JORDAN: THE PALESTINIAN STAKE IN THE EAST BANK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00096R000600760001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Jordan:
The Palestinian Stake
in the East Bank
NESA 87-10031
July 1987
Copy 3 3 5
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Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
in the East Bank
Jordan:
The Palestinian Stake
This paper was prepared by
Directorate of Operations
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution by Office of
Leadership Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 87-10031
July 1987
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Jordan:
The Palestinian Stake
in the East Bank
Summary Jordan's Palestinians, who constitute a large and growing majority of its
Information avai/ab/e population, are unlikely to challenge the stability of the Hashemite regime
as oJ'1 May /987 in the near term. Palestinians have become well established economically,
was used in this report.
dominating trade and commerce, the professions, and the media. In short,
the Palestinians' stake in Jordan is clear-they own much of it. Moreover,
considerable intermarriage has blurred the distinction between Palestinians
and native Jordanians, and mandatory military service and education have
drawn the younger generations closer together.
During the 1990s, however, this situation may begin to unravel because
opportunities for friction between the Palestinian and native Jordanian
communities will grow. Despite King Hussein's efforts to co-opt Palestin-
ians into the country's political and economic leadership, many Palestin-
ians remain deeply suspicious of the King's intentions and continue to view
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Arafat as their spokes-
man. Their general sense of detachment from Jordan's long-term destiny
can be tied to the unresolved Palestinian issue and their belief that there is
a deliberate policy that gives preference to native Jordanians for the
highest positions in the government, the military, and education.
Jordan's economic slowdown--caused primarily by declining Arab aid and
the recession in the Gulf states-has lowered worker remittances, dimmed
overseas employment prospects, and increased job competition among
recent Jordanian graduates. The slowdown may create a mass of unem-
ployed or underemployed Palestinians and erode their stake in preserving
the stability of the regime-a majority of the workers returning to Jordan
from the Gulf are Palestinian. Such a development would widen the
already major gap between native, middle-class Jordanians and over
200,000 Palestinians who remain in refugee camps near Amman and
around the country.
Economic stagnation, moreover, would probably foster domestic political
discontent, giving Islamic fundamentalist groups an opportunity to become
a major political force, especially among young people, by exploiting
Palestinian grievances. Since political parties were banned in 1957,
opposition political opinion has been expressed mostly through Islamic
fundamentalist or other clandestine groups. Although these groups do not
pose a threat to the stability of the regime, as student riots at Yarmuk Uni-
versity last year illustrated, Islamic fundamentalists have proven able to
iii Secret
NESA 87-10031
July 1987
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exploit student frustrations and attract followers, particularly among
Palestinian students, who may be hardest hit by a future contracting job
market.
Growing frustration with the unsolved Palestinian problem on the West
Bank could prompt Palestinians to view Jordan as their homeland and
assert their "right" to govern it. King Hussein's willingness to participate
in US-sponsored peace negotiations will be restrained by this internal
Palestinian threat. The King must have the support of his Palestinian
subjects to participate in an international conference or risk forcing them
to choose between loyalty to the monarchy and Palestinian national
aspirations.
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The Palestinians of Jordan: Numbers and Loyalties
1
The Hashemites' Strategy of Political Assimilation: A Partial Success
3
Social Cleavages: Widespread Discrimination and Alienation
6
Political Cleavages: Palestinian Nationalism Versus Hashemite Legitimacy
8
Peace Process: Fueling Mutual Suspicions
10
Refugee Camps: Cauldrons of Discontent
11
Growing Radicalism Among Palestinian Youth
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de span Nagb
a[jy prae ntebon~i~
t~n'eE`e u~ril authoritative
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Jordan:
The Palestinian Stake
in the East Bank
The Palestinians in Jordan have not challenged the
regime in any major way since the 1970-71 civil war
between the Jordanian Army and the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization (PLO) militias, and we do not
believe they will threaten the Hashemite monarchy
through the remainder of this decade. Many promi-
nent Palestinians appear to have been co-opted by
being named to high government positions, even
though they .are prevented from reaching the most
sensitive, senior political and military levels. ~~
The key to Palestinian integration into Jordanian
society has been the comparatively unrestricted eco-
nomic environment, particularly the decadelong peri-
od of economic growth beginning in the mid-1970s
during which the Palestinian population prospered.
Palestinians are well assimilated into Jordanian soci-
ety and have developed strong family and economic
ties to native Jordanians.
The Palestinians of Jordan: Numbers and Loyalties
The Palestinian community is estimated to constitute
between one-half to two-thirds of Jordan's popula-
tion-there probably are between 1.4 million and
1.8 million Palestinians among Jordan's estimated
population of 2.8 million.
Palestinians in Jordan are divided into four major
groups, each with differing attitudes and degrees of
loyalty to the Hashemite regime. The group with the
oldest ties to Jordan consists of Palestinian families
that arrived before 1948 and who identify themselves
as Jordanians. For the most part, they have prospered
commercially, professionally, and in government ser-
vice.
