PAKISTAN: COPING WITH AFGHAN REFUGEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000600770001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
Afghan Refugees
Pakistan: Coping With
NESA 87-10032
July 1987
329
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Afghan Refugees
Pakistan: Coping With
This paper was prepared b
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
It
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESAI
Secret
NESA 87-10032
July 1987
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Pakistan: Coping With
Afghan Refugees 25X1
Key Judgments Growing concerns about political and economic problems created by the
Information available presence of roughly 3 million Afghan refugees are a major factor behind
as of 1 June 1987 Islamabad's receptivity to a political settlement in Afghanistan. Pakistani
was used in this report.
leaders are concerned about signs of growing friction between the refugees
and Pakistanis and law-and-order problems involving Afghans. They also
worry that international financial support-primarily from multilateral
donors-will soon dry up. Islamabad still believes a short timetable for the
withdrawal of Soviet troops and a major role for resistance leaders in the
new government in Kabul are the best way to achieve a return of the
refugees to their homeland. Islamabad probably is capable of managing the
refugees as long as negotiations on an Afghan settlement continue.
Islamabad will look to the United States to maintain its financial support
for refugee programs and to urge other donors to continue or even increase
their aid. Although Islamabad exaggerates the financial cost of refugee
assistance, Pakistan would face serious problems in meeting refugee needs
if foreign assistance began to decline.
The benefits to the economies of the North-West Frontier Province, the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan in the past few
years probably have matched, and perhaps exceeded, the cost of caring for
the refugees. Many Pakistanis-particularly landowners, wealthy business-
men, and those with political clout-have gained from cheap labor, the
ability to charge skyrocketing rents for housing, and opportunities for
corruption made possible by the inflow of funds and people providing
assistance to the refugees.
Refugees in Pakistan, despite producing some short-term economic bene-
fits, have created several long-term problems for Islamabad. The environ-
ment has been badly damaged, as refugees burden the water supply and
strip forests for firewood. Low-skilled Pakistanis have seen their wages fall.
Tensions between the refugees and local residents began to rise last year.
The increasing numbers of aerial bombings and sabotage attacks have been
blamed on the presence of the refugees. Rioting in Karachi in late
December 1986 that only tangentially involved Afghans reinforced the
perception among Pakistanis that refugees are responsible for a growing
law-and-order problem.
Secret
NESA 87-10032
July 1987
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An economic downturn would, at a minimum, reduce the Pakistanis'
tolerance of the refugees and would probably increase pressure on the
government to seek a solution that would relieve Pakistan of caring for the
refugees. A significant decline in donor support-particularly from the
United States-that forced Pakistan to shoulder more of the financial
burden would almost certainly cause Islamabad to intensify its search for a
political settlement and to be less sensitive to US concerns.
In the event of a settlement on Afghanistan that has US support,
Islamabad would expect Washington to provide generous assistance and
urge the international donor community to aid in transporting the Afghans
back across the border. If the presence of the refugees creates much more
serious domestic political problems than is currently the case, or if US aid
to Pakistan is significantly reduced, Pakistani officials may be more
receptive to a settlement with the Soviet Union on Afghanistan that would
be far less favorable to Washington.
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Key Judgments
Refugee Demographics
Pakistan's Refugee Policy: Tolerance
Assistance for the Refugees
Impact of the Refugees: Mixed Blessings
8
Refugees and the Afghan Settlement
13
Implications for the United States
15
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Figure 1
Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan
Soviet
Union
Refugee camp (Not all camps
are shown. One symbol may
represent multiple camps.)
100 Kilometers
100 Miles
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Pakistan: Coping With
Afghan Refugees
Afghan refugees-at roughly 3 million, the largest
refugee population in the world-have been fleeing to
Pakistan since the Marxist coup in 1978 and the
Soviet invasion in late 1979. By 1981 nearly 2 million
Afghan refugees were reported by government offi-
cials to be in Pakistan.
Refugees arriving in Pakistan from the onset of the
war through the fall of 1983 left Afghanistan more
because the quality of their political, social, and
economic life had collapsed than because they were
directly threatened by the fighting,
brought a means of support-such as animals or
vehicles-with them.
Refugees who have arrived since late 1983 have
suffered a great deal more than earlier migrants.
Because they come from areas of heavy fighting, they
are often wounded Be-
cause of food shortages in parts of Afghanistan,
many-especially children-suffer from malnutrition
and are in generally poorer health than earlier arriv-
als. Beginning in September 1986, severe food short-
ages in parts of northern Afghanistan prompted a new
flow of refugees into Peshawar, according to the US
Embassy in Kabul.
