(SANITIZED)THE KAMA TRUCK PROJECT: PLANS, PROGRESS, AND US PARTICIPATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001700010080-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: IM

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Confidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Kama Truck Project: Plans, Progress, And US Participation
13
AGENCY
Confidential
ER IM 71-128
July 1971
Copy No. F) 9
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WARNING
"Phis document contains information affecting the national
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18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized parson is prohibited by law.
oROUP l
I XCLUDII) !'1101.1 AUTOMATIC
DOWNONADINII AN1)
Uf.I:I,ANSIEICAall:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1971
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE KAMA TRUCK PROJECT:
PLANS, PROGRESS, AND US PARTICIPATION
Introduction
1. The persistent efforts of the USSR during the past two years
to enlist the help of Western truck building firms and, in particular, to
obtain some items of eagerly sought after US machinery and technology
for the Kaina truck project, appear to be paying off. Under the terms of
an interim agreement signed by Mack Trucks, Inc., and the USSR Ministry
of Foreign Trade, Mack has contracted, subject only to the issuance of
export licenses by the US government, to provide substantial engineering
services for Kama. The giant Kama truck plant, now under construction,
is the keystone of Soviet plans to modernize the Soviet transportation
system by moving more commercial freight between cities and over short
hauls by truck instead of rail. The heavy diesel trucks to be built at Kama
are designed to handle cargo weights up to 20 tons over primary and
secondary road systems.
2. The purpose of this memorandum is to discuss Soviet plans for
the production of trucks at Kama, Mack's projected role in the project,
the potential for US participation, and the Soviet need for trucks of the
type to be built at Kama.
Discussion
General
3. The Kama Truck Plant (officially designated the Kama Motor
Vehicle Plant, KamAZ), now being constructed at Naberezhnyye Chelny
Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic
Research.
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on the Kama River, an eastern tributary of the Volga, is the largest known
Soviet construction project of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). The plant
is designed to produce 150,000 heavy diesel trucks a year, a rate of output
that exceeds that of any single plant for large-size trucks in the West.
4. The layout of the plant includes separate buildings for the six
main production shops: (1) forging, (2) foundry, (3) stamping and pressing,
(4) engine, gear, and transmission, (5) assembly, and (6) tooling and repair.
Construction has been under way for about 18 months. Ground preparation
at the 36 square mile site began in late 1969 or early 1970, and construction
proceeded rapidly on road and rail facilities, support structures, and on
permanent housing for workers. Recent reports on the state of construction
indicate that some work is being done on at least half of these shops. The
tool and repair shop is furthest along; the foundry is under construction;
and the powerplant is being built.
5. The original Soviet plan called for completion of the plant and
maximum production by 1975. However, that plan has been set back,
principally because a worldwide search for technical and financial assistance
has been more protracted and difficult than anticipated. The plant probably
will not be completed before the end of 1976, and maximum output of
150,000 trucks a year cannot realistically be expected before the late 1970s.
6. Soviet officials estimate the total cost at 3 billion rubles, but
a large share of that amount is being spent on the construction of the
physical plant and support facilities probably including housing. Up to
one-third, perhaps a billion dollars (rubles) J may be spent in the West
for licenses, technology, and equipment. It is likely that at least $140 million
will be spent in the United States if licenses are obtained. That figure
represents technology and equipment at the highest level of the art that
is available only in the United States.
Search for Western Assistance
7. During the past two years the Soviets have contacted automotive
firms throughout the industrial West: Ford and Chrysler in the United
States, British Leyland in the United Kingdom, Daimler-Benz in West
Germany, Renault and Berliet in France, FIAT in Italy, Volvo of Sweden,
and Isuzu, Hino, and Toyota of Japan. By mid-1970, negotiations had
narrowed to Daimler-Benz and Renault. After numerous high-level
bargaining sessions, however, Daimler-Benz declined the role of major
engineering consultant, and eventually offered only to sell the licenses for
its truck engines. Negotiations foundered mainly on disagreement over price.
1. Assuming a 1:1 ruble-dollar ratio for the cost of automotive production
machinery manufactured in the United States and in the USSR.