A second group-by far the largest among the four-
is made up of Palestinians who fled to Jordan during
the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war. Most academic special-
ists consider this group a silent majority in Jordan
that has enjoyed considerable success commercially
and has achieved positions of significant political
Problems in Estimating the Size
of Jordan's Palestinian Community
25X1
The Jordanian Government defines as citizens those
Palestinian Arabs who resided in the British-
mandated territory of Palestine (1922-48J or their
descendants. Since 1948-49, the massive irJlux of
refugees from the West Bank and the movement in
and out of the country by Palestinians who hold 25X1
Jordanian passports but reside more or less perma-
nently outside the country have made problematical
various estimates of Jordan's Palestinian population.
25X1
Jordan's Department of Statistics conducted the last
o,~cial census in 1979, but no statistics were collect-
ed on the origin of Jordanian citizens or the Palestin-
ian portion of the population. Even iJ'Jordanian 25X1
census takers were allowed to determine the Palestin-
ian population, considerable intermarriage between
Palestinians and native Jordanians has blurred na-
tional origin. ~Fx~
72 percent of all Jordanians residing in the25X1
country are Palestinians or descendants of Palestin-
ians, on the basis of the number of identity cards 25X1
issued to Jordanian citizens. In contrast, the number
of Palestinians living in Jordanian refugee camps is
relatively easy to determine. Palestinian refugees in
need of aid and assistance must register with the UN
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWAJ. According to
US Embassy.figures, about 204,000 Palestinians still
remain in refugee camps. This does not include a
large but undetermined number of Palestinians from
the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel who have
settled in Jordan since 1948 and who have not
registered with UNRWA.
25X1
25X1
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Figure 2
Selected Palestinian Refugee Camps
The UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) was founded in 1949 to provide
relief for Palestinian refugees and began
operating in 1950. The agency works
through field offices composed of the serv-
icesand refugee camps branches. UNRWA
de/ines a Palestinian "refugee" as anyone
whose permanent residence was in Pales-
tine for at least two years before the 1948
war and who lost both his home and means
of livelihood because of the war. UNRWA
categorizes "displaced persons" as Pales-
tinians who were displaced because of the
1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, although in prac-
tice they are treated much the same as refu-
gees.
UNRWA and Jordan's Ministry of Occupied
Territories' Affairs share responsibility for
Palestinian refugees in Jordan. UNRWA
provides services for the refugees, and Jor-
dan's Ministry of Occupied Territories' Af-
fairsprovides orfundsservices fordisplaced
persons-either directly or indirectly
through UNRWA facilities. Four o/ the 10
refugee camps in Jordan were established
before the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, and
six were established afterward. Two of the
camps are located in the Amman municipal
area, and the remainder are in rural loca-
tions.
Number of camps is one,
unless otherwise noted.
~ WEST BANK
t+ (Israeli occupied-
status to be determined)
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responsibility and authority. With their education and
sophistication, they became the core of Jordan's urban
middle class. Although this group of Palestinians
would like to regain lost Palestinian land, most have
investments in homes and businesses in Jordan and
are unlikely to risk losing them for an uncertain
future in a fledgling West Bank state or entity.
A third major group consists of Palestinians who
came after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This group
maintains a strong loyalty to the West Bank and is
much more militant than the earlier arrivals in its
support of PLO Chairman Arafat and his efforts to
establish an independent Palestinian state. Many have
not yet achieved the economic success of the 1948
refugees-a factor strongly underscoring their sup-
port for Arafat and the PLO.
The fourth Palestinian group includes refugees who
have remained in camps after being displaced during
the 1948 and 1967 wars. According to US Embassy
statistics, about 204,000 Palestinians still live in these
refugee camps. Except for some refugees who came
from the Gaza Strip, all have been granted Jordanian
citizenship and may live, work, and own property
outside the camps. Both first- and second-generation
Palestinians born and raised in the refugee camps are
disgruntled, unsettled, despondent, and potentially
militant, according to US Embassy reporting.
Although not resident in Jordan, another Palestinian
group is inextricably linked to Jordan. These Palestin-
ians, totaling 1.5 million according to UN estimates,
live in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Most Palestinians in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem-about 970,000 people-and to a lesser
extent in the Gaza Strip-where about 560,000 re-
side-look to Amman for decisions affecting local
government, education, health, housing, passports,
religious affairs, and banking-giving Jordan consid-
erable clout in day-to-day affairs. Many employees
and officials have continued to receive salaries from
the Jordanian Government since 1967, and thousands
of retirees receive pensions from Amman.
The Hashemites' Strategy of Political Assimilation:
A Partial Success
US Embassy reporting makes clear that King Hussein
feels responsible for reconciling Hashemite and Pales-
tinian interests, and to this end he has made Palestin-
ian issues a central element in his domestic and
foreign policies. A powerful force in the King's ca1cu25X1
lations is his belief that Jordanians and Palestinians
are one "family" and that the East and West Banks
should be united under enlightened Hashemite rule.
