AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200920001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 22, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Africa Review
ALA AR 85-005
22 February 1985
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Secret
Africa Review) 25X1
and presence
Although President Conte's moderate military regime has
accelerated attempts to attract greater Western involvement in
Guinea, Conte probably will not move much beyond the late
President Toure's modest efforts to reduce Soviet military access
elimination of Soviet and Libyan influence.
Economic necessity, an internal power struggle, and French
initiatives have led Benin to improve relations with France and the
United States, but factors such as the prospect of attempts by
radicals to regain power in the government mitigate against the
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Angolan President dos Santos's visit to Kinshasa in early February
signaled improved relations with Zaire, at least over the short run.
Angola: Nonaligned Ministerial
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Production Staff _Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Orly l
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Directions
Guinea, one of the first black African countries to opt
for socialism and close relations with the USSR after
independence, was also one of the first to become
disenchanted with Communist ties that have left this
potentially rich country's economy in shambles. A
coup last year swept away the repressive political
system of Guinea's founding father, Sekou Toure, and
accelerated efforts-belatedly begun by the late
Toure-to liberalize the economy and to attract
greater Western involvement. However, US Embassy
reporting suggests that President Conte's moderate
military government faces some pressures-from
ethnic divisions, rising economic expectations, and the
lower ranks of the military-that will test its unity
and its ability to translate promises into reality.
Although trends in Guinea probably will remain
generally favorable to US interests while Conte
remains in power, we believe the near-term prospects
are poor for genuine economic reform or a pro-
Western tilt in Guinea's foreign policy. Moreover, we
doubt in the short run that Conte will move much
beyond Toure's modest efforts to reduce Soviet
military access and presence. In fact, Conakry's open-
door approach to foreign aid has led it to accept
promises of new assistance from the Soviets and
Libyans. Although not likely in the near term, we
believe Guinea may establish closer ties with the
Communist world if it becomes disillusioned with
Western responsiveness to its economic needs, or if
Conte were replaced by an unstable new regime
vulnerable to Soviet and Libyan blandishments of
political and security aid.
Toure's Legacy
Guinea, the first French-speaking state in black
Africa to achieve nationhood, labors under the legacy
of Sekou Toure's 26 years of authoritarian rule and
misguided economic policies. Toure's death in early
1984 led to a quick takeover by President Lansana
Conte's moderate military regime. The new
leadership's proclaimed aims were to eliminate past
injustices, to restore the economy, and to continue a
nonaligned foreign policy while looking for
development aid from any source. The US Embassy
reports, however, that Conte clearly wants to foster
closer ties to the West, a process that Toure had
begun during his last years.
bauxite deposits and fishing grounds.
Long one of the most radical and anti-Western
leaders south of the Sahara, Toure broke with France
at independence in 1958 to pursue state socialism and
close ties with the Soviet Union and other Communist
states. His policies made a shambles of a once
promising economy, drove hundreds of thousands of
Guineans into exile, and isolated the country from the
mainstream of African development. In exchange for
Soviet arms, Moscow gained limited access to
Guinea's air and naval facilities as well as to its rich
Guinea slowly started in the late 1970s to reorient its
policies toward greater collaboration with the West.
Secret
ALA AR 85-005
22 February 1985
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US Embassy reports indicate that Toure was
concerned that his rigid socialist policies risked
serious political instability and that he had become
strongly dissatisfied with Moscow's level of economic
and military aid. Moreover, the Guinean leader was
impressed by the performance of Western firms-
beginning in the 1960s-in developing the country's
mining sector.
Toure made clear his displeasure with Moscow in
1977 when Conakry withdrew landing rights for
Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft and
Secret
Railroad
Road
Airport
refused transit for Soviet aircraft carrying Cuban
troops to Ethiopia. In subsequent years, the Embassy
reported that Toure sharply reduced the number of
Soviet military technicians in Guinea and continued
to rebuff Soviet overtures to establish a naval base.
Toure started to repair relations with moderate
African neighbors as well as with France, Western
Europe generally, and the United States. According
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to the US Embassy, he became a vigorous spokesman
for West African states concerned about Tripoli's
interference in regional affairs and was criticized
frequently by Libyan leader Qadhafi for abandoning
Africa's revolutionary cause. Toure relaxed some
state control of trade and agriculture, adopted a more
liberal investment code, and personally courted
potential Western investors. At his death, however,
Toure's economic overtures had borne little fruit and
Guinea still depended militarily on the Soviets.
The Soviet Connection
Although ties to Moscow have loosened since 1977,
the US Embassy reports that both the Soviets and
Guineans still derive useful military and economic
benefits from their relationship. The Soviets continue
to use Conakry as a transit stop for military transport
flights to Angola. Conakry also is the only West
African port routinely used by the Soviets' small,
Luanda-based West African naval patrol, although
the number and length of ship days in port have fallen
steadily since the mid-1970s. Moreover, Guinea
serves as the primary transshipment point for sea-
delivered Soviet arms bound for Mali.
Moscow remains Guinea's primary source of military
equipment, training, and spare parts. According to
US Embassy figures, the USSR has committed some
$188.5 million in such aid to Guinea, mostly during
the 1960s and 1970s. The military equipment includes
MIG-21 fighter aircraft, T-34 and T-54 tanks, MI-8
helicopters, and transport aircraft. The current
number of Soviet military advisers is about 20, down
from 200 a decade ago. More than 900 Guineans have
received military training in the USSR over the years.
