CHAPTER 5 PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00530R000500990006-8
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 26, 2012
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 26, 1987
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00530R000500990006-8.pdf509.96 KB
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 At X Lua-JL Lo JUJ_a i W cally ions. !rent oes mits acer and be ays ter ters !cer :ers aff Chapter 5 PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES Section A-Investigative Requirements for Clearances 5-1. General Information. The determination of clearance eligibility is distinct from the granting of access to classified information. Also, deter- mining an individual's eligibility for access to special access program information or suitability for assignment to sensitive duties or such other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination differs from granting access to classified infor- mation. a. The Secretary of the Air Force is the authority for determining security clearance eligibility for Air Force personnel. This author- ity is delegated to AFSCO. b. Commanders, supervisors, and staff agency chiefs must determine positions under their jurisdiction which require access to classi- fied information. They may grant access to incumbents of those positions who have received clearance eligibility under the provisions of this regulation. The requirements of DOD 5200.1-R/ APR 205-1 which includes the signing of SF 189 and job related "need to know" also must be satisfied. c. Military personnel, Air Force civilian per- sonnel, and persons employed by or serving in a consultant capacity with the Air Force, may be considered for access to classified information when such access is required in connection with official duties. Such individuals may be granted either a final or interim personnel security clearance provided the investigative requirements in paragraphs 5-4 and 5-5 are satisfied, all available information has been adjudicated, and a : ading made that the clearance would be clears. consistent with the interests of national security. 5-2. Air Force Clearance Eligibility Authority. AFSCO personnel adjudicate all personnel secu- rity investigations concerning Air Force person- nel worldwide. They are the single Air Force authority for granting, denying, or revoking security clearance eligibility. 5-3. Security Clearance Eligibility and Security Clearance. AFSCO personnel determine security clearance eligibility based on the type of personnel security investigation conducted, the citizenship status of the individual being investi- gated, and the character of the investigation (e.g., complete or incomplete and favorable or unfavorable). The ASCAS roster reflects eligibil- ity to communicate the maximum access level an individual is authorized. A security clearance is determined by the clearance eligibility reflected on the ASCAS roster and the access require- ments coded on the manpower file, provided access requirements do not exceed clearance eligibility. When access requirements exceed -clearance eligibility, a security clearance is granted only to the level authorized by clearance eligibility. Request a higher level of investigation from DIS to allow higher clearance eligibility. 5-4. Top Secret Clearance Eligibility: a. Investigative requirements for final Top Secret clearance eligibility: (1) Civilian employees and consultants: A favorably completed and adjudicated BI or SBI. (2) Military personnel: A favorably com- pleted and adjudicated BI or SBI. NOTE: Immigrant alien personnel and non-US citizens are not authorized security clearance eligibility. b. Investigative requirements for interim Top Secret clearance eligibility: (1) Civilian employees and consultants: ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or NACI when a BI or an SBI has been requested (see chapter 3, section G). (2) Military: ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or NACI when a BI or an SBI has been requested. c. An interim Top Secret clearance is granted when Top Secret access is required before either a requested BI or SBI is complete. DIS personnel must open the requested BI or SBI before AFSCO personnel authorize interim Top Secret clearance eligibility. Request interim clearance eligibility from AFSCO personnel as follows: (1) Forward a PTI 41B tracer transaction to AFSCO requesting interim Top Secret clearance eligibility when a favorably completed ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or NACI is already on file in the PDS. (2) Check the "Advance Notification of NAC" block of DD Form 1879 when no other investigation is on file. This alerts DIS personnel to provide AFSCO with notification of the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 completed NAC. This notification requests AFSCO personnel to grant interim Top Secret clearance eligibility. (3) Do not request advance results of a NAC on DD Form 1879 when a valid SBI, BI, DNACI, NACI, NAC, or ENTNAC is on file. (4) Do not forward DD Form 1879 to AFSCO requesting interim Top Secret clearance eligibility. 