SOVIET-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS IN THE 1980S

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• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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I'a,;
Soviet-North Korean,
Relations in the 1980s
rSecrCt-
An Intelligence Assessment
0
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Soviet-North Korean
Relations in the 1980s
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This paper was prepared byl
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Office of Soviet Analysis, with a contribution by-
SOYA. Comments and queries are
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welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Third
World Division, SOYA,
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Top Secret
SOV 84-10085CX
June 1984
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Soviet-North Korean
Relations in the 1980s
Key Judgments After more than a decade of frosty Soviet-North Korean relations,
Information available Moscow is moving slowly to improve its political ties with P'yongyang.
as of' 29 May 1984 Warmer Sino-Soviet relations, Moscow's deteriorating relations with Ja-
was used in this report.
pan, and rising Soviet concern over US military cooperation with Tokyo,
Seoul, and possibly Beijing give the USSR new opportunities and incen-
tives to woo the North Koreans. The Soviets have:
? Upgraded their delegations to recent North Korean-sponsored events
and sent other signals to Kim 11-song that they want to strengthen ties.
? Absolved P'yongyang of blame for the bombing of South Korean officials
in Rangoon in 1983.
? Moved toward a limited acceptance of Kim 11-song's transfer of power to
his son.
? Hosted a visit by Kim 11-song to Moscow in May 1984,
Despite these low-cost political gestures, Moscow has yet to provide the
major economic and military assistance that we believe would be required
to swing North Korea back into its orbit. Nor has it moved to calm the
North Koreans' concern over unofficial Soviet contacts with Seoul.
Soviet reluctance to provide more military aid reflects, in our view, a desire 25X1
to avoid an outbreak of hostilities on the peninsula that would involve an
East-West military confrontation. Moscow probably also remains dubious
of any substantial political payoff from increased economic assistance,
given the North's fierce independence and unpredictability in foreign
policy. The Soviets may also believe that new strains in their relationship
with China would emerge if they move too quickly to improve ties with
P'yongyang and that terminating contacts with South Korea would deny
them an important source of leverage over Kim 11-song. 25X1
We believe that, because both parties stand to gain from improving ties,
the warming trend in Soviet-North Korean relations will continue. Mos-
cow's concern with the costs and risks of courting the North, however,
probably precludes rapid improvement. The Soviets probably will increase
their low-cost political gestures to P'yongyang. They will also continue to
ship noncritical military supplies and provide moderately increased eco-
nomic assistance. P'yongyang probably will not misinterpret such limited
support as a willingness to underwrite aggression against the South. Under
such conditions, these Soviet actions would have few negative consequences
for US interests
SC 00485/84
June 1984
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Neither markedly closer ties nor a sharp deterioration in bilateral relations
appears likely over the next few years. But either alternative might unfold
under certain conditions
The emergence of a pro-Soviet leadership or a sharp increase in Soviet
economic and military aid would almost certainly foster much closer ties
between Moscow and P'yongyang. This would affect US interests adverse-
ly by increasing the military threat to Seoul. We believe, however, that
such developments are unlikely as long as Kim 11-song remains in power
and the Soviets continue to assign priority to repairing their relationship
with the Chinese
A deterioration in Soviet-North Korean relations might increase Moscow's
willingness to accept a "two Germanys" solution to the Korean reunifica-
tion issue and to expand its ties with the South. But it is equally likely that
P'yongyang could become so alarmed by its loss of support in the
Communist world that Kim 11-song would take drastic measures against
the South to realize his reunification goals.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Soviet Interest in Wooing the North
Trade, Debt, and Aid
Military Assistance: Unmet Demand and Potential Leverage 6
The Limits to Rapid Change 7
The Most Likely Scenario 8
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
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Soviet-North Korean
Relations in the 1980s
Introduction
Since late 1982, after more than a decade of frosty
Soviet-North Korean relations and a pronounced
North Korean tilt toward Beijing, Moscow has moved
to strengthen its ties to P'yongyang. Soviet moves to
date have been cautious and limited mainly to politi-
cal gestures. But such actions raise the possibility of
more substantial Soviet economic and military offer-
ings to maintain and increase the momentum for a
closer relationship.
