S. 2453--ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILTIES TO COMBAT TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: May 15, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
May 15, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Program and the Nation's providers of
health services.
Mr. President, Congress repeatedly
has reaffirmed its commitment to a
Medicare Program that works for our
elderly citizens. Among other impor-
tant adjustments we have made in the
program since its inception, we have
legislated program reforms that cur-
tailed Medicare Program costs, in-
creased the solvency of Medicare's
trust funds, limited beneficiary premi-
um expenses, and extended coverage
to disabled persons and to health
maintenance organizations.'
As a result of such reforms, notable
changes have occurred in Medicare's
financing structure. For example,
during the 20-year period from 1966 to
1986, the maximum annual worker's
payroll contribution for Medicare's
hospital insurance-that is, part A-in-
creased over 2,200 percent, from $23.10
to $534.60. And enrollees' monthly
premiums for Medicare's supplementa-
ry medical insurance-that is, part B-
have increased over 415 percent, from
$3 to $15.50.
But despite these reforms, there re-
mains a significant difference between
the rate of increase in Medicare ex-
penditures and the rate of growth of
the Nation's aggregate taxable payroll.
Per capita health costs for persons 65
years and older increased 525 percent
during the 15 years between 1965 and
1980.
It has been repeatedly noted that
Congress must develop proposals to
ensure the financial solvency of Medi-
care. But these must be thoughtful,
carefully crafted, comprehensive pro-
posals that achieve the proper balance
between costs and quality care. These
proposals must maintain that kind of
cooperative relationship between Gov-
ernment and health providers which is
absolutely essential if Medicare is to
work.
Mr. President, I believe the more dis-
turbing aspects of the current Medi-
care Program illustrate the need for
the careful investigation and review
that is being undertaken by the
Senate Finance Committee. I strongly
support this effort.
We on the Democratic side of the
aisle have repeatedly and unequivocal-
ly demonstrated our commitment to
the fundamental purpose of the Medi-
care Program-to provide comprehen-
sive, accessible, affordable, quality
health care to our elderly citizens. I
believe Democrats will demonstrate
such commitment in the future, and I
pledge my efforts to such ends.
I am sure that such efforts will re-
ceive bipartisan support, because this
program affects people of all colors
and races and all parties. I want to ex-
press my appreciation to the Finance
Committee for the work it has done, is
doing, and will continue to do with
this extremely important program.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
minority leader has 5 minutes remain-
ing of the leadership time, plus 5 min-
utes on a special order.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may reserve
the remaining time under the leader-
ship order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. As to the 5 minutes that
I have remaining on a special order, I
yield that to the distinguished minori-
ty whip for his use or for his yielding
to any other Senator who may need
such time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
RECOGNITION OF SENATOR
CRANSTON
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
California [Mr. CRANSTON] is recog-
nized for not to exceed 5 minutes, plus
the 5 minutes that the minority leader
had yielded to him.
THE CASE OF RAMANUJAM MANIKKALINGAM
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, Ra-
manujam Manikkalingam graduated
last June from MIT with a bachelor's
degree in physics. Because Ram was
committed to using his scientific edu-
cation in his homeland, Sri Lanka, he
returned there last July.
On March 27, Ram Manikkalingam
disappeared from his home in Co-
lombo, Sri Lanka.
When he vanished from his house
without his shoes or wallet, his family
and friends feared the worst-that he
has been taken into custody by the
government. For weeks, the Sri
Lankan security forces denied he was
being detained.
After a month without word of his
whereabouts, Sri Lankan officials fi-
nally admitted that Ram was taken
into custody, allegedly on April 23.
The authorities claim his arrest oc-
curred on or about this same date,
April 23, although Ram was last seen
on March 27.
This is most significant, because
Ram is alleged to have committed
criminal acts on April 17, almost 3
weeks after his family believes he was
taken by the security forces. When
Ram's mother was finally allowed to
see him on May 2, Ram confirmed
that he had been in custody since
March 28.
Although he has not yet been for-
mally charged with any illegal activi-
ties, unconfirmed rumors report that
he was arrested for a curfew violation.
This type of treatment frequently
occurs in Sri Lanka, according to nu-
merous reports from human rights
groups and individuals. Members of
the Tamil minority in that country
S 5971
have suffered arbitrary arrests, arbi-
trary killings, torture, and long-term
incommunicado detention for real or
alleged separatist activities.
"Disappearances" were first report-
ed in 1983, and particularly since 1984,
Amnesty International has received
and increasing number of reports that
families of people reported to have
been arrested by the security forces
are unable to establish the detainees'
whereabouts. In many cases, officials
deny knowledge of the arrest or deten-
tion. Reports of these activities have
sharply increased.
In its January 1986 report, the
United Nations working group on en-
forced or involuntary disappearances
stated that it had transmitted to the
Sri Lankan Government 194 cases of
enforced or involuntary disappear-
ances.
Ram is, by all appearances, another
such case. Ram was an active member
of the ADP Fraternity-many of
whose members have contacted my
office in recent weeks to express their
deep concern for Ram's welfare.