The key to Hussein's strategy in handling the Pales-
tinian challenge in Jordan is his determined effort to
assert the primacy of Hashemite interests in the face
of Palestinian nationalism. 0 25X1
Hussein has given Palestinians access to Jordan's
political and social institutions to win their loyalty tc25X1
the system, while simultaneously balancing national
security considerations and the suspicions of the na-
tive Jordanian minority. Most Palestinians have be-
come well established economically, dominating the
professions, the media, and commerce. Considerable
intermarriage has largely blurred national origin, and
mandatory military service and education have drawn
the younger generations closer together. 0 25X1
According to the US Embassy, the political modera-
tion of Jordan's Palestinians can be attributed in large
part to their desire to share in the general prosperity25X1
and stability that Jordan has enjoyed since the mid-
1970s. Because of the King's efforts to integrate them
into Jordanian society, Palestinians in Jordan enjoy
rights that they have nowhere else in the Middle East.
They do not need work or residence permits and may
travel abroad on Jordanian passports. Palestinians
living in Persian Gulf states, in contrast, must use
laissez-passers and international travel documents.
The economic boom of the 1970s allowed Palestinians
to assimilate to a greater degree in Jordan than
anywhere else in the Arab world. Palestinians own a
large proportion of Jordanian businesses, including
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firms in banking, insurance, manufacturing, construc-
tion, and shipping, according to US Embassy sources.
Palestinians, moreover, play a prominent role in the
state-owned enterprises in the mining, oil refining,
transportation, communications, energy, and other
sectors.
King Abdallah-Hussein's grandfather and ruler of
Jordan from 1921 to 1951-made concerted efforts to
integrate Palestinians into the political system from
the beginning of mass Palestinian immigration follow-
ing the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war. Palestinian nota-
bles were appointed to the 10-member upper house of
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History of the Hashemite Monarchy
1953.
The modern history of Jordan is intimately connected
with the Hashemite family-members ctf the House
of Beni Hashem, descended in the male line from the
prophet Muhammad s daughter Fatima. Abdallah,
King ctf Hilaz, arrived in the area in 1920, expecting
to help his brother Faysal recover the Syrian throne
and expel the French from Syria. The British, to
prevent di~culties with the French, persuaded Ab-
dallah to remain as amir in the eastern portion of
mandated Palestine known as Translordan. Officially
established as asemi-independent amirate in 1923,
Translordan remained under British tutelage until
1946, when it became the independent Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. In 1951, King Abdallah was
assassinated by a Palestinian-in part because of his
clandestine dealings with the Israelis-as he entered
al-Agsa Mosque in Jerusalem. After a short reign by
Abdallah's popular but mentally ill son, Talal, Ab-
dallah's grandson Hussein bin Talal became King in
Palestine and Transjordan
Under the British Mandate
noaazcB~llk2
states.
parliament, to Cabinet posts, and to governorships.
Palestinians who gained influence and prestige from
their civil service positions under the British mandate
were integrated into the upper echelons of Jordan's
bureaucracy. Leading Palestinian nationalists gradu-
ally were co-opted into the system, often as ambassa-
dors to other Arab and occasionally to West European
Hussein has continued this policy. He has made sure
that Palestinians are always represented in Cabinets.
Nine of the 23 ministers Prime Minister Rifa`i select-
ed in 1985 to form his new government were of
Palestinian origin. After a recent minor Cabinet
reshu$ie, many Palestinians with ties to established
West Bank families remained. Most notably, Minister
of the Royal Court Adnan Abu Odeh, Foreign Minis-
ter Tahir al-Masri, Minister of Planning Tahir
Kan`an, Minister for Occupied Territories' Affairs
Marwan Dudin, Minister of Finance Hanna Odeh,
and Chief of the Royal Court Marwan al-Kasim-all
of Palestinian descent-have continued to la promi-
nent roles within Rifa`i's Cabinet. ~ -y 25X1
By recalling the lower house of parliament in January
1984 after a 10-year hiatus, King Hussein sought to
provide an opportunity for even greater Palestinian 25X1
participation at the grassroots level. The lower house
originally consisted of 60 members-30 each from the
East and West Banks. The balance between West and
East Bank members of parliament was maintained
with the passage of a new electoral law in March 1986
expanding the size of the lower house to 142 seats.
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Decisionmaking in Jordan:
I~luential Palestinians
Although Hussein remains Jordan's key decision-
maker and opinion shaper, he delegates considerable
authority to a few key o.,~icials, according to the US
Embassy. For example, most economic and govern-
ment administrative issues are delegated to Prime
Minister Zayd al-Rifa`i, with only infrequent inter-
ventionfrom the palace. Hussein is much more
deeply involved with defense and security issues,
consulting closely with the Commander in Chief Bin
Shaker and other senior officials. On foreign policy
issues, Hussein takes the lead, consulting with a
small circle of advisers.