5-5. Secret Clearance Eligibility: a. Investigative requirements for final Secret clearance eligibility: (1) Civilian employees and consultants: NACI conducted by OPM. Summer hire and other seasonal employees may be granted final Secret clearance eligibility based on a favorably completed NAC conducted by DIS. (2) Military: DNACI, NAC, or ENTNAC. NOTE: Immigrant alien personnel and non-US citizens are not authorized security clearance eligibility. b. Investigative requirements for interim Se- cret clearance eligibility: (1) Civilian employees and consultants: Ini- tiation of a NACI and the determination and documentation by an official with position sensitivity designation authority that a delay in appointment would harm the national security. (2) Military personnel: The ASCAS roster reflecting an open ENTNAC, NAC or DNACI is authority for granting interim Secret access. c. Investigative requirements for Confidential clearance eligibility: The Air Force does not use Confidential clearance eligibility. The investiga- tive requirements for Confidential clearance are the same as Secret clearance eligibility. d. An interim clearance may be issued only after initiation of the required investigation and a completed review of personnel, security police, medical, and unit security records with favorable results. e. Clearance eligibility granted under less stringent investigative requirements remain valid. However, when a higher level of clearance is required, the investigative requirements of this regulation and DOD Regulation 5200.2 must be met. 5-6. Security Clearance Eligibility for Recently Naturalized US Citizens: a. Naturalized US citizens whose country of origin has interests adverse to the United States (designated countries-attachment 8), or who - n, r &U0-Jc co June 1987 have resided in such countries for a significant period of their life are eligible for a security clearance only: (1) If they have been a US citizen for 5 years or longer; or (2) If a citizen for less than 5 years, must have resided in the United States for the preceding 10 years. Only DUSD(P) may grant exceptions to the above policy through the Secretary of the Air Force. b. Naturalized US citizens from countries other than those contained in attachment 8 may be considered for a security clearance in the same manner as native born US citizens. NOTE: Each year of active service in the US military is counted toward residency require- ments. 5-7. Security Clearance Eligibility for Non-US Citizens. Immigrant alien and foreign nationals personnel are not authorized security clearance eligibility or security clearances. Use LAAs when access is required for a person in this category. 5-8. Restrictions on Issuance of Personnel Security Clearances. Personnel security clear- ances may not be issued solely to permit access to a controlled area where there is no exposure to classified information or to permit ease of movement within classified areas where the individual involved has no need for access to classified information and access realistically can be denied. 5-9. Dual Citizenship and Clearance Eligibility. Process persons claiming both US and foreign citizenship for clearance eligibility under para- graphs 5-4 and 5-5. Clearance eligibility is adjudicated in accordance with the "Foreign Preference" standard outlined in attachment 9. Section B-Favorable Personnel Security Investi- gations 5-10. General Information. AFSCO personnel adjudicate all personnel security investigations conducted by any agency of the federal govern- ment concerning Air Force personnel to deetermine suitability for sensitive positions and for either security clearance eligibility or ineligi- bility. 5-11. Favorable Adjudicative Decisions. AFSCO personnel adjudicate personnel security investigations and record favorable security Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 AFR 205-32 26 JunIW7 W clearance eligibility determinations. Security clearance eligibility is issued to the highest level authorized based on the status of the subject and type of investigation conducted. A security clearance determination is then based on the clearance eligibility documented by AFSCO and the access requirement coded on the manpower file. 5-12. Issuing Clearance Eligibility. The record of clearance eligibility becomes a permanent part of either an individual's military personnel file or official personnel folder and is retained throughout the individual's period of service or employment. Documentation of clearance eligibility for military and civilian personnel is recorded in the PDS at Randolph AFB, Texas using the ASCAS and is duplicated in the DCII. a. AFSCO personnel record AFROTC per- sonnel and Air Force Academy (AFA) cadets clearances and transmits information from AFSCO to the PDS on the individual's commis- sioning and entrance on active duty. The PDS has no record of these personnel until they graduate and are commissioned. 'b. AFSCO personnel send AF Form 2584 through the servicing authorized requester of investigations to the Air Force controlling or hiring agency for file. AF Form 2584 is used to document clearance eligibility for personnel whose records are not in the PDS. Contractors, AFR 213-1 educators, and NAF employees are categories of personnel records not maintained in the automated data systems. For example, an AF Form 2584 concerning an educator is sent to the chief of the personnel or education office. AF Form 2584 is returned through the author- ized requester to AFSCO when an employee terminates his or her employment. Receipt of clearance eligibility determinations through the PDS or by AF Forms 2584 means a requested investigation has been completed and adjudi- cated by AFSCO personnel. c. Immigrant alien personnel who have a completed favorable BI are not authorized clearance eligibility. Their ASCAS clearance eligibility record is shown as "None" in the PDS. Immigrant alien personnel who have a completed favorable ENTNAC, NAC, or DNACI are not authorized clearance eligibility. Their ASCAS clearance eligibility record is shown "Favorable" in the PDS, reflecting the completion of the investigation. 