The newer arrivals probably add to refugee tensions
because they do not share many of the ethnic ties to
Pakistanis that previous arrivals had.
lincreas-
ing numbers of new arrivals are non-Pushtuns from
Afghanistan's northern provinces who are escaping
from the increased fighting in the area. Overall, 95
percent of the refugees are
Pushtuns and share a common culture and language
with the 2.2 million Pushtuns in Pakistan.
Estimates of the number of Afghan refugees in
Pakistan vary considerably, partly because a large
number frequently go back and forth across the
border.
Afghan refugees when registering often
inflate the size of their families to get more rations,
and the segregation rules of traditional Pushtun soci-
ety make it impossible to see, let alone count and
register, women and girls. According to
=estimates, 2.84 million refugees were registered
with the Government of Pakistan, and an estimated
300,000 to 400,000 were unregistered as of May
1986. According to US Embassy reporting, roughly
3 million Afghans may be in Pakistan, but US
officials insist the number who are registered and
require aid is far less than official Pakistani estimates.
In 1986 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) used a figure of 2.3 million refugees in
camps to budget its programs. The World Food
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Registering as a Refugee
Afghan refugees must go through a lengthy and
cumbersome registration procedure before being enti-
tled to rations and space in a camp. Authorities are
far behind in registering new refugees, causing hard-
ships for newcomers, according to press reporting.
Camps in the more desirable areas-near Peshawar
and the border-are full and have long waiting lists.
Some refugees must wait for as long as three months
before receiving rations.
refugee must first get a letter from one of the
seven Afghan resistance parties, register at one of the
official refugee camps, and then apply for a card from
the local Pakistani refugee office. On occasion, dur-
ing unusually heavy inflows, rations are distributed
to newly arrived refugees before they are registered,
according to the US Consulate in Peshawar.
The majority of Afghan refugees-more than 85
percent-are registered with the UNHCR and live in
approximately 320 refugee camps where they can
obtain assistance and services. About three-quarters
of the camps are concentrated in the North-West
Frontier Province and the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas with another 20 percent in Baluchistan.
Nearly a dozen camps, containing roughly 150,000
refugees, are in Punjab Province, according to the US
Consulate in Lahore. A new camp established in
January 1987 in Karachi-the only one in Sind
Province-had an initial population of about 15,000
refugees and is slated to support a maximum of
Pakistan: Provincial Share of Afghan Refugees, 1986
Percent (million persons) a
Pakistanis
Afghan refugees
Federally Administered
Tribal Areas
12.0 (2.1 10.7 (0.6)
Punjab Sind
0.27 (0.15)
a Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
25,000 by 1988.
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Figure 2
Pakistan: Projection of Refugee Population in Border Provinces,
1990-2000
Percent (million persons)
North-West Frontier and
1990
1995
2000
Federally Administered
Tribal Areas
13.4 (2
8)
13.4 (3.1
13.1 (306)
006(18.1)
86.6 (20.1)
86.9 (23.9)
Baluchistan
10.6(0.7)
10.5(0.8)
11.4(1.0)
89.4 (5.9)
89.5 (6.8)
88.6 (7.8)
Program (WFP) no longer uses its estimate of 2.2
million refugees in need of aid but targets a specific
food level-350,000 metric tons (mt) annually plus a
buffer stock of 50,000 mt of grain-as the minimum
requirement for the refugees.
The number of refugees entering Pakistan each
month also varies, depending primarily on the intensi-
ty of fighting in nearby areas of Afghanistan. In 1980
and 1981-the first two years of the war-nearly 2
million Afghans fled to Pakistan. Since then, the
refugee flow has been steady, but nowhere near the
pace of 1980-81. Estimates in 1985 and 1986 ranged
from 6,000 to 9,000 per month, according to US
Embassy and press reporting. In March 1987 a
government spokesman reported that since September
1986 monthly levels were up to 9,000. We believe net
additions to the refugee population are substantially
below recent estimates, however, because many of the
arrivals are Afghans who seasonally move back and
forth across the border.
Most refugees remain in the border area, despite long
waiting lists for registration. Because many frequently
cross back and forth from Pakistan to Afghanistan,
they are reluctant to lengthen their journey by regis-
tering in camps far from the border. Pakistanis in
areas farther from the border are ethnically and
linguistically dissimilar to Afghans and in many cases
are traditional and bitter rivals.
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Members of the Pushtun tribe share language, terri-
tory (Pushtunkhwa), religion (Sunni Muslim), and a
cultural code (Pushtunwali).a A common language is
used by members throughout Pushtun territory, but
differences in dialect hinder comprehension between
speakers from northern regions, who use the hard
"kh" and call themselves Pakhtuns, and speakers
from the southern regions, who use the soft "sh" and
call themselves Pushtuns. Pushtunkhwa is not well
defined. It is understood to mean the areas of Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan inhabited by Pushtuns. Polit-
ical leaders in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and Federally Administered Tribal Areas-
where most of the country's Pushtuns reside-have
called for the creation of a separate Pushtun state,
Pushtunistan, to unite Pushtuns and consolidate
their political base.
