CHAPTER 5 PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00530R000500990006-8
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 26, 2012
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 26, 1987
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP90-00530R000500990006-8.pdf | 509.96 KB |
Body:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
At X Lua-JL Lo JUJ_a i W
cally
ions.
!rent
oes
mits
acer
and
be
ays
ter
ters
!cer
:ers
aff
Chapter 5
PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES
Section A-Investigative Requirements for
Clearances
5-1. General Information. The determination of
clearance eligibility is distinct from the granting
of access to classified information. Also, deter-
mining an individual's eligibility for access to
special access program information or suitability
for assignment to sensitive duties or such other
duties requiring a trustworthiness determination
differs from granting access to classified infor-
mation.
a. The Secretary of the Air Force is the
authority for determining security clearance
eligibility for Air Force personnel. This author-
ity is delegated to AFSCO.
b. Commanders, supervisors, and staff
agency chiefs must determine positions under
their jurisdiction which require access to classi-
fied information. They may grant access to
incumbents of those positions who have received
clearance eligibility under the provisions of this
regulation. The requirements of DOD 5200.1-R/
APR 205-1 which includes the signing of SF 189
and job related "need to know" also must be
satisfied.
c. Military personnel, Air Force civilian per-
sonnel, and persons employed by or serving in a
consultant capacity with the Air Force, may be
considered for access to classified information
when such access is required in connection with
official duties. Such individuals may be granted
either a final or interim personnel security
clearance provided the investigative requirements
in paragraphs 5-4 and 5-5 are satisfied, all
available information has been adjudicated, and
a : ading made that the clearance would be
clears. consistent with the interests of national
security.
5-2. Air Force Clearance Eligibility Authority.
AFSCO personnel adjudicate all personnel secu-
rity investigations concerning Air Force person-
nel worldwide. They are the single Air Force
authority for granting, denying, or revoking
security clearance eligibility.
5-3. Security Clearance Eligibility and Security
Clearance. AFSCO personnel determine security
clearance eligibility based on the type of
personnel security investigation conducted, the
citizenship status of the individual being investi-
gated, and the character of the investigation
(e.g., complete or incomplete and favorable or
unfavorable). The ASCAS roster reflects eligibil-
ity to communicate the maximum access level an
individual is authorized. A security clearance is
determined by the clearance eligibility reflected
on the ASCAS roster and the access require-
ments coded on the manpower file, provided
access requirements do not exceed clearance
eligibility. When access requirements exceed
-clearance eligibility, a security clearance is
granted only to the level authorized by clearance
eligibility. Request a higher level of investigation
from DIS to allow higher clearance eligibility.
5-4. Top Secret Clearance Eligibility:
a. Investigative requirements for final Top
Secret clearance eligibility:
(1) Civilian employees and consultants: A
favorably completed and adjudicated BI or SBI.
(2) Military personnel: A favorably com-
pleted and adjudicated BI or SBI.
NOTE: Immigrant alien personnel and non-US
citizens are not authorized security clearance
eligibility.
b. Investigative requirements for interim Top
Secret clearance eligibility:
(1) Civilian employees and consultants:
ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or NACI when a BI
or an SBI has been requested (see chapter 3,
section G).
(2) Military: ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or
NACI when a BI or an SBI has been requested.
c. An interim Top Secret clearance is granted
when Top Secret access is required before either
a requested BI or SBI is complete. DIS
personnel must open the requested BI or SBI
before AFSCO personnel authorize interim Top
Secret clearance eligibility. Request interim
clearance eligibility from AFSCO personnel as
follows:
(1) Forward a PTI 41B tracer transaction to
AFSCO requesting interim Top Secret clearance
eligibility when a favorably completed
ENTNAC, NAC, DNACI, or NACI is already
on file in the PDS.
(2) Check the "Advance Notification of
NAC" block of DD Form 1879 when no other
investigation is on file. This alerts DIS personnel
to provide AFSCO with notification of the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
completed NAC. This notification requests
AFSCO personnel to grant interim Top Secret
clearance eligibility.
(3) Do not request advance results of a
NAC on DD Form 1879 when a valid SBI, BI,
DNACI, NACI, NAC, or ENTNAC is on file.
(4) Do not forward DD Form 1879 to
AFSCO requesting interim Top Secret clearance
eligibility.
5-5. Secret Clearance Eligibility:
a. Investigative requirements for final Secret
clearance eligibility:
(1) Civilian employees and consultants:
NACI conducted by OPM. Summer hire and
other seasonal employees may be granted final
Secret clearance eligibility based on a favorably
completed NAC conducted by DIS.
(2) Military: DNACI, NAC, or ENTNAC.
