AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000200830001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 2, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence I MRS lilt NIL tvi
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Africa Review
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2 November'1984=
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Africa Review) 25X1
Articles Zaire: Mobutu's Relationship With the United States
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President Mobutu most likely will use his recent visit to Washington
to reinforce widely held views among Zairians that the United
States backs him unconditionally, a tactic he has used in the past to
strengthen his domestic position.
Chances that the OAU's annual summit meeting, scheduled for
Addis Ababa from 12 to 15 November, will achieve a quorum are
diminishing due to increased divisiveness among member nations.
Deaths, purges, and the release from a South African prison of
SWAPO cofounder Toivo ja Toivo have led to major changes in the
insurgent group's leadership over the past two year
Tanzania: Challenges From Zanzibar I 17 25X1
Separatist sentiment has flared up again in Zanzibar, but President
Nyerere almost certainly will resist pressure from Zanzibari
activists for constitutional changes that would give their island
increased autonomy.
Senegal: Living With Austerity I 19
Although President Diouf's government is under pressure from aid
donors to impose stricter austerity measures, Diouf probably will
risk the loss of some aid rather than impose measures that could
damage his already slipping popular standing.
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Uganda: Threat of Famine
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Zaire:
Mobutu's Relationship
With the United States
President Mobutu has been buoyed up by his trip to
the United States and to several important European
capitals this fall. Although the visits resulted in some
promises of modest increases in foreign assistance and
continued support, in our view, Mobutu sees the most
important result of the trip as his success in gaining
what he regards as a collective vote of confidence
from his major Western backers.
Mobutu believes the visit to Washington and his
meetings with senior US officials, including President
Reagan, represent significant steps in building his
credibility in international circles. Although US
officials took the occasion to stress to him the
importance of maintaining the momentum on Zaire's
economic reforms, Mobutu most likely will use his
reception in the United States to reinforce the widely
held belief among Zairians that Washington is
completely and unconditionally behind him, a tactic
he has used successfully in the past.
Mobutu has managed to stay in power for 19 years at
least partly through his effective use of his
relationship with powerful foreign backers in the
West. According to diplomatic and open sources, he
has convinced Zaire's major backers that his demise
would leave a dangerous political vacuum that
radicals or Communists would be eager to exploit. In
addition, he has skillfully crafted a system in which
his foreign backers appear to many to have become at
least in part responsible for solving or helping to keep
the lid on Zaire's major problems.
demonstrated US support is central to his remaining
in power because it deters would-be opponents by
giving the impression he has powerful friends.
Consequently, Zaire's foreign policy-and, to a lesser
extent, its domestic policies-are designed in part to
score points and curry favor in Washington. Despite
periodic fluctuations, Kinshasa's relations with the
United States generally have been close during 25X1
Mobutu's years in power. 25X1
Partially in an effort to be responsive to US foreign
policy concerns and partially because of its own
interests, Zaire has supported Washington on a wide
range of issues including Chad, Israel, Iran, the
Olympic boycott in 1980, the Middle East, Central
America, Afghanistan, and the Soviet shootdown of
the South Korean airliner. In 1982, Zaire became the
first black African state to reestablish diplomatic
relations with Israel. Last year, Zaire sent a 2,500-
man force to Chad as a symbolic gesture to help check 25X1
Libyan expansion. In addition, Zaire generally has
cooperated with US efforts on a number of other
African issues, for example, in regard to refugees
along the borders with Sudan and Uganda. Zaire also
has supported US efforts to obtain a settlement in
Namibia. Although Kinshasa has not spoken publicly
in favor of linking withdrawal of Cuban troops from
Angola with the implementation of a Namibian
settlement, Mobutu is opposed to the Cuban presence.
More recently, Zaire has supported US efforts in the
United Nations to delete anti-US name calling and
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The Bilateral Relationship
Zaire's relations with Washington are of primary
importance to Mobutu. According to reporting from
diplomatic and open sources, he believes continued,
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Exaggerated Notions of Importance
to the United States
There is little question that Zaire's size, central
location in Africa, and mineral resources make it an
important country. In our opinion, however, Mobutu
and his inner circle of advisers have come to believe
their country is of primary importance to the United
States. This exaggerated notion of their country's
importance, stemming in part from the attention
Washington has given Zaire over the years, has been
reinforced by a number of US activities on Mobutu's
behalf:
? Military and diplomatic support for the regime
during the two invasions by exiles of Shaba Region.
? Frequent high-level visits to Washington and
Kinshasa by officials of both countries.
? Purchases of Zaire's mineral exports for the US
strategic stockpile.
? Frequent intervention by Washington on Zaire's
behalf with donor countries and international
financial institutions.
? Increasing levels of developmental and security
assistance.
