REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES IN THE THIRD WORLD: A NEW MILITARY CAPABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R001000830003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -S'i'r
Intelligence 25X1
Remotely Piloted Vehicles
in the Third World:
A New Military Capability
An Intelligence Assessment
See
GI 86-10060
August 1986
637
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Remotely Piloted Vehicles
in the Third World:
A New Military Capability
This paper was prepared by
Office of Global Issues. Comments
Directorate of
Intelligence
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and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, International Security Issues Division,
Secret
G/ 86-10060
August 1986
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Remotely Piloted Vehicles
in the Third World:
A New Military Capability
Key Judgments The successful use of remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) by the Israeli
Information available military during the 1982 Lebanon conflict and the promise of an affordable
as of 28 July 1986 unmanned reconnaissance and electronic warfare platform have height-
was used in this report.
ened Third World interest in RPVs. In response to increasing US, West
European, Soviet, and Israeli experience with RPVs, several Third World
states, including Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, India, South Korea, and Egypt,
have recently purchased, or are planning to purchase, them. We believe a
number of other Third World nations with relatively large and professional
militaries will become users of RPVs by the mid-1990s, especially with the
development of inexpensive and easy-to-use systems. RPVs will provide
enhanced surveillance capabilities and, depending on the particular system
purchased, provide a capability to jam enemy communications, detect and
destroy surface-to-air missile batteries, and deliver standoff munitions.
US security interests in the Third World will face new challenges from the
proliferation of RPVs:
? Military Capabilities. RPVs are likely to enhance the capabilities of
professional Third World militaries when used in combat. Israeli use of
RPVs against Syrian SAM sites in Lebanon showed the tactical advan-
tages of RPV use by a well-trained and resourceful military. F_
For na-
tions in the Third World facing insurgent threats, RPVs could improve
intelligence capabilities, an area where many Third World militaries are
weak. Effective use of RPVs in the Third World will be constrained by
shortages of technically qualified personnel to operate the complex
systems.
? Strategic Capabilities. We believe RPVs could become a source of
remote guidance and navigation technologies to Third World countries
aspiring to build strategic missile systems, such as India, Argentina,
Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Israel. Adapting RPV technol-
ogies would, however, require additional technical assistance from suppli-
er states.
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GI 86-10060
August 1986
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? Terrorism. A bomb-laden RPV provided to a terrorist group by a patron
state could be used against a US embassy or other target in a dramatic
fashion. Although we have no indication that any Third World nation or
terrorist group is planning such a modification, operators of RPVs can re-
place the surveillance equipment with a high-explosive payload, effective-
ly converting the RPV into a guided bomb capable of surprise attacks at
short and medium ranges.
RPVs, when used as a reconnaissance system, may help prevent conflict
and maintain stability in tense Middle Eastern and Asian areas. RPVs can
provide timely intelligence about the buildup of enemy troops and allow
increased time for diplomatic action or defensive preparations before the
outbreak of hostilities. Reconnaissance missions flown by unmanned RPVs
are seen as less provocative than manned fighter aircraft, and the loss of
one of these vehicles over the Golan Heights or other sensitive areas is less
likely to instigate retaliatory action.
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Key Judgments
The RPV: A Maturing Military System
Western Europe 4
Soviet Union 4
... And Beyond 7
Implications for the United States 9
Third World Strategic Capabilities 9
Third World Military Capabilities 9
Exports 10
Appendix
RPV Production Programs Worldwide 11
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Figure 1
A Standard RPV Field Deployment
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Remotely Piloted Vehicles
in the Third World:
A New Military Capability
Remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)' are one of several
battlefield management systems available to the
Third World. Like Airborne Warning and Control
Systems (AWACS) aircraft and specially equipped
helicopters, RPVs are designed to provide complete
and timely surveillance of the battle area to military
commanders. Of all the battlefield management sys-
tems available today, the RPV is the least expensive
and the easiest to operate. The system can easily be
modified to perform a variety of electronic warfare
and attack missions and is likely to play an increasing-
ly important role in Third World warfare. This
assessment examines the status of current RPV pro-
grams, projects RPV proliferation into the 1990s, and
assesses the impact of their growing availability on
US security interests.
