects initiated since the mid-1970s have been completed or are
nearing completion. In addition, Havana probably will continue to accom-
plish limited savings by retiring ineffective personnel or transferring them
to the militia and by reducing benefits for personnel on active duty.
Cutbacks in these two areas are not likely to have a significant impact on
the military's capabilities.
From a foreign policy perspective, the issue of funding the Cuban military
involves not only the defense of Cuba but also Havana's ability to project
power abroad. Perhaps the least palatable cuts for the Castro regime would
be reductions in the level of Cuban support for Marxist regimes in Angola
or Nicaragua?unless such a move followed a victory for Havana's allies.
Castro repeatedly has emphasized his support for these governments, and
he recently warned Washington not to underestimate his tenacity in
defending them.
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As a result of the major expansion and modernization that has taken place
in the armed forces since the mid-1970s, Cuba's military capabilities and
operational readiness are at an alltime high. We do not expect the present
economic setbacks to affect seriously the ability of the Castro regime to
maintain and operate the large numbers of modern fighters, missiles, tanks,
armored vehicles, and naval combatants that have been added to the
Cuban inventory. However, there is evidence suggesting that the cycle of
record Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba, which has been under way since the
beginning of this decade, may have begun to level off.
If, as we expect, economic problems continue over the longer term, the
Castro regime ultimately may find it necessary to reduce the number of its
troops on active duty. Personnel reductions pose a difficult problem for
Havana, however, because they most clearly highlight the conflict between
the size of military force the Castro regime believes it should have and
what it can reasonably afford. We believe it will be in this area, rather than
procurement?which is paid for almost entirely by the Soviets?that
decisions on how to allocate Cuban military spending will be the most
contentious. However, in our view, Cuba's economic conditions will not
cause a repetition of the severe reduction of Cuba's armed forces that
occurred during the early 1970s. The economic dislocations in Cuba today
are not as severe as they were then, and relations with the Soviets are mo-
derating?after a period of apparent disharmony over the past two years.
Only if the expected decline in the Cuban economy is accompanied by a
drop in Soviet aid to well below 1985 levels?an unlikely eventuality,
considering the recent rapprochement between the two countries?would
we expect to see indications of the kind of sustained cutbacks that could se-
riously affect military capabilities: reduced flying or ship steaming hours,
sharp reductions in exercise activity, shortfalls in fuel or other consum-
ables, or severe undermanning of some units. Fragmentary evidence of
some of these developments was seen in 1985 but
may have reflected temporary rather than permanent measures.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
hi
Key Judgments
V
Introduction
I
Pressures for Reducing Military Costs 1
Limits on Soviet Aid 1
Cuts in Cuban Military Expenditures 2
Cutbacks. . . and Contrary Indicators 2
Military Spending Flexibility 4
Military Construction 5
Personnel 5
Operations and Maintenance 10
Internationalist Activity 13
Procurement 1 3
Outlook and Implications for the United States 14
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Gulf
of
Mexico
United ,
States ry Miami
(it
Strarts
HAVANA
Anto
Mariel de los Banos
San Oio
Airfield
*.
San Julien
Airfield?, _ ^,
,Cienfuegos
'
NASSAU
\,?
The
Bahamas
North
Atlantic
Ocean
'Camaguey
---
Cayman Islands
(U.K.)
Caribbean Sea
100 Kilometers
r' I
0 100 Miles
Santiago
de Cuba
Guantanamo
(U.S. Naval ease)
(----\\ Jamaica- --
Haiti
-KINGSTON
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
707942 (A04704) 6-86
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Cuba: Protecting the Armed
Forces From Austerity
Introduction
In late 1984, the Cuban Government?evidently
motivated by a cap on Soviet economic assistance?
publicly announced an economic austerity program
and began imposing strictures on many state organi-
zations. The new economic austerity measures an-
nounced by the Castro regime did not address mili-
tary spending, but measures to streamline the officer
25X1 corps and reduce fringe benefits were subsequently
reported . Spot shortages of fuel
and supplies at some military installations were also
noted intermittently in 1985. These temporary disrup-
tions, coupled with an apparent drop in Soviet mili-
tary shipments to Cuba last year, raise questions
about the impact that austerity could have on the
growth and effectiveness of the Cuban military in the
late 1980s.
