STATEMENT OF CHARLES BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE UNITED STATES SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00389R000200210012-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 1, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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For Release
on Delivery
Expected at
2:00 p.m. EST
Tuesday
March 1, 1988
Establishment of an
Inspector General at the Central
Intelligence Agency
Statement of
Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
Before the
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
GAO/T-AFMD-88-6
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to
discuss section 4 of Senate bill 1818 which would establish an
Office of Inspector General at the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). Specifically, we would like to (1) comment on the
effectiveness of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended,
in uncovering abuses and improving agency operations, (2) discuss
the ability of statutory inspectors general (IGs) to protect
classified information, and (3) provide our views on the value of
a statutory inspector general for the CIA.
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
?We believe the Inspector General Act of 1978 has played a
significant role in strengthening federal internal audit and
investigative activities and improving the operations of the
federal government. Under the IG act of 1978 and other
legislation, statutory inspectors general have been established
in 19 departments and agencies. The creation of these statutory
IGs has been a bipartisan effort that has improved the
effectiveness of the federal government.
The establishment of statutory IGs was designed to combat
fraud, waste, and abuse and to correct numerous organizational
and procedural deficiencies in the federal audit and
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investigative community. These deficiencies included
-- the lack of effective central leadership among multiple
audit and investigative units operating within an agency,
the lack of independence due to auditors and
investigators reporting to officials who were responsible
for the functions under review and investigators being
restricted from looking into certain areas of suspected
irregularities,
-- audit recommendations frequently being ignored by agency
officials,
-- audit and investigative units being severely limited due
to inadequate resources, and
-- the lack of procedures to ensure that the agency head and
the Congress were informed of serious problems discovered
in the agency.
GAO strongly supported the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
other legislation that created the statutory inspectors general.
We supported such legislation because it would correct many of
the deficiencies in the audit and investigative communities and
would help ensure that high-level attention is given to promoting
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accountability, adequate internal controls, economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness in federal programs and operations. We also
believed such legislation would help ensure that the Congress and
agency heads would receive independent assessments of federal
programs and operations for which they are accountable or have
oversight responsibility.
GAO reviews of IG activities over the past several years
indicate that the establishment of statutory IGs has been a key
factor in strengthening federal internal audit and investigative
activities and improving operations within the federal
government. The statutory IGs and the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency, whose membership includes the statutory
IGs, have reported to the Congress that they have had substantial
success in helping bring about improvements in the federal
government.
The IGs have been responsible for uncovering fraud, waste,
and abuse in their agencies, and their efforts have resulted in
savings involving billions of dollars. The President's Council
on Integrity and Efficiency has calculated aggregate statistics
for data reported by the IGs for fiscal years 1982 through 1986.
These statistics show that during that period:
-- successful prosecutions of wrongdoers increased from
2,099 cases to 4,094;
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-- investigative recoveries rose from $45.3 million to
$191.8 million;
sanctions against contractors or offices doing business
with the federal government increased from 502 sanctions
to 2,047; and
annual savings resulting from recoveries and restitutions
arising from IG findings and avoidance of incurring
unnecessary expenditures rose from $11.5 billion to
$20 billion.
INSPECTOR GENERAL ABILITY TO
PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
The questions of whether IGs should be involved in areas
dealing with classified or other types of sensitive information
and whether they have the abilities to do so are not new. These
issues were addressed when the Congress passed legislation
establishing IGs at the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State
and when the Senate passed S. 908, the Inspector General Act
Amendments of 1987, which, among other things, would establish
IGs at the Department of the Treasury and at the Internal Revenue
Service.
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Our work with the IGs has not disclosed, nor are we aware
of, any instances where there has been a weakening in security or
confidentiality in agencies that have statutory IGs. This
includes those agencies, such as the Departments of Defense and
State, where security is a paramount consideration. We are not
aware of any reason why a CIA IG could not safeguard information
regarding national security matters.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs also studied
this issue when it was considering the Inspector General Act
Amendments of 1987. In its August 7, 1987, report on this bill,
the Committee determined that "there is no reason to believe an
IG is less trustworthy than other agency officials in handling
sensitive information."