RPVs have been used in combat as a reconnaissance
and electronic warfare platform for over 20 years. The
US armed forces flew over 3,000 sorties of early-
generation RPVs over Southeast Asia from 1965 to
1972. Israel purchased Firebee RPVs from the United
States in the mid-1970s to reconnoiter border areas
and minimize the risk of a surprise attack. The
Israelis expanded their use of RPVs in the 1982
Lebanon conflict by using them in conjunction with
manned aircraft to destroy Syrian SAM sites in the
Bekaa Valley (see inset on Israeli RPVs in Lebanon).
Both the Syrians and the Israelis monitor develop-
ments in Lebanon and on the Golan Heights with
RPVs. More recently
' The following study covers RPVs that are recoverable and
perform a surveillance or electronic warfare mission that tradition-
ally would be handled by a manned aircraft. Target drones used to
train air defense units and expendable attack drones are not
included.)
Most RPVs available today are small vehicles, or
"mini-RPVs," weighing between 100 and 300 kilo-
grams (kg) and capable of carrying a 20- to 150-kg
payload of cameras and electronic equipment. RPV
development programs have concentrated on small,
subsonic vehicles because they are harder to detect
than earlier generation RPVs as a result of their
reduced infrared, noise, and visual signatures. Manu-
facturers are taking advantage of many recent tech-
nologies such as lightweight but durable special mate-
rials and miniaturized electronic components to
improve the capabilities of mini-RPVs (see inset on
RPV Technologies). A second class of midi-RPVs,
weighing up to 2,000 kg, can carry up to a 500-kg
payload and have a longer range than the smaller
mini-RPVs.
Unlike their predecessors, RPVs today are designed to
perform a variety of reconnaissance, electronic war-
fare, and attack missions:
? The cameras used in most RPVs provide real-time
or near-real-time information, whereas traditional,
manned reconnaissance systems and early-
generation RPVs often involve a considerable delay
to develop the surveillance photography. Moreover,
RPVs can be flown over battle areas during high-
intensity conflict when manned aircraft cannot be
used because of the likelihood of losing a pilot and
an expensive aircraft.
? In addition to its surveillance role, the RPV is a
flexible platform; it can carry equipment to jam
enemy communications, detect and destroy surface-
to-air missile sites, correct artillery fire, or deliver
standoff munitions.
? RPVs are also gaining wider acceptance as a laser
designator for the new generation of laser-guided
munitions, such as the US Hellfire antitank missile
and the Copperhead artillery round.
Secret
GI 86-10060
August 1986
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The Israeli Air Force and Army considerably im-
proved their tactical capabilities by using RPVs
during the Lebanon conflict in 1982. The most dra-
matic incident occurred on 9 June when RPVs,
standoff jamming aircraft, and fighter aircraft de-
stroyed 19 Syrian SAM sites in the Bekaa Valley.
RPVs were also employed by the Israeli Army for
surveillance and target identification missions. F7
RPVs are attractive to Third World militaries looking
for improved reconnaissance and electronic warfare
capabilities. Most RPVs do not require runways for
launch and recovery. Some can be launched by hand,
while others are launchable from aircraft, ships, or
specially designed mobile platforms. RPVs are typi-
cally retrieved in nets or are parachute recovered to
reduce the damage to their valuable electronic pay-
loads from runway landings.)
Mini-RPVs contributed significantly to Israeli tacti-
cal successes during the conflict. As a result, the
Israelis plan to increase their RPV force substantial-
mobile SAM threats in the future.
In
1982, division commanders had to wait up to two
hours before receiving evaluated intelligence from
RPYs. Israeli artillery commanders are also evaluat-
ing RP Ys to spot and correct artillery fire. Further-
more, the Air Force is working on a mini-RPV called
Harpy that should enhance Israeli operations against
United States
Most of the development of RPVs is taking place in
the United States and Western Europe. US industry
is involved in 15 programs, and most of these are in
the development and testing stages (see appendix).
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Much of the growing interest in RPVs today is
attributable to advances in composite materials and
electro-optical technologies that have broadened the
RPVs' capabilities. These new advances make RPVs
more survivable on the battlefield by reducing their
overall size and weight. Furthermore, new technol-
ogies will play a more important role in the future as
users seek multimission capabilities in their vehicles.
Airframes
Lightweight and durable special materials are start-
ing to be used more widely in RPV construction.