I have also received word from
Ram's brother, Sudarshan, currently a
student at Hampshire College, that
Ram is scheduled to appear before a
board this Friday, May 16, as a result
of his mother's direct plea to the Sri
Lankan Attorney General. This board
has the power to release him.
Ram's many friends, relatives, and
supporters in the United States are
not trying to make a political issue out
of his detention. They ask only that
he be promptly charged and that, if he
is not released, that he receive a fair
and speedy trial.
I strongly urge Sri Lankan President
Jayewardene and Attorney General
Shiva Pasupathy to insure that Ram
receives fair treatment on Friday and
that if he is not released by the board
tomorrow that he be formally charged
and receive defense counsel.
If he is not released by the Minister
of National Security on Friday, I urge
President Jayewardene to see that
Ram receives a prompt and fair trial,
and receives full access to all necessary
medical care in the interim.
^ 1020
RECOGNITION OF SENATOR
COHEN
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
e [Mr. CoHz ] is recognized for
S. 2453-ENHANCEMENT OF CA-
PABILITIES TO COMBAT TER-
RORISM
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I rise
today to introduce S. 2453, a bill to en-
hance the ability of the United States
to combat terrorism and other forms
of unconventional warfare.
A new form of warfare has emerged
in recent years, a form of warfare that
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
 Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
S 5972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
we have not properly understood, and
that we have not effectively deterred.
This war has not been openly de-
clared, but is being waged across the
globe. It takes the form of terrorist at-
tacks and guerrilla insurgencies.
In both cases, the objectives and
modes of operation are similar. Terror-
ists and guerrillas, both operating
from sanctuaries, seek to attract
media attention, to instill fear, to un-
dermine the stability and prosperity of
target governments, and in some cases
to drive a wedge between the United
States and its allies.
The dimensions of this problem are
clear, as is the threat to U.S. interests.
Currently, over 40 nations and 4 mil-
lion people are engaged in some form
of armed conflict. In our own hemi-
sphere, there are nine active insurgen-
cies, in addition to serious problems
created by drug-traffickers and other
armed subversive groups.
International terrorism has now
reached epidemic proportions. In 1968,
the year that statistics on terrorism
were first compiled, there were 20 fa-
talities worldwide attributed to terror-
ism. Last year, there were over 900
deaths resulting from terrorism. At
the same time, guerrilla forces, often
actively nurtured and supported by
the Soviet Union and client states,
continue to undermine stability in var-
ious parts of the world. While the
threat to U.S. interests from a single
insurgent movement or terrorist inci-
dent may be small, the cumulative
impact of these assaults is potentially
devastating.
This situation has highlighted a rel-
atively new term in the lexicon of war:
"Low-intensity conflict." Such con-
flicts-irregular battles and attacks
perpetrated by irregular armies and
individuals-are a lethal product of a
world in which ideas and beliefs are
pushed on the world's consciousness
by grisly acts of violence.
Hence, while the United States must
remain well-prepared to deter nuclear
and conventional warfare, the day-to-
day challenge for the foreseeable
future seems destined to fall in that
gray area between millenial peace and
all-out war. This places a premium on
our ability to conduct "special oper-
ations"-missions carried out through
forces which must be specially trained
and equipped to engage in this new
type of conflict.
The task is difficult but by no means
impossible. Israeli successes in special
operations are legendary. The British,
too, have had marked success in this
area. They have defeated Communist
insurgencies in Malaya and Oman.
They stormed the Iranian Embassy in
a counterterrorist operation in 1980,
killing all of the terrorists involved
without the loss of life to any of their
military personnel or civilian hostages.
The British also demonstrated the
value of special forces during the Falk-
land Island campaign, destroying Ar-
gentinian aircraft on the runway at
Pebble Beach, capturing the South
Georgia Islands, and operating behind
Argentinian lines, gathering intelli-
gence and harassing and demoralizing
the Argentinian defenders. Despite
the intensity and duration of the Falk-
land Islands conflict, British special
forces suffered only one loss to enemy
fire.
The United States, by contrast, for
all its resources, has suffered repeated
setbacks. During the mission to rescue
the U.S. merchant vessel Mayaquez
from Cambodia, we lost more men
than we saved. The Iranian hostage
rescue mission ended in confusion and
disaster. In the Granada operations,
which pitted overwhelming U.S. forces
against a tiny island nation, disturbing
questions have been raised by the un-
expected difficulty of our victory, in-
cluding the failure of some of our spe-
cial forces to achieve their objectives.
I do not believe that this record is
attributable to persistant bad luck or
an inadequate caliber of men in the
armed services. In my view, we have
not been effectively organized to fight
the most likely battles of the present
or the future.
U.S. special forces are scattered
among the armed services, underfund-
ed, and misunderstood. There are seri-
ous problems in the way we are orga-
nized to conduct the planning of spe-
cial operations and provide the neces-
sary personnel and equipment. The
United States also lacks the necessary
coordination among different Govern-
ment organizations to implement a co-
herent strategy for combating uncon-
ventional warfare.
In short, we are not well organized
for unconventional conflicts-and it
shows.