All Push tuns are Muslims, but their customs deviate
in some ways from mainstream Islam. For example,
the Pushtuns make and take interest-bearing loans,
and, in most cases, their women do not inherit
property or have the right to divorce their husbands.
Although most Pushtun are Sunni Muslims, there
are exceptions, notably Shia groups in the Kurram
and Orakzai tribal agencies.
Pakistani and Afghan Pushtuns share a set of values
known as Pushtunwali, the Pushtun code of honor,
which is widely cited as the reason that Afghan
refugees have been well received in Pakistan. In an
ideal situation, Pushtuns would strictly adhere to the
requirements of Pushtunwali: badal (revenge), mel-
mastia (hospitality), nanawatee (asylum), tarboorwali
(first-cousin rivalry), and tor (female honor). Accord-
ing to melmastia, a Pushtun is required to grant
asylum and to fight to the death for another Pushtun
who asks for refuge. A narrow interpretation of
nanawatee would require one to strictly protect
guests on the run from the law.
a The terms Pushtun, Pashtun, Pakhtun, and Pathan are synony-
mous; the variant spelling of Pashto is sometimes used to identify
non-Pushtun
refugees avoid Pushtun-dominated camps and choose
to live in Peshawar in the North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and Quetta in Baluchistan. Push-
tuns avoid camps farther from the border that are
surrounded by non-Pushtun Pakistanis. Some refu-
gees may travel to camps distant from the border to
register and receive their ration cards but continue to
live or keep their families in unofficial camps near the
border
The number of refugees in camps is likely to continue
to grow steadily as more refugees-possibly 300,000
to 400,000,
complete the lengthy process of registration. Beyond
the net influx of refugees, Afghans in Pakistan have
maintained a 3-percent population growth rate as
births have outpaced deaths, according to a US
Census Bureau study, adding another 90,000 children
per year to the population.
Pakistan's Refugee Policy: Tolerance
There are factors other than tribal affinities with
Pushtuns on the Pakistani side of the border that have
caused Islamabad to seek to treat Afghan refugees
fairly. International support for the refugees in Paki-
stan has been generous, and Islamabad probably
realizes some economic gains from receiving the
refugees. Moreover, by conducting a well-organized
effort to house and feed the refugees in camps,
Pakistan projects its belief that the refugees-and
hence the war in Afghanistan-are not a permanent
fixture in Pakistan. Unlike many other countries with
large refugee populations, Pakistan has experienced
little conflict between refugees and locals by allowing
the refugees in Pakistan relatively free movement
within the country.
Afghans are permitted to work and have used several
other avenues to profit from their relative freedom.
Afghans have taken jobs as seasonal laborers, small
entrepreneurs, and transporters. Although purchase of
real estate is banned, there have been instances where
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wealthier Afghans have bought land for both residen-
tial and commercial purposes,
A substantial numlber of refugees have migrated to
the cities, particularly to Peshawar and Quetta, and
can blend with the local population without arousing
major objections to their presence. Roughly 400,000
refugees live in the Peshawar area, while 200,000 to
250,000 refugees reside in the Quetta area, according
to the US Embassy Refugees
account for about 37 percent of the population in both
areas.
Many of the better educated and more skilled Af-
ghans did not find opportunities to use their talents in
Pakistan and moved to Western Europe or the United
States. According to the US Consulate in Peshawar,
many Afghan professionals could not find employ-
ment in Pakistan to match their education and experi-
ence and have taken positions with private volunteer
organizations.
Pakistan had little choice but to accommodate the
independent and traditionally armed Pushtun tribes-
men. By extending its presence into tribal areas
through supervision of relief programs, the Pakistani
Government can introduce more control in the border
region.
refugees. In late 1984, for example, the provincial
government of Baluchistan decided to transfer 15,000
refugees from Quetta to camps in western Baluchi-
stan, although officials acknowledged that past efforts
to relocate the refugees were unsuccessful.
this effort at relocation also
failed-only 2,500 were actually relocated. Recently,
officials have considered moving refugees away from
border and urban areas, where refugees as well as
UNHCR staff would be safer from Afghan air incur-
sions and Afghan-directed sabotage, according to US
Embassy reporting
Provincial authorities in Peshawar have also taken
steps to reassure the public that they are trying to
keep the refugees under control. As part of an attempt
to force them to return to refugee camps, for example,
the authorities have passed ordinances that prohibit
young Afghan males from spending after-work hours
in Peshawar. Those caught in the efforts to enforce
the ban are turned over to the refugee commissioner's
office, questioned, and then sent to a refugee camp.