Soviet Interest in Wooing the North
Moscow has a longstanding geostrategic interest in
maintaining at least correct relations with North
Korea, which borders the Soviet Union as well as
China and South Korea (see map). Within the past
few years, however, mounting Soviet concern over a
perceived increase in military cooperation among
Washington, Tokyo, Seoul, and possibly Beijing ap-
pears to have strengthened Moscow's interest in forg-
ing closer ties to P'yongyang
Moscow's concern over US military cooperation with
Japan was heightened by the election of Japanese
Prime Minister Nakasone in November 1982 and his
widely publicized commitment to a closer security
relationship with the United States. In response to
this development, Moscow stepped up its campaign
against the "NATOization" of northeast Asia and
threatened Japan with military retaliation in January
1983.
Soviet concern over possible Sino-US strategic coop-
eration also increased in the wake of the August 1982
Sino-US communique on Taiwan and Chinese For-
eign Minister Huang Hua's statement to the Council
of Foreign Relations in October 1982 stressing "com-
mon" US-Chinese interests. Assessments of Chinese
foreign policy appearing in the authoritative Soviet
journal Problems of the Far East throughout 1983
reflected Moscow's preoccupation with such coopera-
tion. So, too, did private comments that high'Soviet
Communist Party officials made to West Europeans
following Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to
Washington in January.
Meanwhile, Moscow's public assessments of the situa-
tion on the Korean peninsula and in northeast Asia
generally reflected the leadership's concern over an
alleged encirclement by "anti-Soviet" forces. For the
first time ever, in 1983, the Soviet press described the
US-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercises as prepa-
rations for an attack against Soviet as well as North
Korean territory. Other Soviet commentary identified
P'yongyang's security interests with those of Moscow,
alleging that US weapons stationed in South Korea
have ranges "that exceed the bounds of the Korean
peninsula."
Even as Soviet concern over US military activities in
northeast Asia was increasing, improvements in Sino-
Soviet relations in the fall of 1982 provided Moscow
with a new opportunity to mend its fences with
P'yongyang. Reductions in Sino-Soviet tensions re-
duced the North's ability to play the two Communist
powers off against one another and probably made the
Soviets more confident that the North Koreans would
respond favorably to Soviet overtures. Moscow also
may have calculated that diminished Sino-Soviet ten-
sions would reduce Beijing's motivation to aggressive-
ly counter Soviet offers to P'yongyang.
Political Relations: A Tactical Thaw
In September 1982, on the eve of the first round of
Sino-Soviet talks, Moscow signaled its interest in
improving ties with P'yongyang. The Soviets reaf-
firmed North Korea's "socialist" identity-which
Brezhnev had implicitly denied at the 1981 Soviet
Communist Party Congress-and sent warmer-than-
usual greetings to North Korea's national day cele-
brations. Diplomatic sources reported that Moscow
then accelerated or completed the delivery of econom-
ic aid already promised to the North. This probably
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was designed to woo Kim 11-song following his trip in
the fall of 1982 to Beijing and to assuage ill feeling
caused by the October 1982 visit to Seoul by TASS
and USSR Ministry of Culture officials. The number
of Soviet delegations traveling to P'yongyang in 1982
also rose some 60 percent above previous levelsF_
During the first months of General Secretary Andro-
pov's tenure, the leadership made more sustained
efforts to mend relations with P'yongyang. Moscow's
gestures included, among others:
The appointment of a former Andropov associate
and an expert on Korean affairs, N. M. Shubnikov,
as the new Soviet Ambassador to P'yongyang.
Meanwhile, in another effort to improve their rela-
tions with P'yongyang, the Soviets by late spring
indirectly signaled a relaxation of their opposition to
the hereditary transfer of power from Kim 11-song to
his son. In public, visiting Soviet and East European
delegations still refused to toast the health of the
younger Kim on the ostensible grounds that he held
no high state position. But in May 1983, presumably
with Moscow's tacit approval, Poland's General Jaru-
zelski reportedly conveyed official greetings to both
Kims when meeting with a North Korean delegation
in Warsaw. A month later, for the first time in a
Soviet Bloc state, the East German party newspaper
reported the publication of a Kim Chong-il treatise on
Marxism-Leninism. Another East German paper
summarized the treatise and published a picture of
the younger Kim, even though previously both the
Soviet and the East European press had completely
ignored Kim's ideological writings.