While many RPVs continue to be made from stan-
dard aluminum alloys and glass fiber materials, the
more capable systems are being made from composite
materials. The airframe for the US Aquila, for
example, is made from molded and preimpregnated
Kevlar 49/epoxy material, and the Sky Eye is made
primarily from carbon fiber and Kevlar. These mate-
rials provide sufficient weight savings to accommo-
date multimission payloads by themselves.
Electro-Optical Sensors
The predominant imaging sensor for future RPV
payloads will be infrared (IR) line-scanning systems,
The Aquila, built by Lockheed Missile and Space
Company, and Lear Siegler's Sky Eye are the two
most prominent US projects. The Aquila is a multi-
mission vehicle that can acquire enemy targets, adjust
artillery fire, illuminate targets for laser-guided muni-
tions, reconnoiter battle areas, relay communications
between ground and air units, and jam radio commu-
nications. The Sky Eye is also a multimission system,
but it can also deliver munitions, such as 2.75-inch
guided and unguided rockets. F-1
The US military is just beginning to receive these
new-generation RPVs. The Army received 32 Aquilas
and nine ground control stations last year and will
accept eight more air vehicles this year (see table).
according to industry reports. IR line scanners can
cut through the haze and smoke of the battlefield and
can perform effectively at night. IR line scanners in
development today are striving to overcome the range
and maintenance constraints of currently available
systems. According to press reports, line scanners
incorporating mercury cadmium-telluride focal
plane arrays, such as those used in Honeywell's
hand-held model, provide the much higher resolution
necessary for long-range reconnaissance. F-1
TV cameras will continue to be a standard surveil-
lance payload, especially for inexpensive and less
complex short-range RPVs. Third-generation low
light level TV cameras are under development and
promise to offer high resolution pictures under star-
light conditions. According to industry reports, the
development of solid-state cameras has made TV a
less costly and more viable option than IR line
scanners for RPVs. Finally, the advent of very-large-
scale integrated circuits (VLSI), and the approaching
very-high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC), should
dramatically increase the processing speed for data
gathered from TV and IR RPVs, making them a
more effective force multiplier.n
The total planned procurement for Aquila will include
another 508 vehicles and 71 ground control stations
(GCS) that will be fielded at the division level. Each
division will consist of 13 Aquilas and one GCS. In
1984 and 1985 the Army also bought eight Sky Eyes
that they launch from airfields at Puerto San Lorenzo
and Palmerola in Honduras. We believe RPV use in
this low-intensity guerrilla environment may lead to
an Army requirement for a battalion-level surveil-
lance capability. The US Navy is using the US
Teledyne BQM 74C for reconnaissance purposes and
will soon set requirements for a midi-RPV with a
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Current Operators of Reconnaissance
and Target Identification RPVs
Syria
DR-3
3
USSR
Nigeria
Sparrowhawk
12
United Kingdom
range of 100 to 300 nautical miles capable of imaging,
target identification, and real-time transmission in a
jamming environment. The Air Force does not cur-
rently field an RPV system but is looking for un-
manned vehicles to perform electronic warfare mis-
sions.
Western Europe
The most widely produced Western RPV is the
Canadian CL-89. West Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Canada have together bought
748 CL-89s equipped with photographic and infrared
line-scanning equipment to provide battlefield intelli-
gence. Canadair is hoping to capitalize on the popu-
larity of the CL-89 and is developing the CL-227,
which has a unique peanut shape and takes off and
lands vertically. The United Kingdom and Italy ac-
count for nearly three-fourths of the remaining 21
programs in Western Europe and are likely to become
leading non-US producers. The most prominent Brit-
ish program is the Phoenix, which is entering produc-
tion and will be used for target acquisition by the
British Army; current plans call for the procurement
of several hundred beginning in 1988. Meteor in Italy
has developed a family of Mirach RPVs for the
Italian Air Force that are capable of performing the
same missions as the US Aquila and Sky Eye. The
Mirach-20 recently entered series production for the
Italian Army and Navy.
Both West Germany and France have been slow to
devote substantial funding to RPV development. The
German Army has shown little enthusiasm for domes-
tic programs, preferring to use the CL-89. Neverthe-
less, Dornier and MBB continue work on the KZO,
MTC-II, and Tucan RPVs, mostly on a private
funding basis. Recent signs of French interest in the
lightweight British Sparrowhawk suggests that the
French may forego the research and development
risks of RPV development and buy them from other
suppliers. The French Army recently gave approval
for full development of the Orchidee helicopter-borne
battlefield surveillance radar that will perform many
of the missions of an RPV, according to press reports.