Senate bill 1818 provides the Director of the CIA a
mechanism to prohibit its IG from looking into matters when such
reviews would pose a threat to national security. Specifically,
section 4(a)(3) allows the Director of the CIA to prohibit the IG
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation, or from issuing any subpoena dealing with ongoing
operations if the Director determines that such a prohibition is
necessary to protect national security. However, if the Director
exercises this power, he must submit the reasons for doing so
within 7 days to this Committee and to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. This
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provision is similar to.a special provision in section 8 of the
IG act which allows the Secretary of Defense to prohibit certain
IG audits and investigations to preserve national security
interests. The act also requires the DOD IG to report any such
action to the appropriate congressional committees, and the
Secretary must submit a statement of the reason to the same
committees. The DOD IG advised us that this provision has never
been used.
Similar to the DOD provision in section 8 of the IG act,
S. 908, the Inspectors General Amendments of 1987, authorizes the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to prohibit IG audits and investigations which require
access to certain sensitive information, when necessary to
preserve the confidentiality of such information. Again, as with
the DOD provision, the prohibition of an IG audit or
investigation would be reported to appropriate congressional
committees. This bill passed the Senate on February 2, 1988, and
is being referred to the House for action.
VALUE OF A STATUTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL AT THE CIA
We have supported the creation of all the existing IGs and
have testified that IGs should be created in the Departments of
Justice and Treasury. We have not reviewed the nonstatutory IG
function at the CIA. However, we believe that a statutory IG
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would be as appropriate and effective for the CIA as it has been
for the other agencies with existing statutory IGs.
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I would like to address some technical considerations
regarding this issue. GAO has consistently supported creating
new IGs by amending the IG act of 1978, because) the act contains
uniform requirements regarding such things as the qualifications
and responsibilities of IGs and the auditing standards they are
to follow. We believe that using the 1978 act as an umbrella
when new IGs are created, and modifying it as necessary for
special considerations, as was done in creating the DOD IG,
ensures consistency in the organization and operation of the
various IG offices.
If the Committee does not wish to include a CIA IG under the
1978 act, we suggest that' the Committee consider the written
comments on section 4 that we provided on December 7, 1987.
These comments included a comparison of the provisions of section
4 with those of the Inspector General Act of 1978. The
comparison identified a number of differences for the Committee's
consideration in drafting the final legislation. We understand
the Committee is considering making some changes to the bill
based on our comments. These include specifying the
qualifications of the CIA IG, giving the IG access to records,
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and ensuring that the IG has direct access to the head of the
agency. We believe that these changes will help strengthen
section 4 of this bill. Our staff is available to discuss these
technical matters.
This concludes my .statement. We would be pleased to respond
to any questions you may have.
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Testimony by
Sherman M. Funk
Inspector General, Department of State
before the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
March 1, 1988
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
It is a great pleasure for me to testify before your
Committee on S.1818, the National Security Reform Act of 1987.
As the Committee has requested, my testimony will focus
on how the statutory IG is working at the State Department and
our ability to inspect intelligence programs and activities. I
hope that this experience will assist the Committee in its
deliberations on S.1818.
This is my first opportunity to appear before this
Committee since the creation of the new Office of Inspector
General. As you know, my office was created pursuant to
P.L. 99-399 of August 17, 1986, and was formally established on
August 27, 1986. I was sworn in as the first statutory
Inspector General on August 14, 1987. Previously, I had served
for six years as IG of the Department of Commerce.
As Inspector General, I operate with complete independence,
reporting only to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. I have
total access to Department personnel and records. In order to
ensure that my office is fully informed of all management
issues, I sit as an ex officio member of the Department's
Management Council and the Internal Controls Steering Committee
which oversees the Department's compliance with the Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act.
The Arms Control and Disarmament Amendments Act of 1987,
signed by the President on December 24, 1987 gave me a second
hat as the Inspector General of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. The Act also directed me to conduct a
survey of physical, personnel, document and communication
security programs and practices in ACDA not later than 90 days
after enactment. We currently have an audit team working on
this project, and I will report the results to Congress.