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Renault now is the only West European firm carrying a major supporting
role for Kama. Under cooperative arrangements already in effect, Renault
is being counted on to supply production equipment and technology for
building truck cabs and to assist the USSR in purchasing machinery in
Western Europe. A purchasing commission of several hundred Soviets is
currently being established in Paris.
8. After the Daimler-Benz deal stalled, the Soviets wasted little time
in making their next move toward getting Western assistance. Soviet officials
took advantage of an invitation made earlier by SATRA Corporation (the
New York trading firm representing Mack Trucks, Inc. and other interested
US companies) to visit Mack and other firms in the United States who
want to sell truck technology and equipment. to the USSR for Kama and
other automotive plants. Within a few weeks the USSR put together a
high-level delegation of 14 officials, including a number of deputy ministers
and chiefs of main administrations and arranged for negotiations with the
US firms and for discussions with officials of the US government. The
mission of the delegation clearly was to make proposals attractive enough
to influence a change in US export policy. On 18 May 1971 a protocol
was executed between Mack Trucks, Inc., and representatives of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Trade which provides for extensive participation by
Mack in the Kama plant project.
Mack's Role
9. Mack Trucks, Inc., is prepared to assume substantial engineering
and management responsibilities for the design and equipment of the Kama
plant. According to the protocol, Mack will be the primary, perhaps sole,
procurement agency for all equipment purchased in the United States, will
supervise the on-site installation in the USSR of US-origin equipment, and
will act as principal consultant for engineering services. Services will include
designing the equipment layouts and specifying the machinery for three
of the six major facilities at Kama: the forge, the engine plant, and the
assembly facility. Mack will also purchase equipment for the foundry. The
foundry design will be supplied by the US firm Swindell-Dressler. In
addition, Mack will design a data processing system for production
management (using Soviet computers) and will supply shop layout and
production equipment for major engine-related parts: crankshafts,
camshafts, and timing gears, as well as rear axles. Virtually all of these
plans are subject to Mack obtaining the necessary export licenses.
10. Although Mack will specify equipment for major portions of the
Kama plant, and can recommend suppliers, the Soviets have kept their
options open and retain the right to buy or not buy in the United States
the equipment which Mack recommends. Hence, Mack's important role in
the Kama project will not necessarily generate a large number of follow-on
orders for other US firms.
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Potential US Sales
11. Much of the technology and equipment for the production of
trucks at the Kama plant will come from Western Europe and the United
States. The USSR will provide most of the equipment for only one of
the production facilities, the tooling and repair shop. For the most part,
only standard, non-specialized machine tools are required for that facility.
12. Although a large share of the major items of machinery and
equipment for Kama probably will be purchased outside the USSR, it is
not known what the total dollar value of such purchases will be. The SATRA
Corporation has estimated potential US sales, including fees for management
and technical services, at $750 million. No specific licensing applications
have yet been submitted, however, and the figure of $750 million bears
no necessary relationship to the eventual total of those applications. Some
of the orders for equipment probably will be filled by US subsidiaries and
licensees in Western Europe.
13. If export licenses are granted, the USSR almost certainly will
purchase a substantial volume of US-manufactured plant equipment. The
Soviets are particularly anxious to procure certain items of American
foundry equipment and specialized machine tools for automotive production
which represent the latest technology and are available only in the United
States. The following expenditures in the United States, totaling about $140
million, appear certain: management fees (Mack), $50 million plus;
technical fees for the layout of the foundry (Swindell-Dressler), about $15
million; equipment for the foundry, $20 million plus; machine tools for
crankshafts, camshafts, and timing gears, possibly $40 million; and
gearcutting machine tools (Gleason), $15 million plus. Payment for these
purchases will be in cash. The project has not yet been developed in detail,
and it is likely that expenditures in the United States could be greater,
perhaps as high as $200 million.
14. In addition to purchases of equipment and technology directly
related to the Kama project, the Soviets have stated a willingness to buy
some heavy trucks and production machinery for consumer goods as an
added inducement to the United States to grant approval of export licenses
for Kama. The Soviets are prepared to buy 50 large (75 and 100 ton)
off highway trucks for mining purposes valued at $11 million, in exchange
for an equivalent amount of nickel. They may wish to order an additional
50 trucks of the same type valued at $11 million, possibly with payment
in dollars. The Soviets have made no written commitment for either
purchase. The protocol signed by Mack and the USSR stipulates only that
"the parties agree to consider the possibility of supplying by Mack Trucks,
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Inc., to the USSR of fifty trucks in exchange for electrolytic nickel." Such
purchases would not be unreasonable since the Soviets are only in the early
stages of developing large (over 50-ton load capacity) off-highway quarry
and alining trucks.