KAL shootdown
Moscow's interest in wooing P'yongyang increased
under the impact of adverse Asian reaction to the
September 1983 KAL shootdown. The Soviets sent a
delegation of higher-than-usual rank to North Ko-
rea's national day ceremonies in P'yongyang in early
September. The delegation reportedly renewed an
open ended invitation to Kim 11-song to visit Moscow
at some unspecified time. For several weeks P'yong-
yang ignored Moscow's gestures. The North Koreans
probably wanted to show their irritation with the
USSR and Eastern Europe, which had failed to
support North Korea's proposed boycott of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) meetings scheduled for
Seoul in early October. To keep their options open,
however, the North Koreans remained silent on the
In late September, at almost the last minute, the
Soviets canceled their decision to attend the IPU
conference. Moscow's decision probably was influ-
enced by its wish to avoid the embarrassment of
public demonstrations and criticism of the USSR in
the wake of the KAL shootdown. But Moscow de-
layed three weeks in announcing its plans. Seoul
meanwhile provided repeated assurances that reaction
to the shootdown would in no way affect the IPU
proceedings or the security of the delegations attend-
ing. The delays involved, and the eventual timing of
the Soviets' decision, suggest that it was calculated as
much as a deliberate nod toward the North as a
reaction to the KAL affair. Almost immediately after
the Soviet decision was announced, P'yongyang re-
sponded by issuing a statement supporting Moscow's
version of the KAL incident-despite the fact that
Korean nationals for whom the North traditionally
claimed to act as spokesman had perished in the
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shootdown. As an added gesture toward Moscow,
P'yongyang also gave wide media coverage to Mos-
cow's latest INF proposals
Moscow's political overtures to the North continued
in the wake of the Rangoon bombing in October and
international allegations of North Korean responsibil-
ity. In contrast with its condemnation of North
Korean behavior at the time of the 1976 axe murders,
Moscow exonerated P'yongyang of any complicity in
terrorist actions. The Soviet Ministry of Defense
newspaper Red Star reprinted only P'yongyang's au-
thorized version of the affair, and Soviet media stated
that the incident probably had been contrived to
further Washington's and Seoul's "aggressive de-
signs" in Asia. After the Burmese investigation and
November court proceedings placed responsibility for
the bombing on the highest North Korean officials,
Pravda ignored the Burmese report and published
only P'yongyang's refutation. The Chinese press, by
contrast, published both the North Korean and Bur-
mese accounts of the incident to signify disapproval of
The Soviets meanwhile moved incrementally toward
tacit acceptance of Kim Chong-il's succession. During
the September 1983 North Korean national day
celebrations held in P'yongyang's Embassy in Mos-
cow, the Soviets-in a departure from their previous
practice-reportedly offered toasts to the younger
Kim. In December, Politburo member Grishin, who
had attended the celebration, sent unprecedented
official New Year's greetings to the younger Kim.
Meanwhile, according to North Korean, accounts,
three more of Moscow's East European allies-Bul-
garia, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary-indirectly en-
dorsed Kim Chong-il as North Korea's prospective
leader.
Since January 1984, Moscow has worked to maintain
the momentum for better relations by promptly re-
porting the North's latest initiative for tripartite talks
with the United States and South Korea on a peace
agreement and reunification. Soviet public commen-
tary, however, initially did not go beyond short factual
accounts of P'yongyang's proposal, and media cover-
age has yet to repeat the enthusiastic editorializing
that accompanied the North's 1980 proposal for a 25X1
dialogue with the South. Moscow's reticence probably
reflects its unease with China's role since September
1983 as chief interlocutor between Washington and
P'yongyang on the question of talks. It also shows
Soviet concern that China might easily become a full-
fledged participant if talks actually get under way.
Moscow, therefore, probably will not go beyond its
limited endorsement of P'yongyang's. initiative until
the participation issue is settled.
for Brezhnev's funeral.
By its treatment of Andropov's death and the Cher-
nenko succession in February 1984, P'yongyang ac-
knowledged that warmer relations had developed over
the past year. The North Korean delegation that
conveyed condolences to the Soviet Embassy in
P'yongyang was of higher rank than that after Brezh-
nev's death in late 1982 and included the heir-
apparent, Kim Chong-il. North Korea also declared
an extra day of mourning for Andropov. The message
of sympathy sent by Kim 11-song expressed gratitude
for the deceased Soviet leader's efforts on behalf of
the Korean people, a sentiment absent in the message
Approximately a month later, in a departure from
North Korean practice, Kim II-song held a widely
publicized "talk" with a Soviet TASS delegation. In it
he portrayed Soviet-North Korean relations in more
favorable terms than those used in recent years, while
indirectly criticizing Beijing's policies on a number of
fronts. The P'yongyang media meanwhile have shown
even greater deference-to Chernenko than Andropov.