During a recent roundup, police detained more than
5,000 Afghans, according to reporting from the Con-
sulate in Peshawar)
Pakistani refugee officials also seek to move refugees
in order to relieve congested areas. As many as
150,000 more refugees--doubling the 150,000 cur-
rently residing in Punjab Province-will be moved to
relieve overcrowded camps in the North-West Fron-
tier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas,
'The refugees now living in Punjab Province
have not caused problems to date because they have
been placed in largely Pushtun districts, far from
major Punjabi ethnic areas.
Relief aid for the refugees comes from international
and Pakistani sources.
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To ease public concerns about security, Pakistani
authorities periodically make highly publicized-but
ineffective-efforts to restrict the activities of the
it costs more than $1 million a day
(about $400 million annually) to support the refugees,
of which roughly $200 million comes from interna-
tional donors; additional small sums are donated on a
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Major Providers of Relief Assistance to Afghan Refugees
UN High Commissioner $60-70 million annually Major coordinating body for relief ef-
forts. Provides nonfood assistance:
health services, fuel, clothing, water
supply, and oversees income-generat-
ing projects.
World Food Program $100 million annually Provides basic food commodities for
(WFP) 2.2 million refugees per year. Monitors
food donations from bilateral donors.
World Bank $10 million annually In conjunction with the UNHCR, the
1987 to 1990. World Bank administers income-gen-
erating projects for refugees in
Pakistan.
Government of Pakistan $190 million annually. Responsible for shipment of all in-
According to the US country relief supplies, primarily from
Embassy, however, the Karachi to refugee areas in the North-
actual amount is about West Frontier Province, the Federally
$90 million. Administered Tribal Areas, and Balu-
chistan. Also supplies health services,
some administrative personnel, and a
cash stipend program.
Increasing emphasis on income-gener-
ating projects. Pakistan is reluctant to
permit such projects because of con-
cern it may give impression that the
refugees will stay for an extended peri-
od. UNHCR claims that more funds
are available for development pro-
grams than for emergency assistance.
WFP's estimate of food requirements
is consistently lower than Pakistani
estimates. Islamabad requests 500,000
mt, based on its estimate of 3 million
refugees versus WFP's 2.2 million.
To address sensitivities of the local
population, the World Bank permitted
up to 30-percent participation by locals
in income-generating projects. In 1987
local participation is scheduled to be
increased to 50 percent.
Pakistan probably views the flow of aid
as an endorsement of its Afghan poli-
cy-would probably view any signifi-
cant reduction in relief as a lessening
of support for its policy in Afghanistan.
bilateral basis. According to the US Embassy, Islam-
abad asked the Pakistan Consortium countries-a
group of Western aid donors-to provide $193 million
for refugee assistance to the Government of Pakistan
in fiscal year 1987. Islamabad claims that it spends
roughly $110 million for cash stipends to refugee
families, $70 million to cover local transportation
costs of refugee material aid, and the remainder to
cover administrative costs. The US Embassy, howev-
er, reports that disbursements for cash stipends are
only $11 million-largely because of infrequent pay-
ments-and transportation costs are exaggerated.
Afghan refugee aid is typically channeled through
official organizations, such as the WFP, UNHCR,
World Bank, International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, and Red Crescent Societies
(Islamic countries' donor organizations). The primary
aid organizations-UNHCR and WFP-administer
a wide variety of programs, including income-generat-
ing projects, education, food aid coordination, and
health services. The ICRC and Red Crescent Societ-
ies generally provide medical assistance-hospitals,
clinics, and dental programs-for both insurgents and
refugees in Pakistan.
Industrialized countries provide most of the relief aid
given to the Afghan refugees. Typically, West Euro-
pean countries each donate about $5 million annually,
and the European Community contributes about $18
million yearly-usually donated through multilateral
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Figure 3
Organization for Refugee Management
in Pakistan
Other UN
agencies
Voluntary
agencies
Secretary
States and Frontier Regions
Chief Commissioner
for Aghan Refugees
Area. administrators I
Camp
administrator
1___
Accounts
section
Attached Personnel From Other Departments
Relief
section
Primary
school
Federal
Coordinate!!
Committee
Other
government
departments
Security
section
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Figure 4
Pakistan: Donations of Wheat for Refugees,
1981-87 a
state that at least 500,000 mt of wheat is necessary to
fulfill the needs of the refugees, according to the US
Embassy.
Islamabad's concern about a drop in foreign assis-
tance to the refugees, the UNHCR's belief that
donors will contribute more to development aid, and a
desire to reduce its own expenditures are leading
Pakistan to give more favorable consideration to
income-generating projects for the refugees, accord-
ing to US Embassy reports. Islamabad is worried,
however, that such projects will provoke resentment
from many Pakistanis who are no better off than the
Community Afghans receiving the aid. Furthermore, a number of
Pakistanis are likely to believe that the projects are
creating jobs-such as carpentering and shawlmak-
ing-for Afghans that could have been filled by
Pakistanis and that the projects are flooding markets
with goods that should have been produced by Paki-
a Most donations are channeled through
World Food Program.
b Pledges.