Although bilateral trade has declined steadily in
recent years as Guinea has turned toward the West,
Conakry still depends on the Soviets in several
economic areas. Between 315 and 450 Soviet
economic technicians are in Guinea, including some
200 teachers and 25 medical personnel, while some
350 Guineans are taking courses in the Soviet Union.
The Soviets developed a bauxite mine at Kindia,
which accounts for nearly half of the $236 million in
economic credits Moscow provided to Guinea in
earlier decades, supplies about one-eighth of the
USSR's bauxite needs, and enables Guinea to repay
loans to Moscow in hard currency. Soviet fishing
operations in Guinea and adjacent coastal waters
make up about 14 percent of the USSR's annual
ocean catch. Moscow has agreed to sell some 10,000
tons of its yearly catch to Conakry.
New Directions
The 25 officers who compose the ruling Military 25X1
Committee for National Redressment strike US
Embassy observers as a pragmatic lot. Most are
familiar faces drawn from Guinea's second tier of
leadership. Some of the older ones-like President
Conte-go back 25 to 30 years and have been trained
by the French. The younger members have been
schooled in Communist countries. Conte has swept
away the repressive practices, all-pervasive party
structure, and the ideology of the Toure era,
according to the US Embassy, while keeping the
existing administrative machinery intact. Freedom of
movement and personal expression now exist as does
limited press freedom. Directives have been issued to
liberalize education, the judicial system, and the labor
movement, while essential economic changes continue
to be studied and debated. Internationally, the regime
has taken pains to stress Guinea's nonalignment
and-despite counting on substantial Western
support-its willingness to look anywhere for
development aid.
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Guinea: The Economy at a Glance
Guinea has the potential to develop one of the
strongest economies in black Africa because of its
extensive mineral and agricultural resources. Data
includes one-third of the world's known reserves of
high-grade bauxite and sizable deposits of high-grade
iron ore and diamonds. The Guinean watershed can
support the cultivation of a wide variety of tropical
agricultural products. Moreover, the country's
hydroelectric power potential is over 62 billion
Despite considerable potential, the economy is
foundering after 25 years of rigid state socialism and
mismanagement. The little-developed modern sector
centers on a variety of state-owned agricultural and
industrial enterprises and the mining enclave, which
has few linkages with the rest of the economy.
Bauxite provides 96 percent of the country's export
earnings and almost all government revenues. Firms
from the United States, Canada, France, West
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Australia, Switzerland,
and the USSR are involved in Guinea's major joint
mining ventures. Production of cash crops, which
accounted for the bulk of Guinea's export earnings
before independence, now represents only 3 percent of
the total value of exports. Today more than 80
percent of the population engages in subsistence
agriculture. According to press reports, at least half
of the country's crops are smuggled out of the country
or sold on the black market, which has transformed
Guinea from a position of near self-sufficiency in food
production to a net importer. Guinea now spends
some 30 percent of annual hard currency earnings on
food imports. Public services are in a shambles as
Conakry has not replaced roads, telecommunications
facilities, industrial plants, and public buildings built
by the French prior to independence.
We estimate that real GDP growth from 1958 to 1982
averaged 1.3 percent a year, less than half the rate of
increase in population. As a result, per capita income
is just under $221, making Guinea one of the world's
poorest countries.
Guinea also had persistent current account deficits
the past several years. To finance these deficits,
Conakry has resorted to extensive overseas borrowing
that has pushed the external debt to over $1.5 billion.
We estimate that servicing this debt now consumes 18
percent of Guinea's annual foreign exchange earnings.
Soaring food and fuel costs have pushed inflation to
more than 25 percent annually for the past few years.
The cost of living probably has increased even more.
US Embassy reporting shows that most commercial
transactions occur on the black market, where the
value of Guinea's currency is as little as one-tenth the
official exchange rate.
While the regime has made a promising beginning in
some areas, the US Embassy reports it is also
confronting some pent-up tribal frictions among
Guinea's three main tribes that call for careful
management. Under Toure, the Malinke dominated
the country. This tribe is now taking second seat to
President Conte's Sousou, although a large number of
Malinke remain in the government and armed forces.
The Fulani, prominent during the French colonial
period, still feel left out of the country's mainstream.
The Economy at a Crossroads. The Conte regime has
taken some modest steps to liberalize the economy,
according to US Embassy reporting, and has begun
consultations with the IMF, World Bank, and
potential bilateral donor governments to provide
technical and material assistance for restructuring the
economy. To encourage agricultural production and
distribution, collective farms have been abolished and
official prices for export crops have been increased. A
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more liberal investment code has been introduced that
is designed to encourage free enterprise. The
government is exploring the possibility of setting up
more joint ventures with foreign investors to better
exploit agriculture and minerals. Moreover, private
commerce is being encouraged.
The US Embassy reports that Guinea's most vital
financial negotiations are with the IMF.