The legislation I am introducing
today will not solve all these ills. We
must, however, go to the root of the
problem and revamp the organization
on which our special forces are built.
We must also address problems in the
coordination of our military, political,
and economic efforts.
The bill would establish a joint mili-
tary organization for special forces,
create a structure within the National
Security Council to coordinate plan-
ning for low-intensity conflict, and es-
tablish an office in the Defense De-
partment, headed by a high-level offi-
cial, to ensure that funding needs and
policy considerations related to low-in-
tensity warfare are factored into
United States planning.
The need for greater integration of
U.S. special forces is evident from his-
torical experience. As retired Army
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub noted
about the ill-fated mission in Iran,
"We tried to bring disparate units
from all over the Armed Forces, from
all over the world-and then put them
into an ad hoc arrangement to do a
very complicated plan." Under these
circumstances it is not surprising that
the mission failed. Six years later, we
still do not have an adequate com-
bined special forces capability.
May 15, 1986
In 1984, a Joint Special Operations
Agency [JSOA] was created to provide
greater coordination. However, it only
"advises" the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As
such, it does not have the authority
necessary to function effectively. The
Army has established the Joint Spe-
cial Operations Command, but this is
essentially a single-service operation
which cannot achieve the effective in-
tegration of different service elements.
The chief Pentagon official responsi-
ble for special operations, Noel Koch,
has continually emphasized the inad-
equacy of the current organizational
structure. In a recent interview, Mr.
Koch noted, "We need to create some-
thing that doesn't depend on the
mercy of the existing services ...
something that makes special oper-
ations function jointly."
Given the politically sensitive nature
of special operations, we need a clear
and uncluttered chain of command
and control from the highest level. We
also need forces that integrate person-
nel from each branch of service and
which, when possible, are deployed
close to potential areas of operation.
This legislation addresses these
needs through the establishment of an
organization with elements from each
of the military services-a "unified
command" in military parlance-to
conduct counterterrorist operations
and prepare special operations units
for deployment near potential operat-
ing areas. I believe that such a struc-
ture would greatly improve the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of U.S. special
forces in a number of ways:
PLANNING
In the attempt to rescue U.S. prison-
ers of war at Son Tay, North Vietnam,
and in the Iranian rescue mission, our
Military Establishment formed com-
missions to produce plans and achieve
Interservice coordination. After
months of planning, both missions
failed. With a unified command for
special operations, we would have a
self-contained multiservice organiza-
tion that could perform similar mis-
sions more quickly and efficiently. The
missions would be planned and carried
out by personnel with special oper-
ations backgrounds and training. In
short, a unified command would bring
operations and planning together
under one roof.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
A unified command would help
ensure the receipt of timely intelli-
gence-a serious problem at present. It
could also help to facilitate the flow of
information in the opposite direction,
since intelligence collection is one of
the principal tasks of special forces.
MORALE
Special operations are regarded as a
virtually dead-end career path. Only
last month, the Army bypassed all of
its special forces personnel and select-
ed an armor officer to head the Joint
Special Operations Agency. The mes-
sage seems to be clear-if you want to
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
 Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
May 15, 1986
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 5970 3
get ahead, don't serve in special forces.
It is my hope that a unified command
for special forces will increase promo-
tion opportunities for special forces
personnel and the desirability of serv-
ing in this demanding career field.
The successes of the Israeli Army in
special operations, such as the Enteb-
be raid, are well known. What is less
well known is that there is not a single
general in the Israeli Army that has
not served in special forces.
In. addition to problems of command
and control, U.S. special forces suffer
from inconsistent and often inad-
equate funding.
The average age of our special oper-
ations aircraft for transporting troops
and equipment to crisis areas is in
excess of 20 years, and the status of
these aircraft is further degraded by
the extraordinary stresses they are
subjected to, including low-altitude
flying and landings on unimproved
runways. In January of this year, the
Armed Services Committee received
testimony that 6 years after the failed
Iranian hostage rescue mission, the
United States still does not have the
capability to perform a similar mis-
sion. In fiscal year 1985, despite the
guidance of the Pentagon's civilian
leadership, the Military Airlift Com-
mand placed special forces airlift 59th
on its list of priorities.
Inadequate funding for special
forces is not a problem unique to the
Air Force. As one special forces officer
stated last year in an article in Mili-
tary Review, the professional journal
of the Army:
The U.S. Army still does not regard guer-
rilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsur-
gency as unique and is unwilling to devote
resources to our most likely form of involve-
ment. The state of preparedness for this
role is at its lowest state in 20 years.
This bill should help remedy the
funding problems which have ham-
pered our special forces capability by
establishing an Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict. As a member
of the Defense Resources Board, the
new Assistant Secretary would be able
to give special operations forces the
advocate they need in decisions affect-
ing personnel and equipment.
In addition, under the provisions of
the Defense Reorganization Act now
before the Congress, the four-star gen-
eral who commands the unified com-
mand for special forces would be re-
porting to a strengthened Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs and his Vice Chair-
man, who would have greater responsi-
bility for preparing the national strat-
egy and budget.