Most Palestinians in government advise the King on
foreign and domestic policies generally dealing with
Palestinian and West Bank affairs. For example,
much of the early conceptual work on the peace
process was done by Minister of the Royal Court
Adnan Abu Odeh, according to the Embassy. Hussein
has used various Palestinian subordinates, including
Abu Odeh and Chief of the Royal Court Marwan al-
Kasim, to play roles with actors in the peace process
such as West Bank notables, PLO Chairman Arafat,
and Arafat's lieutenants. Abu Odeh and Kasim are
considered by Jordanians as the two most inlYuential
Palestinians in the Cabinet-Kasim is often pointed
to as a possible successor to the Prime Minister.
Hussein alone decides Jordan's course in the peace
process, however, and has frequently overruled the
recommendations of his advisers.
A provision of the new law allows Palestinian refugee
camps in Jordan to elect 11 delegates to parliament,
with the number to count toward the West Bank's
allocation of 71 seats. In the past, refugee camps were
not represented in parliament.
Social Cleavages: Widespread Discrimination
and Alienation
Despite the efforts at political assimilation, the rela-
tionship between the Palestinians and Jordanians
remains uneasy. According to US Embassy sources,
Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri probably owes his
current position and his rapid career advancement to
King Hussein's efforts to retain influence with the
Palestinians, particularly those in the occupied terri-
tories, and is an example of a Palestinian success
story. Masri, an experienced diplomat and civil ser-
vant, was born in the West Bank town ofNabulus and
is a member of the wealthy and politically important
Masri clan. Masri is the spokesman and administra-
tor of the daily details of diplomacy but has seen his
role as Foreign Minister eclipsed by the dynamic
Prime Minister Rifa'i. The US Embassy says that
Masri provides a needed balance to Rifa`i's risky
diplomatic ventures and was chosen by the King to
accompany the Prime Minister on a recent trip to the
United States for that reason. Other members of
Masri'slamily who have found wealth and influence
because of their assimilation into Jordanian society
include Wa it al-Masri, onetime Ambassador to
Moscow; Awni and Munib al-Masri, who have con-
nections with Jordan's petroleum market; and Dr.
Munthir WasiJ'al-Masri, who has been a contender
for the position of Minister of Labor and Social
Development.
many Palestinians complain that the King's pro-
nouncements and his decision to reconvene parliament
have not been matched by concrete efforts to eradi-
cate longstanding practices making Palestinians sec-
ond-class citizens. Embassy sources say that Palestin-
ians believe there is a deliberate policy to give
preference to native Jordanians for the highest posi-
tions in the government, the military, and education.
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The process of integrating the Palestinians into the
Jordanian kingdom was severely disrupted by the
Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. Not only did the Arab
defeat discredit the monarchy among many Palestin-
ians, but it also exposed the West Bank population to
occupation by a dynamic and determined people.
For several years gf'ter the 1967 war, Palestinian
guerrillas in Jordan exercised considerable political
and military influence. Their popularity in the'refu-
gee camps was substantial, and even young children
were recruited into paramilitary youth groups. Dur-
ing the period 1966-70, Palestinian groups launched
guerrilla attacks against Israel from Jordanian terri-
tory that were met with brutal retaliation by Israeli
forces. The Palestinian movement in Jordan-led at
the time by George Habbash's Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-reached its peak in 1970
and severely threatened the Hashemite monarchy.
In September 1970, also known as Black September,
the Jordanian Army fought a 10-day civil war with
Palestinian guerrillas led by Habbash, who succeed-
ed in persuading Fatah leader Yasir Arafat to involve
his forces in the heavy fighting. This ended with an
agreement, signed in Cairo, under which the guerril-
las recognized Jordanian sovereignty and the King s
authority and agreed to withdraw their forces from
towns and villages. Some fighting continued,"however,
until 19 July 1971 when the Jordanian Army won a
major victory over Habbash's men in the Ajlun area.
Most of the several thousand Palestinian commandos
therectf?er relocated to Lebanon.
Palestinians complain of discrimination in education
and career opportunities. They theoretically compete
with other Jordanians for acceptance at universities,
vocational schools, or teacher training institutes with-
out formal quota restrictions as in other Arab coun-
tries. the
Ministry of Higher Education intervenes to ensure
that native Jordanian students receive about 60 per-
cent of all first-year university openings and scholar-
ships. The government also limits the number of
Palestinians by distributing university openings on a
geographic basis. For example, most Palestinians liv~25X1
in urban centers such as Amman and are thereby
excluded from openings given to students from rural
areas. Palestinian students 25X1
and professors resent the fact that less qualified
Jordanian students are given admissions preference
and scholarships, particularly since Palestinians on
average have scored higher on the national university
entrance examination. 25X1
25X1
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Despite their predominance in the private sector,
Palestinians are considerably underrepresented in the
public sector as a consequence of Jordanian worries
stemming from the civil war in 1970-71. Palestinians
complain of discrimination in government hiring and
promotion, according to US Embassy officials. Pales-
tinians also note that Jordan's security services have a
suspicious, if not hostile, attitude toward their com-
munity, which adds another source of antagonism
toward the Jordanian establishment.