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This is not the first time Castro has had to face the is-
sues of poor economic performance and its effect on
military capabilities. In the early 1970s, the severe
economic problems caused by a disastrous sugar
harvest led to a major reduction in the size of the
armed forces, in both manpower and bases. Not until
the mid-to-late 1970s?after a period of relatively
good economic performance because of higher sugar
prices and following Cuba's successful military inter-
ventions in Angola and Ethiopia?did the Cuban
armed forces resume a pattern of growth.
Pressures for Reducing Military Costs
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Limits on Soviet Aid
The Cuban military is affected directly and indirectly
by the amount of Soviet assistance provided to the
Castro regime. Virtually all of Cuba's major weapons
originate in the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact
countries. Because this equipment and the associated
spare parts are provided by the Soviets free of charge,
it is Mosc6w that decides the quantity and complexity
of weapons that Cuba will receive. In addition to
1
Soviet military assistance, the volume of economic aid
from Moscow affects the Cuban armed forces through
its impact on the Cuban economy. Soviet economic
assistance to Cuba comes in three forms: oil deliveries
to compensate for Cuba's chronic energy shortage, the
purchase of Cuban sugar at a fixed price well above
the world market rate, and a variety of soft trade
credits and grants. Only the last category is officially
counted as debt by the Soviets.
It has been clear for some time that the Soviet
leadership is unhappy with the rising cost of support-
ing the Castro regime,
For example, Cuba's unpaid debt
to the Soviet Union?estimated at sonic $13-20
billion?is described by the US Interests Section in
Havana as the largest per capita debt burden carried
by any Third World country to a single creditor.
Despite preferential prices paid by the Soviets for
Cuban products, the level of debt has not diminished.
In fact, during the last five years, it has increased by
some $6.5 billion, according to a Cuban defector.
Cuba's apparent inability to get its economic house in
order?a point underscored by this unabated rise in
debt?may have provoked the Soviet Government's
decision to cap economic aid at 1981-85 levels that
have averaged $4.5 billion per year.
there is no evidence that the Soviets plan to
impose similar restraints on the level of military aid
they provide the Cubans. We believe that Moscow's
arms deliveries to Cuba depend principally on Soviet
and Cuban perceptions of the military threat to
Castro and power projection needs rather than on any
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calculation of Havana's ability to pay. Although
Soviet arms deliveries have fallen off some 40 percent
from the record high levels of the early 1980s?
dropping from an average of 58,000 metric tons per
year during the period 1981-84 to only 34,000 tons
last year?they remain well above the 18,000- to
20,000-ton level that was common during the previous
decade.
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Cuts in Cuban Military Expenditures
Very little is known about the Cuban defense budget
or about costs within the Cuban armed forces. Be-
cause Cuba acquires virtually all of its major weapons
systems and most of its military-associated equipment
and spare parts at no cost from the USSR, Cuba's
own outlays are limited to personnel-related expendi-
tures, costs incurred from the construction of military
facilities, operations and maintenance expenses, and,
to a lesser extent, the procurement of small arms,
ammunition, and military-associated equipment from
non-Soviet sources. 25X1
An item that purports to cover "defense and law
enforcement" has been published in the official state
budget of Cuba each year since the mid-1970s. In
January 1986, Cuban officials announced that the
declared budget for defense and law enforcement
would be cut from $1.60 billion to $1.42 billion in
1986, representing a drop of some 11 percent from
1985. While there is no direct correlation necessarily
between the declared military budget and actual
military spending, the announcement strongly sug-
gests that the military, which thus far has been
largely sheltered from spending cuts, may be obligat-
ed to share in some of the hardships associated with
Cuba's worsening economic conditions.
Cutbacks .. . And Contrary Indicators
The first indications that the military had initiated
limited austerity measures were seen shortly after
Castro announced his "economic war" against waste
and mismanagement in December 1984. Although the
evidence noted intermittently throughout much of
1985 is fragmentary, the measures seem aimed at
cutting some personnel costs and conserving energy.
