CHAPTER IX OF SECRET SOVIET MANUAL ON ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ANTIATOMIC PROTECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00246A029600060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 27, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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SERT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
IRONBARK
27 JUL 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Chapter IX of SECRET Soviet Manual on Atomic
Weapons and Antiatomic Protection
1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of Chapter IX of a Soviet
SECRET document entitled "A Guide to the Combat Characteristics of
Atomic Weapons and to the Means of Antiatomic Protection". It was
published in 1957 by the Ministry of Defense, USSR.
2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the
codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET
CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word
IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among
persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3. In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK
material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your
office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utili-
zation of any part of this document in any other form should be
addressed to the originating office.
Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)
CSDB-3/650,080
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VW SECRET
IRONBARK
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Divison of Intelligence
Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics
Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
S CRFT
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IM SECT
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Soviet Manual on Atomic Weapons and
Antiatomic Protection (Chapter IX)
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT Documentary
A reliable source (B).
Following is a verbatim translation of Chapter IX
of a Soviet SECRET document titled "A Guide to the Combat
Characteristics of Atomic Weapons and to the Means of
Antiatomic Protection." This manual was published in
1957 by the USSR Ministry of Defense as a replacement
for a similar 1954 manual (CSDB-35586), and is referenced
in the Information Collection of the Artillery
(cf. CS - . had not been superseded as of
late 1961. A similar, more general document was also
published by the 6th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense
in 1959 (CSDB-3/649,686).
Copy No.
GROUP 1
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downgrading and
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1IRONBARK
CSEt8-3/650, 080
Chapter I
Engineer Means of Protection from Atomic Weapons
32. Requirements for the Construction of installations
Which Will Ensure Protection fro-,,m Atomi % Weapc-+ns
Defensive installations, constructed for protection of personnel,
weapons, materiel and equu.ipments must ensure protection both from
ordinary means of destruction (aeria. booibe and projectiles) and from
atomic weapons.
All the construction elements of the installations (barrier
works, entrances, apertures and the like) must be of uniform
strength and.capable of bearing the load exerted on them by a given
pressure in front of the shock wave of an atomic burst.
The external elements of the installations must not catch fire
from the impingement of thermal radiation. The protective thickness
of installations is chosen on the basis of the requirements for the
protection of personnel in the installations from injury from
penetrating radiation at those distances from the place of an atomic
burst at which they are protected from the shock wave.
The construction of entrances, gun ports, and filter=ventilation
systems must preclude the possibility of the shock wave or radioactive
materials penetrating into the insta l lation.
33. Structural Strength and Protective Pr~; e-fties Of Defense
Installations Trenches, 1A3,gouts and Con necting ?enehess
The simplest installations - trenches, connecc'Jing trenches and
dugouts (Figure 118) - possess significant protective properties: they
protect against thermal radiation, reduce the shock wave pressure, add
attenuate the penetrating radiation close.
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SE&ET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,050
Trenches, connecting trenches and dugouts are fully covered at the
first opportunity. 'Trenches and connecting trenches must have smooth
outlines in the design.
In unstable soils (sand, fine sand, and sandy loam) the simplest
shelters are made, as a rule, with revetments of poles, brush, slabs,
boards, canes and other materials. Special attention is given to the
strength of support fastenings'. Supports are driven into the ground
to a depth of not less than 0.5 meter. In soft ground, and also in
cases where supports cannot be driven to the desired depth, cross bars
are placed flush with the ground between them. The upper ends of the
supports are fastened with guy wires attached to anchor pickets located
2.5 to 3 meters from the top of the revetment.
Trench without revetted slopes
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1 R r" r% 1- Ir
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
`-250.300 ---
b). Trench with revetted slopes made of poles
1.
Anchor picket, d =5 to 7cm
2.
Poles, d= 5 to 7cm
3.
Picket, d= 8 to 10cm
4.
Drain-off
channel
5.
Clamp
6.
Guy wires,
d= 3 to 4mm in two strands
c). Trench with revetted slopes made of brushwood, canes
1. Guy wires, d= 3 to 4mm in two strands over 100cm
2. Brushwood, canes
3. Pressure pole
4. Picket, d= 8 to 10cm
SECRET
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SRET
IRONBARK
CElL-3/650, 080
In order to increase the fire resistance of the revetted slopes
of trenches and connecting trenches, spycallT at points of contact
with the covered installation, they are covered with earth. Antifir:
gaps 1 to 2 meters wide and spaced everyA+0 to 50 meters are left in
revetted slopes of great length.
Trenches and connecting trenc.v ie ~a.t o, t revettedl slopes, Zan;.-
structed in average soil, do not sustain d,-age at distances fr ?m t o
center (ground zero) o n at oomi ^c burst where the shook wave pressure,
at the surface o-f the th, is 0 3g g/cmm or less. At pr ss;gyres of
0.3 to 0.5kg/cm2 such trenches = ta, n slight damage , that, is, ,mag .
which has practical y no effect on their fi=tl; er military use.
Trenches with regretted slopes s-,: v vee pressures of less than.
0.5kg/cm2 ; they sustain slight damage at pressures of 0.7, to 1.2kg/cm2.
Trenches and connecting trenches, as well as dugouts, when
situated perpendicularly to the direction of shook wave movement, en-
sure protection from the impact of the shock wave pressuz head, and
from the direct impact of thermal radiation, and they reduce the
penetrating radiation dose in an atomic air burst by 5 to 15 times.
The minimum distances from the center (ground zsr .) of a burst
at which trenches (dugouts, connecting trenches) can ensure protection
of personnel, area
with bursts of low yield warheads - about 0.9ksn?.