The French Army plans to procure 20 Orchidees by
1993. France's Matra and Thomson-CSF, however,
continue to work on the Scorpion, which has yet to fly,
missing its planned first test launch in 1983. F_~
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has experimented with drones and
RPVs since the early 1950s and currently has three
major programs, according to press and military
intelligence reports.2 The DR-3 can perform both
photographic and television reconnaissance, has a
' Unmanned Soviet reconnaissance vehicles are often referred to as
drones by industry experts because they fly a preprogramed flight
path that can be overridden by a ground control station operator.
We have included Soviet drones in our study because they meet a
military requirement similar to Western RPVs and they have an
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The Canadair CL-227 can take
off and land vertically, thereby
reducing the number of support
range in excess of 250 kilometers, and normally flies
at an altitude of 1,500 meters or lower. Soviet indus-
try is developing the DR-X-4 to provide real-time
video collection; it is launched from a tracked
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) to improve its mo-
bility. The third Soviet drone program is provisionally
designated DR-5 and will be able to cover a broader
area than the DR-3. Soviet DR-3 is fielded with
Soviet forces and has been exported to Syria:
? The DR-3 was first deployed with Soviet units in
the late 1970s-12 reconnaissance squadrons use 12
air vehicles each.
Third World
Israel is the leading RPV developer in the Third
World and has more systems in production than any
other nation. We believe Israeli industry is well suited
to produce RPVs given the technological skill of the
for surveillance missions.
work force at Israeli Aircraft Industries and their
extensive experience manufacturing miniaturized
electronic components for aircraft. Israeli Aircraft
Industries and Tadiran Electronics produce three
RPVs-the Mastiff, the Pioneer, and the Scout. The
Israeli Air Force is currently helping with the devel-
opment of the "Harpy" mini-RPV that will counter
mobile SAM threats that are difficult to track and
target, such as the SA-8. Israeli RPVs are used by
Israeli armed forces and have been exported in small
numbers:
? The US Navy bought 21 Israeli Pioneers for $28.5
million.
? Switzerland bought four Scout RPVs for experi-
mental testing.
? Singapore purchased four Mastiff and eight Scout
RPVs that are deployed in three separate squadrons
Elsewhere in the Third World, National Dynamics,
Ltd., of South Africa is developing the Eyrie multi-
mission RPV capable of firing 2.75-mm rockets. The
Argentine firm Quimar builds the Italian Mirach-70
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The Israeli Mastiff is a com-
bat-proven RPV that Third
World militaries may find at-
under license for use as a target drone and will soon
begin building a variant of the Mirach-100--desig-
nated MQ-2 Biqua-designed to carry out attack and
electronic countermeasures missions. The Brazilian
firm Companhia Brasileira de Tratores will soon
begin producing the BQM-1 BR target, reconnais-
sance, and attack RPV, according to press reports. F
Over the Short Term ...
Many Third World countries are showing an increas-
ing interest in RPVs. We believe greater use of these
systems in the United States, Western Europe, and
the Soviet Union and the successful Israeli operations
during the 1982 Lebanon conflict has stimulated
much of this interest. Most of the countries to display
interest are conflict states in the Middle East and
South Asia that see immediate uses for RPVs in local
conflicts or crises:
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? Thailand recently bought an unknown number of
Sky Eye RPVs for patrol missions, according to
press reports.
Using RPVs in the Third World:
Technical and Training Constraints
The effective use of RPVs demands the commitment
of highly skilled and well-trained personnel, who are 25X6
in short supply in many Third World countries. RPVs
are complex systems that incorporate many new
remote-sensing and surveillance technologies. A typi-
cal RPV squadron, for example, requires 10 people to
man the ground control station, transport the system
from one site to another, and maintain the equipment.
Of these 10 personnel, five-the squadron command-
er, air vehicle operator, mission payload operator,
and two maintenance technicians-must have techni-
cal experience and be familiar with electronics and
? China also agreed to purchase 10 Sky Eyes in May
for $25 million, according to State reporting.
