PAKISTAN REPORTED NEAR ATOM ARMS PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100090019-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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W. , pa (v
Pakistan Reported Near
Atom Arms Production
Acquisition of Weapon Could Halt U.S. Aid
By Bob Woodward
Wa.Yiaytoe Poet SW writ' r
President Reagan certified to
Congress last week that Pakistan
currently "does not possess a nu-
clear explosive device," although
according to intelligence reports
considered reliable inside the ad-
ministration, the country has re-
cently made dramatic progress to-
ward production of a nuclear weap-
on.
Presidential certification is ' re-.
quired by Congress as a condition of
continued U.S. aid to Pakistan,
which receives approximately $600
million a year in military and eco-
nomic assistance. Pakistan has co-
operated with clandestine U.S. aid
to Afghan guerrillas fighting the
Soviet occupation of their country,
and has provided facilities for U.S.
intelligence-gathering near the So-
viet Union.
According to a classified Defense
Intelligence Agency report, Pakis-
tan detonated a high explosive de-
vice between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21
as part of its continuing efforts to
build an implosion-type nuclear
weapon, sources said.
It was * Pakistan's second such
test this year, according to the
sources, who said the Pakistanis
have been conducting the tests for
years in trying to perfect a nuclear
weapons triggering package.
Intelligence reports also show
that Pakistan has enriched uranium
to 93.5 percent at its atomic plant
at 'Kahuta, according to authorita-
tive sources. A 90-percent level is
normally needed to make a bomb.
President Reagan in.late 1984 told
Pakistani President Mohammed Zia
ul-Haq in a .top-secret letter that 5
percent would be the highest en-
richment level acceptable to the
United States.
In July, the White House warnt?d
Pakistan has repeatedly denied
that it is developing nuclear weap-
ons. But a Special National Intelli-
gence Estimate * (SNIE) completed
earlier this year by U.S. intelligence
agencies cited numerous activities
totally inconsistent with those as-
surances, according to sources. The
SNIE concluded that Pakistan
would have a small nuclear weapon
at a future, unspecified date.
Charles E. Redman, the State
Department spokesman, said yes-
terday that Reagan signed the
Pakistani certification Oct. 27. He
added, however, that the Reagan
administration still has "serious con-
cerns" about the future and said the
current certification should "not be
interpreted as implying any U.S.
approval of the Pakistani nuclear
program."
He declined to comment on any
intelligence reports.
There is disagreement among
intelligence and nuclear nonprolif-
eration experts about the exact sta-
tus of the Pakistani program. One
senior Reagan administration offi-
cial confirmed that the program is
advancing aggressively, but said
that a new, multibillion-dollar U.S.
assistance proposal would provide
leverage to deter actual construc-
tion of a bomb.
Another official said Pakistan
could assemble a bomb within two
weeks. Another well-informed
source said it could be done in a
shorter time and, in practical terms,
Pakistan is only "two screwdriver
turns" from having a fully assem-
bled bomb.
Pakistani Prime Minister %1,,.
hammed Khan Junejo during tua
visit here that acquiring a nuclear
weapon would result in the end of
U.S. comic and military assist-
ance... I --I
Despite this evidence, sources
said, keeping Pakistan from obtain-
ing a bomb is a low priority on the
list of administration foreign policy
goals. Said one senior official direct-
ly involved in monitoring the pro-
gram, "This administration wouldn't
come down on Pakistan if we found
a bomb in Zia's basement"
The reason, the sources said, is
Pakistan's willingness to help the
administration by acting as the
pipeline for the hundreds of millions
of dollars in CIA covert assistance
that is provided the Afghanistan
rebels-a top priority for Reagan
and his administration. At the time
of Junejo's visit last summer to
Washington, Reagan said that Pak-
istan was a "front line" against "the
brutal Soviet occupation of Afghan-
istan."
Pakistan also cooperates with
U.S. intelligence agencies in high-
priority electronic intelligence gath-
ering near the Soviet Union and in
Southeast Asia, the sources said.
On June 21 the Soviets issued a
strongly worded, unusual warning
to Zia charging that Pakistan had
achieved the capability to build nu-
clear weapons, which Moscow said
it would not tolerate, according to
sources.