? Public espousals by senior US officials of Zaire's
importance and of Washington's support for
Mobutu personally
Washington's tolerance of occasional attacks by
Mobutu along with the appearance of making
concessions to him on certain issues has left many
Zairian and European observers with the impression
that Mobutu is able to manipulate the United States
at will. Moreover, Washington's refusal to cut its ties
to Mobutu as the more oppressive and corrupt aspects
of his rule became widely known and as his domestic
support appeared to erode in the late 1970s and early
1980s reinforced the impression of Mobutu's value to
the United States
According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, Mobutu
and his advisers believe Zaire has a special
relationship with the United States that should
exempt the regime from Washington's occasional
public criticisms. The proud and easily offended
Mobutu believes Zaire should not be taken for
granted by Washington, that it should be rewarded
more lavishly for supporting US positions in
international forums, and that these rewards should
be proffered unconditionally. In meetings with US
representatives, Mobutu and other senior Zairian
officials jealously cite other African countries such as
Sudan or Zimbabwe which, they argue, receive more
US aid and less criticism in the US press or in
Congress but do not support the United States as
staunchly.
The Warming Trend
The improvement in US-Zairian ties since Mobutu's
public renunciation of US aid some two years ago can
probably be attributed in part to Washington's quiet
diplomacy and Mobutu's responsiveness to high-level
attention from Washington. Related to this has been
the approval, with Washington's support, of an IMF
program last December and an accompanying debt
rescheduling. Both have had a considerable positive
impact on bilateral relations, according to the US
Embassy in Kinshasa.
Over approximately the past two years, both
Washington and Kinshasa have increasingly
expressed satisfaction with the state of their relations.
Last summer, for example, Zairian Foreign Minister
Umba told the Israeli Ambassador in Kinshasa that
Mobutu was highly pleased with the state of US-
Zairian ties and that Kinshasa had chosen the proper
course in attempting to strengthen relations with
Washington.
Since returning to Zaire this fall, Mobutu has
expressed his satisfaction with his meetings in the
United States. He also has ordered senior Zairian
officials to reassure US diplomats in Kinshasa of
Zaire's intention to live up to its IMF commitments
and other financial and budgetary restrictions. At the
same time, he has had them warn US officials that
Washington must remain steadfastly behind him if it
expects Zaire to continue as a staunch friend of the
United States.
Mobutu's European Backers
In some respects, Mobutu's survival might seem more
important to Paris and Brussels than to Washington.
Belgium and France each provide Zaire with more aid
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than does the United States. Both have more than 100
military advisers in Zaire, some assigned to key
Zairian units that are responsible for security in the
capital or in Zaire's vulnerable Shaba Region. Both
have extensive economic and financial ties involving
Zaire's vital mining industry and probably Mobutu
himself. Thousands of jobs in Belgium are directly
dependent on Zaire's minerals. There may be as many
as 18,000 Belgian and 8,000 French citizens in Zaire.
Over the years, however, Paris and Brussels have tried
their best to keep Washington in the lead-and taking
the flak-in supporting Mobutu and in maintaining
pressure on him to undertake various reforms. In our
view, Mobutu has long been aware of subtle
differences between Belgian, French, and US interests
in Zaire, and has at times cleverly played them off
against one another.
Ameliorating Effects of the US Presence
The high value Mobutu places on his ties to the
United States, in our view, has put Washington in a
unique position to prod Mobutu on reforms. Mobutu
has shown, however, that he will only go so far and is
likely to react adversely to criticism. Mobutu and
other senior Zairian officials repeatedly state to US
representatives that Zaire is extremely jealous of its
sovereignty and remains sensitive to what it interprets
as interference in its domestic affairs. In our view,
Mobutu is unlikely to make liberalizing changes that
he believes could ultimately weaken his grip on power.
Most Western observers agree that Mobutu's rule
would have been more harsh without expressions of
US concern for human rights. Mobutu's awareness of
the US position has, in our view, led him to make
some efforts to change his government's image. His
careful handling of his protracted struggle with
dissident exparliamentarians who attempted to form a
second political party is a recent case in point. F
Prospects
We believe US-Zairian relations will remain close for
the near term to midterm, despite the probability of
periodic bilateral problems involving aid levels,
Zaire's economic performance, and human rights
issues. Mobutu will expect continued US assistance in
dealing with Zaire's economic difficulties. He also
will look to the United States and his other major
backers for support if he feels threatened by political
and social ferment, a growing dissident threat, or
stepped-up terrorist attacks-all of which are possible
in the months ahead. Even if Mobutu were to be
removed from power in some unforeseen manner, we
believe his successors would continue to look to the
United States for guidance, support, developmental
aid, and security assistance
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The OAU: Struggle To Survive
We submit the foregoing, as all reporting on the
OAU, with the caution that nothing concerning the
OAU is unchanging and that neither consistency nor
Cartesian logic is likely to prevail there anytime
soon.