The new Office of Inspector General has a heavy burden of
work, covering 334 foreign posts and all domestic offices of
the Department of State and ACDA. One of my main jobs, in the
six months since I assumed my new responsibilities, has been to
recruit a highly-qualified staff to carry out our broad
mandate. The office has a total of 236 authorized positions,
of which 211 are either on board or selected and awaiting
security clearances. Although far short of our authorized
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ceiling, we we are carrying out a vigorous and far-ranging program
of inspections, audits and investigations. Earlier, the
inspection function in State was carried out by the Office of
Policy and Program Review, pursuant to Section 209 of the
Foreign Service Act of 1980. To avoid costly and unnecessary
duplication, the Secretary merged that office into mine last
summer.?
In this fiscal year, we have already inspected the large
U.S. missions in the Philippines, Japan, West Germany, Spain,
Portugal and El Salvador. We are currently inspecting 18 posts
in Western and Southern Africa, the Caribbean, and Switzerland
as well as the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the
Office of Foreign Missions. We are also carrying out a special
review of the crisis management capabilities of the
Department. Our audit office is actively reviewing a range of
functional problems in the areas of security, overseas
construction, financial management and consular fraud. Our
Office of Investigations had a case load of 182 cases as of
January 31, 1988. I have brought copies of our semiannual
reports for the periods October 1, 1986 to March 31, 1987 and
April 1, 1987 to September 30, 1987. These reports provide
detailed information on the activities of the office and on the
most important findings and recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, you have expressed an interest in how my
office reviews intelligence programs and activities. In the
course of each overseas inspection, the senior inspector, who
is usually a former Ambassador, is tasked with personally
assessing relations between the Chief of Mission and
intelligence components of the Embassy. On his return, the
senior inspector reports to me on these relationships and on
any problems which he has observed. In addition, he reviews
intelligence activities to determine, within the constraints of
time and access, whether there are any apparent violations of
law involved in intelligence programs in the country being
inspected. On a quarterly basis, I report to the Chairman of
the President's Intelligence Oversight Review Board on these
2nd other relevant findings which arise from our work. In
addition, once each year a senior inspector reviews in depth
all covert programs known to the Department. This review is
carried out pursuant to Executive Order 12334 of December 4,
1981, which charges Inspectors General and General Counsels of
the Intelligence Community to report to the President's
Intelligence Oversight Board concerning intelligence activities
that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to
Executive Order or Presidential directive. Our review involves
a detailed reading of INR's files and interviews with senior
officers in INR, the Geographic Bureaus and the Office of the
Legal Advisor. Each and every covert program for which there
is a presidential finding is reviewed.
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Beyond these regular reports, my office inspects the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research as part of our regular inspections
of Department bureaus. Coincidentally, an inspection of INR is
now under way, personally led by Deputy Inspector General
Anthony Quainton. Ambassador Quainton is with me today to
answer any specific questions you may have about that
inspection.
I should, however, like to comment in general terms on the
INR inspection. A total of six Foreign Service and Civil
Service inspectors are working with Ambassador Quainton. The
inspection began in January and, by the time we complete the
job on April first, they will have interviewed all of INR's 370
employees. They are reviewing INR's analytical product,
assessing the management of INR's human and financial resources
and examining INR's effectiveness as a coordinator of
intelligence programs overseas. Having obtained all the
appropriate clearances, the inspectors are looking at INR's
work to judge the extent to which it is producing timely,
policy-relevant analysis and is carrying out its coordination
responsibilities to ensure that foreign intelligence activities
are consistent with law and U.S. Foreign Policy objectives.
The INR inspection team will also be looking at the question of
the security of classified information in INR and will be
making appropriate recommendations to management in this
regard. I would be happy to provide to the Committee a copy of
the final classified inspection report.
I should note that as we gather information through our
Offices of Audits, Inspections, and Investigations, we also
preserve the security of the information we gather. This comes
easy to us, because OIG staffs are accustomed to working daily
with very sensitive (but usually unclassified) material. Our
people are professional clams. At State, where we handle a
huge volume of classified material, we release our classified
reports only to those with appropriate clearances -- including
Capitol Hill. We are particularly careful to maintain controls
in all matters relating to special category and other sensitive
intelligence.