Rescheduling Guinea's large debt hinges on
conclusion of an IMF accord, as does Guinea's
possible entrance into the French-backed African
franc zone. The IMF wants Guinea to institute basic
reforms, including a substantial devaluation of its
currency, removal of subsidies on rice and petroleum
products, elimination or reform of many state
enterprises, and a large reduction in civil service
personnel. So far, according to the Embassy, Conte
has demurred, pending further study, but he has not
ruled out an IMF program.
Exports (f.o.b.)
494
493
442
516 537
Imports (f.o.b.)
394
446
378
392403
Current account balance
-91
-96
-63
-24 7
Gross foreign reserves
-239
-289
-281
-349 NA
Disbursed debt outstanding
1,020
1,249
1,231
1,216 1,564
Real GDP growth 2.6 0.6 1.8 1.3 NA
Inflation (GDP deflator) NA 25.0 25.0 NA NA
Debt service ratio 19.2 16.8 17.0 13.4 NA
a Preliminary.
b Estimated.
Broadening the Stable of International Donors.
Guinea's new leaders appear willing to accept
economic aid from any source so long as it carries no
political strings.
Conte's new Foreign Minister told Guinea's 32 new y
appointed ambassadors late last year that their
primary aim-on which they will be graded-was to
attract aid and investment. Thus, the US Embassy
reports that Conakry has simultaneously solicited
assistance from both North and South Korea, Taiwan
and China, moderate and radical Arabs, Libya and
Israel, and from the USSR as well as the West. In our
view, the regime's willingness to solicit new aid from
Communist states reflects primarily opportunism, not
a reversion of Guinea's previous disillusionment with
Soviet Bloc country assistance.
Conte has made special efforts to cultivate France
and the United States. After a high-level French
Government delegation received red carpet treatment
last fall, according to the US Embassy, the French aid
program in Guinea grew significantly. Paris increased
direct aid and credits in 1984 from $2.4 million to
$7.9 million to help revitalize transportation,
telecommunications, electrical power, agriculture,
and education. Although Conte has requested French
help to reorganize the Guinean Army, the Embassy
reports that Paris has agreed only to a modest $1.8
million military program for 1985. France will
provide a light helicopter, two small naval patrol
boats, some engineering equipment, and military
training in France for 30 to 40 Guinean soldiers
Guinea's new investment code and discussions about
giving market forces more play have stirred growing
French commercial interest, according to the US
Embassy. Last year alone, at least four high-level
French business groups visited Conakry. Even before
the coup, the Embassy reported that some 50 French
firms and 1,000 French nationals were in Guinea,
involved in engineering, construction, and industrial
renovation projects. France has become Guinea's
chief supplier of capital goods, according to the
Embassy, and trade increased 25 percent between
1977 and 1982-the last period for which data are
available. Almost 90 percent of French purchases
from Guinea consist of bauxite and alumina.
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Relations with the United States also are good. US
food aid has been the cornerstone of US assistance to
Guinea since 1971 when Washington terminated an
AID program that had provided almost $100 million
since independence. US food assistance for FY 1984
was increased from $2 million to $5 million, with
smaller increases in agricultural and manpower
development projects that date from 1976. The
United States provided a $3 million grant for FY
1985 to purchase military equipment, including patrol
boats. Two years ago, the United States initiated a
small but well-received program of military
educational training for Guinean officers in the
United States.
American firms, like their French counterparts, are
showing growing interest in post-Toure Guinea and a
number have made contact with Conakry to explore
trade and investment opportunities in the mining,
agriculture, and energy sectors. The Conte
government has also begun to use the US Embassy as
a regular channel to solicit private American
financing for planned development projects. Existing
American private investment, primarily in bauxite
and iron ore mining, totals $185 million. US firms are
developing diamond mining projects and exploring for
oil and uranium. The United States purchased an
average of 31 percent of Guinea's exports, mail
bauxite and alumina, between 1979 and 1983.
Constraints on Moderating Trends
In our view, Conte faces a number of potentially
serious constraints as he seeks to liberalize the
economy and to involve the West to a greater extent
in Guinea's development. Politically, the US Embassy
reports that the regime faces real challenges in
meeting popular expectations for improvements in
living conditions and in dealing with tribal frictions
between key groups sharing power within the regime.
US Embassy reporting suggests that impatience
among the populace and the military's lower ranks
over the economy, together with ethnic rivalries
between Conte's Sousou tribesmen and the formerly
dominant Malinke, contributed to Conte's
reorganization of the government late last year and
his raising of salaries for civil servants and the armed
forces. By downgrading the Prime Minister and
several other Malinke, Conte consolidated his position
for the time being. But we believe he still faces
difficulties because a large number of Malinke remain
in the government and armed forces. Moreover, the
Fulani, prominent during the French colonial period,
still feel left out of the country's mainstream.
Western Donor Response. In our view, Western
responsiveness to Guinea's aid and investment needs
will be an important factor in Conte's willingness and
ability to tackle difficult economic reforms. Although
the US Embassy reports that Guinea's efforts to
obtain new foreign assistance have resulted in fairly
impressive pledges of aid so far from a cross section of
Western and other countries, we suspect Conte may
be disappointed by the amount of new aid that
actually is tendered, particularly by key Western
governments. Embassy reporting suggests that
budgetary constraints on France and the United
States will not permit their support to translate into
the sums Guinea expects. Furthermore, we believe
that the regime's open-door policy of accepting aid
from any source carries with it certain risks. In our
view, Guinea's key Western supporters may
eventually become disgruntled if they perceive no
further reduction of Conakry's ties to Communist and
radical Third World governments.