Addis Ababa,
22 October 1984
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has
become an itinerant body with institutions that barely
function. Most of its atomized energies have been
spent over the past three years in simply trying to
convene meetings. Increased divisiveness and fear that
this important symbol of African identity-if not
unity-will crumble have made the members hesitant
to take firm positions and have paralyzed the
organization.
The 20th Summit
The chances of the 20th summit meeting taking place
as scheduled on 12-15 November in Addis Ababa are
diminishing daily, although invitations from the host
and current chairman, Ethiopia's head of state
Mengistu, to its 50 regular members went out in
September. The most contentious issue is once again
the presence and possible seating of the Saharan
Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR), which has been
invited to "visit" Addis Ababa during the summit.
The summit probably will not be convened unless the
members can agree on how to proceed within the first
two days of their arrival in Addis Ababa. Informal
meetings and ad hoc negotiating committees will have
to be formed quickly. To have a quorum, 34 members
must not only be present but also must officially
register. During the failed attempts to convene a
summit in Tripoli in 1982 and at the summit in Addis
Ababa in 1983, governments were unwilling to give an
early signal of their intentions by registering. Most
again will want to hold back on a commitment to
attend until major disagreements have been resolved.
The longer the delay, the more likely the summit will
not be convened. Leaders whose political positions at
home are less than solid are likely to grow
increasingly nervous about being out of the country. 25X1
Others probably will stay home until a quorum seems
certain]
Virtually no preparations have been made for the
upcoming meeting. No agenda has been circulated,
and none is known to exist. A Council of Ministers,
which traditionally meets just prior to the summit to
set the agenda, has not yet been scheduled to convene.
Mengistu's apparently unilateral decision not to hold
ministerial meetings generally has been approved by 25X1
other leaders as a means of averting major
disagreements that might delay a summit indefinitely.
Only Tanzanian President Nyerere has objected and
has vowed not to attend at all unless the foreign
ministers meet first
Most moderate African leaders probably recognize
that rushing into a summit without much preparation
increases the likelihood of the meeting collapsing
before it even begins. Nevertheless, they seemingly
favor this risk over the alternative of prolonging the
chairmanship of Mengistu, apparently believing that 25X1
his close relationship with the Soviets belies the
organization's supposedly nonaligned position.
Furthermore, African moderates are concerned over
Mengistu's use of OAU fora for denunciations of the
West (at the OAU's 21st anniversary celebration at
Addis Ababa in May 1984, for example) and his
unabashedly partisan role in the deliberations both on
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Chad and on the Sahara, sometimes working at odds
with the OAU Secretariat. For his part, Mengistu like
most OAU chairmen before him, is reported to be
"fed up" with the job and anxious to turn it over to
the next leader. He is likely to remain Chairman until
a summit can be convened, however.
The Chairmanship
Another sign of uncertainty is that there still is no
consensus on who should succeed Mengistu as
chairman. Earlier momentum in favor of
Zimbabwean Prime Minister Mugabe now appears to
have dissipated. The choice of Mugabe would
conform better to the widespread preference for a
genuinely nonaligned chairman than Mengistu or a
markedly pro-Western leader. If Mugabe were
selected, this would give southern Africa the
chairmanship for the first time since President
Kaunda of Zambia in 1970-71.
The next chairman, if he can be chosen at all given
the dim outlook for the summit, will emerge as part of
the agreement necessary to attain a quorum for the
meeting. In the meantime, rumors about potential
candidates abound in the OAU Secretariat and
among representatives to home countries.
President Diouf of
Senegal has been gaining strength as a "consensus
candidate" but so also have Nyerere and Kaunda; the
latter insists, however, that he is not interested.=
Mengistu is supporting President
Ratsiraka of Madagascar, who also is reported to be
uninterested. To round out the candidate pool,
Morocco is said to be committed to the selection of
Libyan Chairman Qadhafi
The chairmanship no longer appears to be viewed as a
singular honor to be bestowed on an elder statesman
in recognition of his leadership. Factional disputes
among the African states have made the
chairmanship a matter to be bartered as part of a
larger compromise. The chairman traditionally hosts
the next summit, but most leaders are now hesitant to
accept this responsibility because it entails an
enormous financial burden for the host country.
The experience of President Tolbert of Liberia is still
fresh in the minds of African leaders. After building
costly facilities to host the 1979 summit, Tolbert
proposed cutting rice subsidies to ease the overspent
budget, which led directly to rioting and a coup d'etat
a year later in which Tolbert was assassinated.
There is now some sentiment for establishing a
permanent site for future OAU meetings, but many
members are against Addis Ababa as such a site
despite its position as the home of the OAU
Secretariat. The only volunteer for this role may be
Tripoli, also unacceptable to most members.