These factors will not guarantee
that special forces receive everything
they want, but they will guarantee
that special forces have their day in
court.
The Vice President's Task Force on
Combating Terrorism issued its report
recently, calling for, among other
things, a new National Security Coun-
cil position to strengthen coordination
of our. national counterterrorism pro-
gram. The legislation I am introducing
today calls for the establishment of a
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs for Low-In-
tensity Conflict and a coordinating
board for low-intensity conflict within
the National Security Council. These
initiatives, in my view, are necessary to
ensure that counterterrorist and coun-
terinsurgency operations are properly
integrated into the overall framework
of U.S. policy.
Mr. President, the Reagan adminis-
tration deserves credit for its initia-
tives on special operations, including
the recent increases in the number of
troops, equipment, and dollars spent.
Despite these efforts, however, serious
problems remain.
As a member of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Armed Services Committee, I
have had ample opportunity to exam-
ine the threat to our country from un-
conventional warfare and our ability
to respond to this threat. In my view,
we are not adequately prepared to
fight the most likely battles of the
present or the future.
Simply increasing the funding that
we devote to special operations and
low-intensity conflict will not solve
this problem. We must also take im-
mediate steps to repair a flawed orga-
nizational structure that leaves special
operations forces at the mercy of
interservice rivalries and a military bu-
reaucracy in which support for special
operations runs counter to main-
stream thought and careers. We also
need to more effectively coordinate
the efforts of the various civilian insti-
tutions which have roles to play in
low-intensity conflict. I hope that my
colleagues in Congress, the stewards of
our national security in the adminis-
tration, and the American people will
support this effort.
Mr. President, I would like to say
before yielding the floor to my col-
league from Georgia that I have the
privilege of serving on the Armed
Services Committee and the Select
Committee on Intelligence with the
Senator from Georgia. I think we both
share the view that this threat is in-
creasing; that we are ill prepared to
deal with it; that time has not been a
factor in our favor; that we are no
better prepared today than we were 6
years ago to carry out an Iranian
rescue-type mission. Noel Koch, the
man who has been assigned the re-
sponsibility for beefing up this capa-
bility, is reportedly prepared to resign.
He made the statement not too long
ago that our military bands are in a
higher state of readiness than some of
our special operations forces. That is
not an exaggeration, and Mr. Koch
would not make that statement with-
out some basis in fact.
This may not be the most perfect
form of legislation to accomplish our
objective. We have just gone through
a major reorganization of the entire
Department of Defense. But no one is
paying sufficient attention to this
problem And if it takes legislation-
which may not be the best route to
achieve it, since it should be done by
the executive branch-I am prepared
to push the legislation.
But it seems to me, Mr. President,
that this problem is going to intensify,
and we are going to have mounting
casualties. And if we continue to expe-
rience confusion, and lack a coherent
plan, then I think we will have abdi-
cated our responsibility by our failure
to take action.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of the bill be print-
ed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
S. 2453
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS
The Congress finds-
(1) that the threat to the United States
and its allies from unconventional warfare,
including terrorism and insurgency, is in-
creasing each year at an alarming rate;
(2) that although the United States must
continue to maintain and improve its strate-
gic and conventional forces in order to deter
aggression and protect the security of both
the United States and its allies, the use of
force by the United States since the end of
the Korean conflict has increasingly been in
response to guerrilla insurgencies against
allies of the United States and against ter-
rorist attacks directed at the United States;
(3) that the use of armed force by the
United States in the foreseeable future will
most likely be in counterterrortist, counter-
insurgency, and other unconventional oper-
ations;
(4) that the capabilities needed to respond
to unconvential warfare are not those tradi-
tionally fostered by the Armed Forces of
the United States;
(5) that the Department of Defense has
placed an overwhelming emphasis on plan-
ning and preparation to fight a large scale
war and, as a consequence, units assigned
counterterrorist, counterinsurgency, and
other special operations missions have not
been adequately supported, particularly in
airlift capability;
(6) that the Department of Defense has
not given sufficient attention to the tactics,
doctrines, and strategies associated with
those combat missions most likely to be re-
quired of the Armed Forces of the United
States in the future;
(7) that problems at command and control
have repeatedly beset military forces of the
United States engaged in counterterrorist
and counterinsurgency operations and other
low intensity conflicts;
(8) that such problems were evident
during the Mayaguez incident, the Iranian
hostage rescue mission, the Grenada oper-
ation, and the Beirut peacekeeping mission;
(9) that the establishment of a unified
command for special operations would help
to eliminate problems of command and con-
trol;
(10) that a unified command should be as-
signed responsibility for coordinating the
planning of special operations and for the
joint training of units whose principal mis-
sions involve counterterrorism, counterin-
surgency, or other special operations;
(11) that a unified command should also
exercise operational control over units
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
 Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
S 5974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
whose principal missions involve special op-
erations when such units are not assigned to
other commands;
(12) that the establishment of a unified
command for special operations will create
promotional opportunities thereby remov-
ing a barrier which has deterred many offi-
cers in the past from pursuing careers in the
field of special operations;
(13) that establishing a unified command
for special operations will facilitate the ex-
change of information between special oper-
ations units and other commands and agen-
cies of the United States;
(14) that a unified command for special
operations will enhance civilian oversight of
special operations and provide the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and civilian
authorities with a greater diversity of mili-
tary advice and options;
(15) that the Secretary of Defense has
placed increased emphasis on increasing the
capabilities of the United States to respond
to terrorism, insurgency, and other uncon-
ventional warfare- threats, but while some
progress has been made, the persistence of
inadequate service support for units as-
signed counterterrorist, counterinsurgency,
and related special operations missions fur-
ther emphasizes the need for organizational
reform;
(16) that the creation of an Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict and a unified
command for special operations would
greatly improve the effectiveness, funding
levels, readiness, force structure, and com-
mand and control of special operations
forces; and
(17) that greater coordination of policies
with respect to unconventional warfare op-
erations is greatly needed within the Na-
tional Security Council.