? Nigeria bought 12 Sparrowhawk RPVs from Great
Britain in 1984 for reconnaissance missions.
percent drop in arms purchases by LDCs.
in oil prices and the continuing shortage of hard
currency that have already produced at least a 20-
... And Beyond
We believe the demand in the Third World for RPVs
is likely to continue as more militaries become famil-
iar with RPV usage. The most likely countries to buy
RPVs in the 1990s are those fielding large and
professional militaries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia,
Chile, Peru, Jordan, and Iraq, which can properly
utilize sophisticated RPV technologies. Effective use
of most RPVs available today demands technical
skills that poorly trained militaries would have diffi-
culty overcoming (see inset on Technical and Training
Constraints). Purchases by these countries will, how-
ever, be influenced by the success of many current
programs. The US Aquila project, for example, has
experienced several procurement delays, shifting mis-
sion requirements, and cost increases over its 15-year
development life. While it appears that most of these
problems have been solved, any further complications
in this program or other high-profile RPV projects,
such as the British Phoenix, could dampen further
interest in these systems in the Third World. Procure-
ment of RPVs may also fall victim to the recent drop
communications equipment.
the mission payload operator should have
several years' experience with radar systems, while
the air vehicle operator should be familiar with
aviation principles to be able to ':fly" the RPV
properly. most of
the Israeli technicians operating RPVs over the
Bekaa Valley in 1982 had extensive academic and
professional engineering experience. Using skilled
personnel, initial training on most RPV systems takes
two to six months, and full operational effectiveness
is not reached for a year after field deployment
We believe many Third World countries will be
unable to find the qualified personnel to properly
operate their RPVs or will be unwilling to detail even
a few of their scarce technical personnel from other
higher priority missions.
many Third World militaries cannot main-
tain their existing fleets of advanced fighters and
missile systems, and others, such as Libya and Saudi
Arabia, must rely on expatriate personnel. We believe
manpower shortages could hurt export sales of RPVs,
especially those systems, such as the US Sky Eve and
British Hawkeye, that are intended for deployments
with smaller battalion or brigade units and require a
greater number of technicians to operate the system.
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Costing an RPV
The variety of capabilities, payloads, and construc-
tion materials for RPVs has created a wide disparity
of procurement costs. The electronics package in
most RPV air vehicles accounts for nearly 80 percent
of the air vehicle costs and includes the fight con-
trols, data link, and various payloads of infrared (IR)
line scanners, laser designators, communications
equipment, or electronic countermeasures equipment.
The inclusion of two payloads in multimission vehi-
cles, such as a laser designator and surveillance
cameras, adds to the costs accordingly. Designers of
these more capable systems often build the airframes
from expensive lightweight composite materials to
reduce the air vehicle's weight, further increasing
costs. The least expensive RPVs do not provide real-
time reconnaissance data and tend to be made from
inexpensive aluminum alloys.
Below, we present comparative cost data on the US
Aquila and a less complex hypothetical RPV system
that we believe would meet the intelligence collection
requirements of many Third World countries. The
Aquila air vehicle comes equipped with an IR line
scanner for intelligence collection and a laser desig-
nator, while the suggested Third World vehicle comes
with only an IR line scanner. A small number of
laser-guided munitions have been exported to the
Third World. The lower cost figures for the Third
World RPV reflect the elimination of the laser
designator and associated equipment in the ground
control station. We have also excluded the need for a
maintenance shelter that provides protection in a
nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare environment:
Lockheed Aquila Third World RPVs
Air vehicle 800 440
(each)
Ground control 1,600
station
Squadron purchase 11,305
of 10 air vehicles
and one of each
other item
We believe RPVs could become more attractive to
other Third World countries if less expensive export-
oriented models are developed and their utility for
missions important to LDCs is clearly demonstrated.
Most of the RPVs fielded today are designed for
large-scale warfare in Europe or an Arab-Israeli
conflict. Stringent requirements for the survivability
of RPVs used in West European combat have driven
up costs and made the systems very complex (see inset
on Costing an RPV). We
believe that most manufacturers have failed so far to
exploit the RPV's suitability for low-intensity or
counterinsurgency warfare where the RPV's intelli-
gence, special operations, and communications capa-
bilities could be very valuable. We believe there is
considerable interest in the Third World in a low-cost
basic reconnaissance RPV.
lin
Cairo. We believe other Middle Eastern, Latin Amer-
ican, or Asian countries facing serious insurgent
threats would also be attracted to less expensive but
capable RPVs. For example:
? Basic surveillance RPVs could provide valuable
information on insurgent movements and activities
to government forces in El Salvador, Honduras, or
the Philippines.