Impact of the Refugees: Mixed Blessings
Although some Pakistani newspapers and leftist jour-
nals have consistently complained about the burden of
the refugee presence, relations between the Afghans
and the borderland Pakistanis over the past eight
years have been surprisingly harmonious. The benefits
313185 6-87 to the economies of the North-West Frontier Prov-
ince, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and
Baluchistan from the foreign aid programs, close
agencies. Japan is a much larger contributor. Its food ethnic and language ties, and a deeply felt tradition of
donations-about $15 million-are roughly twice as hospitality among Pushtun peoples have, until recent-
large as those of the biggest European food donor, ly, outweighed concerns about Afghan lawlessness,
West Germany. competition for jobs, and damage to the environment.
International aid flows have been inconsistent. In
certain years other worldwide relief efforts have
caused donors to shift their food aid away from
Afghan refugees. During 1983-85, when world atten-
tion was focused on aid to Africa, food aid for
Pakistan fell, and not until 1986 did donors contribute
what Islamabad believes is an adequate level of food
aid. WFP contributions reached a record 494,000 mt
of wheat last year, largely because of the low world
price of US wheat. Islamabad, however, continues to
Economic Boom
An economic boom generated by the inflow of aid
funds has created new jobs for Pakistanis. Some 6,000
Pakistanis work in the NWFP and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas to assist in the administra-
tion of refugee camps, according to the US Consulate
in Peshawar. Several hundred more jobs have been
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created by private voluntary organizations, often at
salaries higher than those paid by Pakistani employ-
ers. Most of the jobs created require minimal skills-
guards, drivers, and clerks-and attract many Paki-
stani applicants. Several hundred professional posi-
tions have been created that not only provide employ-
ment for doctors, pharmacists, engineers, and
teachers, but also offer additional training. In the long
term, we believe the provincial skill pool will be
improved by the training supervised by private organi-
zations.
Labor Market
The refugees' willingness to work for low wages at
unskilled or seasonal jobs has benefited Pakistani
employers. Refugees, who make up 9 to 10 percent of
the labor force in the NWFP, the Federally Adminis-
tered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan, routinely accept
15 to 25 rupees-90 cents to $1.50-per day for
unskilled work, while Pakistani laborers seek as much
as 30 rupees-$1.80-per day, according to a
UNHCR report. Afghan masons, carpenters, and day
laborers substantially undercut established wage
scales, sometimes by 20 to 40 percent
For the most part, according
to the US Consulate in Peshawar, Afghan refugees
work only a few days a month at low-paying jobs that
provide cash to supplement their rations with meat
and fresh fruits and vegetables and to purchase
clothing on occasion. The UNHCR believes, on the
basis of limited surveys, that 87 percent of refugee
families in the North-West Frontier Province and
Federally Administered Tribal Areas receive some
income from the earnings of a family member.
Transportation
Although local residents resent what they see as
Afghan domination of transportation services in the
border region, the presence of the refugees has proba-
bly stimulated sufficient demand for transportation
services to absorb the added capacity, according to
reporting from the US Consulate in Peshawar. There
would be a serious shortage of passenger transport in
the Peshawar area in the absence of buses brought 25X1
from Afghanistan by refugees,
Registration of new commercial vehicles by Paki-
stanis continues at traditional levels, and Afghan
truck drivers now must pay the same registration fee
as local drivers.
Rents
Pakistani landlords, particularly in Peshawar, have
reaped windfall profits from soaring rents caused by
the influx of refugees, wealthy Afghan businessmen,
and officials of relief agencies at the expense of
middle-class Pakistanis, who cannot find reasonably
priced housing. On the basis of conversations with
tenants and landlords, officials of the US Consulate in
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Peshawar report that residential rents have risen by as
much as 500 percent since 1979. New construction
abounds, with lots once considered suitable for a
single residence now subdivided for three or four
houses.
Pakistani landowners have profited from the estab-
lishment of refugee camps on their land. They allow
the camps to be constructed on plots that would
otherwise be economically unproductive and bill Is-
lamabad for the rental of their property
Food Prices
Although some Pakistanis believe that refugees are
responsible for higher food prices because the Af-
ghans can and will pay more for food, the US
Consulate in Peshawar points out that the supply of
meat and other commodities has increased, helping to
hold food prices steady. Roughly two-thirds of the
refugees in Pakistan were farmers before leaving
Afghanistan, according to a UNHCR survey. Many
refugees receive income from the sale of milk from the
herds they brought from Afghanistan, and others
have reported to the UNHCR that they sell their
cattle to survive. Although Afghans are prohibited
from owning land, some can obtain Pakistani identity
cards
Others
have developed informal sharecropping arrangements
with local farmers, according to sources of the US
Consulate in Peshawar.