5-13. Termination of Security Clearance Eligi- bility. A personnel security clearance remains valid until: a. An individual separates from the armed forces or from DOD civilian employment. b. An individual has no further official relationship with DOD. c. AFSCO personnel take official action to deny or revoke clearance eligibility. d. The individual's supervisor determines that regular access to classified information is no longer necessary to perform his or her assigned duties. If future duties require access to classi- fied information, the individual's commander or supervisor may authorize access providing there is no known unfavorable information and the ASCAS roster reflects the appropriate level of clearance eligibility. If an individual resumes the original status in a or b above with no single break in his or her relationship with DOD greater than 12 months, AFSCO personnel will reissue clearance eligibility. 5-14. Security Clearance Data in the PDS. Security clearance eligibility data for Air Force military and civilian personnel are maintained in the PDS, PDSC and DCII. Clearance eligibility data in the PDS master file at HQ AFMPC, Randolph AFB Texas, the base level military personnel system (BLMPS) at the local CBPO or CCPO, and the DCII must always be iden- tical, except during brief periods when AFSCO personnel update files. Procedures for AFA cadets and ROTC personnel are outlined para- graph 5-12a. AFSCO personnel enter clearance eligibility data into the PDS, PDSC, and the DCII through ASCAS. Elements of clearance data in the PDS and PDSC include the full date and type of investigation and the full date and status of clearance eligibility. The information is invalid when any of these four data elements are incomplete. When the PDS contains security clearance data, destroy security clearance certifi- cates in military personnel files according to AFR 12-50. When valid and complete ASCAS data are added to PDS civilian records and the AFROTC automated systems, remove security clearance certificates from files. Verify the accuracy of the ASCAS data and then destroy according to AFR 12-50, volume Il. a. The unit commander, normally through the unit security manager, must debrief personnel whose PDS records reflect invalid security data elements such as "unknown," "none," "999999," etc., and resolve them through the Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 w Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-887 W Mir- base authorized requester of investigations. The level and investigation type are based on authorized requester resolves invalid ASCAS ASCAS data in the PDS, PDSC, or on AF data after identification and notification by the Form 2584. unit commander (security manager), by submit- b. Written notification of intent to visit or ting a PTI 41B tracer request through ASCAS. written visit requests must contain security Provide all available information from any clearance data concerning those visitors who source document on file, including prior or require access to classified information. TDY maiden names under which an investigation may orders are a valid source authority for clearance have been conducted. If local files or AFSCO eligibility data. Contact the unit, agency, duty cannot develop evidence of a previous clearance section, or security manager for verification or investigation, request a new investigation. when doubts arise concerning the validity of Call AFSCO personnel to verify clearance data clearance data on a TDY order. when there is no record in the PDS, but an c. PCS orders are not a valid source authority individual is certain a clearance or investigation for security clearance eligibility data because exists. Use this procedure only when immediate PCS orders are normally prepared months in access is required for new or recent arrivals on advance of an individual's move and changes in station. Authorized callers must have the sub- clearance eligibility data may occur in the ject's name, grade, SSN, and dates of service interim. readily available before calling AFSCO person- nel. When AFSCO has valid clearance eligibility on file, a record of the call may be used as evidence of valid clearance data pending update of ASCAS after the following conditions in b below are met: b. The authorized requester must document the information using a dated Memorandum for Record (MFR) showing: (1) Name, grade, and individual calling AFSCO; (2) Name, grade, organization, and SSN of the subject; (3) Name of person from AFSCO providing clearance data; and (4) Type and date of investigation and level and date of the clearance eligibility. c. The authorized requester of investigations must forward a copy of the MFR to the individual's commander. NOTE: Clearance eligibility is not authorized unless all the requirements of paragraph b above are met. d. The authorized requester of investigations and the individual's commander must destroy the MFR when the ASCAS is updated with current clearance eligibility data. 5-15. Clearance or Investigative Data in Written Authorization: a. Except as provided below, written or printed notices of security clearance status are not issued when an individual has an ASCAS record in the PDS. This does not preclude the issuance of written notification for categories of employees not in the PDS and for non-Air Force activities. In all cases, notices of clearance 5-16. Manpower File Coding and Security Clearance. To manage and control security clearances within the Air Force, the level of access required for day-to-day job performance by each military and OPM Federal civilian is coded on the Unit Manpower Document (UMD). The security access coding of each manpower position functions as a Security Clearance Billet Control System. The granting of a security clearance is based upon the level of access documented on the UMD and the level