The Issue of Western Sahara
A summit probably cannot be convened without
resolving beforehand whether or not the SDAR will
be seated. The OAU has been wrangling over aspects
of this issue since February 1976 when recognition of
the Polisario Front's status as a liberation movement
was in question (see box). By July 1980, a bare
majority of members (26 of 50) advocated the
admission of the SDAR as a regular member of the
OAU. After a series of heated debates and failures by
ad hoc committees to resolve the issue, OAU
Secretary General Kodjo of Togo decided to seat the
SDAR at the Council of Ministers meeting in
February 1982. Kodjo justified his action as a proper
"administrative decision" within the confines of the
charter. Morocco and 18 other states immediately left
the meeting
The presence of the SDAR also made it impossible to
convene a summit in Tripoli in August 1982 because a
quorum could not be achieved. Besides those
committed to boycotting OAU meetings in which the
SDAR was included, other heads of governments
reportedly decided to stay away either to protest
Qadhafi's policies or because they sensed that the
effort to achieve a quorum would fail.
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1. Any independent sovereign African State may at
any time notify the Secretary General of its
intention to adhere or accede to this Charted
2. The Secretary General shall, on receipt of such
notification, communicate a copy of it to all the
Member States. Admission shall be decided by a
simple majority of the Member States. The
decision of each Member State shall be
transmitted to the Secretary General, who shall,
upon receipt of the required number of votes,
communicate the decision to the State concerned.
Those opposed to SDAR admission have argued on
the basis of the first paragraph of Article 28 of the
OAU Charter that the SDAR is neither
"independent " nor "sovereign. " Supporters of the
SDAR cite the second paragraph of the same article,
noting that the Secretary General has received the
required number of votes in favor of the SDAR s
admission and, therefore, should be seated. F__1
A summit convened in 1983 primarily because the
SDAR voluntarily withdrew from attending. This
year, however, we believe the SDAR's desperation
over its deteriorating military position has made it
determined to take its seat. The group has been
involved in an extensive lobbying effort, including a
visit to Cuba, and probably can count on Mengistu's
help.
Until recently, the balance of sentiment on the issue
in the OAU had been shifting against Morocco. Many
black African countries have long viewed the issue as
more an Arab than an African problem and have lost
patience with the dispute because of the degree to
which it has threatened the survival of the OAU. Two
months ago most seemed ready to vote to seat the
SDAR and be done with it even if Morocco walked
out
_f he Libyan-Moroccan accord in August may lead
some states to change their stance on the SDAR
because of their hostility to Libya, but the accord may
also have strengthened the hand of Moroccan King
Hassan on the issue. Hassan has proved in the past to
be skilled in building factions and manipulating the 25X1
OAU process. Even Nigeria, which withdrew from an
OAIU Implementation Committee that has attempted
to resolve the issue in September 1984 blaming
Moroccan intransigence, is now indicating that it will
not necessarily support the SDAR.
Chairman Mengistu appears intent on calling for a
report of the Implementation Committee, which
presumably will recommend seating the SDAR, and
then scheduling a vote on its acceptance. We believe, 25X1
however, that Morocco will work behind the scenes to
ensure that a quorum is not achieved or to get the
SDAR to stay away. If such efforts fail, Rabat will
try to have any vote on the Western Sahara issue
formulated in a way that would be likely to result in
excluding the SDAR.
Outlook
In our view, there is a less than a 50-percent chance 25X1
that the summit will be convened in mid-November
because of the current state of disarray. Even if a
summit is held then or in the next several months, we
believe prospects for the OAU are not bright.
The Chad and Western Sahara disputes have shown
the OAU framework for solving intra-African
disputes does not work, and disagreements among
OAU members will continue to weaken the
organization and inhibit the smooth running of its
institutions. There are few established mechanisms
for dealing with problems. Ad hoc solutions have
proved ineffectual, and the secretary general and
chairman often have worked at cros p u:rp osevs.
Members exhibit their ?ow level of
commitment by failing io fund the organization's.
activities. Total dues in : rears now equal almost
twice the amount of the OAU's entire 1984-85
budget.
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President Mobutu of Zaire recently proposed the
creation of a Black African League, which could
become an alternative to the OAU. Mobutu argues
that too many disputes within the OAU are Arab
based and should not concern black African countries.
Mobutu's concept has been widely discussed, but so
far only pro-Western governments seem supportive.
In our judgment, a complete breakup of the OAU is
highly unlikely. We expect the shared legacy of
colonialism and the ideal of Pan-Africanism will keep
the OAU alive, if only barely. There are few signs,
however, that the OAU will develop into an
organization capable of meaningful action.
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Namibia: SWAPO's Leadership'
The South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) has undergone major leadership changes
over the past two years.' SWAPO cofounder Andimba
(Herman) Toivo ja Toivo, released in February 1984
after 16 years in a South African prison, was elected
the insurgent group's new Secretary General in
August. Six Central Committee members have died
or been removed from office, and 15 new members
have been named. SWAPO's expanding foreign
representation soon will include offices in at least 25
countries staffed by senior officials, including two
members of the National Executive Committee (or
Politburo) and nine other Central Committee
members.