SEC. 2. ESTABLISHMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPER.
ATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CON-
FLICT
Section 136(b) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting at the end
the following new paragraph:
"(7) One of the Assistant Secretaries shall
be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Con-
flict. He shall have as his principal duty the
overall supervision of special operations and
low intensity conflict affairs of the Depart-
ment of Defense.".
SEC. 3. REQUIREMENT FOR ESTABLISHING A UNI-
FIED COMMAND FOR SPECIAL OPER.
ATIONS FORCES
Section 124(a) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) by striking out "and" at the end of
clause (1);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of
clause (2) and inserting in lieu thereof a
semicolon and "and"; and
(3) by inserting after clause (2) the follow-
ing new clause:
"(3) establish a unified command for spe-
cial operations forces, unless the President
determines such action is not in the nation-
al interest.".
SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF COORDINATING BOARD
Section 402 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402) is amended by Insert-
ing at the end the following new subsection:
"(e) The Council shall establish within
the Council a coordinating board to be
known as the 'Board for Low Intensity Con-
flict'. The Board shall have as its principal
duty the coordination of low intensity con-
flict policy for the United States.".
SEC. 5. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING THE
APPOINTMENT OF A DEPUTY ASSIST-
ANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATION-
AL SECURITY AFFAIRS FOR LOW IN-
TENSITY CONFLICT
It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should establish within the Exec-
utive Office of the President the position of
Deputy Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs for Low Intensity
Conflict. It is further the sense of the Con-
gress that the President should designate
such Deputy Assistant as the chairman of
the Board for Low Intensity Conflict estab-
lished under section 402(e) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402(e)), as
added by section 4 of this Act.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I yield
the floor to my colleague, the Senator
from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what time
is remaining under the special order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Maine has 2 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to
support the bill just introduced by
Senator COHEN. I am pleased to be a
cosponsor.
Mr. President, I will just take a very
brief period of time. First, I wish to
congratulate the Senator from Maine
for putting his finger on a very serious
problem. The question is often asked,
Why is Congress micromanaging the
operations of the Defense Depart-
ment? The reason is because the exec-
utive branch is not managing it, and
that is a regrettable statement of fact.
Congress should be a board of direc-
tors. This legislation should not be
necessary but, in fact, it is necessary
because we have to get the attention
of some people in the executive
branch, particularly in the Depart-
ment of Defense, and make them un-
derstand that the Congress of the
United States knows that this problem
is being neglected.
The Senator from Maine has done
an outstanding job of bringing this to
the attention of our body. We have
just gone through a major reorganiza-
tion bill. We delegated a broad amount
of authority to the Secretary of De-
fense under that bill. There may be
some details in this legislation that
might contravene at least the philoso-
phy of the reorganization bill, so we
are going to have to proceed cautious-
ly as we examine this legislation.
^ 1030
But the Senator from Maine is ex-
actly correct in saying that we have a
serious problem. We are not better
equipped now than we were 6 years
ago to carry out an Iranian hostage-
type rescue mission, primarily in the
transportation area. The Air Force has
been, in my opinion, dragging its feet
in terms of dealing with the problem
of transportation of special operations
forces. They are now beginning to do
better at it. I am hopeful that this im-
provement will be something that is
not just a short-term trend.
It is really regrettable that we
cannot report to the American people
that the situation is improved. But it
May 15, 1986
has not. Last year I sponsored an
amendment to deal with these prob-
lems, which was included in the au-
thorization bill. This amendment was
simple and direct. It requires the Sec-
retary of Defense to certify that he is
providing sufficient funds in the fiscal
year 1987 5-year defense plan to meet
his own guidance to the military de-
partments so as to ensure that the spe-
cial operation requirements of the
war-fighting commanders in the field
are met by 1991. We finally received
that certification on April 1, 1986. It
took a long time to get it because the
fiscal year 1987 5-year defense plan
submitted in February fails to meet
the guidance of the Secretary of De-
fense. The problem here is not the
Secretary of Defense's guidance. It is
very clear the problem is that no one
has carried out the guidance. The Sec-
retary has not required it to be carried
out. The services have not budgeted
sufficient resources to meet the Secre-
tary's guidance, and evidently the Sec-
retary was not prepared to change the
services' plans to see that it did.