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In late May, Kim traveled to Moscow-his first
official visit in 23 years-and held two days of talks.
with top Soviet political,'. economic, military, and
foreign affairs officials before proceeding on to East-
ern Europe. From Moscow's perspective, the symbolic
significance. of Kim's visit-after his decadelong tilt
toward Beijing-probably was its own reward.
P'yongyang undoubtedly valued the visit as an oppor-
tunity to pressure Beijing to increase its support for
the North on international issues. In contrast to
normal Soviet practice, however, no joint communi-
que was issued after the visit. This suggests a failure
to reach agreement on key issues of concern to Kim
(the Kim Chong-il succession, the tripartite talks on
Korea) or on North Korean support for Soviet interna-
tional positions
Trade, Debt, and Aid
Moscow's failure to markedly improve Soviet-North
Korean economic ties since October 1982 contrasts
dramatically with its efforts to build a closer political
relationship. The Soviets have yet to confirm substan-
tial new material offerings to develop political lever-
age with P'yongyang~
The bilateral trade that forms the basis of most
Soviet-North Korean economic interactions rests on a
combination of long-term (five-year) agreements
(LTA) and annual protocols usually signed in the
spring. The Soviets carry the accounts.in subsidized
CEMA ruble prices, even though North Korea is not
a CEMA member
price the North has had to pay for Soviet petroleum.
Moreover, during 1983, two-way trade decreased by
20 percent
The USSR consistently accounts for slightly more
than one-third of the North's total foreign trade,
making it P'yongyang's largest trading partner. North
Korea, on the other hand, accounts for about 1
percent of Soviet trade with Communist countries and
an insignificant share of total Soviet trade. Since 1978
Moscow has imported mainly magnesium clinker,
ferrous and nonferrous metals, cement, and rice from
the North, while it has exported petroleum, machin-
ery and equipment, and wheat to the North)
Prospects for expanded bilateral trade probably will
be limited by Moscow's continued unwillingness to
tolerate the large trade imbalances it permits Cuba
and Vietnam. The North's limited ability to expand
its own exports to repay earlier credits and to pay for
greater imports of Soviet goods make the imbalance a
perennial problem. P'yongyang's debt to the USSR-
more than $600 million in 1982-has been diminish-
ing slowly but only in response to Soviet pressures on
the North to export even at the expense of North
Korean domestic economic needs.
Ithe Soviets have
adopted a less flexible position on the issue of the
annual trade balance between the two nations. Annu-
al trade must now be "balanced" at the year's end,
allowing no rollovers of imbalances as credits.'
Moscow has yet to make a sustained effort to expand
its trade with the North. Although total estimated
trade value in 1983 was roughly 1.6 times the 1975
level (see table 1), much of the nominal growth during
the past eight years probably stems from the rising
Moscow has shown little interest in giving more
economic aid to build a closer relationship (see table
1). Levels of per capita economic assistance to the
North remain substantially lower than those the
' The annual trade "balance" takes into account credits extended
and repayments of debts. Trade is "balanced" when Soviet exports
minus imports, plus the difference between repayments and credits,
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Table 1
USSR and North Korea:
Trade and Economic Assistance, 1975-83
Million current US $
(except where noted)
296 392 438
348 500 410
259 360 443
388 440 345
556 753 881
736 940 755
As percentage of all Soviet trade with 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
socialist countries
0.9 1.0 NA
a Projected, based on nine-month trade data.
b Trade totals may be greater than the sum of exports and imports
due to rounding.
Economic assistance calculated from reports of Soviet deliveries of
project-related materials.
Soviets offer other Communist states. They possibly
recognize that the North is better equipped than some
of their clients to support itself economically. More
important, the Soviets probably doubt the political
value of sending more aid.
Signs of Soviet misgivings about the wisdom of
increasing aid to P'yongyang abound:
? The current LTA, which runs until 1985, makes no
provision for new projects.