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? Governments such as Colombia, attempting to in-
terdict arms and drug smuggling activity, would
benefit from regular RPV patrols of border and
coastal areas.
We believe that the overall demand for RPVs in the
Third World will be determined by the organizational
level at which they are deployed. The US, South
Korean, and Soviet armies field their RPVs at the
corps or division level, and we believe that new
operators will follow this pattern. Most Third World
armies consist of five to 10 divisions, and current
deployment planning with existing users calls for an
average of 10 air vehicles per division. If RPVs are
increasingly used as intelligence gathering assets for
counterinsurgency operations, deployments at the bri-
gade or battalion level will be necessary, thereby
increasing the number of vehicles needed.
Implications for the United States
Third World Strategic Capabilities
We believe RPVs could become a source of remote-
piloting technologies for Third World countries at-
tempting to build strategic weapon systems. Procure-
ment or continued development of RPVs by India,
Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, and South
Korea could enhance their abilities to build guided
strategic missile systems. Argentina, for example, has
purchased missile propellant technologies from the
Italian firm SNIA-BPD and is negotiating for the
coproduction of an as yet unidentified RPV system
under development by Meteor. We believe this RPV
would at least have the capabilities of the Mirach-
300, which can carry a payload of 150 kg a distance of
900 kilometers. These remote-piloting technologies
could be adapted to a strategic missile system, but
significant foreign technical assistance probably
would be required because of the limited technical
manpower available in some countries.
Third World Military Capabilities
When used in combat, RPVs are likely to enhance the
warfighting capabilities of professional militaries. The
Israeli operations in the Bekaa Valley demonstrated
the tactical advantages derived from RPV usage by a
motivated and resourceful military organization. Fur-
thermore, South Korea expects to enhance corps-level
intelligence resources in a possible conflict with North
Korea through the use of RPVs. For nations facing
serious insurgent threats, procurement of RPVs could
improve their intelligence capabilities, an area where
many Third World militaries are weak. By them-
selves, however, we do not believe that RPVs will
prove to be a deciding factor in conflict because more
fundamental training, leadership, organizational, and
doctrinal considerations play a much greater role in
the success or failure of an operation than any
particular weapons technology; militaries must re-
spond effectively to the information they receive from
their RPVs.
Third World militaries may attempt to enhance their
capabilities by arming their RPVs. Operators of
RPVs can replace the surveillance equipment with a
high-explosive payload, effectively converting the
RPV into a guided bomb capable of flying undetected
beneath enemy radar coverage, although there are no
indications that any Third World militaries are plan-
ning to use their RPVs as guided bombs. The payload
weight limitations of many RPVs of less than 60 kg
reduce the potential destructiveness of "cruise
missile" RPVs.
We believe the RPVs could be a stabilizing force in
areas of tension when used to monitor opposing forces.
RPVs can provide timely intelligence about the build-
up of enemy troops and allow increased time for
diplomatic action or defensive preparations to deter
an attack. RPVs are also seen as less provocative than
combat aircraft fitted with reconnaissance equipment
when flying over sensitive areas, such as the Golan
Heights. We believe the shooting down of an RPV
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during periods of heightened tension between India
and Pakistan, the two Koreas, or Israel and its
adversaries is less likely to lead to retaliatory action.
The Terrorist Potential
The proliferation of remote-piloting technologies to
radical Third World states, such as Libya or Iran,
could pose a new terrorist threat to US interests.
Some terrorist groups may be attracted to RPVs in
their quest for new and dramatic ways to carry out
their violent acts. Terrorist groups in the past have
resorted to gliders, rubber rafts, and other unique
means to carry explosives to densely populated areas.
The RPV would provide a standoff system capable of
delivering a sizable bomb accurately. The intense
training needed to properly operate an RPV and the
extensive support system that helps keep the system in
the air, however, would mitigate against RPV usage
by many terrorist groups. We believe only the larger
Palestinian groups, such as Fatah and PFLP, with
large cadres of professionally trained soldiers and
links to nations likely to have RPVs would pose a
potential threat in the near future.F__1
Exports
Aggressive marketing efforts by key manufacturers
will tend to accelerate the proliferation of RPVs in the
Third World. We believe US manufacturers of RPVs
will be competitive in the export market. US firms
collectively offer a wide variety of RPVs with varying
costs and capabilities.
some Third World military leaders believe
that US firms have given piecemeal presentations in
the past and, when marketing systems, failed to
address such critical issues as unit deployment and
integration of the RPV into existing communication
networks. We believe that these problems will be
resolved as US producers become more familiar with
RPV utilization.