Within two days, the Reagan ad-
ministration replied with its own
protest, in effect telling Moscow to
keep "hands off" Pakistan. This in
effect made the administration a
protector of the Pakistani program,
and two sources said that the Pakis-
tanis may have interpreted the ad-
minstration's remarks as approval.
A senior administration official
disputed this interpretation, how-
ever, saying the White House made
clear last summer to Junejo that a
single bomb would result in termi-
nation of all U.S. aid.
The intelligence report that ura-
nium has been enriched at levels in
excess of 90 percent has alarmed
nuclear weapons experts most.
Leonard S. Spector, a nuclear pro-
liferation expert at the Carnegie
Endowment for International
Peace, said yesterday that, if true,
"it would be the last important step
in the Pakistani program. It was the
one outstanding gap in their pro-
gram and could be a terrible set-
back to worldwide efforts to curtail
the spread of nuclear weapons."
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&CDA Aide
Faulted on
-1 0
Jecuri1
'A A-/
By Bob Woodward
Wu g,. es, swr writer
Administration officials
re seeking permanently to
ft the security clearances
I an employe of the U.S.
arms Control and Disarma-
tent Agency who allegedly
mishandled about 500 doc-
ments, including some of
to U.S. government's most
ensitive top-secret intel-
gence about Pakistan's ef-
>rts to build a nuclear
omb.
The employe, Kathleen
trang, improperly removed
'-e documents from a stor-
ge vault at the State De-
artment, repeatedly left
tam overnight in an open
ife accessible to dozens of
eople without security
earances and then ignored
!veral warnings from su-
ervisors over a period of
ionths, according to por-
ons of an internal investi-
itive report filed in a re-
ted suit in U.S. District
Duct here.
Strang said she had com-
iitted only a technical in-
action of regulations and
t harm had resulted, ac-
-rding to sources familiar
ith the case. .
U.S. - security officials
we no evidence that any-
-e saw or took any docu-
ents from Strang's safe.
it the internal investiga-
re file alleges that she
we portions of some sen-
tive documents to officials
the South Korean govern-
ent in September 1984,
~parently hoping to prove
at Pakistan was develop-
g a nuclear bomb and thus
u:ourage the South Ko-
ans from providing any
chnical assistance that
ght aid the Pakistanis.
rang said she gave only
classified material to the
uth Koreans, sources
id.
In July 1985, U.S. officials
See ACDA, A16, Col 3
U.S. Aide Faces Disciplining on Security
ACDA, From Al
removed Strang's safe from her
fourth-floor office at the State De-
partment and then spent months
conducting a damage assessment.
Inside the safe, sources said, the
officials found documents bearing
the code-words UMBRA and MO-
RAY-terms used for highly sen-
sitive communications intercepts
gathered by the National Security
Agency. They also found computer
floppy disks with other documents
stored on them. The investigative
file alleges that Strang used a sec-
retary without a proper security
clearance to transcribe classified
information onto the disks.
When Lt. Gen. William E. Odom,
director of the National Security
Agency, heard about the matter, he
sent a handwritten letter to
ACDA's director, Kenneth L. Adel-
man, calling what the investigators
found one of the worst security vi-
olations he had ever seen, accord-
ing to sources. Odom threatened to
cut off ACDA's access to sensitive
intelligence unless immediate and
severe steps were taken, the
sources said.
The case has caused particular
concern among U.S. intelligence
officials, who said someone with
accesstathe documents could draw
a full portrait of the methods and
techniques used by U.S. intelli-
gence agencies to monitor nuclear
tests and weapons developments in
other countries, including the So-
viet Union.
"Other than early warning intel-
ligence on a surprise attack, it's the
most vital function we perform,"
said a senior Reagan administration
intelligence official.
Disclosure of an allegedly serious
breach of internal security inside
the ACDA came after several high-
ly publicized efforts by the admpin-
istration to block leaks of classified
information, including a threat by
Odom and CIA Director William J.
Casey to prosecute news organiza-
tions that disclose secret "commu-
nications intelligence." Much of the
material in Strang's safe was based
on communications intercepts, ac-
cording to sources.
At the time Strang's safe was
seized, her security clearances
were suspended and she was placed
on leave, with pay, from her job in
charge of monitoring the Pakistani
nuclear program.
LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM
... threatened to end ACDA's access
An internal ACDA panel recom-
mended that her clearances be re-
voked permanently. She has ap-
pealed that decision to Adelman.
and he held a closed-door five-hour
hearing on her appeal yesterday but
made no final decision, sources said.
Strang also filed a lawsuit under the
Freedom of Information and Priva-
cy acts, seeking monetary damages
and demanding-deletions-from- her
personnel file; this lawsuit resulted
in the placement of portions of the
investigative file in court records.
Strang declined to comment on
the case.
ACDA security chief Berne In-
dahl, who conducted an internal in-
vestigation, said in a memorandum
that "all the material in her safe,
marked or unmarked, was consid-
ered by State's (intelligence divi-
sion) to be compromised. Classified
material was taken home, to meet-
ings and overseas. Classified ma-
terial was provided to foreign gov-
ernments without proper author-
ization." Indahl's memo is contained
in the court papers.
In response to questions, the
ACDA released a brief statement
confirming that a safe was "seques-
tered" on July 1, 1985, as part of a
security investigation of an un-
named employe.
Strict regulations govern the use
of classified material by federal of-
ficials, in part because intelligence
officials assume that hostile coun-
tries attempt to place agents in jan-
itorial, secretarial or other routine
jobs at certain federal agencies.
As the agency that is responsible
for all arms control issues, the
ACDA receives sensitive informa-
tion from all over the government:
policy papers from the White
House, intelligence reports from
NSA and the CIA, technical data on
nuclear technology from the De-
partment of Energy.
The most sensitive data is code-
worded and is supposed to be avail-
able only to those with a need to
know. At the State Department,
such code-word material is kept in a
sixth-floor vault where authorized
officials can read it, but not remove
One of Strang's coworkers, who
was not identified by name, was
quoted in the investigative file as
saying: "During mid-1984 to mid-
1985 she had almost total contempt
for routine security procedures. I
was usually the first one in the of-
fice in the mornings. Many times I
would find her safe not only un-
locked but wide open .... I asked
her about this situation. Her re-
sponse was to the effect that if I
wanted her safe locked I should do
it myself."
The investigative file also out-
lined the circumstances surround-
ing the South Korean incident. Carl-
ton B. Stoiber, a former ACDA of-
ficial, said that during a September
1984 arms control meeting in
Seoul, Strang "gave classified infor-
mation to the Korean government
that was not cleared. It was very
unsettling .... I was shocked and
upset at her conduct. I swore I
would never. send or have her on a
delegation again."
Another person at the same
meeting said, "I was amazed she
passed out the classified informa-
tion to the Koreans. I was wonder-
ing how much damage this may
have caused and whether or not I
should rudely take from the Ko-
reans the papers she had just
passed out."
Stoiber reported the incident by
cable to the State Department
when it occurred, one official
said.
According to sources. Strang and
her attorney have said that some of
her fellow workers have a personal
grudge against her and this ac-
counts, in part, for the allegations.
Staff researchers Ferman Patterson
and Barbara Feinman contributed
to this report.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 1986': A14
Summit Aftermath: The Futuristic Weapons
Experts Say soviet Has Conducted
Space Tests on Anti-Missile Weapons
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
Experts on Soviet technology said
yesterday that the Soviet Union had ap-
parently conducted weapon tests in
space of the type that would be re-
stricted by the 10-year ban on "Star
Wars" testing proposed by the Rus-
sians In Iceland.
The American experts said a laser
being developed as an antimissile
weapon has been fired from a research
station at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan
at a manned Soviet spacecraft, with
Soviet astronauts wearing special
gles to protect them from the beam.
The overall Soviet program, how?e-
vever, is seen as crude compared to the
American "Star Wars" program,
known officially as the Strategic De-
fense Initiative.
This relative backwardness. experts
say, is a primary reason why the Soviet
Union wants a ban on further testing
outside of laboratories. The Soviet
Union, although about even with the
United States in basic antimissile re-
search, lags badly behind America -n
advanced technologies needed to i u'
lasers, particle beams and other de
vices into effective weapons. The kev
deficiencies include less powerful com-
puters and a huge lag in the miniaturi-
zation of arms.