? In 1983 Moscow imposed harsher conditions on
loans to the North by doubling interest rates and
halving the repayment period,
Moscow also has been unsympathetic to North Ko-
rea's energy needs and has held the amount of crude
petroleum targeted for sale to P'yongyang at roughly
1 million tons annually since 1973. Actual Soviet
deliveries from 1980 through 1983 have been much
lower-in the 600,000 ton range-largely owing to
the North's inability to export enough to pay for the
oil. As a result of declining Soviet deliveries and
increased purchases from other suppliers, Moscow's
potential oil leverage over the North has been dimin-
ishing steadily. In 1976 Soviet supplies accounted for
three-fourths of the petroleum the North imported. In
1983 North Korean oil purchases from the USSR
were smaller than those from either China or Iran.F_
Whatever economic benefits the Soviets receive from
their trade with Pyongyang probably are tied largely
to the development of Siberian resources. North
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Korean cement, metals, foodstuffs, and consumer
goods may have some limited impact on reducing
regional shortages. Another economic benefit for
Moscow is its almost exclusive use of the.port of Najin
on North Korea's eastern coast some 30 kilometers
from the Soviet border. (Soviet access on a fee basis
permits the transshipment of third-party goods by a
combined sea-rail route.) Moscow also employs North
Korean workers (an estimated 10,000 in 1982 in the
logging industry of Eastern Siberia.
No specific new economic assistance agreements were
announced during Kim's May 1984 visit to the
USSR. But Kim would not have agreed to the visit
without assurances of some tangible benefits for the
North, and Soviet media reports during the visit
claimed agreement on new economic projects and
steps to increase economic cooperation. The fact that
.the visit took place as both nations were preparing
new, long-term economic plans also points toward
some agreement on expanded economic relations. F_
Military Assistance:
Unmet Demand and Potential Leverage
Despite the potential for leverage, Moscow has done
little to develop influence with P'yongyang through
military agreements, even though North Korea has no
other potential sources for advanced military equip-
ment. Since 1978, China, rather than the USSR, has
accounted for the lion's share of North Korea's
military imports (see table 2). The Soviets have given
aid to the North's defense industries since the mid-'
1970s, especially for North Korean production of AT-
3 antitank and SA-7 antiaircraft missile systems and
for T-57 and T-62 medium tank production. However,
they have not supplied any major weapon systems
since 1973 and have shipped mainly defensive and
support equipment. The far greater military aid given
to Vietnam and India probably reflects Moscow's
annoyance with P'yongyang's pro-Beijing tilt, its un-
easiness with Kim II-song's propensity for risk taking
on the peninsula, and its assessment that close ties to
these other Asian countries are more important to
Soviet security.
Moscow appears particularly unwilling to assist the
North in expanding and modernizing its Air Force
with new fighters and bombers. Since 1974, China,
rather than the USSR, has provided P'yongyang with
MIG-19s and later model fighters (the F-7/MIG-21
using mid-1960s technology).
No details regarding possible new military assistance
agreements appeared during Kim's May 1984 visit to
the USSR and talks with Soviet officials. But Soviet
media commentary indicated that "special emphasis
was made on issues of strengthening security in the
Far East." According to North Korean press reports,
during the visit Soviet Politburo member Grishin
promised that the USSR would take "necessary steps
to strengthen its security and also the security of its
friends and allies" to counter the alleged "aggressive
nature of imperialism" in Asia.
An offer of more advanced MIG-21 or MIG-23
fighters, advanced aircraft production technology, or
the antitank and air defense missiles
substantially raise Moscow's standing with P'yong-
yang. But Moscow apparently remains concerned that
such a reversal of its existing policy would be inter-
preted by P'yongyang as a sign that the Soviets would
support the North-with manpower as well as materi-
al-in a full-scale military invasion of South Korea.
Such a North Korean action would almost certainly
lead to a war on the peninsula involving US as well as
South Korean troops. In view of Moscow's previous
inability to prevent the North from escalating the
level of tension on the peninsula, the Soviets probably
entertain no illusions that they would be able to
control when or how weapons shipped to the North
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Table 2
Soviet and Chinese Military
Assistance to North Korea, 1978-83
1983 a 1978-83 b Chinese Assistance as 1954-83 b
Percent of Soviet
Assistance
a January through June 1983.
b Through June 1983.
might be used. Minimally, Moscow also is almost
certainly concerned that more advanced aircraft or
production technology might end up in the hands of
the Chinese
Moscow's reluctance to exploit its potential for mili-
tary leverage with the North appears even greater
when compared with Chinese behavior. In addition to
its delivery of F-7s in 1982, Beijing allowed Kim Il-
song and Kim Chong-il to tour defense industry sites
during their visits in 1982 and 1983.
In the future, Moscow may assist P'yongyang's mili-
tary production to a somewhat greater extent, because
it benefits indirectly from the North's role as arms
supplier to the Third World. Weaponry sales of nearly
$1.5 billion since 1978 have been a major hard
currency earner for P'yongyang's troubled economy.