The Soviets and Libyans. We believe Guinea
probably will not let its turn to the West antagonize
the Soviets to the point of risking an open rupture.
The US Embassy reports that Conakry continues to
be dependent on the Soviets for major arms, spare
parts, and military maintenance. Moreover, we see
little alternative to Guinea's continued collaboration
with the Soviets in the Kindia bauxite project and in
the fishing industry.
In addition, the Soviets are becoming more active in
trying to protect and expand their presence. The US
Embassy reports that a $115 million Soviet loan
accord was signed in late 1984, although it does not
appear to represent an increase over previous spending
levels or to have been disbursed yet. The loan, to be
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used for a variety of agricultural and industrial
projects, involves a 10-year repayment period at an
interest rate of 4 percent. Conakry is to use 25 percent
of the credit to import Soviet machinery and
equipment to be sold to cover local costs of the
projects. Repayment is to be made in bauxite or in
hard currency if delivery schedules are not met.
According to the Embassy, a high-level Soviet
military delegation visited Conakry late last year to
discuss the possible replacement of aircraft for the Air
Force and refurbishing other equipment in the
year offered to establish a fishing port off Conakry in
return for exclusive fishing rights in Guinean waters
and being allowed to refurbish another port for use by
Soviet-manned patrol boats for protection of their
fishing fleet. Nothing further has been heard about
the proposals.
We believe the Libyans are a potential constraint on
Conakry's turn to the West, even though Tripoli at
present is not much involved in Guinea. US Embassy
reporting indicates that Libya is showing greater
activism in West Africa. After getting French forces
out of Chad, Tripoli is trying to put moderate regimes
on the defensive and to reduce French influence
further in the region. Libya has meddled with
disgruntled Muslim elements in neighboring Senegal
and The Gambia, and may follow suit in Guinea-
particularly if Paris were perceived to be regaining
predominance in Conakry. In our view, fear of active
Libyan subversion could cause Guinea to become
more circumspect in its opening toward the West.
Outlook
In our view, Guinea's greater receptivity to Western
economic involvement will continue so long as Conte
remains in power and firmly in charge of the
government and the armed forces. His primary
political challenges will be to maintain cohesion
within the senior military leadership, while keeping
popular economic expectations within bounds, ethnic
tension in check, and junior officers pacified. If his
legitimacy is seriously challenged, we believe Conte
probably would become more preoccupied with the
exigencies of personal survival, rather than with
pursuing further economic reform and openings
toward the West. He also probably would feel
compelled to clamp down on personal freedoms now
allowed in Guinea.
We believe, however, that the near-term prospects are
poor for genuine economic reform or a pro-Western
tilt in Guinea's foreign policy even if Conte is able to
maintain an unchallenged grip on power. We doubt in
the short run that Conte will press for further
significant reduction in the Soviet presence primarily
because of Guinea's dependence on Moscow for
military supplies and concern about Soviet influence
within the armed forces. Furthermore, we believe that
Conte's pragmatism and apparent lack of ideological
commitment make the Guinean leader capable of
sudden policy reversals, if required by his perception
of Guinea's self-interest and what is needed for
personal survival.
Alternate Scenarios
Although we do not believe Guinea's disillusionment
with close ties with the Communist world will soon
fade, Conte's overthrow in a military coup could
afford exploitable opportunities to the Soviets and
Libyans at least in the near term. A power grab by
disgruntled tribal groups or by young and
inexperienced populist radicals probably would be
followed by considerable domestic turbulence and
uncertainty in Guinea's foreign policy. A vulnerable
new regime might prove susceptible to Soviet and
Libyan blandishments of military and economic aid.
On balance, however, we believe Guinea's long-term
economic interests would remain with the West, even
though a successor regime might take some time in
coming to this realization as was the case in Ghana
under Rawlings.
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Another possibility is that Conte may endure in power
and become less favorably disposed toward the West.
Although probably unlikely in the near term, he could
become disenchanted with the Western response to
Guinea's aid and investment needs. Conte might
calculate that increasing ties with Moscow and Tripoli
could prompt the West to provide needed new
assistance that could help his regime ride out any
increase in popular dissatisfaction over economic
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Benin: Limits to Moderation
US Embassy reporting over the past several years
indicates that the leftist government of Benin-after a
decade of radical experimentation-has attempted to
reduce its dependence on the Soviets and Libyans in
favor of closer relations with the West. This new
direction, which stems from economic necessity, an
internal power struggle, and French initiatives, has
resulted in warmer relations with Paris and
Washington and limited economic reforms.
Nevertheless, we believe a number of factors-
including internal divisions and the prospect of
attempts by radicals to regain power in the
government with Soviet and Libyan support-
mitigate against Benin's abandonment of socialism
and elimination of Soviet and Libyan influence over
the near term
Background
Since gaining independence from France in 1960,
Benin has been one of black Africa's most unstable
countries. Regional and ethnic rivalries, a scarcity of
natural resources, and a rapidly growing population
have hindered economic development and the
establishment of national unity. The first decade after
independence saw a succession of nine short-lived,
relatively moderate, pro-French civilian and military
regimes. No government held power long enough to
deal effectively with the serious economic and social
problems that plague the country.