Pentagon View of Soviet Effort
This view is sharply at odds with that
of the Pentagon, which has maintained
that antimissile systems the Russians
zlready have in place represent a real
threat to the West.
The issue arose last weekend when
Soviet officials proposed at the Iceland
summit talks that all but laboratory re-
search, testing and development of an-
timissile systems be halted for 10
years.
Dr. Simon Kassel, a senior scientist
with the Rand Corporation who has
v. ritten serveral reports for the Penta-
gon on Soviet beam weaponry, said
yesterday that in Iceland, the Russians
were basically trying to buy time to
catch up with the West.
"It's one thing to do basic research,
and have a lot of different *concepts
going, and another to translate it into
weapons," he said in an interview. "In
that they face considerable difficul-
ites."
He continued: "Their technology
Lase is not as rich as ours. People don't
realize how bad it is. We tend to put
them in the same class with us. They're
not. The only reason we talk to them is
that they have nuclear weapons."
Changes in Strategic Doctrine
Dr. Kassel said the Russians were
frightened by the sweeping changes 'in
strategic doctrine that lie at the heart
of President Reagan's antimissile plan.
"What was suggested in Iceland is that
we shift the competition from building
nuclear weapons, which they have
mastered, to a competition in exotic
technolgies," he said. "They're playing
for time. So far, the technological lag
has been tolerable for them beause it
was confined to traditional techologies
that they have mastered."
He added that an example of a key
technology in which the Soviet Union
lags is computers, which are consid-
ered critical for a "Star Wars" system.
"Their situation in the computer field
is very bad," Dr. Kassel said.
In contrast to such views, the Penta-
gon says Russian antimissile work has
a very long history and is very aggres-
sive and threatening. "Soviet efforts in
most phases of strategic defense have
long been far more extensive than
those of the United States," according
tq "Soviet Strategic Defense Pro-
grams," a publication of the Defense
Department. It said the Soviet Union is
conducting advanced work in lasers,
particle beams and kinetic-energy
weapons.
At Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan, it
said, the Soviet Union has set up a large
ground-based laser that today can fire
at satellites and in the future could
"possibly" play a role in an antimissile
system. It also noted that Moscow has
the world's only operational antisatel-
lite weapon.
'Beyond Technical Research'
"Unlike the U.S.," it said, "the
U.S.S.R. had now progressed in some
cases beyond technical research. It al-
ready has ground-based lasers that
could be used to interfere with U.S.
satellites, and could have prototype
space-based antisatellite laser weap-
ons by the end of the decade." .
Some experts outside the Govern-
ment said the Soviet Union has already
apparently conducted weapon tests in
space.
. "In. 1982 Soviet cosmonauts were;
asked if they had on their goggles on as
they went over Sary Shagan," said
James E. Oberg, an expert on the
Soviet space program who is author of
"Red Star in Orbit." "The implication
is that their spacecraft was a target for
a ground-based laser."
Dr. Gerold Yonas, former chief
scientist of the Pentagon's Strategic
Defense Initiative program and now
vice president of Titan Corporation in
La Jolla, Calif., said that Moscow made
up for backwardness in some areas of
antimissile technology by sheer prag-
matism.
"They get their equipment out in the
field and learn by doing," he said. "In
some cases they are able to deploy de.
vices even before we do, even though
we had the technology first." An exam-
ple in the area of antimissile systems,
he said, was the Soviet rocket-intercep-
tor system that rings Moscow. "I don't
think you can over-emphasize the i-n-
portance of a warm production line in
terms of operational experience." he
said.
Dr. Roy D. Woodruff, a senior scien-
tist at the Lawrence Livermore Na.
tional Laboratory in California who has
studied Soviet antimissile work, said
the Russians had gone far beyond
' laboratory' testing, as defined in Ice-
land.
"Sary Shagan is an enormous fact.
tiv." Dr. Woodruff said. "You have to
ask questions about what they're doing
there. Before any agreement is signed,
they're going to have to be much more
open about this stuff. It's a closed soci.
ety. Even with all the classified infor-
mation, we still don't have a very good
idea of what's going on. We don't
known what the quality is. My guess is
that it 'isn't very good. But who
knows?"