With regard to the broader question of security, I have
directed the Security and Intelligence Division of the Office
of Audits to give particular attention to questions of
documentary and physical security. It will be looking
especially at the programs of the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, beginning with the security and counterintelligence
training of its special agents. As in the case of ACDA, we
shall be examining all aspects of the Department's security
program.
An area of great concern to me and to the Secretary has
been security at our Embassy in Moscow. Last October,
accompanied by the Assistant Inspectors General for Audit and
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for Investigation and a senior inspector, I reviewed the very
complex security and logistical problems faced by our Mission
in the Soviet Union in Finland. On our return, I discussed our
findings with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Department
bureau heads, and with senior officials of the intelligence
agencies. My formal report to the Secretary makes specific
recommendations for enhancing security and
counterintelligence. These recommendations are currently
under review at the highest levels of the Department.
In short, Mr. Chairman, security is a very high priority
for my office. As we review the management and implementation
of U.S. foreign policy, we will be acutely aware of security
and counter intelligence and of the necessity that our
Government's covert programs abroad be carried on in full
compliance with law and applicable presidential findings.
This, I know, is a concern of your Committee as evidenced by
S.1818 which we are discussing today.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
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MARCH 1. 1988
STATEMENT BY
HONORABLE JUNE GIBBS BROWN
INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
U. S. SENATE
MARCH 1, 1988
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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be
here today to testify regarding Inspector General, Department of
Defense (1G, DoD) coverage of classified programs.
In your letter of invitation, you asked that I discuss our operational
abilities and constraints in addressing classified programs.
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
When the Inspector General Act of 1978 was amended in 1982 to
establish an Office of Inspector General (01G) for the Defense
Department, special consideration was given to classified programs and
operations. Unique provisions were enacted with respect to DoD which
were intended to allow only the Secretary of Defense and no one else
to control IG access to the most sensitive classified programs. The
Secretary and the IG must provide the Congress with information
concerning any instance where the Secretary acted to restrict IG access
to classified information. A copy of this portion of the IG Act is
appended to my statement.
We have found these provisions serve our needs. They provide good
mechanisms for our access determinations to be made at the highest
levels of the Department. The requirement for immediate
Congressional notification when the Secretary denies access to us
precludes unnecessary limitations by the Department. To date, we have
never had to advise the Congress that we were denied access. There
have been instances where there have been delays and problems, but
these have always been resolved without compromising our
independence and access and the Department's legitimate security
needs.
INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS
My office interfaces with classified programs in four ways. We audit
the programs; inspect organizations and functions involved in classified
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programs; perform oversight reviews of the Defense Contract Audit
Agency (DCAA) and the Military Service internal audit agencies, all of
which audit classified contracts; and conduct criminal investigations
relating to intelligence or special access programs.
Audits
For years, the IG, DoD has been involved in auditing classified
programs of the Department of Defense. The audit techniques used for
audits of these programs are the same as those used for other audits.
Such audits have included programs of the Military Departments and
the Defense agencies. Some of the agencies that are given continuous
audit coverage include the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Nuclear Agency, and the National Security Agency. In the Military
Departments, we audit such areas as tactical intelligence, intelligence
training and combat readiness. We also have audited defense
reconnaissance programs which interface with national programs of
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Our Audit Policy and Oversight Office reviews the DCAA Field
Detachment which was established to audit certain classified contracts.
The work and responsibilities of the Detachment are the same as that of
the rest of DCAA except that special security measures are used to
protect the classified data. Originally, the Detachment was established
to review certain compartmented contracts; however, during the past
-several years special access programs have been established for major
weapon systems, and audit cognizance was given to the Detachment
because of the security requirements. Our oversight reviews of DCAA
and the Field Detachment are the same. We review for compliance with
prescribed auditing standards, policies and procedures.