15. According to
Deputy Ministry of Foreign Trade N.D. Komarov
the Soviets are prepared to spend
up to $1 billion on US machinery for the production of consumer goods.
No time period for such purchases has been specified, however. There is
no denying the Soviet need for modern machinery for consumer goods,
and the importing of such machinery would be more consistent with Soviet
policy than would be the importing of consumer commodities. The
statement greatly exaggerates, however, the amount of foreign exchange
the Soviets are willing to devote to consumer goods industries.
The Kama Trucks
16. The Kama plant will build 3-axle (6 x 4) 21 trucks, in three basic
variants and at the following rates when maximum output levels are reached:
(1) a truck with a standard body (stake and platform) which also can pull
a trailer, combined carrying capacity of 16 tons - 30,000 units a year and
its variant with all extended chassis, 25,000 units a year; (2) a truck tractor
for pulling a semitrailer carrying up to 20 tons - 55,000 units a year; (3)
a dump truck with a carrying capacity of 7 tons - 40,000 units a tear
(see Figure 1).
17. The Kama trucks reportedly will use diesel engines of Soviet
design rated at 160, 2i 0, and 260 horsepower. Probably the fourstroke
cycle, direct injection engines developed by the Yaroslavl Engine Plant and
now in use in the trucks produced in Kremenchug will be used. Reportedly,
the engine performs well, but it has substantial defects, including excessive
weight, excessive tolerances between moving parts, inferior metallurgy, and
high fuel consumption. These problems can be alleviated with the assistance
of experienced Western engine specialists.
18. Mack Trucks, Inc., is probably as well qualified as any US
manufacturer to assist the Soviets in improving their engines. The Mack
Thermodyne engine employs a similar combustion system, similar piston
and connecting rod design, and generally similar layout of crankcase block
and head. Modern US foundry practice will reduce the engine's weight,
?. The first figure states the number of wheels and the second figure
states the number of wheels that will be powered.
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planned annual
rote of output
(units)
Truck tractor,
basic chassis
I Stake and
Platform (S&P)
$ & P. extended
wheelbase
Truck tractor
with semitrailer
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and modern US machine tools can improve the tolerances and surface finish
of the moving parts.
19. Planned production at the Kama plant is about 250,000 engines
a year. Many of these engines will go into trucks manufactured at other
automotive plants in the USSR. Moreover, Soviet negotiators are currently
dickering with the West German firm of Kloeckner Humboldt-Deutz (KHD)
for technology to produce air-cooled diesel engines at the rate of 50,000
a year, and sonic of these may be intended for Kama trucks.
Economic Need for the Kama Trucks
20. The trucks to be produced at Kama will be suitable for several
important economic applications: the truck tractors with semitrailers are
needed to relieve Soviet railroads from the burden of short-distance,
intercity freight hauling; the stake and platform model will be suitable for
hauling general cargo, including grain and other agricultural crops; and the
dump model is urgently required for transporting heavy construction
materials such as earth and gravel.
21. The USSR has a pressing requirement for trucks with larger
carrying capacity than those now standard in the common carrier park.
At present, there are about 5 million trucks in the inventory, but relatively
few of these are 3-axle heavy cargo trucks of the type to be built at Kama.
': he average load carrying capacity of the Soviet common carrier truck fleet
is now about 4 tons, and most of the 500,000 to 600,000 trucks being
built each year are in this range (see the table and Figure 2). In order
to reduce highway transport costs and to reduce the requirement for hiring
and training drivers, the USSR must raise the average carrying capacity of
its trucks.