Jeffrey T. Richelson, a aerospace ex-
pert at American University in Wash-
ington, D.C., said the Pentagon had a
tendency to make overly bold asser-
tions about Soviet antimissile ad-
vances. An example, he said, was the
repeated Pentagon assertion that
10,000 Soviet scientists are working on
antimissile weaponry. "Their esti-
mates are often more confident than
they should be" and sometimes based
on "dubious methodology," he said.
"Uncertain estimates are all too often
taken as literal truth"
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11,
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 26,1986
Iran Arms Profits Were
Diverted to Contras;
Poindexter Resigns,
NSC's North Is Fired
By David Hoffman
w-11:91- Ee.t wf
President Reagan yesterday announced
he resignation of national security adviser
Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter and the fir-
ng of a key deputy, Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North, following the disclosure of a clandes-
tine web of financial transactions in which
)rofds from the sale of American weapons
:o Iran were diverted to help rebels fighting
he Nicaraguan government.
A shaken and grim-faced Reagan. con-
'ronting the most serious crisis of his pres-
dency, told reporters "I was not fully in-
'ormed" about "one of the activities under-
aken" in the secret weapons shipments to
ran. "This action raises serious questions
>f propriety," he said.
Attorney General Edwin Meese III an-
>ounced that $10 million to $30 million in
>rofits from weapons shipped to Israel and
whsequently sold to Iran were deposited in
Swiss bank accounts and 'made available to
the forces in Central America' fighting the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The
money was diverted during a period in
which Congress had cut off U.S. military aid
and prohibited American officials from help-
ing the rebels.
Administration sources said that Justice
Department officials discovered the di-
verted funds late last week when they were
attempting to piece together a chronology
of events in the Iran arms shipments. Ac-
cording to an adminisbation account of the
discovery. a secret intelligence Intercept"
quoted Iranians and perhaps others discuss-
ing the price of the weapons in amounts
that appeared to be far greater than their,
actual value, triggering a search for the
profits and the reason they were diverted,
the sources said.
The departures of Poindexter and North
occurred on a day of deepening contradic-
tions and disappointment at the White
House. where officials were reeling from
three weeks of disclosures about the secret
Iran operation that have seriously damaged
Reagan's credibility and set the stage for
renewed confrontation with Congress.
Congressional leaders said they would
conduct their own investigations into the
Iran and Nicaraguan operations, and some
said Reagan's foreign policy is in "total dis-
array." Meese said he would also pursue his
investigation. and Reagan announced he
would create a special review board to ex-
amine the role and procedures of the Na-
tional Security Council staff. Sources said
former Senate Armed Services Committee
chairman John Tower (R-Tex.) would be
named today to chair the panel.
The statements by Meese and others
rekindled questions about how aware Rea-
gan was of the activities of his administra-
tion's senior officials. Meese repeatedly
said Reagan knew nothing about the oper-
See PRESIDENT, A6, Col. I
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lt an r unus were Inverted;
Poindexter, North Out
PHE.SIDENT, From Al
ation. Meese said North was the
only person in the U.S. government
who "knew precisely" of the trans-
actions, but added that Poindexter
"did know that something of this na-
ture was occurring, but he did not
look into it further." Meese said lat-
er-_that "there may have been others
who may have been Working in
some capacity" with North. Meese
also-said that Poindexter acknowl-
edged to him on Monday that he
knew some aspects of the Ni-
caraguan operation and told Meese
then that he intended to resign.
Meese said former national se-
curity adviser Robert C. McFar-
lane. Poindexter's predecessor, also
knew of the operation. ,
In London, where he was making
a speech, McFarlane said in a state-
ment that, "in May of this year. in
connection with a mission to. Iran I
was advised by Col. North in gen-
eriii"terms that such a [transfer]
half taken place after my departure
fr&W government Based upon -the
summary account I took it to have
been a matter of approved policy
safhttioned by highrtr authority.
These transfers were reported. to
have taken place this year. At. no
time was it raised or considered
during my service in government:':;
Many other; inside the adminig.,
tration and outside questioned
Meese's statement that the Ni-
caraguan operation was kept secret
from other senior polk:ymakers in
the government and from the U.S.
intelligence community. In an inter-
view with NBC. News last night,
former secretary of state Henry A.