Tribalism
Ethnic background is the most important factor in the
leadership's makeup as Owambos-the largest of
Namibia's 10 major ethnic groups with about half the
national population-hold two-thirds of SWAPO's
National Executive and Central Committee seats for
which tribal affiliation is known. The Kwanyamas-
the largest of seven subgroups of the Owambo tribe-
control eight of the group's 18 National Executive
Committee positions and at least 21 of the 51 seats on
the Central Committee. Most other black Namibian
tribes also are represented on the Central Committee
to lend a broad national appearance to the insurgent
group
The Kwanyamas strengthened somewhat their
dominance of SWAPO's leadership at a Central
Committee meeting in April 1983. They prevented
members of minority tribes of central and southern
Namibia-the Damaras, Hereros, and Namas-from
removing several Kwanyamas from the Central
Committee. They also managed to put another
Kwanyama official on the committee while removing
three non-Owambos. The Kwanyama faction failed,
however, to remove the Herero serving in a largely
ceremonial role as SWAPO's national chairman, and
the Damara who is the group's administrative
secretary
Although the Kwanyamas have long dominated
SWAPO's guerrilla force-the People's Liberation
Army of Namibia (PLAN)-they have been
frustrated in efforts to take over the important post of
Secretary for Defense. Kwanyamas hold the offices of
military commander, deputy commander, and
political commissar, and support Military
Commander Dimo Amambo for the secretarial
position, vacant since the death of the incumbent
Peter Nanyemba on 1 April 1983. President Sam
Nujoma, who is a member of the small Ngandjera
subgroup of the Owambos, has avoided a complete
Kwanyama takeover of the military wing, however, by
retaining the defense portfolio himself and naming
Caprivian Richard Kapelwa to be Acting Secretary
for Defense. The latest Central Committee meeting in
August 1984 avoided a confrontation between the
Kwanyamas and others by retaining Kapelwa as
Acting Secretary
leadership positions
that the southern tribes are unfairly favored with
Growing Factionalism
SWAPO is increasingly divided by tribal,
bureaucratic, and personal jealousies. Members of
southern minority tribes resent the Kwanyamas'
dominance of SWAPO, while many northerners insist
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Outlook
While SWAPO's internal cohesion is under increasing
strain, diplomatic activity by South Africa and
Angola, including their February 1984 troop
disengagement agreement, is putting pressure on the
group. SWAPO must decide soon whether to order
another major infiltration of Namibia during the
rainy season that lasts from November to April. To do
so would be a violation of the troop disengagement
agreement. An offensive also would preclude further
SWAPO talks with South Africa, and possibly incite
a mutiny among some disillusioned insurgents who
want to end the guerrilla war. Pretoria's release of
Toivo ja Toivo, whose SWAPO credentials rival
Nujoma's, heightens the potential for disunity. In our
judgment, a split in SWAPO probably is more likely
now than at any time since the expulsion in 1980 of
most of SWAPO's Caprivian members, including
Vice President Mishake Muyongo, following a tribal-
based power struggle for control of the organization.
Short of a disruptive split, the continuing ferment
undermines the ability of insurgent leaders to control
military operations and respond to the changing
diplomatic situation
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Tanzania: Challen es From
Zanzibar
Separatist sentiment in Zanzibar, temporarily
silenced by President Nyerere's purge of the island's
leadership last February, has flared up again as
Zanzibari activists seek controversial changes in the
constitutions of Zanzibar and Tanzania. Despite the
separatists' pressure, Nyerere's demonstrated
firmness on this issue almost certainly assures that
their proposals will be rejected.
Historical Perspective
In April 1964, the newly independent island of
Zanzibar-an Arabic state-and the two-year-old
republic of Tanganyika-a former British colony
inhabited by Christians and animists-merged to
form the United Republic of Tanzania. Zanzibar
retained its identity with its own president, legislative
bodies, and court system, while Tanganyika's political
structure was abolished. Former Tanganyikan
Government officials dominated the key positions in
the Union government, however, and Zanzibari
concerns received less attention than mainland
matters, causing Zanzibaris to complain that the
island had become the junior partner in what they had
thought was to be a union of coequal sovereign states.
A sense of cultural and economic differences has led
to growing Zanzibari separatist sentiments since the
union. Secession efforts reached a peak in early 1984
when Aboud Jumbe, then President of Zanzibar,
pushed for Islamization of the island. Nyerere reacted
fiercely to the challenge, forcing Jumbe to resign and
following up with a purge of Zanzibari leadership.