NOTE: Immigrant alien personnel and non-US
citizens are not authorized security clearance
eligibility.
b. Investigative requirements for interim Se-
cret clearance eligibility:
(1) Civilian employees and consultants: Ini-
tiation of a NACI and the determination and
documentation by an official with position
sensitivity designation authority that a delay in
appointment would harm the national security.
(2) Military personnel: The ASCAS roster
reflecting an open ENTNAC, NAC or DNACI
is authority for granting interim Secret access.
c. Investigative requirements for Confidential
clearance eligibility: The Air Force does not use
Confidential clearance eligibility. The investiga-
tive requirements for Confidential clearance are
the same as Secret clearance eligibility.
d. An interim clearance may be issued only
after initiation of the required investigation and
a completed review of personnel, security police,
medical, and unit security records with favorable
results.
e. Clearance eligibility granted under less
stringent investigative requirements remain valid.
However, when a higher level of clearance is
required, the investigative requirements of this
regulation and DOD Regulation 5200.2 must be
met.
5-6. Security Clearance Eligibility for Recently
Naturalized US Citizens:
a. Naturalized US citizens whose country of
origin has interests adverse to the United States
(designated countries-attachment 8), or who
- n, r &U0-Jc co June 1987
have resided in such countries for a significant
period of their life are eligible for a security
clearance only:
(1) If they have been a US citizen for 5
years or longer; or
(2) If a citizen for less than 5 years, must
have resided in the United States for the
preceding 10 years. Only DUSD(P) may grant
exceptions to the above policy through the
Secretary of the Air Force.
b. Naturalized US citizens from countries
other than those contained in attachment 8 may
be considered for a security clearance in the
same manner as native born US citizens.
NOTE: Each year of active service in the US
military is counted toward residency require-
ments.
5-7. Security Clearance Eligibility for Non-US
Citizens. Immigrant alien and foreign nationals
personnel are not authorized security clearance
eligibility or security clearances. Use LAAs when
access is required for a person in this category.
5-8. Restrictions on Issuance of Personnel
Security Clearances. Personnel security clear-
ances may not be issued solely to permit access
to a controlled area where there is no exposure
to classified information or to permit ease of
movement within classified areas where the
individual involved has no need for access to
classified information and access realistically can
be denied.
5-9. Dual Citizenship and Clearance Eligibility.
Process persons claiming both US and foreign
citizenship for clearance eligibility under para-
graphs 5-4 and 5-5. Clearance eligibility is
adjudicated in accordance with the "Foreign
Preference" standard outlined in attachment 9.
Section B-Favorable Personnel Security Investi-
gations
5-10. General Information. AFSCO personnel
adjudicate all personnel security investigations
conducted by any agency of the federal govern-
ment concerning Air Force personnel to
deetermine suitability for sensitive positions and
for either security clearance eligibility or ineligi-
bility.
5-11. Favorable Adjudicative Decisions.
AFSCO personnel adjudicate personnel security
investigations and record favorable security
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
AFR 205-32 26 JunIW7 W
clearance eligibility determinations. Security
clearance eligibility is issued to the highest level
authorized based on the status of the subject
and type of investigation conducted. A security
clearance determination is then based on the
clearance eligibility documented by AFSCO and
the access requirement coded on the manpower
file.
5-12. Issuing Clearance Eligibility. The record
of clearance eligibility becomes a permanent part
of either an individual's military personnel file
or official personnel folder and is retained
throughout the individual's period of service
or employment. Documentation of clearance
eligibility for military and civilian personnel
is recorded in the PDS at Randolph AFB,
Texas using the ASCAS and is duplicated in the
DCII.
a. AFSCO personnel record AFROTC per-
sonnel and Air Force Academy (AFA) cadets
clearances and transmits information from
AFSCO to the PDS on the individual's commis-
sioning and entrance on active duty. The PDS
has no record of these personnel until they
graduate and are commissioned.
'b. AFSCO personnel send AF Form 2584
through the servicing authorized requester of
investigations to the Air Force controlling or
hiring agency for file. AF Form 2584 is used to
document clearance eligibility for personnel
whose records are not in the PDS. Contractors,
AFR 213-1 educators, and NAF employees are
categories of personnel records not maintained
in the automated data systems. For example, an
AF Form 2584 concerning an educator is sent to
the chief of the personnel or education office.
AF Form 2584 is returned through the author-
ized requester to AFSCO when an employee
terminates his or her employment. Receipt of
clearance eligibility determinations through the
PDS or by AF Forms 2584 means a requested
investigation has been completed and adjudi-
cated by AFSCO personnel.
c. Immigrant alien personnel who have a
completed favorable BI are not authorized
clearance eligibility. Their ASCAS clearance
eligibility record is shown as "None" in the
PDS. Immigrant alien personnel who have a
completed favorable ENTNAC, NAC, or
DNACI are not authorized clearance eligibility.