Refugees may also be selling their food rations,
depressing the cost of wheat and edible oil to local
Pakistanis, according to the US Embassy. Some
Afghans gather extra rations by registering at differ-
ent camps and obtaining more ration card
By overstating the size
of his family, the father can procure additional rations
of food and sell the surplus to buy other items. F_~
Business Competition
Pakistanis who own small and medium-size businesses
feel threatened by Afghan competitors who undersell
small-scale vendors and peddle their goods in what
were once Pakistani markets. The US Consulate in
Peshawar reports that a string of shops owned by
Figure 5
Refugees and the Transport Business
in the Peshawar District, 1986
Note: Afghan trucks typically have twice
the capacity of Pakistani trucks.
Afghans usually springs up where refugees congre-
gate. Information from US Consulate sources sug-
gests that Afghans are also active in the black market,
moving in on a lucrative Pakistani activity. As a
result, bazaars in the NWFP and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas contain a wide variety of
Soviet goods-from caviar to cheap printed cotton-
and a variety of Afghan fruits. Established Peshawar
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merchants, however, do not feel particularly threat-
ened by refugee competition because few large Paki-
stani businesses look to the refugees as a potential new
market.
Corruption
The boomtown look of many frontier cities is caused
mostly by profits obtained through traditional smug-
gling and by corruption in the distribution of refugee
relief. Legitimate commercial activity generated by
the refugees, both as consumers and merchants, repre-
sents only a small part of the frontier economy,
according to the Consulate in Peshawar.
Press reports claim that Pakistani administrators in
refugee camps regularly charge up to $100 for new
ration cards, which are supposed to be given to the
refugees at no cost. Other press accusations include
charges that Pakistani middlemen control nearly all
aid-related distribution and use their influence for
personal gain.
Crime
The US Embassy in Islamabad reports that crime has
not increased significantly in the North-West Frontier
Province since the large influx of refugees began
seven years ago. The refugees, nonetheless, are
blamed for a wide variety of illegal activities, includ-
ing the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other illicit
items into Pakistan; highway robberies; and a general
upsurge in violence. A recent editorial discussing the
increase in drug usage in Pakistan attributed the
upsurge primarily to the "changing situation around
our borders" and noted that the "active movement of
refugees have [sic] encouraged the drug trade here."
Leaders of the opposition Pakistan People's Party
publicly claim that the smuggling of arms and drugs
by Afghans into Pakistan is increasing the sense of
fear among the local population.
Environmental Impact
The refugees' impact on the ecology has been clearly
negative. The environmental damage in the border
region is acute. According to US officials, Afghan
herds are overgrazing the land and causing serious
erosion. Refugees are denuding forests for firewood,
A shoe market for Afghan refugees
and water is becoming contaminated from too many
people using the limited supply in the area.
Despite the lack of major economic disruption and the
benefits that have accrued to some Pakistanis, we
believe that the Afghan refugees are beginning to
wear out their welcome. In early 1987 tensions be-
tween refugees and locals crossed a new threshold in
Peshawar. Locals, in an apparently spontaneous dem-
onstration, attacked refugees after the bombing of a
resistance group's headquarters that killed at least 12
Pakistanis, including five children in a nearby school.
In the aftermath of the bombing, civil unrest contin-
ued for three days in Peshawar including armed
clashes between refugees and locals, resulting in at
least one death. Government and refugee vehicles
were burned. Students in Peshawar and neighboring
towns, supported by bazaar merchants' organizations,
held protest demonstrations that led to the closing of
their schools. Calm returned following government
measures that enforced the ban on the bearing of
arms by both locals and refugees in the city and
ordered the confinement of refugees to their camps.
This incident follows a tangible shift in attitudes in
Peshawar since the beginning of 1986. According to
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reporting from the US Consulate in Peshawar, some
local people now see the refugees as a threat to their
personal safety because Afghans are perceived to be
potential terrorists. The average Pakistani's impres-
sion of the refugees is formed by those most visible-
the young, well-fed, and often armed males common
on the streets of Peshawar and other cities. The old
men, women, and children who make up the majority
of the refugee population are seldom seen outside the
camps. some
antirefugee groups have emerged in Peshawar to paint
slogans on walls and issue press releases calling for
better security. non-Pushtun
urban groups-such as bazaar merchants, who have
provided political support for President Zia-are
openly expressing concern about the refugees.