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Table 1
Declared Military and Law Enforcement
Budget, 1980-86
Billion US $
Share of Total
Budget (percent)
1980
1.1
8
1981
1.2
8
1982
1.1
9
1983
1.3
11
1984
1.4
10
1985
1.6
13
1986
1.4
11
Cuban Min-
ister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro launched a
campaign early last year to streamline the officer
corps and improve the efficiency of the armed forces
by retiring ineffective senior officers or transferring
them to the Territorial Militia (MTT). The govern-
ment's austerity program and its effect on the military
budget were specifically cited as reasons for reducing
the number of officers drawing full salary,
Later reportini
confirmed that the unpaid Territorial
Militia had become a dumping ground for disgruntled
or incompetent officers. Other reliable information
has described similar measures initiated in the Cuban
army during early 1985 to retire ineffective personnel,
primarily reservists. Although the small number of
personnel involved in these reductions?probably only
a few hundred?will not significantly affect overall
manning levels, the actions may represent the initial
steps in a cost-effectiveness prograirl
Other signs of limited belt-tightening have also been
seen. Raul Castro announced last year that impending
budget cuts would force officers to accept a reduction
in benefits.
a number of
benefits were cut for active-duty army personnel. Free
medicine was no longer available, special prices on
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Force Reductions in the Early 1970s
The Cuban armed forces have gone through four
distinct phases of development. From 1959 to 1965,
they were in a period of consolidation, when Castro
secured his command over the revolution and estab-
lished internal control mechanisms. From 1965 to
1970, the military underwent a period of expansion,
when the armed forces were enlarged and attempts
were made to extend the revolution to other Latin
American countries. From 1970 to 1975, Havana
undertook a period of rationalization, when the
armed forces were cut to less extravagant dimensions.
From 1975 until the present, the Cuban armed forces
have undergone a period of extensive moderniza-
tion?substantially improving the quality of their
weaponry?while at the same time launching a series
of overseas adventures in support of Marxist regimes.
The reduction of Cuba's armed forces that began in
1970 followed the catastrophic failure of the Castro
regime to achieve its unrealistic goal of a 10-million-
ton sugar harvest that year and the ensuing Soviet
criticism of the size of Havana's military establish-
ment. Cuba's Ground Forces bore the brunt of the
reduction. Ground Forces personnel were reduced in
the early 1970s some 50 to 60 percent?in line with
the view of the Deputy Chief of the Cuban General
Staff that the size of the armed forces in peacetime
should be no more than 2 percent of the population.
Of this, no more than 30 to 35 percent of personnel
were to be regular troops and the rest reservists. In
addition, the Frontier Brigade?the Cuban unit de-
ployed opposite the US naval base at Guantanamo?
was reduced and its components consolidated into
other ground force units. At least two military
schools were closed, air defense artillery units were
disbanded or transferred to the reserves, and many
ground force weapons were put into long-term stor-
age. Although the Air and Air Defense Force suffered
the deactivation of about one-third of their surface-
to-air missile sites, including virtually all those in
eastern Cuba, no aircrqft were withdrawn from active
service.
Offsetting measures were taken to minimize the
impact of these cuts on the military's capabilities.
For example, to compensate for the reduction of
surface-to-air missile forces, a number of fighter
aircraft were transferred to eastern Cuba. Personnel
cutbacks were partially offset by an increase in the
ready reserves and the passage in 1973 of a compul-
sory service law that gave the military access to more
highly qualified personnel than it had previously been
able to attract.
clothing and appliances were discontinued, and allot-
ments of tobacco products were terminated.
In addition to the modest savings
effected by these measures, they may serve a symbolic
purpose in showing civilians that military personnel
are bearing their fair share of austerity-induced cut-
backs. 25X1
In addition to personnel-related measures, evidence of
limited cuts in operations and maintenance spending
was noted sporadically last year.
3
Sharp cutbacks also reportedly were ordered
in Eastern Army spending late last year. However, we
cannot establish whether these episodes resulted from
genuine or continuing shortfalls; fuel reductions, for
example, may simply reflect the transfer of some units
to new bases or the inefficiency of the Cuban distribu-
tion system. The Eastern Army cutbacks came at the
end of an annual budget cycle and may have reflected
a severe but temporary situation. In any case, while
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Coping With Cutbacks
We believe Havana will try in various ways to
forestall the necessity for meaningful military reduc-
tions. Such an approach would involve trying to
improve hard currency earnings while simultaneously
pressing Moscow to exempt the Cuban military from
aid cuts. If these efforts fail, Cuba could try to cope
by reallocating existing funds to minimize damage to
its military capabilities. 25X1
Bleak prospects for rapid improvement in the domes-
tic economy appear to have prompted the Castro
regime to adopt a more conciliatory tone toward the
Soviets as a means of persuading them to be more
generous with aid. Despite the apparent disharmony
between Havana and Moscow during the past two
years?punctuated by Soviet criticism of Cuba's in-
ability to meet its economic commitments and Cas-
tro's notable absence at the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance summit in June 1984 and at
Chernenko's funeral in March 1985?Castro now
appears to be taking a more moderate approach to his
Soviet sponsors in an effort to win their support. For
example, at the Third Cuban Communist Party
Congress in February 1986, the Cuban leadership
publicly emphasized the approach Moscow had been
pressing for?austerity, economic discipline, and a
priority for development over consumption.