The military coup in 1972 that brought the present
regime to power represented an attempt to alter
radically the country's fortunes by moving it leftward.
The coup leaders-junior and middle-grade Army
officers-sought to purge the pro-French ruling elite
and create an authentically African identity. Col.
Mathieu Kerekou, a former sergeant in the French 25X1
Army from northwest Benin, was selected to head the
new regime, but has faced challenges ever since
maintain his authority over competing factions.
Kerekou initially was confronted by a small but
aggressive group of professed Marxists-young Paris-
educated civilians-who gained behind-the-scenes
control of the regime and began to chart its radical
political course. By 1975, the government formally
embraced Marxism-Leninism, proclaimed the
People's Republic of Benin, and established the
People's Revolutionary Party as Benin's sole political
party. In the wake of an unsuccessful mercenary
attack in 1977, organized by members of the exiled
former ruling elite, the radicals reinforced their
predominance by forming a close security relationship
with the Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans. An East
European-style constitution was adopted and in 1980
military rule gave way to a Soviet-modeled civilian
government. Kerekou became President in civilian
dress and most of his fellow officers retained high
positions.
Soviet Connections
US Embassy reporting indicates that the Soviets
initially gained influence with the current regime in
the early 1970s by backing the leftist radicals who
gradually took control of Kerekou's government. 25X1
According to a senior official of the US Embassy, the
Soviets now maintain a sizable presence in Benin
consisting of about 150 diplomats, military advisers,
technicians, and their dependents. The Soviet
Embassy has an active cultural center and
commercial office, and an Aeroflot office which
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handles the weekly flight from Cotonou via Tripoli to
Moscow. The official also indicates that the Soviets
enjoy easy, and almost exclusive, access to Beninese
military personnel and facilities.
The Soviets enhanced their influential role with the
regime in 1977 by taking advantage of Kerekou's
fears of external threats in the wake of the mercenary
attack. Since then, the regime has become almost
totally dependent for its internal security on the
Soviets, their allies, and the Libyans. Under a 1977
security assistance agreement, Moscow provided
small arms, training, and other aid-with Libyan
financing-to establish an 800- to 1,000-man
presidential guard.
Benin also has an extensive arms and military training
relationship with the Soviets.
Moscow delivered about $20 million in
military equipment to Benin by 1980, and currently
provides 17 military technicians to assist the armed
forces. The Soviets recently completed a new
headquarters building in Cotonou for the Beninese
The US Embassy reports that the Soviets also are
constructing a military airfield some 100 kilometers
northwest of Cotonou. If the airfield is built to the
proposed length of 3,000 meters, we believe it would
be suitable for use by long-range Soviet transport and
naval reconnaissance aircraft that presently operate
from Angola to conduct surveillance of Western naval
forces in the Atlantic. In our judgment, the airfield
would provide an alternate site to Cotonou, away from
public scrutiny, and could serve as a clandestine
transit site-particularly for the Libyans-to support
subversive activities in the region.
The US Embassy indicates that Soviet economic and
technical assistance is limited to an experimental state
farm, small-scale mineral exploration, a fishing
project, and several medical technicians and language
teachers. A cultural and scientific cooperation
agreement signed with Moscow last September
provides for some 60 scholarships to Beninese students
for study in the USSR, and various cultural
exchanges. Cuban aid is limited to student exchanges
and some 30 medical and technical personnel who
provide assistance under a scientific and technical
agreement signed with Havana in 1978.
Beninese radicals.
The Libyan Foothold
US Embassy reporting indicates that Libya also
seized on Benin's economic and security problems in
the late 1970s to supply significant amounts of
financial and military aid, and cultivate close ties with
capitals.
Tripoli has bought political favors through bribes and
overt cash gifts to pay for military expenses and
overdue civil service salaries. The US Embassy
reports that some 50 Libyans are assigned to the
People's Bureau in Cotonou. Many of them
purportedly are involved in joint commercial ventures
and economic, social, and cultural projects. According
to the US Embassy, Libya has funded a housing
project, schools, a mosque for the Muslim
community-which makes up about 15 percent of
Benin's 4 million population-a hospital, and a
roadbuilding and repair project. Most recently,
Tripoli donated a used Boeing 707 aircraft, a fully
equipped mobil television studio, and pledged funds
for housing projects in the country's six provincial
Our review of US Embassy reporting
indicates that, in return for official subsidies and
widespread bribery, Cotonou has allowed Tripoli to
use Benin as a base for subversion against other
governments in the region.
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ccording to recent Embassy reporting,
Tripoli is again funneling Chadian dissidents from
Benin to Libya to help bolster Libyan and
rebel troops occupying northern Chad.
Pressures for Change
The recent moderation evident in some area of
Beninese policies and the country's new flirtation with
the West are the product of serious pressures on the
regime, according to US Embassy reporting. Kerekou
is beholden to moderate elements who appear to have
a slight upper hand at the moment over the radicals in
the government. Increased foreign development aid
and investment is needed to arrest the economy's
rapid deterioration under socialist policies. Military
grumbling over economic and political conditions also
has grown. Fear of the more powerful military
government in neighboring Nigeria also appear
have drawn Benin toward policy moderation.