The internal audit agencies of the Military Departments also conduct
audits of special access and classified programs. DoD Directive 7600.2
provides that these auditors shall have full and unrestricted access to all
records, facilities and personnel for the accomplishment of the
announced objectives of their audits. Only the Secretary of the Military
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Department may deny access to his or her auditors and only for the
reasons under which the Secretary of Defense may deny access to the
Inspector General, DoD. This Directive further provides that the
Secretary of the Military Department will notify the Inspector General,
DoD, within 15 working days of any denial actions.
Further, in March 1986, the Deputy Inspector General, DoD, entered
into a memorandum of understanding with the Director, Joint Staff,
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on access by DoD auditors to sensitive
military plans and supporting documents. This MOU also applies to the
internal auditors of the Military Departments.
Inspections
Our inspectors inspect organizations and functions that may be
involved with classified and special access programs. Inspections are
closely coordinated with program management personnel, who control
program access, as well as with security personnel. Recent inspections
involved classified activities within the Defense Nuclear Agency, the
Defense Communications Agency and the Defense Mapping Agency.
Investigations
The investigative arm of my office, the Defense Criminal Investigative
Service, has conducted investigations regarding criminal activities, such
_as cost mischarging, false test certifications and conflict of interest, in
classified programs, as have the investigative organizations of the
Military Departments. For example, the Army Criminal Investigation
Command successfully completed a corruption related investigation in
the classified activities of an Army special operations program which
resulted in convictions before courts martial. The Naval Investigative
Service has also achieved results in their investigation into activities of a
special operations group, obtaining convictions in U.S. District Court
and courts martial for procuremendraud and corruption offenses.
Access has not been a serious problem for our investigators.
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Having established positions in the functional areas of the OIG to
handle the unique aspects of auditing, inspecting and investigating
matters related to classified programs, we have been able to perform
our responsibilities in a manner which I believe is satisfactory both to us
and to program officials. The OIG personnel working in this area bring
to their duties both the requisite functional expertise and an
appreciation of how their work must be conducted, documented and
safeguarded in the classified arena.
The constraints imposed by the IG Act are reasonable. The
Department has not sought to unnecessarily invoke the Act's denial
provisions. Indeed, it appears to me that the Department has taken a
view that only the most time-sensitive information would need to be
limited as, for example, if by chance we had sought information
relating to the Grenada invasion on the eve of that event.
In summary, I believe we are as able to address issues in classified
areas as we are in non-classified segments of the Department's
operations. The IG Act serves our needs for access and the constraints it
imposes have been reasonably interpreted by the Department.
You also requested that I comment on the impact of a statutory IG in
maintaining the security of classified information and on the
Department's ability to carry out its missions effectively.
INSPECTOR GENERAL IMPACT ON MISSION PERFORMANCE
Of course, people who do not want independent review of their
classified programs are prone to instinctively raise the spectre of
"security" as a reason to block OIG oversight or investigation. However,
in reality, our work in this area to date has presented no additional
security problems for the Department.
We are a part of the DoD, and as such, we are aware of the necessity
to protect classified information. We have auditors, investigators, and
inspectors with the appropriate security clearances. To preclude
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problems, we have a cadre of specially trained and indoctrinated
auditors for the most sensitive programs. We also created a special unit
within the Defense Criminal Investigative Service to monitor and assist
in our investigations of classified programs. To further improve our
ability to pursue criminal violations in special programs, we have
developed procedures with the Department of Justice wherein it has
agreed to designate the Defense Procurement Fraud Unit as the focal
point for all criminal investigative referrals involving classified
programs. Criminal Investigations Policy Memorandum Number 9,
entitled "Criminal Referrals Involving Fraud and General Crimes in
Classified or Sensitive Programs,"signed by the Deputy Inspector
General on July 29, 1986, provides guidance on these referrals to the
Military Departments. The memorandum specifies that such referrals
shall be made directly to those individuals in the Fraud Unit who have
the appropriate security clearances and eligibility for access. The
referrals shall also be made without prior coordination or referral to
local United States Attorneys. As you can see, we have made every
effort to ensure that the security of these programs is not compromised.
believe that our work involving classified programs has improved
the Department's mission performance. We bring to the classified
arena the same standards of integrity, efficiency and accountability that
we apply elsewhere in the Department. Our investigations, audits and
inspections provide senior officials with information they can use to
improve the execution of these programs and.our followup programs
ensure that due consideration is given to our findings and
recommendations.