The clearest indication that Castro might be willing
to trade greater political flexibility for a relaxation
of the Soviets' line on aid, however, came during the
Cuban leader's speech before the 27th Soviet Party
Congress in late February this year. Castro alternat-
ed between unusually effusive praise for the Soviet
party and an impassioned call for Soviet economic
assistance to the Third World?including, implicitly,
Cuba. Coming from the foremost revolutionary to
address the Soviet congress, Castro 's speech was
particularly well received, and, according to the US
Embassy in Moscow, even the Politburo seemed to
become more animated and attentive while Castro
was speaking.
Whether Castro's effective oratory at the Soviet party
congress will translate into a softening of the Soviet
position on aid, however, is by no means clear. In our
judgment, military aid from the Soviets will probably
be determined by the perceived value to the Soviets of
their military and intelligence facilities in Cuba, by
Moscow's assessment of the seriousness of the US
threat to Cuba, and by the irevailing climate in US-
Soviet arms negotiations
the shortages affected the readiness of some units, the
overall capabilities of the armed forces were not
seriously degraded.
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Meanwhile, some high-cost programs, such as fighter
operations and paramilitary construction, appear to
have continued at high levels despite an budget
pinch.
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Military Spending Flexibility
Uncertain prospects for increased Soviet aid and the
poor outlook for improvements in the domestic econo-
my make it increasingly likely, in our view, that the
Cuban leadership will come under pressure to re-
duce?or give the appearance of reducing?at least
some military expenditures. Havana can be expected
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to make every effort to shield the armed forces from
such cutbacks?particularly if they impinge upon the
readiness or effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces.
We do not believe the scale of cuts, however, will
approach the severity of the drawdowns in the early
1970s. 25X1
In deciding how to implement meaningful cost reduc-
tions, the Castro regime, in our view, has five major
categories of expenditure?military construction, per-
sonnel, operations and maintenance, overseas activi-
ties, and procurement?in which cuts can be made.
While some initial savings are possible, a review of
each category of spending shows how difficult any
more than cosmetic changes would be. In assessing
these categories, Havana will most likely try to mini-
mize the impact of any cuts on its priority military
objectives?defense of the nation against the United
States, maintenance of domestic security, and contin-
uation of Cuba's foreign policy, including overseas
military activities.
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Military Construction
In our judgment, the scheduled completion of many
major military construction projects probably affords
the Castro regime an opportunity to demonstrate
savings at little real cost?other than perhaps to defer
some additional plans. Since 1975, construction and
upgrading of military facilities have been stressed as
integral parts of the regime's expansion and modern-
ization program. Overhead imagery shows that during
this period:
? A major new airbase?including a primary pilot
training facility?has been built, additional dispers-
al airfields have been constructed, runways at most
existing bases have been extended, and hardened
aircraft shelters have been completed.
? Some 20 additional surface-to-air missile sites have
been constructed, and other sites have been modi-
fied to accommodate new missile systems.
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? Two major naval bases have been constructed since
the late 1970s, and two additional bases?including
the primary arms receiving port at Mariel?have
undergone considerable expansion.
? Ground forces construction?including improved
regimental facilities, fuel and munitions storage
areas, and field fortifications?also have been com-
pleted recently.
In our judgment, based on analysis of overhead
imagery, most of these extensive programs are sub-
stantially complete. The termination of these major
military construction projects will reduce a major
category of expenditure and afford the Castro regime
a means of significantly reducing military spending
without affecting readiness or lessening combat capa-
bilities.
Personnel
Of all major categories of military spending, person-
nel outlays pose the most difficult problem for Ha-
vana in our view because they most clearly highlight
the conflict between the size of military force the
Castro regime believes it should have and what it can
reasonably afford. In our estimation it will be in this
area?rather than procurement, which is paid for
almost entirely by the Soviets in any case?that
decisions on how to allocate Cuban military spending
will be the most contentious.