Political. Although Kerekou's 13 years in office give
the appearance of outward stability, the country has
been plagued by a longstanding power struggle
involving personal and philosophical disputes, tribal
rivalries, and a sharp split between the north and the
south. In addition, growing corruption, foreign
Communist and Libyan backing of radicals,
Kerekou's weak leadership, and a lack of technical
expertise have prevented the regime from dealing
effectively with the country's mounting problems.
Three principal factions are involved:
? The "leaguers," a small group of well-educated
civilians from the south, are dedicated to radical
Marxist ideology. Lacking mass support, they
initially achieved influential positions in the regime
and the ruling party by supporting Kerekou's
takeover. They have promoted close ties with the
Soviets, Cubans, and Libyans, receiving backing in
return for their domestic political maneuvering.
? The military, made up predominantly of
northerners, has become disillusioned with the
meager economic returns of the country's Marxist
experiment. A small group of senior officers,
however, has sided with the leaguers, largely to
advance its own political ambitions.
? Civilian moderates, less radical and more numerous
than the leaguers, have gained strength as public
discontent with failed Marxist policies increases.
Their opposition to the leaguers has grown over the
years, and they are now pushing for a fundamental
political reorientation of Benin along more
moderate lines.
Embassy and other reporting indicates that moderate
civilian and military leaders are disillusioned with
Moscow's limited economic aid and the quality of its
military equipment and training. Reports of coup
plotting among moderates in 1982 prompted Kerekou
to accede to demands that he replace a number of
influential radicals in the Cabinet with more
moderate members, a process that is continuing
The Economy. The US Embassy indicates that the
moderates have convinced Kerekou that the
government's long-term survival depends on its ability
to arrest the country's economic decline. Benin's weak
resource base, coupled with two decades of economic
mismanagement, have left it one of the world's
poorest countries. Per capita annual income was about
$310 in 1982. According to the US Embassy, the
agriculturally based economy-about 80 percent of
the country's 4 million population is engaged in
subsistence farming-is plagued by endemic drought
as well as inefficient state-owned enterprises
responsible for collecting, processing, and marketing
cash crops. A small offshore oil deposit of some 22
million barrels of recoverable reserves is Benin's only
significant mineral resource. Although the
government reportedly hopes oil production-which
began in 1983-will help ease soaring import bills,
World Bank studies project that production will peak
this year and that the country will again be a net oil
importer by 1989.
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Benin: Selected Financial
Indicators
The Military. Our review of Embassy
reporting indicates that in the last several years
Kerekou has been under constant pressure to stem
festering discontent among the ranks of the 3,200-
man armed forces.
Trade balance
-198.77
-206.09
-285.95
Exports (f.o.b.)
274.49
356.97
304.20
Imports (f.o.b.)
473.26
563.06
590.15
Balance of payments
-131.57
-149.05
-253.10
Net foreign assets
-35.97
-24.29
-41.98
External public debt
440.50
723.80
718.90
GDP
1,162.38
1,107.79
1,060.69
Debt service ratio
2.70
4.50
14.20
Note: Data from US Embassy.
Excessive government intervention, a large and
inefficient public sector, and sharp increases in
government spending, in our judgment, have brought
the official economy to the point of collapse. The
Embassy notes that:
Exports-primarily palm oil, cotton, and peanuts-
have stagnated or declined, while imports have risen
sharply.
The growth of government spending continues to
outpace revenues, resulting in a growing budget
deficit.
Heavy foreign borrowing for government
development projects in the last several years has
resulted in a sharp jump in debt servicing charges,
and an estimated official debt of $750 million.
? Overall living standards that rose slowly through the
mid-1970s appear to have declined sharply, possibly
to preindependence levels.
Only continued Western foreign aid and black-market
trade have enabled Benin to avoid economic disaster,
-according to US Embassy officials. Western financial
institutions (mainly the World Bank), the EC, and
bilateral donors-especially France-account for
almost 90 percent of Benin's foreign assistance.
Secret
moderate senior Army officers put pressure on
Kerekou to institute reform by discussing his possible
ouster with police officials, high-level bureaucrats,
and former politicians who also oppose the regime's
unsuccessful socialist policies.
Discontent also extends to poorly paid junior Army
officers and enlisted men who are envious of the
corruption that enables senior officers to augmen
Nigerian Threat. Benin's turn toward moderation in
the base of a perceived threat from Nigeria
apparently stems in part from Lagos's warnings to the
regime in Cotonou about the potential danger posed
by the Soviet and Libyan foothold in Benin.
According to the US Embassy in Cotonou, Lagos has
warned the Kerekou regime on more than one
occasion in recent years that it would respond
militarily to the introduction of Soviet troops to
Signs of Change
The Cotonou Government has taken important steps
toward moderating its policies in an effort to win
crucial Western economic assistance. Kerekou has
eliminated several influential radicals from his regime
and implemented some reforms of the statist
economy. Nevertheless, Benin still maintains strong
ties to the Soviets and Libyans who have ample access
to government officials. Moreover, Benin continues to
vote with the Soviet Bloc and sharply criticize US
policies in international forums, particularly the
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Political Moderation. We believe that Kerekou, in
response to mounting pressure, has strengthened his
hand against leftist ideologues in the last several
years. He dramatically reduced their influence in a
cabinet reshuffle last summer eliminating all but one
radical from the government-the president of the
National Revolutionary Assembly. Although
staunchly pro-Soviet, the assembly president is
unpopular even among his colleagues who regard him
as a token leftist retained by Kerekou to placate
Moscow, according to a senior officer at the US
Embassy. In a recent conversation with the US
Ambassador, Beninese Foreign Minister Affo,
formerly Ambassador to Cuba, pointed out that the
majority of his countrymen now realize that Benin
can no longer look to other socialist states for the
inspiration or aid needed to develop their country, but
instead must turn to the West.