Their ASCAS clearance eligibility record is
shown "Favorable" in the PDS, reflecting the
completion of the investigation.
5-13. Termination of Security Clearance Eligi-
bility. A personnel security clearance remains
valid until:
a. An individual separates from the armed
forces or from DOD civilian employment.
b. An individual has no further official
relationship with DOD.
c. AFSCO personnel take official action to
deny or revoke clearance eligibility.
d. The individual's supervisor determines that
regular access to classified information is no
longer necessary to perform his or her assigned
duties. If future duties require access to classi-
fied information, the individual's commander or
supervisor may authorize access providing there
is no known unfavorable information and the
ASCAS roster reflects the appropriate level of
clearance eligibility. If an individual resumes the
original status in a or b above with no single
break in his or her relationship with DOD
greater than 12 months, AFSCO personnel will
reissue clearance eligibility.
5-14. Security Clearance Data in the PDS.
Security clearance eligibility data for Air Force
military and civilian personnel are maintained in
the PDS, PDSC and DCII. Clearance eligibility
data in the PDS master file at HQ AFMPC,
Randolph AFB Texas, the base level military
personnel system (BLMPS) at the local CBPO
or CCPO, and the DCII must always be iden-
tical, except during brief periods when AFSCO
personnel update files. Procedures for AFA
cadets and ROTC personnel are outlined para-
graph 5-12a. AFSCO personnel enter clearance
eligibility data into the PDS, PDSC, and the
DCII through ASCAS. Elements of clearance
data in the PDS and PDSC include the full date
and type of investigation and the full date and
status of clearance eligibility. The information is
invalid when any of these four data elements are
incomplete. When the PDS contains security
clearance data, destroy security clearance certifi-
cates in military personnel files according to
AFR 12-50. When valid and complete ASCAS
data are added to PDS civilian records and the
AFROTC automated systems, remove security
clearance certificates from files. Verify the
accuracy of the ASCAS data and then destroy
according to AFR 12-50, volume Il.
a. The unit commander, normally through the
unit security manager, must debrief personnel
whose PDS records reflect invalid security data
elements such as "unknown," "none,"
"999999," etc., and resolve them through the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
w Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-887
W Mir-
base authorized requester of investigations. The level and investigation type are based on
authorized requester resolves invalid ASCAS ASCAS data in the PDS, PDSC, or on AF
data after identification and notification by the Form 2584.
unit commander (security manager), by submit- b. Written notification of intent to visit or
ting a PTI 41B tracer request through ASCAS. written visit requests must contain security
Provide all available information from any clearance data concerning those visitors who
source document on file, including prior or require access to classified information. TDY
maiden names under which an investigation may orders are a valid source authority for clearance
have been conducted. If local files or AFSCO eligibility data. Contact the unit, agency, duty
cannot develop evidence of a previous clearance section, or security manager for verification
or investigation, request a new investigation. when doubts arise concerning the validity of
Call AFSCO personnel to verify clearance data clearance data on a TDY order.
when there is no record in the PDS, but an c. PCS orders are not a valid source authority
individual is certain a clearance or investigation for security clearance eligibility data because
exists. Use this procedure only when immediate PCS orders are normally prepared months in
access is required for new or recent arrivals on advance of an individual's move and changes in
station. Authorized callers must have the sub- clearance eligibility data may occur in the
ject's name, grade, SSN, and dates of service interim.
readily available before calling AFSCO person-
nel. When AFSCO has valid clearance eligibility
on file, a record of the call may be used as
evidence of valid clearance data pending update
of ASCAS after the following conditions in b
below are met:
b. The authorized requester must document
the information using a dated Memorandum for
Record (MFR) showing:
(1) Name, grade, and
individual calling AFSCO;
(2) Name, grade, organization, and SSN of
the subject;
(3) Name of person from AFSCO providing
clearance data; and
(4) Type and date of investigation and level
and date of the clearance eligibility.
c. The authorized requester of investigations
must forward a copy of the MFR to the
individual's commander.
NOTE: Clearance eligibility is not authorized
unless all the requirements of paragraph b above
are met.
d. The authorized requester of investigations
and the individual's commander must destroy
the MFR when the ASCAS is updated with
current clearance eligibility data.
5-15. Clearance or Investigative Data in Written
Authorization:
a. Except as provided below, written or
printed notices of security clearance status are
not issued when an individual has an ASCAS
record in the PDS. This does not preclude the
issuance of written notification for categories of
employees not in the PDS and for non-Air
Force activities. In all cases, notices of clearance
5-16. Manpower File Coding and Security
Clearance. To manage and control security
clearances within the Air Force, the level of
access required for day-to-day job performance
by each military and OPM Federal civilian is
coded on the Unit Manpower Document
(UMD). The security access coding of each
manpower position functions as a Security
Clearance Billet Control System. The granting
of a security clearance is based upon the level of
access documented on the UMD and the level of
clearance eligibility determined by AFSCO.