Rioting in Karachi in late December 1986 sparked by
a government effort to restrict the traffic in drugs and
arms reinforced a perception in Punjab and Sind that
the refugees are responsible for growing law-and-
order problems)
Although the riots involved only Pakistani
Pushtuns from the North-West Frontier Province and
Muhajirs-Pakistanis who migrated from India after
1947-many people nonetheless concluded that Af-
ghan refugees were deeply involved, according to the
US Consulate in Lahore.
Government authorities in Baluchistan appear to fo-
cus on the Afghans as scapegoats for law-and-order
problems.
Pressure from Afghanistan has
included cross-border air violations, terrorist bomb-
ings-particularly in the North-West Frontier Prov-
ince and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas-
and attempts at fueling tribal rivalries.
dents increased sharply last year.
sabotage inci-
t e number
of bombings and resulting casualties in the North-
West Frontier Province more than doubled in 1986.
The attacks, which appeared to have been aimed at
Afghan refugees in the past, are now aimed at causing
mass casualties among Pakistanis, according to the
US Embassy in Islamabad.
This year incidents of sabotage and aircraft bombings
have accelerated dramatically, focusing both on Paki-
stani civilian targets and Afghan refugee camps. In
February the NWFP suffered the highest monthly
casualty rate since the beginning of the Afghan war
from sabotage and air bombardments. Afghan bomb-
ing raids on refugee camps on 26 and 27 February
killed as many as 100 Afghans and Pakistanis, ac-
cording to the US Consulate in Peshawar. On 23
March another bombing run on two Pakistani border
villages-with significant concentrations of refu-
gees-resulted in more than 100 deaths.
The security situation in Baluchistan is aggra-
vated by the increasing availability and falling price
of modern small arms, primarily AK-47s. Regulations
that prohibit local police forces from entering refugee
camps in pursuit of suspected criminals increase the
tendency to blame unresolved crimes on Afghan
the deaths from these
caused by air raids in all of 1986.
refugees.
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We believe that tensions between the Afghan refugees
and Pakistanis are manageable as long as it is per-
ceived that the refugee presence is temporary and
prospects for the majority of refugees returning are
positive. Continuing negotiations on an Afghan settle-
ment and preliminary discussions in Islamabad for the
transport of refugees back to Afghanistan reinforce
the expectation in Pakistan that the refugees will
someday return. Pakistani Government leaders as well
as opposition leaders recognize that a settlement
acceptable to the resistance is required or the refugees
will not return.
The Kabul regime would have to extend its destabili-
zation campaign into the major cities of Punjab and
Sind Provinces or substantially increase the destruc-
tion caused by cross-border air violations to bring
effective pressure to bear on Islamabad. We believe
an expansion of the Soviet-Afghan destabilization
campaign would increase refugee-local tensions and
raise public frustration with the presence of Afghan
refugees. Until recently, unrest associated with the
refugees has not occurred in the politically dominant
Punjab Province, reinforcing a perception in the
minds of key policymakers that the refugees were not
a pressing problem
Demands to restrict the movement of refugees are with the independent Pushtuns in the frontier area
likely to grow, particularly if sabotage incidents in- who traditionally resent government authority. =
crease. The government will almost certainly make
periodic crackdowns on refugees in urban areas, Domestic security problems, in our view, have not
mostly to address the security concerns of urban become troublesome enough to cause the Pakistani
Pakistanis. We, however, do not expect successful Government, out of concern for the refugees, to
curtailment of the movement of Afghans on a con- reduce support for the insurgents, at least over the
tinuing basis. To do so would require a considerable next year. We believe that officials in Islamabad are
and sustained expenditure of police, paramilitary, and
perhaps military resources, and could lead to conflict
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Would the Refugees Respond to a Settlement?
In a typical situation, refugees of similar ethnic
heritage-the Afghans share a common heritage with
the Pushtuns of Pakistan-are familiar with the
language and the way the system operates, and they
are more likely to stay in the host country, according
to an article in the Political Science Quarterly.
in most refugee
situations, the fourth and fifth years are the water-
shed years in determining whether refugees will ever
return to their homes in large numbers. After four or
five years, the refugees begin to lose contact with
their native country. By the end of roughly a decade,
the refugees have become well enough integrated into
the society of the host country that they are unlikely
to leave.
We believe, however, there are several compelling
factors that would induce a large number of the
refugees to return to Afghanistan, even though many
of them have resided in Pakistan for nearly nine
years:
? Tribal leaders, I com-
mand much respect and could influence refugees to
return home if they perceive a settlement as just.
? Many refugees are reluctant to move to better
equipped camps that are far from the border,
indicating that strong ties to their homeland
remain.
? Refugees have retained links to land and villages in
Afghanistan. More than half of the refugees still
have property in Afghanistan,
and many ar-
range for family members to return periodically to
take care of it.
? The relative confinement of women to camps pre-
vents them from becoming more integrated into
Pakistani culture.