Kissinger said, "I cannot imagine a
lieutenant colonel or even an admi-
ral like Poindexter doing this with-
3ut somebody knowing."
The administration sources said a
ending candidate to replace Poin-
lexter is Navy Secretary John F.
ehman Jr. Other candidates are
slid to include former NATO am-
ossador David Abshirc; former
Jnited Nations ambassador Jeane J.
Cirkpatrick and Undersecretary of
Mate for Political Affairs Michael
I. Armacost.
,Reagan pledged that "future for-
eign and national security policy
ini,~iatives will proceed only in ac-
cordance with my authorization."
His decision to create the special
review board appeared to be a re-
sponse to growing questions from
senior State Department officials
and members of Congress about
whether the White House had over-
stepped the proper function of the
National Security Council by run-
ning covert operations out of its
basement offices in the West Wing.
Shortly after Reagan's announce-
ments. State Department spokes-
man Charles E. Redman announced
that Secretary of State George P.
Shultz had prevailed in his effort to
gain control of future U.S. policy
toward Iran. Shultz designated Ar-
macost to take charge of the de-
partment's effort to revamp the
Iran'' initiative and seek release of
Americans held in Lebanon.
Shultz has been the subject of
intense speculation that he would
leave the administration because of
hi- opposition to the covert Iran
artpq sales, but yesterday he de-
clared his support for Reagan's pol-
icy.to reach out to factions in Iran,.
and''said he intended to be ."very.
M4 a part of they effort to bring`
the* to fruition.'..
Reagan promised to make:public
theresults of the administration
investigation, and continued to'in-
sist that his basic policy toward Iran
was not flawed.
"I'm deeply troubled that the im-
plementation of a policy aimed at
resolving 'a truly tragic situation in
the Middle East hat resulted in
such controversy," Reagan said. "As
I've stated previously, I believe our
policy goals toward Iran were well-
founded. However, the information
brought to my attention yesterday
convinced me that in one aspect.
implementation of that policy was
seriously flawed."
After first saying that North "has
been relieved of his duties" on the
National Security Council staff,
Reagan then said that "no one was
let go; they chose to go." Meese
said North may retire from the Ma-
rine Corps. According to one source
who was present, when the con-
gressional leaders were told that
North was returning to the Ma-
rines, 'Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger announced imme-
diately that he was not. .
Meese announced that Poindex-
ter's deputy, Alton G. Keel Jr.,
would' assume the post- of acting
national security adviser, until a su-
cessor is choosen. Keel immediately
took over the duties, ping yes-
terday over a.bigh-level meeting ou
arpts control..
' rovtd-
ed yesterday by tion
sources, Justice Dept aisles
on Thursday were going over doc-
uments, on the Iran attas sales in
Administration -
officials said that-,:..
Justice Department
officials' discovered
the diverted funds
late last week when
they were attempt-
ing to piece
together a chronol-
ogy of events in the
Iran arms shipment.
preparation for testimony to con-
gressional intelligence panels by
Director of Central Intelligence
William J. Casey. After they found
the intelligence intercepts indicat-
ing that money was diverted from
the arms sales-which went
through Israel-Meese went to
Reagan on Friday and said he was
concerned about the controversy.
Reagan told Meese to pursue it, and
the attorney general and other Jus-
tice Department aides interviewed
North extensively over the week-
end, officials said.
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 On Monday. Meese talkrvi ,ti, e.. ---
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--~-- - --?es-.,.-..........
k v1J IuIKa, r nere I - ..vux urnciais sattl
'low 119 of the operation and not
telling the president, and he told
Meese he would probably have to
resign. Meese then reported what
he had found to Reagan and Vice
President Bush, sources said.
Yesterday, Meese arrived in the
White House West Wing for an ear-
ly meeting with Reagan, chief of
staff Donald T. Regan and Bush.
Shortly thereafter word that "this is
resignation day," as one aide put it.
spread through the building be-
cause the president's**? sc eduled
meetings were spddenlycanceled.
After receiving Poindeader's res-
.,lgnstioni(: Reagan summoned can-,, gressional leaders to inform them,
and described Poindexter as '"like..
the captain of a ship w+Iio ' b not at,
the helm when the ship hits the
sand bar`he?stfU.'asasimes-respon.
sibility."