AFSCO personnel determine clearance eligibility
based on the type of investigation conducted
and the status of the individual involved (e.g.,
US citizen, immigrant alien, etc.). When an
individual changes job assignments through
PCA, PCS, etc., his or her security clearance is
adjusted up or down to correspond with the
coded access requirements of the new position.
Security clearances are administratively adjusted
providing the individual has the necessary
clearance eligibility. Request a higher level of
investigation from DIS when it is needed to
support the coded access requirements of a
position.
Section C-Unfavorable Personnel Security In-
vestigations
5-17. Unfavorable PSI Processing Procedures.
AFSCO personnel evaluate PSIs to decide
whether clearance eligibility can be immediately
determined or if additional processing is re-
quired. When an investigation contains signifi-
cant unfavorable information which preclude the
granting of security clearance eligibility, AFSCO
personnel: (see chapter 8 for adverse actions)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
on
AF
or
-ity
ho
)y
ice
ity
on
of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8
W
a. Temporarily suspend the subject's access to
classified information. The suspension occurs
when AFSCO personnel change the individual's
ASCAS clearance eligibility record to reflect
"pending adjudication."
b. Forward the PSI to the individual's com-
mander, through the authorized requester, for a
determination of the individual's continued
eligibility for military service or government
employment.
c. Discontinue their adjudication of a PSI
when the individual's commander determines the
individual will be either discharged or separated.
AFSCO personnel code the individual's clear-
ance records "Z" in the DCII to reflect the
existence of unadjudicated information at the
time of an individual's discharge or separation.
d. Adjudicate the PSI for eligibility or denial
or revocation of clearance or restriction of
access when the individual is not being dis-
charged or otherwise separated from military
service or, civilian employment.
5-18. Unfavorable Adjudicative Decisions. Un-
favorable adjudication results in the denial or
revocation of clearance eligibility. AFSCO's
adjudicative decisions are reflected on unit
ASCAS rosters as clearance eligibility, denial,
revocation, or restriction of clearance eligibility.
Restriction occurs when there are adjudicative
issues which must be resolved before an
individual is assigned to a position requiring
clearance eligibility or access to classified
information.
Section D-Reciprocal Acceptance of Prior
Clearances
5-19. General Information. Only designated
authorities of the parent military department or
defense agency may issue the clearance on any
individual, civilian or military. Therefore, only
AFSCO personnel determine security clearance
eligibility for Air Force personnel. Clearances
issued by other federal agencies may be used
pending AFSCO recertification provided the
requirements of paragraphs 5-4 and 5-5. as
applicable, are met.
5-20. Prior Personnel Security- Determinations
Made By DOD Authorities:
a. Adjudicative determinations for appoint-
ment in sensitive positions, assignment to
sensitive duties or access to classified informa-
tion (including those pertaining to SCI) made by
V
designated DOD authorities will be mutually and
reciprocally accepted by all DOD components
without requiring additional investigation. Re-
quest an investigation only when there has been
a break in an individual's military service or
federal civilian employment longer than 12
months or derogatory information occurs or
becomes known after the most recent security
suitability determination.
b. When a valid DOD security clearance
eligibility determination or Special Access autho-
rization (including one pertaining to SCI) is on
record, components may not request DIS or
other DOD investigative organizations to for-
ward prior investigative files for review unless:
(1) Significant derogatory information ex-
ists, or a later investigation was completed after
the date of the last clearance eligibility;
(2) The subject of the investigation is being
considered for a higher level clearance eligibility
(e.g., Secret to Top Secret), the individual does
not have a special access authorization and is
being considered for one;
(3) There has been a break in the individu-
al's military service or federal civilian employ-
ment longer than 12 months since the date of
the prior investigation; or
(4) The most recent SCI access authoriza-
tion of the subject individual was based on a
waiver.
c. Request for prior investigative files are
made in writing. Provide specific justification
for the request (i.e., upgrade of clearance, issue
special access authorization, etc.), and include
the date, level, and issuing organization of the
individual's current or most recent security
clearance eligibility determination or special
access authorization.
d. When a civilian or military member
transfers from one DOD activity to another, the
losing organization's security office is responsi-
ble for advising the gaining organization of any
pending action to suspend, deny or revoke the
individual's clearance eligibility as well as any
adverse information that may exist in security,
personnel or other files. In such instances,
clearance eligibility will not be recertified by
AFSCO personnel until they have adjudicated
the questionable information.___________
NOTE: k NACI -conducted- by-OPM is accepted
and considered--egij lent to a IvAC or DNAC1
for-the-purpose-o his regulation.
Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-0053OR000500990006-8