Economic Reform. The US Embassy reports that
Kerekou and the moderate faction now recognize that
excessive centralization and state ownership have
been a mistake, and are encouraging a limited
revitalization of the private sector, as well as more
Western trade and investment, to stem Benin's
accelerating economic decline.
US Embassy officials note that the government has
issued increasing numbers of business permits to
small- and medium-sized private companies, invited
foreign transport firms to operate in the country, and
toned down its anticapitalist propaganda. After
soliciting World Bank recommendations on how to
reorganize the nearly bankrupt public sector, Kerekou
abolished some of the most inefficient among Benin's
approximately 60 state enterprises, combined others,
and reorganized their largely corrupt and incompetent
top-level management. Moreover, the government is
continuing discussions begun late last year with the
IMF for a standby agreement and a rescheduling of
the official debt.
Warming Relations With the West. Kerekou has
placed particular stress on the need for more
productive ties with France and the United States,
with whom relations plummeted because of Benin's
suspicion of Western involvement in the 1977
mercenary attack. We believe that the election of
French socialist President Mitterrand in 1981 helped
facilitate Kerekou's efforts to justify closer ties with
the former metropole by emphasizing to hardcore
leftists the newfound ideological compatibility
between Benin and France.
Mitterrand's visit to Benin in 1983 has been followed
by regular visits by high-level French officials. The
US Embassy reports that French assistance to Benin
has been increasing at a rate of about 12 percent a
year since the early 1980s and rose about 25 percent
from 1981 to 1982 to $21.3 million. Paris disbursed
about $4.5 million in budget support in January
(1985) to help pay overdue civil service salaries and
government operating expenses. France is Benin's
largest trading partner-discounting illegal black-
market trade with Nigeria-and buys the lion's share
of Benin's meager exports.
Paris has resumed military and security aid to Benin
at Kerekou's request, according to the US Embassy,
breaking on a modest scale the Soviet and Libyan
monopoly in this field in the last several years. The
French have delivered three refurbished C-47
transport aircraft and also agreed to provide training,
vehicles, and radio equipment to the police force.
Cotonou's relations with the United States also began
to improve gradually following the ascendancy of the
moderate faction in the early 1980s. The Beninese
Foreign Minister made an official demarche to
normalize Beninese-US relations in 1982 and followed
up with specific proposals ranging from visits to Benin
by US Government leaders to creation of a mixed
Beninese-US commission to deal with political
relations, cultural exchanges, and economic
cooperation. The first US ambassador to Benin since
1976 arrived in 1983 and a military education
program totaling $50,000 was instituted. Most
recently, Washington has reinstated a $6 million
water project and increased the Peace Corp presence
to some 70 volunteers.
Limits to Change
In our view, the pace and scope of Benin's turn toward
moderation will be limited by domestic political
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cleavages and Soviet and Libyan efforts to retain their
access. Although the West's leverage-stemming
from bilateral economic aid and support from
international financial institutions-is increasing, we
believe the Western response probably will prove less
generous than Kerekou and the moderate faction
expect. Moreover, we expect the Soviets and Libyans
to maneuver behind the scenes to improve the fortunes
of leftists in the government who will attempt to limit
Political Ferment
In our view, the power struggle between moderate and
radical factions will constrain the regime's ability to
institute economic and political reforms in favor of
more moderate, pro-Western policies. Despite the
current ascendancy of the moderates, hardcore leftists
appear to us to wield enough influence to forestall
rapid or sweeping policy shifts. The US Embassy
indicates that the current financial crisis has
heightened political differences in the regime. Party
ideologues are opposing an agreement with the IMF
because they believe that the regime's acceptance of
IMF conditions, such as reductions in public-sector
employment, would repudiate the goals set by the
1974 "revolution" and the government's legitimacy,
according to the Embassy. Nevertheless, Embassy
sources indicate that eventually Benin will have to go
to the IMF, probably provoking more political
controversy.
According to the US Embassy, Paris now insists that
the regime come to an agreement with the IMF and
negotiate a rescheduling of the official debt before
France will dispurse additional aid. We believe that
the ascendant moderate faction will intensify pressure
on Kerekou to cooperate with France or consider
ousting him if they become convinced that Paris
would back such a move. Moreover, unless Kerekou
can stem the downward economic spiral, he will face
the growing risk that disgruntled senior or junior
military officers will stage a coup.
The Soviet and Libyan Response
In our view, Moscow and Tripoli, recognizing the
implications of Kerekou's warming relations with the
West, will seek ways to reassert their influence.