Meese portrayed the president
yesterday as having not been i 4
formed of key aspects in the Iran
operation. Meese said the president
-' "knew. nod ' about the transfer
? of funds to Nicaragua. He said Rea-
gan 'd dnl have complete informa-
Israel to Iran in November, ,1985.
He **id Reagan was informed "after
the fact" that Israel had. shipped
weapons to Iran in August 1985,
just 'before the release of the. Rev.
Benlamut Weir. Who was being held
Meese also raised as many ques-
teon- wbe answered about the pre-
cise nature of the transactiori in
whiclr'the Nicaraguan. rebels, also
knowni as ic*tras, benefited, .'He
suggested that' the weapons were
taken front ?t:S. stockpiles and
shippe4 _to Israel, where: some Is-
caelis* ion did not identify,
then saa them to Iran at an inifirated
costa
The U.S. 8vernment was then
reimbursed blt Israel tfrrou the
Central Intelligence Agency for the
real cost of the weapons,, while the
profit was diverted to the Swiss
bank accounts. Administration of-
ficials have said previously that
about $12 million in TOW antitank
missiles and Hawk antiaircraft mis-
sile parts were transferred to Iran.
and Meese reiterated that estimate
yesterday.
Three weeks after the secret
Iran arms shipments were first dis-
closed by a pro-Syrian Lebanese
magazine, Meese-offered a picture
r)f the administration still struggling
to find out what had occurred in the
)lwration.
than we had already put together
,
he said. And it was a matter, then,
of the president requesting me to
talk with everyone who had any
participation at all, because one
agency was doing one thing, anoth-
er agency. was doing another thing,
there was very little. paper work
Meese was vague. in responding
to questions about the Iran and Nic-
aragua operations, stating frequent-
ly who was not told and what was
not known. but skirting details
about what his- investigators had
uncovered in interrogating North
over the weekend.
A A
1YILf
Meese. "k
b4 l Void the .ong.
erati
.,o?-? ...+lu . ue
gUes ' iaott at; t,copgs.
sionat htatiag ;Friday. Meese. 'es-,
terday " gingerly; answered some -
questioi that could figure in future
legal proceedings: such as congres-
sional and criminal probes,
For example; .referring to, the.:,
profits tl t. emapp Hy used to?-
help the Nlc$aEuana rebels. Mess.
said, "We have no control over that
money. It was never United States,
funds, it was never. the. property of
United States official, so we have .
no control over that , Whatsoever."
Meese said his'tthew would.at-.
tempt to determinq. whether the
secret transfer of furldq;;to, the Ni--?
caraguan rebels hW-'rciolated -.the.;
congressional ban on aiding the con-.
tras, which was ref+ently fifted'when
Congress approved4100'million in
military and other aid,` Whether the
law was violated "deponrb on two
things: he said, 'pre isely what
was done and preceiy'who did it.
in terms of what people are United
States officials, or United States
citizens. actually partidpated, and
what their conduct 'was.: That's
what we're still looking at."
Asked how the administration
would try to restore its credibility
with Congress, Meese said it would
"tell them exactly what happened"
and added, "I don't think anyone can
he responsible if someone on the
lower echelons of government does
something that we don't feel ... or
that objectively viewed is not cor_
rect." fie called the Nicaraguan
connection an "aberration" from the
policy Reagan had set toward Iran.
"nut an inherent part of anything
h; Rani' tiw if,) with t1.? ,,I,' . If-.If -
Isclosures. "Flabbergasted
" V
,
one
aide said. "What a mess," another
sighed.
Chief of staff Regan, who sought
to exert control over most aspects
of White House operations during
the entire time that the Iran and
Nicaraguan operations unfolded,
remained out of the limelight yes-
terday.
Poindexter could not be reached
for comment yesterday.
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THE WASHMCM Posy
TRANSCRIPT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S NEWS CONFERENCE
How did it come to your attention?
?- In the course of a thorough review of a number of in-
tercepts, and other materials, this-the hint of a possi-
bility that there was some monies being made available
for some other purpose came to our attention, and then
we pursued that with the individuals involved.
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 25X1
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