22. Moreover, the 3-axle trucks that are now being produced in the
USSR do not meet the requirements of the existing road system. The Soviet
motor vehicle industry now produces 3-axle (6 x 4) trucks at Kremenchug,
the KrAZ-258, which have about the same cargo capacity as those designed
for the Kama plant. However, the Kremenchug 6 x 4 trucks are adaptations
of heavy duty all-wheel-drive trucks initially designed as tactical military
vehicles. The rugged construction necessary in a tactical vehicle results in
a very heavy chassis and a reduced payload/empty weight ratio. The axle
load imposed on' the road by the KrAZ-258 is nearly 10 tons per axle.
In effect, this means that KrAZ trucks cannot be used on most of the
Soviet highway system. Only 75,000 kilometers of roadway in the USSR,
out of a total of about 1.4 million kilometers, can support 10-ton axle
loads. The rest of the highway system, because of weak surfaces and low
capacity bridges, limits axle loads to about 6 tons. The trucks to be
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Soviet Production of Trucks
Year
Thousand
Year
Thousand
1960
362
1966
408
1961
382
1967
.. 437
1962
382
1968
478
1963
382
1969
504
1964
385
1970
525
1965
380
1975 Plan
790
Figure 2
Soviet Production of Trucks by Class Size, 1969
Thousand units
Light
(loss than 1)
Medium
(2.5.5)
Medium- Heavy
Heavy
(7.5.8.5) (12-14)
Cargo tonnage
Off Highway
(27)
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produced at Kama, on the other hand, because of their excellent
payload/empty weight ratio, will be able to carry large payloads over the
entire highway system.
Strategic Significance of Kama Trucks
23. The military forces of the USSR hold about 4% of current truck
inventory. Because of the general shortage of all-wheel-drive trucks, the
military motor pools contain many general-purpose and conventional-drive
vehicles. During periods of military mobilization, such as occurred during
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, some vehicles of civilian motor
vehicle parks are diverted to military uses.
24. Some of the Kama trucks could also end up in military motor
pools. They could effectively transport heavy cargo between military
commands headquartered in Soviet cities or between the USSR and Soviet
forces in Eastern Europe. Alternatively, and more probably, the applications
of Kama trucks to civilian industrial and agricultural uses will release more
of the output of the other truck plants for the production of trucks with
military characteristics.
25. In any case, the 3-axle trucks that the USSR plans to produce
at the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant are not tactical military vehicles. Although
some of them may eventually be fitted with front wheel drive, giving them
a 6 x 6 wheel formula for better traction in muddy or icy environments,
most will be of the 6 x 4 wheel formula which is standard for 3-axle
commercial trucks. Moreover, it does not seem likely that these trucks will
be equipped for deepfording or for control of tire pressure by the driver,
both characteristics of the ZIL-131 trucks that are produced at the Moscow
Likhachev Plant (ZIL) and for which licenses to export production
equipment recently have been issued. 31
Summary
26. The Kama plant, the largest single industrial construction project
of the present Five-Year Plan (1971-75) will build 3-axle heavy diesel trucks
in the 7- to 20-ton range. These trucks are not designed as tactical military
vehicles. They could, however, be used for moving general cargo or military
support equipment to military bases in the USSR or Eastern Europe.
3. In May the United States approved $88 million of orders outstanding
for machinery to other Soviet truck building plants, including ZIL.
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27. During the past two years, the USSR approached several US, West
European, and Japanese firms for help in designing and equipping the Kama
plant. None was willing to assume a major supervisory role in plant
engineering. In May the USSR sent a high-level trade delegation to the
United States in a final bid to gain US assistance and technology. The Soviets
hope their proposal is attractive enough to bring about a change in US
export policy. Under a protocol signed by the USSR and Mack Trucks,
Inc., on 18 May 1971, Mack agreed, subject to the issuance of export
licenses, to act as procurement agent for equipment purchased in the United
States, to supervise the installation of such equipment at Kama, and to
be a principal consultant for engineering services.
28. If US export licenses are granted, the USSR will receive substantial
technological assistance from US firms for the Kama truck plant.
Expenditures in the United States are likely to be at least $140 million
and could reach $200 million. There could be additional sales by US
subsidiaries and licensees abroad. In addition to equipment intended for
Kama, the USSR has also offered to buy 50 off-highway trucks from Mack
in exchange for nickel and have surfaced the possibility of purchasing
machinery in the United States for manufacturing consumer goods. No firm
commitments on these offers have as yet been made.
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