Palestinians in the
armed forces are better educated than other groups
but are openly distrusted. Palestinians are rarely
found in combat units, and there are few high-ranking
officers-for example, there are no Palestinian bri-
gade commanders. The low number of high-ranking
Palestinian officers-in sharp contrast with the Pales-
tinians' heavy representation in the conscript ranks-
is largely because Jordanian military leaders have not
forgotten the 1970-71 civil war and, as a result, are
extremely reluctant to allow Palestinians to move into
the higher military ranks. Palestinian officers general-
ly are placed in support units such as the maintenance
corps, signal corps, and finance department, although
there are occasional exceptions to this practice. Not
surprisingly,
morale is low among Palestinians in the military
because they resent their exclusion from more senior
positions. In contrast, the Air Force was not heavily
involved in the civil war and, consequently, has fewer
bitter memories. A system of merit awards favoring
promotions based on demonstrated ability has given
Palestinians in the Air Force good opportunities to
advance in the officer corps.
Resentment between Jordanians and Palestinians is
largely based on issues of power and wealth. Both
Palestinians and native Jordanians have prospered
during the economic boom, but US Embassy officials
report that conspicuous consumption by wealthy Pal-
estinians fuels the resentment of poor Jordanians who
believe that Palestinians have taken over Jordan.
Conversely, many poor refugees point to the wealth of
some Jordanians as proof that Palestinians are dis-
criminated against in education and employment. The
greatest discontent is among the Palestinians still
living in Jordan's refugee camps, whose standard of
living remains low.
Political Cleavages: Palestinian Nationalism
Versus Hashemite Legitimacy
The US Embassy in Amman estimates that most
Palestinians in Jordan are political moderates who
have learned since the 1970-71 civil war to tolerate
Hussein's authority. But they have never considered
him their spokesman-a role they continue to accord
to Arafat and the PLO, while generally rejecting the
violent tactics of radical PLO factions. Radical Pales-
tinian influence in Jordan has been limited since
Hussein expelled the guerrillas from the country in
1970-71 and adopted strict security measures to pre-
vent their reinfiltration.
Jordan's Palestinians still identify to varying degrees
with the Palestinian national movement, depending on
their stake in Jordan. Their general sense of detach-
ment from Jordan's long-term destiny can be tied to
the unresolved Palestinian issue. In the past, the
Palestinians' rejection of the Hashemite regime was
' 25X1
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The Kingdom of Jordan lies east of the Jordan River,
the Dead Sea, and the series of wadis from the Dead
Sea south to the Gulf of Aqaba. Native Jordanians
are a diverse group, numbering probably more than
1 million, or more than one-third of Jordan's popula-
tion of 2.8 million. These native people are the
descendants of the approximately 300,000 inhabit-
ants of the area when it became the Amirate oj.
Transjordan in 1921. Nearly haif'of these 300,000
were bedouins, and the rest were townspeople, villag-
ers, and seminomads. Amir and later King Abdallah
based his authority primarily on support from the
bedouins of the south, who shared his Hijazi origins.
Abdallah also brought a small number oflollowers
with him from Mecca and Syria following the French
occupation of Damascus.
Before the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Jordan's popula-
tion was largely native born. One of the major
consequences of this war was Jordan's seizure of the
West Bank and the granting of citizenship to all
residents of the West Bank as well as to the Palestin-
ian refugees who found themselves in Jordan and the
West Bank after the war.
The native Jordanians-especially the bedouins-
regard the settled townsmen as less manly and less
Arab than themselves and generally oppose intermar-
riage. In contrast with the largely urban, educated
Palestinians, the Jordanians before 1948 were provin-
cial, conservative, and poorly educated. The
determined by the perception that their nationalist
goals might be achieved by the monarchy's overthrow.
The monarchy was threatened several times through
the 1960s and up to 1971 when nationalist fervor was
at its highest-stimulated by the union of Egypt,
Syria, and Iraq by Egyptian President Nasir in 1963,
the beginning of terrorist operations by Arafat's
Fatah in 1966, and the PLO's maintenance of a major
military presence in Jordan from 1968 to 1970.
education level of Jordanians now equals that of
Palestinians, but conservatism and provincialism re-
main Jordanian characteristics. They do not perceive
regaining the West Bank or destroying Israel as being
realistic or relevant.0 25X1
Although possessing a similiar ethnic and cultural
heritage, Palestinians and Jordanians have different
historical and national outlooks. Palestinian immi-
grants from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and particu-
larly the 1967 war have remained emotionally at-
tached to the struggle for their lost homeland and
have not focused on integrating with the tribal and
kinship-oriented Jordanians. Those Palestinians in
refugee camps have been heavily influenced since
1967 by the rise of a militant guerrilla movement and
are undoubtedly the least supportive of the Hashem-
ite monarchy.~~ 25X1
Despite these contrasts, many ties and relationships
exist between Palestinians and Jordanians. Increased
urbanization has led to greater intermingling between
the two communities, particularly in Amman. One
example is the enduring complex of traditional fam25X 1
ily links between the West Bank towns of Nabulus
and Hebron and the Jordanian cities of As Salt and
Al Karak, respectively. Even in the midst of Israel's
occupation, families in Nabulus and As Salt and in
Hebron and Al Karak have continued to arrange
marriages and conduct a.flourishing commerce.