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Havana probably will be reluctant to cut armed forces
manpower because of military challenges to Cuba at
home and abroad. Judging from the scope of Cuba's
defensive military buildup, we suspect Castro per-
ceives the threat of a US invasion or attack on
Cuba?largely as a result of the situation in Central
America?to be higher than at any time since the
Cuban missile crisis. To meet this perceived threat,
the military's extensive expansion and modernization 25X1
programs since the late 1970s have created a large
and technologically rather advanced force maintained
at high readiness levels and requiring comparatively
large numbers of technically skilled personnel. As a
result of growth and modernization, the number of
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?
,
Personnel. Troops in major active-duty combat
units (air and missile forces, armor, artillery, and
infantry) probably will not undergo major reduc-
tions in the near term. If as we expect, economic
problems continue to mount, however. Havana
ultimately may find it necessary to reduce the
number of personnel on active duty.
active-duty personnel in the armed forces is some
30 percent greater than in 1975 and totals over
170,000 (see tables 2 and 3).
Table 2
Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces
and Militia, 1985
Number of persons
Total
Ground
Forces
Air and Air
Defense
Forces
Navy
Total Armed
Forces and
MTT
1,805,750
Active
In Cuba
130,750
97,000
20,250
13,500
Abroad.
40,000
33,000
7,000
Total
170,750
130,000
27,250
13,500
Ready
reserve
135,000
MTT
1,500,000
Mostly reservists on active duty.
Soviet opinion is also a factor. The Cuban presence in
Africa serves an important function for the Soviets,
and it would not be in Moscow's interest to cut back
on the number of Cuban troops in Angola, for exam-
ple, while the military balance in that country re-
mains uncertain. Even so, there is some evidence that
the Soviets believe the Cuban military establishment
overall is too large for its present budget and that in
the long run it may have to be cut back.
Moreover, unlike the situation in the early 1970s, over
40,000 Cuban military personnel are now serving
overseas in Africa and Nicaragua, maintaining a
credible role for Cuba as an important Soviet ally.
Havana needs comparatively large military forces to
meet its commitments at home and abroad, and it
probably will resist efforts initially to reduce troop
strength significantly unless it believes the threat to
Cuba and its allies has diminished. In the wake of the
US military action in Grenada, however, the Cuban
leadership probably holds the opposite view.
9
in 1979 the Soviets
considered the Cuban army to be too large for the
country's budget and proposed establishing guidelines
for streamlining and improving the Cuban armed
forces from 1979 through the year 2000. The princi-
pal Soviet goal in the plan was the reduction of the
Cuban armed forces to a maximum strength of
100,000 personnel by the year 2000. Although later
reporting indicated that Mos-
cow was in basic agreement that Cuba needed to
maintain strong military forces to discourage the
United States from invading, there are probably
continuing Soviet efforts to limit the number of
Cubans on active duty.
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Irregular Forces. Because it is a lower cost?
albeit less effective?alternative to the regular
Armed Forces and provides a useful means of
party control, the Territorial Militia is unlikely
to be cut back by the Castro regime in response
to growing economic pressure.
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As Cuba's economic difficulties continue to mount,
cuts in personnel spending may also become more
attractive to Cuban planners. Personnel outlays prob-
ably constitute the largest category of Cuban military
spending and are therefore likely to be scrutinized
carefully as economic policy makers search for ways
to cut back.
Even if significant reductions eventually become nec-
essary, Havana can be expected to try to preserve as
much as possible the combat capabilities of the
existing force. We do not expect troops in major
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active-duty combat units (air and missile forces, ar-
mor, infantry, and artillery), which constitute Cuba's
first line of defense, to undergo major reductions in
the near term. Instead, Havana is more likely to try to
achieve economies in such units through organization-
al restructuring, the shift of some functions to the
reserves or militia, and reductions in pay, benefits,
and promotions. If economic problems continue to
deteriorate, the regime ultimately may be forced to
reduce active-duty personnel, but it would probably
try to absorb needed reductions as much as possible in
support and service functions rather than in frontline
combat units. The delivery of large numbers of mod-
ern weapons to Cuba in recent years, and the need to
repair and maintain them, will make such decisions
especially difficult, however.