That situation now appears to be
changing somewhat. The Secretary
has finally forced the services to
comply with his own policy guidance
in the 5-year defense plan. This is a
positive step forward, and is long over-
due.
On the negative side, however, I
think we ought to note that the com-
mitment to meet these requirements is
still in the future because the certifi-
cation calls for no changes in the
pending budget request. In other
words, all of the improvements that
are going to be made in this particular
area are going to be in the outyears, as
we call it, after the fiscal year we are
dealing with now. That will not take
place until 1991.
I think it is a sad state of affairs
when we have the kind of problem we
had 6 years ago with transportation of
special forces, and yet 6 years later,
after spending billions and billions of
dollars, we still cannot report to the
American people that we are in better
condition than we were.then.
So I congratulate the Senator from
Maine. I look forward to working with
him on this in the Armed Services
Committee. We are going to be in con-
ference with the House on legislation
in this overall area. I think it is impor-
tant that he has taken this leadership
step. I am proud to be a coauthor with
him of this amendment.
Mr. President, Senator COHEN has
accurately recounted the recent histo-
ry of, employment of our special oper-
ations forces and the problems we
have experienced. Let me add some of
my own thoughts.
In my view, the most likely use of
force by the United States in the fore-
seeable future is by our special oper-
ations forces. The threat that we face
from terrorism and other forms of low
intensity conflict mean that we must
be prepared to deter, and respond if
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
 Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
May 15, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
necessary, with special operations
forces. In some instances, we must be
ready to respond in a matter of hours
which puts an extreme premium on
operational readiness. In addition,
democratic forces around the world
are being challenged by insurgencies
and we must have special operations
forces that can assist in meeting that
challenge.
Finally, our special operations forces
must be prepared to play their vital
role in a major war. Too frequently,
Mr. President, we think of special op-
erations forces only in their capacity
to combat terrorism or to engage in
counter-insurgency. We forget that
they will perform extremely impor-
tant missions to augment our conven-
tional forces in a war. For example,
special operations forces were the first
American forces ashore in Grenada. In
future such operations it is likely that
they would perform a similar role.
Mr. President, this year the Commit-
tee on Armed Services held several
hearings on the capabilities of our spe-
cial operations forces. We learned
about serious deficiencies in this area,
both in terms of the readiness of those
forces and the resource levels allocat-
ed to support them. We learned that
our warfighting commanders in the
field did not have the capabilities they
needed. After one particularly alarm-
ing hearing Chairman GOLDWATER and
I wrote to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have that letter printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my re-
marks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit No. 1.)
Mr. NUNN. In that letter we stated:
We are particularly concerned that six
years after the tragedy at Desert One [the
Iranian hostage rescue mission], we appear
to have made few significant improvements
in this essential capability.
This is a disgrace. After the massive
commitment of defense resources over
the past 5 years we are not as pre-
pared as we should be to fight some of
the most likely conflicts we face. Be-
cause many of the capabilities in this
area are sensitive, I cannot go into the
specific details of the very serious defi-
ciencies.
The administration has maintained
that revitalization of special oper-
ations forces is one of their most im-
portant policy objectives. On October
3, 1983, then Under Secretary of De-
fense Paul Thayer issued a memoran-
dum directive to the military depart-
ments which outlined this key policy
objective:
U.S. national security requires the mainte-
nance of Special Operations Forces (SOF)
capable of conducting the full range of spe-
cial operations on a worldwide basis, and the
revitalization of those forces must be pur-
sued as a matter of national urgency.
The memo went on to issue some
specific policy directives. Two merit at-
tention here.
Necessary force structure expansion and
enhancements in command and control, per-
sonnel policy, training, and equipment will
be implemented as rapidly as possible and
will be fully [emphasis in original] imple-
mented not later than the end of Fiscal
Year 1990.
and
Each Service will assign SOF and related
activities sufficient resource allocation pri-
ority and will establish appropriate inten-
sive management mechanisms to ensure
that these objectives are met.
Despite the clear and unequivocal di-
rection, we know from our hearings
and examination of the budgets that
the services have not followed this
guidance. The Secretary of Defense
has failed to insist that the services
follow his own guidance. And quite
frankly, the stated goal of having the
capability 10 years down the road isn't
exactly what I call a high priority, es-
pecially considering the woeful lack of
readiness in certain key assets that
has existed in the past several years.
For these reasons, I sponsored an
amendment to deal with these prob-
lems, which was included in last year's
defense authorization bill. My amend-
ment was simple and direct: it required
the Secretary of Defense to certify
that he has provided sufficient funds
in the fiscal year 1987 5-year defense
plan to meet his own guidance to the
military departments so as to insure
that the special operations require-
ments of the warfighting commanders
in the field are met by 1991.
We finally received that certification
on April 1, 1986. It took a long time to
get it because the fiscal year 1987 5-
year defense plan submitted in Febru-
ary fails to meet the Secretary's guid-
ance, and evidently the Secretary was
not prepared to change the service's
plans to see that it did.