Although Libya and the USSR are unwilling to take
Cotonou on as an economic client, Qadhafi is likely to
use periodic infusions of cash and gifts to retain his
influence and access. The US Embassy reports that
Libya is considering Cotonou's request late last year
for budgetary support. In our view, Qadhafi is willing
to tolerate greater Western economic involvement in
Benin as long as he is satisfied that Cotonou will
continue to support radical courses.
Meanwhile, Moscow and Tripoli probably will
continue to use close ties to the Beninese military and
security service to try to intimidate those favoring
Outlook
We believe that Benin probably will move gradually
toward more moderate, pragmatic policies but within
certain limits. Pressing economic needs are likely to
push the regime to search for more Western
assistance. The increasingly influential moderate
faction probably will continue to press Kerekou to
dilute the radicals' power and reduce the regime's
dependence on Moscow and Tripoli. We believe,
however, that Kerekou-in his weakened position-
will find it difficult to resolve longstanding
intragovernment squabbling that is hindering a more
fundamental political reorientation toward the West.
US leverage is generally limited to its bilateral
economic aid and support to international financial
institutions, neither of which, in our view, is likely to
induce prompt overhaul of Benin's statist economic
institutions or fundamental change toward a more
balanced international posture. In addition, the
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limited market potential for US investors and the
likelihood of continued political ferment in Benin
probably will deter any significant increase in US
trade and private investment.
We also believe the turn toward moderation could be
quickly reversed by extreme leftists trying to regain
political predominance with the backing of their
foreign patrons. If further Libyan and Soviet plotting
should be exposed, Kerekou might be convinced that
the political risk of a complete ouster of the radicals
would be too great. In our view, in the event that Paris
does not provide additional aid, the regime would
become increasingly vulnerable to demands from
Moscow and Tripoli on behalf of the radicals
We believe a diminished Soviet and Libyan presence
in Benin-either under Kerekou or a successor-
would reduce opportunities for subversion in
neighboring moderate states and improve prospects
for regional stability. Moreover, Western
responsiveness to Cotonou's economic needs during its
turn away from Moscow and Tripoli could bolster the
confidence of all moderate West African states. If
Benin continues to move away from close Soviet and
Libyan ties, we believe US interests will benefit from
some greater objectivity on Cotonou's part in
international forums and its reduced hostility toward
the US diplomatic community.
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Angola: Dos Santos Visits Zaire
Zaire's President Mobutu rolled out the red carpet for
Angolan President dos Santos during the latter's state
visit to Kinshasa from 6 to 9 February. The two
leaders papered over policy differences despite deep
distrust of each other, and signed six bilateral
agreements that gave the visit an air of success and
signaled improved relations-at least over the short
run.
The most significant agreement covers defense and
security issues, as both sides pledge not to let their
territory be used to undermine the stability of the
other. A joint commission will be set up to monitor
border violations and probably will include mixed
patrols to prevent illegal border movement. This
suggests, but Mobutu did not make any public
guarantees, that Zaire would end its quiet support for
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA insurgents, according to the
US Embassy.
The other five agreements dealt with the movement of
goods and people, frontier commerce and customs
cooperation, conservation of shared national
resources, medical care and cooperation, and the
1985/86 protocol to an existing scientific and cultural
agreement. These agreements could help defuse
tensions over Angola's treatment of Zairian citizens in
border areas, and could ease problems caused by an
upsurge of refugees fleeing into southern Zaire to
escape the civil war. The US Embassy sees little
prospect of increased trade because of market and
financial limitations
A joint communique denounces apartheid as well as
South Africa's occupation of Namibia and parts of
Angola. The media in Kinshasa praised dos Santos
personally and portrayed Angola as being in the
forefront of the struggle against apartheid. Indeed,
the fence-mending tone of the visit suggests that
Mobutu is hoping to play a role in any eventual
mediation effort in the Angolan civil war.
Secret
ALA AR 85-005
22 February 1985
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Mobutu's cryptic reference in his dinner toast to
"certain people" who are trying to create tensions
between Luanda and Kinshasa probably was aimed at
Moscow. Mobutu recently complained to the Soviet
Ambassador about Soviet press allegations that the
United States and South Africa use Zaire as a staging
area to support UNITA
Secret 18
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Africa
Briefs
Angola Nonaligned Ministerial
The ruling MPLA has reaffirmed Angola's intention to host a Nonaligned
Movement (NAM) ministerial meeting in Luanda from 2 to 4 September. The
reference to the NAM meeting was made in a politburo declaration issued on
2 February marking the 24th anniversary of the national liberation struggle.
President dos Santos appears intent on hosting the meeting because of the
international attention it will focus on the ruling MPLA as the legitimate
government in Angola. Dos Santos, however, is taking a gamble that Jonas
Savimbi's UNITA insurgents will not push the civil war into the environs of
Luanda at the same time. Furthermore, Luanda will need first-class hotel space it
does not now have, and the city's populace will have to join in a major campaign to
clean up the capital.
Some nonaligned countries have expressed reservations about Angola's ability to
host a conference of this magnitude, but Sweden, India, and Yugoslavia have
offered assistance to the Angolans. Yugoslavia and Angola held talks in late
January to discuss preparations for the NAM ministerial. In 1970, the Yugoslavs
helped subsidize the Third NAM Summit in Lusaka, Zambia
19 Secret
ALA AR 85-005
22 February 1985
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Secret
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