In our view, Cuba's approximately 135,000 ready
reservists?who train with active-duty units?are
likely to remain at about current levels because they
cost less than active-duty forces and are critical to
Havana's military philosophy of being able quickly to
mobilize forces that are well trained and well
equipped. Moreover, the reservists play an important
role in Cuba's overseas military missions.
more than half the Cuban
military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia are reserv-
ists. Some cost reductions could be gained by cutting
the relatively long period of active service-
45 days?many reservists are paid to perform annual-
ly. Because the reserves provide Cuba with large
numbers of experienced personnel at comparatively
low cost, however, we believe they would be less likely
to suffer reductions in a budget squeeze than active-
duty forces.
Operations and Maintenance
Unlike reduced spending on construction or modest
cutbacks in personnel, reductions in the area of
operations and maintenance would have an almost
immediate impact on Cuba's military readiness, in
our judgment. This is a result of the expansion of the
armed forces in recent years and the acquisition of
new, more advanced equipment that has increased the
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Castro's Irregular Forces: Immune From Cuts?
Cuba's paramilitary forces have three functions?to
provide a large irregular military force at low cost to
defend the island in case of invasion, to furnish a
plentiful supply of cheap agricultural labor, and to
politicize and discipline Cuban youth.
The largest and most effective paramilitary force, the
Territorial Troops Militia (MTT), was created in
May 1980 to strengthen combat readiness without the
expense of enlarging active military forces. An equal-
ly important role, however, is to tighten government
control over women, students, and older citizens not
effectively controlled through civilian mass organiza-
tions. More than 1.5 million irregulars have been
trained to serve in the MTT, according to official
statements. The MTT has independent access to its
own arms, is controlled by the party, and enjoys
nearly a 5-to-1 advantage over the military in person-
nel strength. 25X1
Although initially voluntary, service in many MTT
units is now compulsory, according to a Cuban
defector. Unlike reservists, who must be paid their
full civilian wages during periods of military service,
MTT personnel are expected to donate one weekend a
month, one night a week, and half their annual
vacation time to militia duties, and they must buy
their own uniforms. Because it is a lower cost?albeit
less effective?alternative to the regular armed forces
and provides a useful means of party control, the
MTT is unlikely to be cut back by the Castro regime
in response to growing economic pressure. In fact, the
recent order for 100,000 assault rifles from North
Korea suggests that the MTT may be projected to
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military's operations and maintenance needs.2 An Air
Force unit transitioning from MIG-17s to late-model
MIG-21s or MIG-23s, for example, requires more
11
than double the amount of technical and maintenance
support, . The greater
variety of equipment now in the Cuban inventory also
contributes to maintenance requirements. While Cu-
ban surface-to-air missile forces in 1975 operated only
one basic type of surface-to-air missile, they now
operate five major systems. Maintenance needs for
the Navy also have increased as a result of the
delivery of whole new classes of combatants?frig-
ates, submarines, hydrofoils, amphibious transports,
and missile patrol boats?since 1978.
Cuba's emphasis on military readiness in recent years
has meant more training, more exercises, and greater
realism in training events?all entailing greater wear
and tear on equipment, more demands on skilled
technicians, and high consumption of fuel, lubricants,
and other consumables.
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The establishment
of a new flight school at San Julian Airfield in
western Cuba and the massive retraining needed to
absorb new aircraft into the Air Force probably
contributed to the dramatic increase.
the cost per flying hour?
depreciation, rations, and pay?exceeds $1,000 for
helicopters and presumably much more for jet fight-
ers, easily bringing the total cost of even a relatively
modest air defense exercise to some $500,000. Econo-
mies could be achieved by consolidating weapons and
equipment in fewer locations, scrimping on scheduled
maintenance, mothballing equipment, reducing flying
and, ship steaming hours, and cutting back on train-
ing and unit readiness exercises. However, all of these
measures would adversely affect combat readiness,
and, for that reason, the Castro regime probably
would be reluctant to implement them unless it were
particularly hard pressed. Even then, it would proba-
bly turn to Moscow for relief, citing the impact a
cutback would have on the readiness of Cuban troops
both on the island and abroad.
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Operations and Maintenance.
Reductions in operations and
maintenance funding would ad-
versely affect combat readiness,
and, for that reason, the Castro
regime probably would be re-
luctant to implement them un-
less economic conditions be-
came particularly severe and
the Soviets failed to provide
relief
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Internationalist Activity. Although unpopular at
home, Cuba's involvement in Angola increases
Havana's value to the Soviets and enhances
Castro's prestige among black African leaders.