The proceeds have been used to boost imports, which
in turn help P'yongyang meet its export commitments
to the USSR.
hardware. Iran, for example, has been the North's
largest customer since 1980. The arms link maintains
a basis for future Soviet-Iranian weapons deals, while
political relations between Moscow and Tehran are
increasingly strained.
The Limits to Rapid Change
Several constraints operating on both Moscow and
P'yongyang make it unlikely that any dramatic im-
provement in relations will occur during the next few
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years. Moscow remains 25X1
suspicious of North Korean tactics in the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM).
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The Soviets appear not to oppose North Korean arms
sales to former or actual Soviet customers. They may
believe that P'yongyang's exports help ensure contin-
ued Third World dependence on Soviet-designed
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Table 3
Three Scenarios for Soviet-North Korean
Relations: Trend Indicators
Most Likely Scenario: An Alternative: Entente or Alliance An Alternative: Deterioration and Friction
Continued Slow Improvement
Low-cost symbolic gestures by Moscow Endorsement of Kim Chong-il succession; Refusal to acknowledge actual Chong-il suc-
(anniversary celebrations, exchanges of emergence of pro-Soviet leadership in cession; emergence of strongly pro-Beijing
delegations, media coverage). P'yongyang. faction in leadership"after Kim II-song's
demise.
Confirmed arrangements for official visits Visits by a leading Soviet official to Absence of any visits by top leaders on either
to Moscow by both Kim Il-song and Kim P'yongyang. side; reduction in rank of delegations
Chong-il, with accompanying offers of exchanged.
new economic or military aid.
Soviet endorsement of North Korean dip- Implicit Soviet acceptance of terrorist ac- Soviet condemnation of actions by North
lomatic initiatives.' tions by North against South. against South.
Support for efforts to have 1988 Olympics Announcement that USSR will boycott Confirmation of Soviet decision to attend
moved from Seoul. 1988 Olympics if held in Seoul. 1988 Olympics in Seoul.
Continuing low-level unpublicized con- Termination of all contacts with the Publicity in Soviet press for academic and
tacts with Seoul; attendance at interna- South; announcement of a trade boycott. cultural contacts with South; direct bilateral
tional events in South. trade with South Korea.
Economic
Some loosening of recent restrictions on Granting of more favorable loan terms The imposition of harsher credit terms than
credit terms to North. than in the past. those already existing or a denial of any new
credits for additional projects.
Guarantees of uninterrupted deliveries of Significant increases in targeted oil deliv- Sharp reductions in oil deliveries or denial of
petroleum and petroleum products and eries beyond the 1 million tons pledged in price concessions provided CEMA countries.
possible slight increase in shipments (up to past annual protocols.
I million tons annually).
Additional moratoriums on debt pay- Forgiveness of all past indebtedness. Refusal to roll over any unpaid debts and rigid
ments. insistence on scheduled repayment.
Projection of generally balanced trade in Provision of swing credits in the event of Greater pressure on North Korea to meet
LTAs and annual protocols. yearend imbalances. agreed-upon delivery schedules by withhold-
ing scheduled Soviet exports to ensure bal-
anced trade throughout the year.
Some additional economic aid to ongoing Major new assistance agreements which Sharp reductions in future economic aid even
projects of roughly the same magnitude as are at least 50 percent greater than past in the face of North Korean willingness/abi-
1981-85 levels (plus or minus 10 percent of levels; provision of technology for develop- lity to honor export commitments; suspension
the norm); assistance for new projects as ing new economic sectors. of deliveries of investment goods provided in
existing ones are completed. economic assistance agreements.
Shipment of noncritical military supplies Provision of advanced offensive weapon Termination or sharp reduction in existing
(trucks, small boats) and defensive equip- systems and air-to-surface missiles; trans- military aid; blockage of North's arms exports
ment (radars, antiaircraft missiles); some shipment of North Korean arms exports. to Soviet clients.
sharing of intelligence and command-con-
trol-communications assistance; accept-
ance of arms exports to Third World.
Continued denial of verbal support for Soviet approval of minor military actions Public condemnation of North's infiltration
offensive actions on peninsula. by the North in the DMZ stopping short efforts against the South and terrorist actions.
of a major military offensive on the penin-
sula.
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relations in the near term. The most likely scenario is
continued slow improvement. The less likely alterna-
tives are entente and deterioration.