Israel, Great Britain, and Canada will offer strong
competition. Israeli companies have proven models
available for export and can point to the hands-on
experience of the Israeli military to enhance its
marketing effort. some
Israeli RPVs cost as little as one-tenth the price of US
models, can easily be adapted to perform a variety of
missions, and are less complicated to operate.
are trying to sell t eir mini-m rare ines scanners
and minilaser target designators to US and West
European RPV manufacturers. Canadian and British
producers will also try to capitalize on the field
experience they gain as domestic armed services
become more familiar with RPV technologies. Cana-
dair's CL-227 may become a popular naval RPV
because of its ability to take off and land vertically,
thereby eliminating the need for special launch or
recovery equipment on naval vessels with limited
space. British export prospects may be further en-
hanced by industry-sponsored conferences intended to
highlight the global visibility of British RPV manu-
facturers.
Third World countries are likely to show little interest
in Soviet RPVs, in our opinion. Syria is the only
Soviet arms recipient to operate Soviet RPVs, and
Damascus may be dissatisfied with the sys-
tem. We believe that the superior reputation of West
European and US electronics systems, as compared 25X1
with Soviet equipment, would prompt some of Mos-
cow's other clients that buy arms from the West, such
as Iraq and Libya, to choose West European RPVs.
The purchase of RPVs by these countries from West-
ern sources would not in itself indicate a shift in
procurement patterns, however, because RPVs are
bought in small numbers and do not symbolize an
arms supply relationship as concretely as the extensive
air, ground, and naval weapons Moscow has delivered
to its Middle Eastern clients. We believe some Soviet
clients fighting insurgencies, such as Angola or Nica-
ragua, could benefit from the intelligence drawn from
RPV overflights of insurgent areas if Moscow provid-
ed these systems.F__1
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Appendix
Companhia Brasileira
de Tratores
System Role a Endurance Payload Status
or Range (kg)
Biqua-2 R, A, E 900 km 70 Coproduction of Italian
Mirach-100.
CBT-BQM-
I BR
Development; failed to meet
initial flight date of 1984.
Production for Italian Navy
and Army.
Production for Italian Navy
and Air Force.
40 Production. Used as target
drone by Italian military.
a R
= Reconnaissance.
TA = Target acquisition.
ST
= Strike.
EW = Electronic warfare.
El
= Electronic intelligence.
ECM = Electronic countermeasures.
C = Communications relay.
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RPV Production Programs Worldwide (continued)
System Role Endurance Payload Status
or Range (kg)
South Africa
National Dynamics. Eyrie ST, E
Soviet Union DR-3 R, E
AEL, Ltd. Sparrowhawk R
ASVEC, Ltd. Merlin R
British Aero. Stabileye R
Raven R 110 km
Eyrie UMAC R 160 km
Ferranti UMA R 250 km
FR, Ltd. Falconet R, ECM 1.5 h
GEC Avionics Phoenix R, TA 50 km
ML Aviation Sprite R 2.5 It
Vinten Vindicator R 5 h
Target Technology Spectre R, ECM 1.25 It
12 Development.
25- Development.
8 Development.
Development.
Entering production for British
Army.
5 Development.
160 Development.
15 Development.
Aerotronics Dragonfly R 31 Development.
Beechcraft Raider R, E, ECM 2.6 It 160 Development; prototype flew in
1985.
Boeing
E-310
ATM-100
R
R, TA
4h
6h
160 km 36 Development.
250 km Production. Fielded by Soviet
troops. Exported to Syria.
300 km Development; fielding in 1986.
R, ECM, E 7 It
R = Reconnaissance.
ST = Strike.
El = Electronic intelligence.
Pave Tiger program.
9 Development.
Development.
Development.
Development.
Development.
Production to start in 1986 for
US Army.
Development.
Developmnent.
TA = Target acquisition.
EW = Electronic warfare.
ECM = Electronic countermeasures.
C = Communications relay.
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Secret
Secret
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