Nyerere silenced the separatists by placing the
Tanzanian People's Defense Forces on full alert and
moving reinforcements into Dar es Salaam to
preclude a coup attempt against his regime.
elected to this position in April 1984, a mere formality
since he was the ruling party's sole candidate for the
position. Mwinyi's reputation as a Nyerere lackey
first aroused suspicion in Zanzibar, but over time he
appears to have earned substantial support.
he has proved far more
decisive and independent than his detractors had
dared to hope. Yet, Mwinyi's decision to accept the
ruling party vice-chairmanship under pressure from
Nyerere demonstrates that he has not forgotten his
predecessor's fate.
The Zanzibar Constitution
Separatist sentiment has once again surfaced,
however, as a draft constitution for the island
prepared by Zanzibar's Attorney General includes
several controversial measures. Some appear designed
to circumvent the supremacy of Tanzania's ruling
party-a major tenet of Nyerere's government-
while others probably are intended merely to
demonstrate that Zanzibari nationalist spirit has not
been crushed:
? A provision calling for direct election for members
of the island's House of Representatives, who would
in turn appoint members to the Revolutionary
Council, would prevent Nyerere from appointing his
loyalists to these legislative positions.
? The definition of Zanzibari citizenship is designed
to prevent Nyerere from naming individuals not
born on the island to other key positions in the
Zanzibar government.
? One measure provides for an island militia and a
Navy under command of the Zanzibar president.
Two days after Jumbe's resignation, Nyerere
appointed Ali Hassan Mwinyi as Interim President of
Zanzibar and Vice President of the Union. He was
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? A revenue clause would enable the holding of
special funds that could not be withdrawn or
allocated to the Union without the approval of the
Zanzibar government.
? A series of provisions calls for a Zanzibar public
seal, a national anthem, and a banner for the
president of Zanzibar.
The separatists also are lobbying
for a profit and distribution formula that would
guarantee Zanzibar benefits from any future energy
such
Zanzibari efforts have stalled progress on the
Tanzanian constitution. Union leaders reportedly are
trying to avoid raising Zanzibari sensitivities over
being subservient to the mainland, while carefully
monitoring the wording of amendments so that
separatists will not be able to manipulate them later.
discoveries made in Tanzania
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The draft constitution has passed out of the
Revolutionary Council and awaits approval in the
Zanzibar House of Representatives.
After approval in the Zanzibar House, the
draft must go before the National Executive
Committee of Tanzania's ruling party for final
approval. Nyerere has given the Zanzibaris a
December deadline for presentation of the
constitution to the party's executive committee
The Union Constitution
Although less controversial, work on a series of
amendments to Tanzania's constitution also is in
progress. The Zanzibaris are attempting to assert
Outlook
The inclusion of various nationalist provisions in the
draft Zanzibar constitution is an important victory for
separatists within the Zanzibari government who
appeared to have suffered a mortal blow from
Nyerere's early 1984 efforts to stamp out the
movement. Aware of Nyerere's ability to act
forcefully against them, separatists are unlikely to
press too hard for their ideal goal-a constitution
establishing a federation of two sovereign republics-
but they will strive to incorporate language into the
Union constitution giving Zanzibar greater autonomy.
Although the bulk of the separatists' proposals almost
certainly will be rejected by the Tanzanian ruling
party, separatists have demonstrated their supremacy
over Unionists within the island government. They
also have gained considerable publicity for their cause
through press reporting and televised coverage of the
debate in the Zanzibar House of Representatives.
Nyerere, meanwhile, has sent an important signal via
his envoys to the debate: he will not allow separatist
actions to interfere with his primary political goal-
party supremacy. As he demonstrated by his actions
during the crisis earlier this year, the President-
despite his relatively cautious moves in the current
situation-will act forcefully if he is pushed too far.
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Senegal: Living With Austerity
The moderate, pro-Western government of President
Diouf is facing pressures from bilateral donors, the
World Bank, and the IMF for stricter austerity. At
the same time, the political costs of reform are
growing and Diouf's standing is at its lowest ebb since
he was elected to a full five-year term in February
1983. Diouf is being urged to scale back further
Senegal's inefficient public sector and to raise rice
prices as a precondition for a new IMF standby
agreement.F___1
Diouf probably will risk the loss of some financial aid,
rather than provoke an adverse popular response to
additional food price hikes and cuts in government
services, while he tries to garner wider political
support. The US Embassy reports that government
economic actions already have met some opposition
from the Mourides-the country's most powerful
Muslim brotherhood-as well as from organized labor
and students. The President probably expects that the
recent return of normal rainfall will result in higher
crop yields and ease economic stresses somewhat next
year, but we believe economic constraints likely will
mount unless Senegal can come to terms with the
IMF.