Although Jordan's economic boom probably has
strengthened the Palestinians' interest in the status
quo, the potential exists for a revival of radical
Palestinian influence. The US Embassy in Amman
says Jordan's refugee camps are breeding grounds for
Palestinian nationalism that can be exploited by
radical Palestinian groups.~~ 25X1
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Peace Process: Fueling Mutual Suspicions. King
Hussein's relationship with the Palestinian communi-
ty has become increasingly complicated by his efforts
at political cooperation with the PLO. Despite the
failure of Hussein's yearlong effort to reach an agree-
ment with Arafat in February 1986, Jordanian offi-
cials continue to state publicly that Jordan will not
enter peace negotiations with Israel without the PLO.
Most Palestinians believe Hussein hopes to sway
Palestinian opinion in his favor to undermine PLO
influence and woo the support of an independent West
Bank leadership that will join him in the PLO's place
in the peace talks.
Most Palestinians suspect that the King is only inter-
ested in dominating the Palestinian movement and
regaining control of the West Bank. Moreover, the
US Embassy says that the Palestinians' longstanding
suspicions about Hussein's intentions are standing in
the way of their support of his ambitious West Bank
development plan, which anticipates-unrealistically,
we believe-spending $1.3 billion by 1990 on develop-
ment projects.
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Figure 7. PLO Chairman `
Arq/at and King Hussein at the
17th session ojthe Palestine
National Council in Amman,
Hussein's involvement in the peace process has in-
creased the suspicions of native Jordanians-especial-
ly bedouins and their descendants-of the country's
Palestinian community. According to the US Embas-
sy, despite their staunch loyalty, native Jordanians are
wary of the King's peace efforts, fearing that Hussein
might undermine their interests for the sake of the
Palestinians. After the 1974 Rabat Arab summit
meeting decision naming the PLO as the "sole, legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people," some
East Bankers believed their sacrifices on behalf of the
Palestinians were ignored and rejected by the Arab
world and the Palestinians themselves. This sense of
rejection and the realization of their own separate
interests led to the growth of the "East Bank first"
school of thought that calls on King Hussein to put
national interests ahead of his sense of mission and
responsibility for the West Bank and Jerusalem. They
argue that Hussein should not negotiate with Israel on
behalf of the Palestinians and demand that he have
broad, public Arab support even for limited moves in
the peace process.
ReJ'agee Camps: Cauldrons of Discontent. We believe
the refugees-not the established Palestinian business
class-would have the greatest potential to cause
trouble if they were convinced that the King was
trying to stifle Palestinian nationalism by entering
negotiations with Israel without the PLO. US Embas-
sy sources say that dedication to the Palestinian cause
is more central than loyalty to the Hashemite king-
Growing Radicalism Among Palestinian Youth. De-
spite being more integrated into Jordanian society
than their elders, Palestinian youth are the hardest hit
by Jordan's social inequities and growing economic
troubles. Violent campus unrest in May 1986 at
Yarmuk University, north of Amman-Jordan's sec-
ond largest university-resulted in the deaths of at
least three students during confrontations with Jorda-
nian security forces. Jordanian officials attributed the
demonstrations to discontent with academic policies,
but, in our judgment, the outbreaks also stemmed
from growing student frustration with King Hussein's
centralized governing style, poor employment oppor-
tunities, and subversive efforts by a small group of
radical activists. Most Yarmuk students come from
low-income, predominantly Palestinian families who
could not afford newly imposed tuition hikes.
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Palestinian radicals
were instrumental in exploiting political frustrations
at the university. Many in the Yarmuk demonstra-
tions denounced the government and the King's Feb-
ruary 1986 speech that ended his dialogue with PLO
Chairman Arafat.
Islamic fundamentalism in Jordan is providing anoth-
er channel for expression of political opposition by
disaffected Palestinian youth.
the Islamic fundamentalist move-
ment and the Palestinian nationalist movement in
Jordan are inextricably linked because many Palestin-
ians look to the establishment of Ayatollah Khomein-
i's Islamic republic as an example of a successful
popular uprising.
many young Palestinian women are wearing tradition-
al Islamic garb more as a protest against the govern-
ment than as a religious statement.