Reduction in the level of Cuban support to the
Marxist regimes in Angola or Nicaragua would
be unpalatable to Castro, unless it followed a
victory for Havana's allies. Shown is a Cuban
armored column in Angola.
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Internationalist Activity
Perhaps the least palatable cuts to the Castro regime
would be reductions in the level of Cuban support to
the Marxist regimes in Angola or Nicaragua?unless
such a move followed a victory for Havana's allies.
Castro has repeatedly emphasized his support for
these radical Marxist regimes, and he warned in his
concluding speech at the Third Communist Party
Congress in February that Washington should not
underestimate Havana's tenacity. According to Cas-
tro, Cuba was willing "to remain in Angola 10, 20, or
30 years" and would do everything possible to step up
aid for Managua if the United States increased
assistance to the anti-Sandinistas.
Cuba's foreign policy objectives are furthered by some
40,000 military personnel serving abroad, mostly in
Angola and Ethiopia.
the Castro regime's involvement in
the Angola war is unpopular among the Cuban
13
people, but we believe Cuba's aid to the Luanda
regime offers advantages to Havana in furthering its
relations with the Third World and enhances Castro's
prestige among black African leaders. More impor-
tant, Moscow's use of Cuban troops as surrogates
increases Havana's value to the Soviets, thereby
strengthening Castro's case for maintaining Soviet aid
levels.
Direct economic benefits to Cuba from its involve-
ment in Angola are probably overshadowed by the
costs associated with maintaining such a large over-
seas force?for which we believe Havana supplies at
least salaries, fuel, and provisions. Cuba bills the
Angolan Government for some services?for example,
Luanda is charged $150,000 plus fuel for each Cuban
airline flight to Angola on at least one major route,
and Havana insists on payment from Luanda of some
$28-30 monthly for each Cuban enlisted man and
$40 for each Cuban officer in Angola, according to a
Cuban defector. Such fees may make overall Cuban
expenses in Angola more bearable but probably do not
begin to approach the total costs to Havana of
maintaining a 35,000-man expeditionary force in
southern Africa to defend its Marxist ally.
Havana's burden, however, is compensated not only
by foreign policy advantages but by domestic consid-
erations as well. A major cutback in overseas activity
resulting in large numbers of Cuban troops returning
from Angola and seeking to reenter civilian life in
Cuba would swell the ranks of Cuba's unskilled
laborers at a time when the island's economy is ill
equipped to receive them. Although such a reduction
in internationalist activity would probably be an
effective way to cut some military costs, it could also
result in increased levels of dissent in Cuba unless
employment could quickly be found for most of the
returning troops.
Procurement
In our view, this category of military spending is the
least likely to undergo major cuts as a result of
economic pressures on Havana. Almost all of the
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Table 3
Cuban Armed Forces
Personnel
1970
1975
1980
1985
Total
215,000
191,000
242,500
305,750
Ground Forces
190,000
166,000
216,000
265,000
Navy
9,000
9,000
10,500
13,500
Air and Air
Defense Forces
16,000
16,000
16,000
27,250
Figures are based on analysis of Cuban Armed
Forces order of battle. In some cases this provides only fragmentary
information from which the organization of units can be recon-
structed. Confidence levels are high for air and naval units; for
ground force units, somewhat lower.
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major weapons and spare parts Cuba receives are
provided by the Soviets free of charge. As a result,
Havana spends only relatively minor amounts on
military procurement. Cuba has spent some hard
currency in recent years on arms and military-associ-
ated equipment?including machineguns and other
equipment from Eastern Europe, munitions-related
machinery from Spain, and a small amount of ammu-
nition from Japan. In addition, Castro recently an-
nounced an agreement to purchase 100,000 assault
rifles from North Korea.
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Because Havana spends relatively little on procure-
ment, it can save little by cutting back. However,
some economies might be achieved as Cuba's princi-
pal military construction programs wind down, thus
reducing expenditures on building materials. Indeed,
most Cuban procurement spending is devoted to such
military-associated items as steel, tires, construction
materials, and transport equipment. Beyond this,
however, given the Castro regime's active interest in
finding additional sources of small arms and muni-
tions, we do not believe Havana has any intention of
limiting procurement expenditures.