President Diouf s Inheritance
When Abdou Diouf succeeded to office in 1981 upon
the resignation of President Senghor, Senegal already
was involved in a three-year comprehensive program
sponsored by the IMF and World Bank. By 1983,
however, the country was no better off financially
than in 1980 when Senghor launched the austerity
measures. By mid-1983, the government faced a
current account deficit of $354 million and debt
service payments that absorbed about 50 percent of
government expenditures. Diouf had no choice but to
seek financial relief again from the IMF and debt
reschedulings. Donors-principally, France, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States-provided aid to fill
the remaining financing gap, but Diouf still faced the
unpleasant task of raising food, petroleum, fertilizer,
and seed prices. The government also cut producer
prices for peanuts-the country's main export crop-
and froze public-sector wages.
Dakar's problems last year were aggravated by a
severe drought-the worst since independence in
1960-that seriously affected agricultural production.
Even in good years, the land barely provides a
livelihood for Senegal's rural workers-about 70
percent of the labor force. Harvests yielded only about
30 percent of the country's food needs last year and
forced the government to buy foreign rice and wheat,
boosting imports significantly. The drought also
caused peanut production to drop 50 percent,
frustrating Dakar's attempt to take advantage of
rising export prices for peanut oil. Government
subsidies to cover crop losses to farmers accounted for
nearly one-third of the country's overall budget
deficit
Dakar's overstaffed bureaucracy adds to Senegal's
problems. During the first two decades of
independence, the government's policy of hiring all
graduates from schools and universities who applied
contributed to gross overem to ment in the public
sectord wages and salaries
in the early 1980s consume is It' of the government's
current budget costs. Senegal resorted to pleas for
stepped-up donor assistance and international
borrowing to make ends meet
Heavy government involvement in the economy,
reflecting a French heritage of centralized planning,
also encouraged inefficiency and squeezed the private
sector. Parastatals often failed to deliver seed and
fertilizer to farmers in timely fashion, and state-
controlled marketing operations left considerable
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scope for corruption. High public salaries-20 to 25
percent higher than the private sector-pushed the
general wage level up drastically, pricing Senegalese
workers out of the international labor market.
Moreover, the US Embassy reports that government
borrowing drained the local banking system, leaving
no credit for the private sector.
Diouf skillfully orchestrated price cuts last year,
allowing the government to meet all of its IMF
targets. He elicited cooperation from key interests by
holding meetings with government ministers, senior
union officials, religious leaders, and other groups.
Public reaction, according to the US Embassy, was
one of gloomy resignation. The only protests came
from the principal opposition party, the Senegalese
Democratic Party.
Pressures for Renewed Austerity
As 1984 opened, Senegal faced a severe drought
together with a large current account deficit caused
by low agricultural export revenues, a substantial debt
service burden, and high costs for food and petroleum
which together account for over two-thirds of
Senegal's imports. Government subsidies to farmers
and public workers continued to leave little money
available to meet other public- and private-sector
spending needs. As a result, Diouf again sought IMF
and donor financial support.
Unlike past years, however, when Dakar could count
on a generous response, Diouf's pleas for financial
assistance were met with pressure from Senegal's
most important donors-the World Bank, France,
and the United States-to make major policy changes
in order to receive substantial additional financing:
? Raise the price of rice, wheat, and other imported
cereals to a level where urban consumers would
choose to buy local cereals such as millet, sorghum,
and corn.
? Improve seed and fertilizer distribution by allowing
farmers to form private purchasing groups with
direct access to credit.
? Reduce government spending in the rural sector by
cutting down on employment and services provided
by agricultural parastatals.
These requirements were endorsed by the IMF and
incorporated in its proposed one-year standby
program for Senegal.
Senegal:
Current Account Balances, 1980-84
Exports (f.o.b.)
375
475
475
521
Imports (c.i.f.)
-790
-793
-783
-740
Trade balance
-415
-318
-308
-219
Net services and
transfers
14
51
-5
-6
Interest on external
debt
-113
-128
-131
-135
Current account
balance
-401
-267
-313
-225
a Preliminary.
b Projected.
Diouf has balked over several measures, particularly
raising rice prices, and deferred an IMF standby
agreement until at least early 1985. We believe that,
at least for now, the President would rather face the
loss of some outside financial aid than risk an adverse
popular response to further food price hikes.
According to the US Embassy, the 50-percent
increase in cooking oil prices last August created
considerable resentment among urban dwellers.
Although the government has announced cost cuts in
several agricultural parastatals, the US Embassy
reports that no specific reductions are under way.
Diouf probably is hesitant to face the prospect of
further unemployment in the wake of a two-month
strike by university students earlier this year over the
expected shortage of government jobs. We believe the
President also is reluctant to impose further austerity
because of the hardships that have been created by
drought. Total cereals production this year reached
only 400,000 metric tons, nearly 1 million tons short
of Senegalese needs.