The US Embassy in Amman has noted a discernible
rise in Islamic activity on campuses in recent years
largely because of the absence of competing student
sively Palestinian causes.
organizations. In 1978 student unions were abolished
after students at the University of Jordan in Amman
challenged the university administration and called a
major strike. The unions were replaced by elected
"student committees" organized for each faculty. The
resulting leadership vacuum on campus has been
filled over the past five years by fundamentalist
students, who now control virtually every student
committee at the Universities of Jordan and Yarmuk.
At least one small clandestine fundamentalist group,
the "Supporters of God's Victory," promotes exclu-
Although we believe Jordan's fundamentalists have
had an impact on all levels of Jordanian society, they
have not yet created a unified or coordinated national
movement. Nonetheless, extremists have proved able
to generate explosive confrontations at Yarmuk Uni-
versity and have the potential to do so again in the
future, particularly as Jordan's economic conditions
worsen. The US Embassy says the student body at
Yarmuk University is 80 percent Palestinian. Many
recognize that they will be unable to find jobs when
they graduate because of Jordan's stagnating econo-
my and few job opportunities in the Gulf and believe
they have nothing to lose by protesting.
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Irbid: Potential for Unrest
The violent campus unrest at Yarmuk University
focused attention on the northern city of Irbid, which
is one of Jordan's major urban centers and the site of
the country's.fcfth-largest Palestinian refugee camp.
Irbid s economy, which is based predominantly on
agriculture, provides only limited job opportunities
for university graduates.
During the 1970-71 civil war the city's large number
of Palestinian reJ'ugees and its proximity to the
Syrian border and Syrian troops made Irbid an ideal
PLD base. the PLD
continues on a small scale to exploit antimonarchy
sentiments among students frustrated over poor post-
graduation employment prospects.
Fundamentalist sentiment also appears strong among
Irbid s Palestinians, as witnessed in a fierce byelec-
tion battle tofill a vacant seat in parliament early
last year. A Muslim Brotherhood candidate lost
narrowly to a Christian candidate in a close cam-
paign.
We believe the potential for further unrest is high if
job prospects remain bleak for Irbid s sizable student
population and ij'the government continues to be seen
as being heavyhanded in dealing with Palestinian
political and religious activity.
Prospects
For the short term-at least through the remainder of
this decade-we believe the animosities between the
Palestinian and native Jordanian communities are
manageable. Jordan's healthy economy over the last
10 years has materially improved the lives of both
groups, with some Palestinians actually becoming the
wealthiest among Jordan's business community. This
wealth and the intermarriage between the two groups
give the Palestinians a strong social and financial
stake in good relations with their Jordanian neigh-
bors.~~ 25X1
During the 1990s, however, we believe changing
political, economic, and social conditions will magnify
the Palestinians' discontent with continuing limita-
tions on their status, particularly if the population
balance shifts more in their favor-which almost
certainly will happen, given the Palestinians' highe25X1
seek solace in fundamentalist Islamic practices.
25X1
According to Jordanian Government estimates, the
country's work force will increase by 25 percent, from
535,000 in 1986 to 670,000 in 1990, largely because
of the increasing numbers of Jordanian youth and
greater female participation. The return of workers
who are losing their jobs in the Persian Gulf states 25X1
will add to the economy's burden of absorbing so 25X1
many new workers. Recession in the Gulf, where 40
percent of Jordanian workers are employed, forced
about 20,000 Jordanians-many of them Palestin-
ians-to return home during 1986. This has prevented
many of Jordan's recent high school, vocational
school, and university graduates from obtaining jobs.
With its domestic labor force growing at 5 percent
annually, unemployment could reach 20 percent by
1990, according to US Embassy sources. 25X1
As economic difficulties grow, the Palestinian stake25X1
preserving domestic stability to protect their interests
under Hashemite rule may be eroded. We believe a
mass of unemployed or underemployed Palestinians
would pose a growing and potentially ominous securi-
ty risk. Dissatisfaction with their standard of living
and increased discrimination in university and career
opportunities may cause more Palestinian youth to
25X1
We believe that, for King Hussein, meeting the
minimum aspirations of the Palestinians in any future
peace talks will be an overriding national objective.
According to the US Embassy, the King's sensitivities
to Palestinian concerns, however, will not earn him
the unquestioned support of Jordan's Palestinians
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Jordan's Growing Economic Woes
Reduced Arab aid and declining worker remittances
are taking their toll on Jordan's hard pressed econo-
my. Assistance from the Persian Gulf states to Jor-
dan dropped from $1.2 billion in 1981 to about $580
million in 1986. Zf Riyadh does not forgive Jordan's
oil debt, Guff aid this year will be significantly below
1985 levels.