Sometimes we have felt that it was unduly time consuming to obtain
access to classified program information, but we have always obtained
access to the information we required to complete our audits,
investigations and inspections. The IG Act provisions have provided us
with a good balance: we can obtain access to the information we need;
the Secretary can prevent us from this access when he determines the
national security is concerned, and the Congress has oversight to ensure
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1 7 TITLE 6?APPENDIX. I
closed with the kaowledge that It was false or with willful disregard for
Its truth or tabity.
LogietaiIvo 111blow. Pet lighlatIve CI Coda Coag sad ads seam. p.
binary sae wpm ef Pub L 211-4St. ear
I S. Additional provisions with respect to the iropector General of
the Department of Defense
(a) No member of the Armed Forces, active or reserve abaft be ap-
pointed inspector Ceeeral of the Department of Defense
(0)(1) Notwithstanding the last two seatences of section 3(a). the
inspector Central shall be under the authority. direction. and control of
the Secretary of Defense with respect to audits or Investigations. or the
bsuance of subpoenas. which require *teem to Information concerning?
. (A) sensitive operational plaza;
. (2) Intelligence matters;
. (C) tousteriateIligence matters;
- (D) ongoing trimisal Investigations by other samlatetrative units
of the Department of Defies* related to national security; or
(2) other matters the disclosure of which would Constitute a seri-
ous threat to eaUonal security.
(1) With respect to the information described la paragraph (1) the
Secretary of Defense may prohibit the Inspector General from initiating,
carryiag oat or eompletiag any audit or levestigatIon, or from Issuing
any subpoena, after the Inspector General has decided to leftist., carry
out or complete such audit or investigation or to issue such subpoena, if
the Secretary determloes that each prohibition Is necessary to preserve the
eational security Interests et the Vaiteed States.
(3) If the Secretary et Defense exercises any power seder paragraph
(1) or (I). the Inspector General shall submit a statement concerning
such exercise withis thirty days to the Committees on Armed Service,
and Goveramental Affairs of the Senate and the Committees on Armed
Services and Government Operations of the House of RepresentaUres and
to other appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress.
(4) The Secretary shall. lentil& thirty days after submiasion of a Ma
meat ender paragraph (3), transmit a statement of the reasons for the
exercise of power ander paragraph (1) or (I) to the Committees on Arm-
ed Services and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committees
on Armed Services and Government Operations elite House of Repro-
sentatives and to other appropriate committees or subcommittees.
(e) In addition to the other duties and responstbillUei specified fa this
Act, the inspector General of the Department of Defense shall?
. (1) be the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for mat-
ters relating to the preventioa and detectioa of fraud, waste, and
abuse in the programs sad operations of the Department; --
(3) Initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and investigations
ta the Department of Defense (Including the military departments)
?_as the laspector General considers appropriate:
(3) provide policy direction for audits and inestIgations relating
to fraud. waste, and abuse and program effectiveness:
(4) investigate fraud. waarte, and abuse uncovered as a result of
other contract and internal audits, as the Inspector General considers
appropriate;
(I) develop policy, monitor and evaluate program performanec.
and provide guidance with respect to all Department activities relat-
ing to criminal Investigation programs;
(8) monitor and evaluate the adherence of Department auditors
to interval audit. contract audit, and internal review prteciples, poll-
dee: and procedures;
17) develop policy, evaluate prorram performance, and monitor
actions taken by all components of the Department In response to
?
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?
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT $ $A
matted ovens. liters.) audits. later'sl review reports. sod evitta
-.Dcavetcol by the Comptreller Courtrai eof the Milted States:
? (1) precool assletasce as seeded from other audit. lespectlee. sad
laveettpattee salts of lb* Departmeet of Dates' (baud's, sellItom
departaieeta) end .
?
?