Fortunately, that situation has
changed. The Secretary has finally
forced the services to comply with his
own policy guidance. The services have
been directed to make major adjust-
ments in their plans for special oper-
ations forces. This is a positive con-
structive step forward that is long
overdue in my opinion. I do want to
note, however, that the commitment
to meet these requirements is still in
the future, because the certification
called for no changes in the pending
budget request. All the increases are
scheduled for future years and much
of the capability still will not be in
place in 1991. The challenge we now
face is to insure that the services do
not walk away from this latest direc-
tive.
The primary culprit in this sad
story, unfortunately, is the Air Force,
because the Air Force has the major
procurement programs required to
support the defense guidance. I state
here that the Air Force, at least in the
past, has failed to award priority to
this key mission. The facts are compel-
ling.
Special operations aircraft are
among the oldest in the Air Force in-
ventory. The average SOF aircraft is
over 20 years old. This average will in-
S 5975
crease virtually year-for-year until the
next decade.
The current readiness of the special
operations aircraft is disappointing.
The precise numbers are classified.
But it is telling to note that by a very
large margin, Air Force tactical fighter
squadrons are consistently more
combat ready than are special oper-
ations squadrons. These special oper-
ations squadrons are crucial to our
counter-terrorism capability and the
low readiness state in this area is a
shameful indictment of Air Force pri-
orities.
During the past 4 years the Primary
Special Operations Airlift Program
has been the Combat Talon Program.
The Combat Talon Aircraft is a modi-
fied C-130 transport, fitted with spe-
cial systems designed to support long-
range covert insertion and removal of
special operations forces. During the
past 4 years there have been eight pro-
gram managers. The program has
been repeatedly stretched out.
This is a very sad history of the Air
Force's commitment to special oper-
ations forces. Let me say to my col-
leagues, that I chose the word "histo-
ry" explicitly, because I believe the Air
Force has come to realize the very se-
rious nature of our requirement for
special operations forces and has made
recent changes to improve our capa-
bilities.
I hope in coming months that we
will start to see ,signs of improvement.
Prior to March 1983, Air Force special
operations elements were spread
across several Air Force commands.
This resulted in fragmented logistics
support, a lack of long-range planning,
no practical commonality between air-
craft subsystems, and poor overall reli-
ability and maintainability.
In March 1983, these elements were
consolidated under the Military Airlift
Command and efforts are underway to
improve the situation. They estab-
lished a new branch for special oper-
ations logistics at MAC headquarters.
A large number of immediate quick fix
programs have been or are being im-
plemented. This is good news. But it is
not enough.
MAC still consistently places other
major new starts as a higher priority
than its special operations forces and
SOP modernization. Indeed, much of
the SOF modernization plan remains
unfunded in the Military Airlift Com-
mand's list of priorities.
Mr. President, at the core this repre-
sents a model case study of why we
need to reorganize the Department of
Defense. Senator COHEN recently
wrote an excellent article in Armed
Forces Journal International on the
state of our special operations forces.
In that article he noted:
Special Operations Forces (SOF), as indi-
cated by the U.S. experience during the
Grenada and Iranian rescue missions, are
one aspect of the defense establishment
that is most assuredly broken and must be
fixed.
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
 Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5
S 5976
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 15, 1986
It is evident that the ills which beset SOF
are in part a microcosm of the ills that occa-
sioned the overall Senate Armed Services
committee staff report on defense organiza-
tion. [T]he United States still lacks joint
military institutions capable of effectively
integrating the forces of the different Serv-
ices in combined operations.
The services do not give very high
priority to special operations forces
because they do not consider them
major missions and do not require
massive resources. The service's are
more interested in preparing to fight
the next world war, not the current
ongoing war against state sponsored
terrorism. And despite the fact that
the administration has placed special
operations forces as one of the Na-
tion's highest priorities, it has failed
to insist that the service's follow that
national guidance.
Because these are the forces we are
most likely to employ in the near
term, how they perform will have an
impact on our national security far
beyond the scope of any operation.
Our entire Armed Forces-and hence
our military capacity-will be judged
on whether these forces succeed or
fail. If they succeed, the perception of
American forces as strong and highly
competent will be reinforced. If they
fail, the world will conclude-wrongly,
in my view-that the United States is
a big bungling giant that cannot con-
duct effective military operations. We
cannot afford to leave the world with
this perception and unless we improve
our current abilities we run this risk.
After the Vietnam war, funding and
support for special operations dropped
dramatically. Units deteriorated,
equipment was not replaced, officers
were not promoted and morale sank to
rock bottom. In the late 1970's, that
began to change. The growing threat
of terrorism began to shake us out of
our lethargy. The tragic failure of spe-
cial operations forces at Desert I in
the Iranian hostage rescue mission
was the most dramatic evidence of the
serious shortcoming of our special op-
erations forces.
In the wake of the failure of the Ira-
nian rescue mission, first President
Carter and then President Reagan,
began to put increased emphasis on
the reinvigoration of our special oper-
ations forces. The Joint Special Oper-
ations Agency was created in the
office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
the Joint Special Operations Com-
mand was created at Fort Bragg. A
number of memoranda and directions
were written, and more money was
provided.