Moscow, for its part, undoubtedly perceives low-cost
tactical advantages in better relations. These provide
the Soviets with opportunities to:
Signal to both China and the United States that
Moscow's arm's-length relationship with P'yong-
yang is not permanent and that it is fully prepared
to expand its influence in nations bordering China
should Sino=Soviet talks fail to show progress.
o Build North Korean support for possible Soviet
inclusion in any reunification talks, especially
should the talks be expanded to include China or
both China and Japan.
Enlist P'yongyang's support for the Soviet "peace
campaign" and Moscow's INF positions in Asia, in
the face of Chinese and Japanese backing for US
proposals of global limits.
The P'yongyang regime probably has become increas-
ingly anxious to secure a stronger Soviet commitment
to its legitimacy and to its drive for reunification on
its own terms. Recent statements suggesting that
Beijing's understanding of "confederation" involves
two distinct Korean entities coexisting side by side,
and China's invitation to South Korean sports teams
to participate in events in China, almost certainly
have heightened North Korean concerns over the
strength of Chinese support. The warming of Sino-
Soviet, Sino-US, and Sino-Japanese relations since
October 1982 also may have contributed to P'yong-
yang's concern that Chinese support for North Kore-
an objectives on the peninsula might falter. The elder
Kim might regard Soviet and Chinese approval of his
son's succession as necessary to prevent a struggle for
power upon his death. Meanwhile, the North would
appreciate even small increments to the Soviet eco-
nomic assistance program-whether in the form of
new aid disbursement, technical assistance, or guar-
anteed oil deliveries-because they would aid the
stagnating economy.
North Korea's increased receptivity to Soviet over-
tures over the past 18 months may also reflect a
calculation that its pro-Beijing tilt and rebuff of
Soviet overtures during the 1970s and early 1980s
failed to elicit the kinds of economic and military
offerings from Moscow that it sought. The North now
appears prepared to move back toward a position of
equidistance with respect to its two giant Communist
neighbors. Such moves fit well with Kim 11-song's
traditional strategy for preserving North Korea's in-
dependence and may be designed to ease the way for a
successor leadership to deal with both Moscow and
Beijing.
Moscow probably will continue to rely largely on
political offerings to nourish warmer relations. Kim
11-song visited the USSR in late May at the invitation
of the Soviet Communist Party and Government. A
subsequent trip to P'yongyang by a high-ranking
Soviet leader should not be ruled out. In the future,
Moscow might issue an invitation for a separate visit
by the younger Kim, step up the number and impor-
tance of Soviet delegations to P'yongyang, and in-
crease its public support for North Korea's proposals
for tripartite talks. P'yongyang would almost certainly
welcome increased Soviet support in its competition
with South Korea for international recognition and
membership in international organizations. Mean-
while, the North Koreans have tempered their propa-
ganda support for the pro-Chinese regime of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea and have reaffirmed their support
of the Soviet position on INF deployments in Europe.
Although some increase in Soviet economic assistance
to North Korea and continued shipment of noncritical
military items are also likely, the amounts involved
probably will be small. Moscow probably remains
dissatisfied with the way the North has used earlier
economic aid and almost certainly believes that major
military aid could encourage P'yongyang to initiate
hostilities against the South.
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A slow-but-steady warming in Soviet-North Korean
relations would pose few problems for US policy-as
long as the North does not misinterpret Soviet ges-
tures as unqualified endorsement of its more radical
foreign policies. But so long as Moscow does not take
steps to radically increase its leverage over P'yong-
yang, there also is little reason for Washington to
expect that Moscow can act as a restraining force on
any actions the North undertakes in the region
Alternative Scenarios
Although neither markedly closer ties nor a sharp
deterioration appears likely over the next few years,
either alternative could unfold under certain condi-
tions.
Entente or Alliance. Kim I1-song's strategy for pre-
serving North Korean independence by avoiding ex-
clusive reliance on either the Soviets or the Chinese
make it unlikely that a patron-client relationship
between Moscow and P'yongyang will emerge during
Kim's lifetime. The legitimacy Kim Chong-il derives
as executor of his father's policies, as heir to the Kim
11-song personality cult, and as chief spokesman for
the indigenous chuche (self-reliance) model for North
Korea's socialist development makes it difficult for
him to embrace Moscow and its policies wholeheart-
edly without undermining his own authority.
Closer Soviet-North Korean ties approaching alliance
could result from Kim 11-song's death or retirement,
however, if a pro-Soviet leadership emerged victorious
from a struggle for power. Despite signs of recent
leadership shifts in P'yongyang, we have no reliable
evidence that such a faction presently exists. If politi-
cal competition between the USSR and China intensi-
fied or the Soviets decided to pressure South Korea,
the Soviets might endorse Kim Chong-il and invite
him to Moscow before a succession occurs.