(I) give particelar regard to the activities of the tetereal audit.
lespectioe. sad tovestliative unite of the military departs:lest, with a
vie. toward &veldts( duplication sod homier effective toordloatios
and cooperatios.
.(4) Notwithsteadlog e?ctIoe 4(4). the lespector General of the De-
partment of Defeats shall expeditiously report suspected or studied viols-
Roam of chapter 41 stilt). 10. Dotted States Code (Uniform Cods of Mili-
tary Sestice). to the Secretary of lb. militsry departmest toncereed or
De Secretary of Defer's,.
. .
..(o) Toe the purposes of section .7. a member of the Armed Forces
shall be amend to be an employee of the Department of Defense.
...AIM) Rath seartannual report prepared by the Inspector General of
the Departmest of Defies' leader sectios 1(a) shall Include Inforteatios
macerate( the 'umbers and types of cootract andlts conducted by the De-
partment during the report's, period. Lath such report shall be trans-
mitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Committees on Armed Sorriest
sad Governmental Affairs of tile Senate aad the CocomIttees oa Armed
Services and Goverament Operations of the Rouse of Representatives sad
to other appropriate committees or subcommittees of the Congress. ..
:".(1) Any roport ikotrod to as traasmItted by the Secretary of Defense
Is the appropriate aoransittees sebeotomIttees of the Coagress seder
settles 1(4) shall also be transmItted. edible De seven-day period sped-
Bed Is sect settles to the Committees teo Armed Services and (lovers-
meats! Affairs of the Senate sad the Committees Si Armed Services sad
Government Operatic., of the Rouse of Representattves.
(11) The provisions St section 1311 of title 11. Vetted States Code.
shall sot apply to audits sad InvestIgatioes conducted by. under the
direction of. or at the request of -tbe lespector General of the Departareat
of Defense to carry out the purposes of tate Act
Lesioativ. ietatave. Per below.. urn 0.1.Ceds C?se sad ASe. News. o
bloat-, sad purpose et reb.L SS-431, owe 3r11.
111 SA. Special provisions relating to tile Agency for International be.
Woloproent
(a) In addItion Ii tbe other duties and responsibilities specified la Ms
Act the inspector General of the Avery for latorreatIonal Development?
(1) shall superylse. direct. sad metro! all security activittes re-
lating to the programs Ind operations a that Agency. subject to
the superrialos Of the Adtsiolstrator of that Agency; and
(2) to the is teat requested by the Director of lb. United States
Interoatiooal Development Cooperation Agency (after consultation
with the Administrator of the Ageocy for loternatioca) Develo;
meat). shall supervise, direct, sod cootrol all audit, Investigative, acd
security activities relation to programs sod operatic.. within the
palled States loternatiocal De%elopcneot Cooperation Agent).
(hi Is addition to the Ass...tact lospector Cetera!s protided for In
secUon 3(1) of this Act, the Inspector General of the Agency for later-
satiate! Developmect *ball. lo accordance with applicable laws and rtfU?
knots goverolog nit civil service, appolot at Assistant Inspector General
?tor Security who stall have the responsibility for supervising the perform,
amt. of security activities reiatieg to programs aid operatioos of the
a
?tibe7 for Isteroatiocal Developmeit.
(t) The settlanousl reports required to be submitted to the Admit-
?510 of the Agency for Interoatiooal Detelopmeot pursuant to section
53
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that the national security is not used as an excuse to cover up
mismanagement or illegal activity.
Finally, you asked for a description of the relationship between my
office and the rest of the Department.
INSPECTOR GENERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DOD
I have direct access to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
as well as to all officials subordinate to them, both at the Defense level
and in the Military Departments and Defense agencies. The budget for
the OIG is included as part of the appropriation for Operations and
Maintenance, Defense Agencies.
As I stated earlier, I believe that the OIG is part of the Department
and that I work for the Secretary. But my obligation to him, and to the
President, is to independently evaluate the programs and operations of
the Department, to promote economy and efficiency, and to prevent
and detect fraud, waste and mismanagement. Both Secretary
Weinberger and Secretary Carlucci recognize the unique role that the
IG performs and have provided the operational and personal support
needed to make my office truly effective within the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
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