of clearance eligibility determined by AFSCO. AFSCO personnel determine clearance eligibility based on the type of investigation conducted and the status of the individual involved (e.g., US citizen, immigrant alien, etc.). When an individual changes job assignments through PCA, PCS, etc., his or her security clearance is adjusted up or down to correspond with the coded access requirements of the new position. Security clearances are administratively adjusted providing the individual has the necessary clearance eligibility. Request a higher level of investigation from DIS when it is needed to support the coded access requirements of a position. Section C-Unfavorable Personnel Security In- vestigations 5-17. Unfavorable PSI Processing Procedures. AFSCO personnel evaluate PSIs to decide whether clearance eligibility can be immediately determined or if additional processing is re- quired. When an investigation contains signifi- cant unfavorable information which preclude the granting of security clearance eligibility, AFSCO personnel: (see chapter 8 for adverse actions) Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 on AF or -ity ho )y ice ity on of Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8 W a. Temporarily suspend the subject's access to classified information. The suspension occurs when AFSCO personnel change the individual's ASCAS clearance eligibility record to reflect "pending adjudication." b. Forward the PSI to the individual's com- mander, through the authorized requester, for a determination of the individual's continued eligibility for military service or government employment. c. Discontinue their adjudication of a PSI when the individual's commander determines the individual will be either discharged or separated. AFSCO personnel code the individual's clear- ance records "Z" in the DCII to reflect the existence of unadjudicated information at the time of an individual's discharge or separation. d. Adjudicate the PSI for eligibility or denial or revocation of clearance or restriction of access when the individual is not being dis- charged or otherwise separated from military service or, civilian employment. 5-18. Unfavorable Adjudicative Decisions. Un- favorable adjudication results in the denial or revocation of clearance eligibility. AFSCO's adjudicative decisions are reflected on unit ASCAS rosters as clearance eligibility, denial, revocation, or restriction of clearance eligibility. Restriction occurs when there are adjudicative issues which must be resolved before an individual is assigned to a position requiring clearance eligibility or access to classified information. Section D-Reciprocal Acceptance of Prior Clearances 5-19. General Information. Only designated authorities of the parent military department or defense agency may issue the clearance on any individual, civilian or military. Therefore, only AFSCO personnel determine security clearance eligibility for Air Force personnel. Clearances issued by other federal agencies may be used pending AFSCO recertification provided the requirements of paragraphs 5-4 and 5-5. as applicable, are met. 5-20. Prior Personnel Security- Determinations Made By DOD Authorities: a. Adjudicative determinations for appoint- ment in sensitive positions, assignment to sensitive duties or access to classified informa- tion (including those pertaining to SCI) made by V designated DOD authorities will be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all DOD components without requiring additional investigation. Re- quest an investigation only when there has been a break in an individual's military service or federal civilian employment longer than 12 months or derogatory information occurs or becomes known after the most recent security suitability determination. b. When a valid DOD security clearance eligibility determination or Special Access autho- rization (including one pertaining to SCI) is on record, components may not request DIS or other DOD investigative organizations to for- ward prior investigative files for review unless: (1) Significant derogatory information ex- ists, or a later investigation was completed after the date of the last clearance eligibility; (2) The subject of the investigation is being considered for a higher level clearance eligibility (e.g., Secret to Top Secret), the individual does not have a special access authorization and is being considered for one; (3) There has been a break in the individu- al's military service or federal civilian employ- ment longer than 12 months since the date of the prior investigation; or (4) The most recent SCI access authoriza- tion of the subject individual was based on a waiver. c. Request for prior investigative files are made in writing. Provide specific justification for the request (i.e., upgrade of clearance, issue special access authorization, etc.), and include the date, level, and issuing organization of the individual's current or most recent security clearance eligibility determination or special access authorization. d. When a civilian or military member transfers from one DOD activity to another, the losing organization's security office is responsi- ble for advising the gaining organization of any pending action to suspend, deny or revoke the individual's clearance eligibility as well as any adverse information that may exist in security, personnel or other files. In such instances, clearance eligibility will not be recertified by AFSCO personnel until they have adjudicated the questionable information.___________ NOTE: k NACI -conducted- by-OPM is accepted and considered--egij lent to a IvAC or DNAC1 for-the-purpose-o his regulation. Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8