The Soviets, however, probably would have to take
stronger action, such as sharply increased economic
and military aid or substantially increased oil ship-
ments, to wean P'yongyang away from its policy of
balancing. Calculations of the economic costs for
Moscow that such a move would entail do not appear
especially compelling. A doubling or even a tripling of
aid to North Korea would not burden the Soviet
economy, given the low levels of current aid. Moscow,
however, probably would be skeptical of receiving any
substantial political return in exchange for major new
economic offerings.
Dramatically improved relations would also require
that Moscow meet some if not all of the North's
demands for military assistance and advanced offen-25X1
sive weapon systems. We judge it unlikely that Mos-
cow would perceive the benefits of such a move as
outweighing the risks to Soviet-US and Soviet-Chi-
nese relations or to military stability on the peninsula.
Closer Soviet-North Korean ties, moreover, would
remain contingent upon Moscow's willingness to ter-
minate all contacts with the South. Moscow, thus,
would have to forgo any economic advantages that
increased trade and technological exchanges with the
South can provide.
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P'yongyang's response to such Soviet initiatives would
be less than predictable, as it would be framed with
one eye on Beijing. If, however, Beijing withdrew its
support for P'yongyang's reunification scheme and
moved toward a "two Germanys" solution, P'yong-
yang might be more inclined to embrace Moscow in 25X1
return for merely token increases in Soviet support.
China, meanwhile, probably would not easily accept
the emergence of a new Soviet client on its borders.
Deterioration or Friction. A marked deterioration in
Soviet-North Korean relations appears equally un-
likely. Events during 1983 probably have demonstrat-
ed to both nations that improved relations can be
maintained for mutual advantage and at little real
cost to either. Moscow's economic and military offer- 25X1
ings to the North remain so small that temporary
halts or minor cutbacks would not be likely to provoke
a rift. Nor would a dramatic breakthrough in the
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Sino-Soviet normalization talks, which is itself unlike-
ly, necessarily affect Moscow's ties to P'yongyang
adversely.
An open rupture might develop should Moscow dem-
onstrate implacable opposition once a Kim Chong-il
succession occurs. P'yongyang then might respond by
aligning itself more decisively with Beijing, thereby
provoking further Soviet retaliation. In the unlikely
event that the Chinese agreed to participate in four-
or five-power talks on Korea's future-talks that
would include the United States and Japan but not
the Soviets-and P'yongyang concurred, Moscow
might end all economic and military aid to the North
and increase contacts with the South.
Implications. For US interests and allies in northeast
Asia, significantly closer ties between Moscow and
P'yongyang would probably be threatening. Substan-
tial increases in Soviet military and economic aid to
the North would increase the chances of a North
Korean invasion of the South, thereby threatening not
only Seoul's security but also that of Japan. In return
for such aid, the Soviets might also press North Korea
for base rights on either the Yellow Sea or the Sea of
Japan. This would pose an additional threat to the
security of both China and Japan. Minimally, sub-
stantially greater Soviet support for the North might
encourage P'yongyang to undertake further terrorist
actions against the South.
The effect of a deterioration in Soviet-North Korean
relations on US interests and allies is more difficult to
predict. A loosening of ties might increase Moscow's
willingness to approve a "two Germanys" solution to
the Korean reunification issue. It almost certainly
would lead to a rapid extension of Soviet ties and
dealings with the South, thus signaling de facto Soviet
acceptance of the status quo on the peninsula. But a
rapid deterioration and expanded Soviet-South Kore-
an ties might also convince P'yongyang that its com-
petitive position on the peninsula is rapidly eroding.
Such an assessment might encourage Kim II-song to
resort to drastic measures to realize his reunification
out of desperation would not.
goals. Although Soviet acceptance of a "two Germa-
nys" solution would be in the US interest, a situation
that would drive the North to act against the South
It remains unlikely that new diplomatic or economic
initiatives aimed at Moscow by Seoul or a US decision
to reduce or withdraw troops on the peninsula would
induce the Soviets to totally eliminate their support
for Pyongyang. Such a US move would undoubtedly
encourage the Soviets to adopt a more critical stance
toward at least some of P'yongyang's foreign or
domestic policies. But Moscow's minimal leverage
over the North means that even such initiatives would
have few practical consequences for North Korean
behavior or for US interests on the peninsula.
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