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Outlook and Implications for the United States
Constraints on Soviet aid, Cuba's poor economic
prospects, and the recent leveling off of Soviet mili-
tary assistance to Cuba suggest that the cycle of rapid
expansion and modernization of the Cuban armed
forces may be nearing an end. However, because
Havana's military capabilities are now at a high level,
the climate of austerity that we expect to prevail in
Cuba over the next year or so probably will not affect
its ability to maintain or operate the large numbers of
fighters, missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, and naval
combatants in the armed forces inventory. Moreover,
the upgrading of air and naval
facilities have significantly improved the military's
effectiveness. In addition, the recent completion of
many military construction projects affords Havana
an opportunity to cut back on military spending
without appreciably curtailing combat capabilities.
A slowdown in the pace of military construction,
cutbacks in some benefits for military personnel, and
a limited drawdown of less effective personnel are the
most likely areas for reductions in military spend-
ing?at least for the near term. Only if economic
conditions decline significantly in Cuba over the
course of the next few years and Soviet aid fails to
keep pace are further cuts in personnel or operational
funds?cuts that could materially affect readiness or
combat effectiveness?likely to arise.
So far, Castro has protected the armed forces from
austerity more than any other major institution?and
we expect he will continue to try to do so, using the
state of tension with Washington and the Soviets'
need for a proxy army as rationale in his discussions
with Moscow. The continued weakness of the Cuban
economy and the increased size of the Soviet Military
Advisory Group in Havana over the last several years
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Table 4
Inventory a of Selected Cuban
Weapons and Equipment
1975 1980 1985 1975 1980 1985
Air and Air Defense Navy (cont.)
Forces
Modern jet fighters/ Minesweepers
trainers b
MIG-23 0 12 47
MIG-21 (95) 138 160
L-39 trainers 0 0 30
Yevgenya 0 7 12
Sonya 0 1 4
Polnocny landing ship 0
0 2
Other aircraft b Ground Forces
MI-24 attack
helicopters
0
0 12
MI-8/17 helicop-
ters (3) 30 56
AN-24/26 trans-
ports (2) 24 30
Surface-to-air missile
launchers
SA-2
175 175 175
SA-3 6 24 42
SA-6 0 20 20
SA-9/I3 0 0 20
Navy
Modern medium tanks
T-62 0 50 (200)
1-54/55 (300) 630 780
-Other armored vehicles
BMP infantry 0 45 81
combat vehicle
BTR-60 armored (80) 340 426
personnel carrier
BRDM reconnais- ( 40) 90 130
sance vehicle
Field artillery
M-I973SP I52-mm 0
howitzer
0 6
M-1974 SP 122- 0
Foxtrot submarines 0 2 3 mm howitzer
6 18
Koni frigates 0 0 2 B-21 122-mm (0) 40 72
multiple rocket
launcher
Guided-missile patrol
boats
Osa-1 5 5 5
Osa-11 1 7 13
Torpedo boats
P-4/P-6/Komar (24) (19) 13
conversion
Turya hydrofoil 0
4 9
130-mm field gun (100) 110 175
122-mm howitzer (140) 160 225
ZSU-23/4 SP air 0 28 40
defense artillery
a Operational inventory only.
b Through 1980 there were also decreasing numbers of older aircraft.
c Includes MIG-21H (reconnaissance) but excludes older MIG-2l
variants whose operational status is uncertain.
Note: ( ) Denotes substantially greater uncertainty.
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Indicators To Watch For
If a serious downturn in the economy forces the
Castro regime to make substantial reductions in the
military?an outcome we believe is less likely than
moderate cuts not directly affecting readiness?
possible indicators could include:
? A sharp drop in naval, ground, or air defense
exercise activity.
? Substantial and sustained reductions in military
fuel allocations.
? Disestablishment of some Ground Forces units.
? Sharp increases in length of time that major equip-
ment is out of commission for repairs.
? Undermanning of major combat units.
? Severe reductions in the number of reservists sup-
porting active units or in the weeks of annual
training required of reservists.
suggest an even greater future Soviet role in deter-
mining Cuba's long-range military plans. For now,
however, Castro's implicit prioritization of armed
forces needs and Soviet near-term tolerance for Cu-
ban force levels indicate that it is unlikely that Cuban
force readiness or deployment capabilities will be
degraded.
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