However, this is not enough. We dis-
covered in the operation in Grenada
that the integration of special oper-
ations forces into combat operations
conducted by regular units was not as
smooth as it should be. We know from
other examples that the command and
control over these forces is not ade-
quate. We know that readiness levels
of key units has been spotty at best.
Confusion often reigns, particularly in
their relationship to the unified com-
manders in the field.
Senator COHEN has explained the
purposes of this bill and I will not
repeat them. However, let me say that
I believe that the President should
consider creation of a unified com-
mand for special operations forces.
That is probably the most important
step that he can take, particularly be-
cause the DOD reorganization bill re-
cently passed by the Senate, gives in-
creased authority to unified command-
ers.
I also support the other provisions in
Senator COHEN's bill, namely the cre-
ation of a senior official on the NSC
staff, a coordinating body within the
National Security Council, and the
designation of an Assistant Secretary
of Defense, all with responsibility for
special operations and low intensity
conflict. We do not need to create an
additional Assistant Secretary of De-
fense position because the reorganiza-
tion bill we just adopted provides for
several Assistant Secretaries of De-
fense, but does not specify their titles
in law. Thus, the Secretary of Defense
has flexibility to designate one of
those Assistant Secretary of Defense
positions as the Assistant Secretary
for Special Operations and Low Inten-
sity Conflict.
I have some reservations about the
wisdom of placing these, all of these
requirements in law. As Members of
the Senate know, the DOD reorganiza-
tion bill recently enacted by the
Senate seeks to give the President and
the Secretary of Defense as much
flexibility as possible in organizing the
Department of Defense. In addition,
we were very aware of the President's
constitutional responsibilities as Com-
mander in Chief. Therefore, the reor-
ganization bill does not specify any
unified or specified commands in law.
Moreover, it does not specify any As-
sistant Secretaries of Defense except
one, the Assistant Secretary for Re-
serve Affairs.
Notwithstanding these concerns, Mr.
President, I continue to believe that
Senator COHEN's bill deserves serious
consideration by the Armed Services
Committee. I believe the administra-
tion should move in the direction sug-
gested by Senator COHEN's bill and
that it should be the focus for debate
on these important issues, both in the
Congress and in the public.
[ExHIBIT No. 1)
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, January 29, 1986.
Hon. CASPAR WEINBERGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DC.
DEAR CAP: The condition of our Special
Operations airlift assets continues to be a
matter of considerable interest to our Com-
mittee. We are particularly concerned that
six years after the tragedy at Desert One,
we appear to have made few significant im-
provements in this essential capability.
It is discouraging to note that today we
have exactly the same number of MC-130
Combat Talon aircraft (14) and AC-130 A/H
gunships (10/10) as we had at the time of
Desert One, and two fewer HH-53 Pave Low
helicopters than we had in May, 1980 (7
today, compared with 9 in 1980).
The apparent failure of the Department
of Defense to overcome existing shortfalls
in a timely fashion raises serious questions
regarding the Department's ability to estab-
lish priorities.
Section 152 of the Fiscal Year 1986 De-
fense Authorization act?was passed in an
effort to assist the Congress in performing
our oversight responsibilities in this area. As
you know, that provision requires the sub-
mission to Congress of a plan for meeting
both the immediate and near-term airlift re-
quirements for the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) and special operations
forces of the Unified Commander-in-Chief.
Section 152 also requires a certification that
the funds needed to meet these airlift re-
quirements are included in the Fiscal Year
1987 Five Year Defense Plan.
This airlift plan will be a critical element
in our deliberations on the Fiscal Year 1987
Defense Authorization bill. We request that
you take whatever steps are necessary to
insure its timely delivery.
With best wishes,
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman.
SAM NUNN,
Ranking Minority Member.
RECOGNITION OF SENATOR
PROXMIRE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE]' is recog-
nized for not to exceed 5 minutes.
WHY SECRETARY HICKS
SHOULD BE FIRED
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the
biggest military and Fiscal decision the
Congress must make in the next few
years is whether or not to proceed
with the strategic defense initiative or
star wars. This decision will hinge pri-
marily on its technological feasibility.
If it is realistic to expect American sci-
entists to design a system that will
largely protect this country from a
Soviet nuclear attack, the Congress
will proceed. If not, we will not. The
central question is, How do the great
majority of Members of the Congress
who are not physicists and who have
almost no scientific training or experi-
ence make this decision in which tech-
nology is crucial? Answer: We rely
heavily on the judgment of scientists
who can speak their minds objectively
and honestly. Our decision will be no
better than the truth of the scientific
advice we get.
Will Congress be able to rely on the
scientific community to give us this
truth? An article that appeared in the
Washington Post by Fred Hiatt re-
ports that it is going to be very hard
for us as we make that decision to get
the truth we must have.
Donald Hicks is the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineer-
ing. Secretary Hicks has the central
role in determining precisely who gets
the billions of dollars in research
money expended each year by the De-
Approved For Release 2011/07/06: CIA-RDP87B00858R000600960019-5