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The government probably will make it through the
year by depending on international food relief and
budgetary aid from Saudi Arabia, which
has approved a $50 million
loan for Senegal. Dakar also has received 217,000
tons of cereals as food aid from Western countries this
year, according to UN reports. Based on French
statements to US Government officials, we believe
Paris will provide financial help to ease the way
toward an IMF agreement early next year. In the
meantime, Senegal probably will continue to
accumulate trade arrears, which reached $40 million
last year, and will cease payment of principal owed on
public external debt.
percent of the budget compared to only 11 percent for
education, has been directed to rein in military
spending. Even with its large budget share, the
military already is more than a year behind in
payments for such basic staples as rice and cooking oil
for the troops.
Although we see no immediate threats to Diouf's
survival in office, we believe he faces some difficult
choices. On the one hand, political considerations
probably will slow the pace of economic reforms.
Diouf probably will continue to postpone food price
hikes and cutbacks in farm subsidies and government
employment to avoid further alienating consumers,
farmers, and students. At the same time, economic
constraints will continue to mount in the absence of
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Hard Road Ahead
Diouf's inability so far to deal effectively with
Senegal's worsening economic woes has contributed to
an erosion of his political standing. His ruling
Socialist Party is in disarray, with local elections only
a few weeks away, and party leaders are preoccupied
with infighting rather than dealing with the country's
economic crisis. The US Embassy reports Diouf is
increasingly blamed for high living and corruption
among government officials even as most Senegalese
face declining living standards. Opposition parties are
trying to foment unrest among students, labor, and
the military
Diouf also faces growing opposition from the
Mourides-the country's most powerful Muslim
brotherhood-which represents a major base of
political support. Mouride peasant followers account
for two-thirds of peanut production and have
benefited from government loans, subsidies for seed
and fertilizer, and high producer prices for the peanut
Diouf also must keep a watchful eye on the military, a
highly disciplined and apolitical security force whose
support would be crucial in the event of civil violence.
The Ministry of Defense, which accounts for 13
an agreement with the IMF.
Normal rainfall returned this fall, and Diouf probably
is counting on a better harvest next year to ease
economic pressures. Peanut production should rise to
about 670,000 tons-100,000 tons above last year's
crop but still well below peak production of 1 million
tons-allowing the government to take some
advantage of rising export prices. Although rains
throughout Senegal are expected to provide enough
food for those in the south and in major cities,
continuing drought in the northern region and
transport and marketing problems probably will lead
to another food shortfall next year in that region.
Moreover, livestock shortages will persist because
many peasants were forced to slaughter their cattle
during the drought last spring.
Economic realities, however, will prevent the
government from solving its basic agricultural
problems over the near term. The only areas fertile
enough to ensure improved agricultural production
are in the Senegal River Basin and in the southern
part of the country, which receive higher rainfall and
have a lower population density. To develop these
areas, however, would be costly. According to one
AID official in Dakar, the cost would be over $1
billion for the Senegal River Basin alone, even
without transport and marketing costs. Meanwhile,
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the shortage of public funds has led to a drastic
decline in funding for agricultural projects and
reduced the government's capacity to provide even
basic services to the farming sector. Rapid population
growth, spreading desert conditions, and soil depletion
in the northern and central areas will continue to
cause productivity to drop in those regions. =
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Africa
Briefs
food.
Food shortages in the Karamoja area of northeastern Uganda are growing
increasingly serious. The US Embassy reports that the problem stems from
drought in the already and region, disruptions to cultivation caused by military
operations earlier this year, inadequate seed supplies, and the loss of grain stores.
Moreover, a poor road network and a lack of trucks, spare parts, and supervisory
personnel have delayed food aid distribution. As a result, deaths reportedly are
increasing and people are beginning to move to resettlement centers in search of
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The government, dominated by ethnic groups hostile to the Karamajong tribe and
burdened by political infighting and a spreading insurgency near Kampala, has
been unwilling so far to take on the added load of a famine relief program in the
outer reaches of the country. It has made little effort even to move food from
surplus areas into Karamoja. Although donors are stepping up aid efforts, the food
shortages may not be eased significantly, and the threat of renewed unrest in this
perennially troubled region could grow in the coming months.
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Ethiopia is trying to lease one of its two newly acquired Boeing 767s to Kenya,
We believe it needs the money to help
problems.
cover payments due on the planes, which were delivered to Ethiopia less than six
months ago. Up to now, Ethiopian Airlines has been able to meet payments
obligations for the aircraft, but apparently has not been able to obtain enough
revenues from its flight operations to ensure continued timely servicing of the debt,
part of which is commercial. If Ethiopia is unable to make payments on the
commercial debt-a better-than-even chance given the country's current financial
situation-a loss of banker confidence is likely. Although debt from private
sources, according to our estimates, is less than 10 percent of Ethiopia's total
indebtedness, such an outcome would add to Ethiopia's spiraling hard currency
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