? Afghan religious leaders are often the refugee camp
teachers. Their emphasis is on the Afghan way of
life acid-the religion of Islam)
convinced that their hard line in negotiations and
support to the insurgents have forced Moscow to
make some concessions and they do not want to ease
the pressure now.
We believe, however, that concern over popular dis-
content about real or imagined refugee problems is an
important factor prompting Islamabad to probe Mos-
cow's flexibility to see if an agreement can be reached
that would meet Pakistan's goals-withdrawal of all
Soviet troops from Afghanistan and return of the
refugees. Although Zia and Prime Minister Junejo do
not appear overly concerned about refugee problems,
they do not want to provide their political opponents
with an issue by appearing to be laggard in seeking a
just settlement.
Alternative Scenario
We believe that Islamabad would resort to force to
move refugees back to Afghanistan in the unlikely
event a settlement was reached that key resistance
leaders and the majority of refugee leaders found
unacceptable. Refugees would take their cue from
tribal leaders who are aligned with one of the seven
resistance parties. Leaders of the resistance alliance
would almost certainly discourage the refugees from
returning to Afghanistan if they considered the re-
gime in Kabul to be unacceptable. Under this scenar-
io, we believe Islamabad would be prepared, as a last
resort, to use paramilitary and military forces to make
the refugees leave. We also believe Pakistani officials
are confident that, if it came to using force, they could
make life so miserable for the refugees that most of
them would leave of their own accord.
In our judgment, domestic problems not directly
associated with the Afghan refugees-a serious eco-
nomic downturn, increased ethnic tension in Punjab,
or a decline in international donor support-would
prompt Islamabad to lower its price for an Afghan
settlement. Zia and his senior colleagues already have
demonstrated more concern than usual about out-
breaks of sectarian violence, especially in Karachi,
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Accord-
ing to US Embassy reports, Zia is concerned that
Soviet propaganda has convinced many Pakistanis in
Sind, including some government officials, that the
sectarian violence is a direct result of Pakistan's
hospitality to the refugees.
We believe a major economic slump-reversing the
trend throughout the Zia years-would, at a mini-
mum, heighten the perception that refugees are a
burden and put pressure on the government to seek a
solution that would relieve Pakistan of caring for
them. According to the US Embassy in Islamabad,
remittances from Pakistani workers overseas-the
largest single source of foreign exchange for Paki-
stan-are beginning a gradual downward spiral. In
the last half of 1986 remittances fell 13 percent
compared with the same period in 1985. Additional
repercussions from the economic recession in the
Middle East would be felt heavily in the North-West
Frontier Province because a disproportionate number
of Pakistan's workers overseas come from this region.
Moreover, a spell of bad weather that reduced crop
harvests would severely limit Pakistan's exports of
rice and/or cotton-which account for half the value
of exported goods-and would probably force Islam-
abad to impose austerity measures.
According to the US Embassy, Islamabad fears that
aid will not keep up with the rapidly growing needs of
the refugees, and it will be watching for signs of donor
fatigue. In the event of a significant decline in donor
support, the Pakistanis would probably have to make
up the difference, adding to the public perception that
the refugees are an unwanted burden.
Implications for the United States
Islamabad will look to the United States to urge
multilateral and bilateral donors to continue and even
increase their aid to the Afghan refugees. Pakistani
officials undoubtedly believe that continued pressure
from Washington is a powerful tool against donor
serious domestic political problem.
Should aid levels fail to keep pace with a growing
refugee population, Islamabad, citing popular discon-
tent over refugees, would look to the United States to
make up the difference. Pakistani officials would
argue that they are already devoting all the resources
they can to the refugees, that they have pressing
development needs elsewhere in the country that must
be met, and that they believe it is in Washington's
interest to do what it can to prevent support for the
refugees from becoming a serious political issue in
Pakistan.
If a settlement is reached on Afghanistan that has US
support, we believe that Islamabad would expect
Washington and the international donor community
to assist in transporting the refugees back to Afghani-
stan. Pakistani officials would encourage the United
States to provide funds for such things as rebuilding
houses, repairing small shops and factories, and pur-
chasing tools and seed to resume agricultural produc-
tion. Islamabad would probably argue that such aid
would be on a one-time basis and that the costs would
not exceed the support currently going to the refugees.
We believe that Pakistan would change its Afghan
policies if it concluded that US aid would be signifi-
cantly reduced because of US spending constraints,
the nuclear issue, or a change in the US administra-
tion. Pakistani officials under such circumstances
would probably seek a settlement with the Soviet
Union on Afghanistan less acceptable to Washington.
We believe Pakistani officials could drum up consid-
erable domestic political support for such a settlement
by portraying their action as demonstrating their
independence from the United States and solving a
fatigue.
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