Jordan's third five year development plan (1986-90J
focuses on assistance to its troubled sectors, includ-
ing the ever-growing need for water, further develop-
ment of the service and agriculture sectors, housing
and construction, and relief of unemployment. By
stimulating investment to spur job creation, the gov-
ernment hopes to create approximately 100,000 jobs
over the next,five years. If realized, the new jobs
would help to ofJ`set reduced remittances from Jorda-
nians working abroad particularly in the Persian
Gulj=and help to hold Jordan's unemployment rate
to no more than 10 percent by 1990. We believe
Jordan will not garner the.financial resources needed
to implement the investment called for in the five-
year plan. Unless the private sector can pick up the
because of their vivid memories of past Jordanian
crackdowns, particularly the suppression of Palestin-
ian guerrillas during the 1970-71 civil war. These
reservations about Hashemite intentions will increase
if it appears that Jordanian-Israeli negotiations over
the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will
take place. Hussein will have to bring in the PLO
directly or else secure its blessing for non-PLO Pales-
tinian representatives to avoid forcing his Palestinian
subjects to choose between the monarchy and their
nationalist aspirations. If the Palestinian issue re-
mains unresolved, Jordan's Palestinians are likely to
begin to agitate for political change in Jordan, argu-
ing for greater democratization of the country's politi-
cal institutions. The King's decision to reconvene the
lower house of parliament, partly to broaden Palestin-
ian participation in government, has stimulated in-
creased parliamentary criticism of Hussein's policies,
particularly by Islamic fundamentalist members.
slack-an unlikely development-the levels and pat-
tern of growth projected in the plan will not be
realized.
Jordan's unemployment forecasts are badly.flawed,
in our judgment. More realistic US Embassy projec-
tions place the unemployment rate in 1990 at about
20 percent, which would leave over 100,000 Jordani-
ans out of work. Employment prospects for university
graduates-whose unemployment rate already runs
significantly higher than the national average-are
further clouded by the graduates' refusal to accept
jobs in the construction, agricultural, and service
sectors. US Embassy sources estimate that 30 percent
of Jordan's engineers and physicians-many of whom
are Palestinian-are unemployed.
Such high unemployment would place the Jordanian
Government under tremendous pressure to become
the employer of last resort, a role it is not inclined to
take. With limited growth prospects, however, the
government ultimately may have to create a large
number of make-work jobs.
King Hussein's continued commitment to the Pales-
tinian issue also is likely to increase tensions between
native Jordanians and Palestinians, particularly if
Jordan's economic problems grow-as seems likely.
Jordanians will come to resent the financial and
political capital spent to resolve the issue, particularly
Hussein's plan for West Bank development.
An Israeli decision to annex the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip would create serious and possibly destabi-
lizing tensions in Hussein's relations with his Palestin-
ian subjects. Such an Israeli move could quickly
generate Palestinian underground activity against the
regime of a sort not seen since the 1970-71 civil war.
An Israeli decision to force significant numbers of
Palestinians under occupation to emigrate to Jordan
would create an overwhelming Palestinian majority
25X1
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Figure 10
Jordan: Declining Arab Aid and Foreign
Exchange Reserves, 1983-86
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 I II III IV I II III IV . I II III IV I II III IVb
1983 84 85 86
Foreign
exchange
reservesd
I I I I
0 1983 84 85 86
d By quarter, end of period figure.
t, Estimated.
Baghdad Agreement payments.
dEnd of period; 1986 year-end figure estimated.
within the country and imperil the Hashemite crown.
This majority, frustrated with the Jordanian-dominat-
ed status quo, could use its numerical superiority over
time to foster development of a Palestinian state in
Jordan
Palestinian acceptance of the monarchy is essential to
a smooth succession on King Hussein's death-a
contingency few in Jordan wish to face, given Crown
Prince Hassan's widely doubted leadership abilities
and past poor performance. We believe Hassan's
views toward the Palestinians closely resemble King
Hussein's, and he would almost certainly continue the
King's moderate policies. Although Hassan has con-
centrated his efforts on economic, social, and cultural
affairs, he has assumed a more active role in foreign
affairs as well.~~ 25X1
The Crown Prince is an ardent supporter of the
Palestinian cause and strongly denounces Israel's
West Bank settlement policy and the effects of its
occupation of Jerusalem. He has written several books
on the subject and has made himself an expert on
demographic changes in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. The US Embassy reports that he pays frequent
visits to Jordan's refugee camps, particularly when
the King has made foreign policy decisions unpopular
among Palestinians, such as the ending of a peace
dialogue with PLO Chairman Arafat in February
1986. He has been active recently in drumming up
international financial support for Jordan's West
Bank development plan. The US Embassy reports he
has worked closely with Minister of Planning Tahir
Kan`an, a Palestinian, to redirect the bureaucracy
into thinking about the coherence of Jordan's pro-
grams on the West Bank and to bring them into
confer with Jordan's overall development efforts.
25X1
Despite Hassan's vocal support for the Palestinian
cause in recent years, US Embassy sources report that
many Palestinians do not entirely trust him and
continue to believe it was the Crown Prince who
pushed King Hussein into confrontation with the
Palestinians during the 1970-71 civil war. We believe,
however, that many Palestinians would accept Has-
san's rule because they would not want to risk losing
the stability and prosperity they have enjoyed over the
last 10 years. 0 25X1
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