-- with bursts of medium yield `rtr>dt-a(is - about 1.4km.
Covered Sectors of Trenches $0onnect: ng Trenc hes .
and Covered Slit Trenches
Covered sectors of trenches, connecting trenches and slit trenches
may be made of bogs, fascines, and may also have the form of wattle,.,
earthe'rn arches or arches of elongated sand bags (Figure 119). The
slopes of the covered. sectors of trenches, dug in soft or average scil
must be covered.
WMIII~ SFCRFf
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MW SECRET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
In winter time the covered sectors of trenches, connecting trenches and
slit trenches may be made of snow, ice or frozen ground over a form made of
wattle or fascines.
The covered sectors of trenches do not suffer damage at distances from the
center (ground zero) of an atomic burst where the shock wave pressure, at the
earth's surface, is less than 0.8kg/cm2 . At pressures of 0.8 to 1.2kg/cm2
they sustain slight damage.
Covered slit trenches do not suffer damage at pressures less than 1.0kg/cm2,
but they sustain slight damage at pressures of 1 to 1.5kg/cm2.
Il
Figure 119. Covered Portions of Trenches
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gaSECRET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Description of Figure 119. Covered Portions of Trenches
A. Top view
B. Cross-section with cover of logs,
1. Flat wooden ceiling., d =12 to 14cm
2. Poles, d= 5 to 7cm
3. Stakes., d=10 to 12cm at intervals of 100?:m
4. Cross tie (in soft soil)
C. Cross-section with cover of fascines
1. Earth
2. Fascines, d=25 to' 30cm
3. Brushwood., canes
4. Brushwood, canes
5. Stakes., d =10 to 12cm at intervals of 100cm
6. Drain-off channel
D. Cross-section with earth cover
1. Earth
2. Arch for earth, 20 to 25cm thick, on wattles
3. Brushwood, canes
4. Stakes, d- 10 to 12cm at intervals of 50cm
5. Drain-off channel
Covered portions of trenches and covered slit trenches completely
protect personnel from thermal radiation and reduce the penetrating
radiation dose by 25 to 50 times.
The minimum distances from the center (ground zero) of a
burst, at which the covered portions of trenches (connecting trenches)
and covered slit trenches ensure protection of personnel, are:
-~ with bursts of small yield warheads - about 0.7km;
-- with bursts of medium yield warheads - about 1.2km.
Dugout Shelters
Dugout shelters are usually constructed for 4 to 8 men. Dugout
frames are made of logs, poles, slabs, and also of reinforced con-
crete sections (blocks) or sections of corrugated steel (Figures
120 to 123).
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Figure 120.
Dugout with Slopes Revetted with Poles and Covered with Boards
A.
Top View B.
Longitudinal Section
1.
Posts, d r 12cm
1.
Earth - 90cm
2.
Board frames, d= 14 to 16cm
2.
Clay - 10cm
3.
Place for stove
3.
Log, d- 16cm
4.
Drainage pit
5.
Light-type protective door
6.
Poles, d--5 to 7cm
GROUP 1
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SthQET
IRONBARK
csDB-3/650, 080
A.
Top View B.
Longitudinal Section
1.
Removable plank bed
1.
Earth - 90cm
2.
Place for stove
2.
Clay - 10cm
3.
Board frame, d- 14 to 16cm
3.
Log, d= 16cm
4.
Drainage pit
4.
Drainage pit
5.
Light type protective
door
6.
Poles, d= 5 to 7cm
7.
Removable plank bed
8.
Crossbars, d = 12cm
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S&RET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
2.
d=12 to 14c.m
Log frames, d= 12 to 14cm
B.
Longitudinal Section
1. Passages, d= 12/2cm
2. Earth
3.
Open connecting trench
3. Clay - 10cm
4.
Place for stove
4. Frame of installation
5.
Supports, d= 12/2cm
5. Drainage pit
6.
Bed made of poles
6. Light-type protective door
7. Log, d= 12cm
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SICPFT
IRONBARK
A. Top View
1. Reinforced concrete section B-1
2. Place for stove
3. Plank bed
4. Light-type protective door
B. Longitudinal Section
1. Earth
2. Clay - 10cm
3. Frame of shelter
4. Drainage pit
5. Reinforced concrete
section B-2
6. Opening for stove pipe
7. Reinforced concrete
section B-1
?3. Reinforced concrete
section B-3
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TSECRET
IRONBARK
The protective soil cover over dugouts must be not less than
100cm deep to ensure reduction of the penetrating radiation dose by
200 to 400 times. The entrances to dugouts are equipped with light-
type protective doors.
The structurally strongest dugouts are made of reinforced con-
crete sections and corrugated steel; the least strong with revetted
slopes made of poles and a cover made of logs. On the average, dug-
outs do not suffer damage from shock wave pressures at ground level
less than 1.2kg/cm2. They sustain light damage from pressures of
1.2 to 2kg/cm2.
Dugouts of the construction cited above ensure protection of
personnel at a distance of about 0.5km from ground zero of the burst
of a low-yield atomic bomb and at a distance of about 0.8km from
ground zero of the burst of a medium-yield bomb.
Lighht-Typ Shelters
The light-type shelter is usually constructed by means of ex-
cavation. The frames of pit shelters are made of timbererI elements
in the form of frames, panels and blocks, and of reinforced con-
crete sections and corrugated steel sections (Figures 124, 125).
The soil thickness covering a light-type pit shelter mast; be
no less than 160cm to ensure a 2000 to 3000 times reduction in the
penetrating radiation dose. Entrances to the shelter are equipped
with heavy-type protective doors, air intake openings and chimneys
with anti-blast valves or gravel shock absorbers; chimney openings
are fitted with hermetic valves closed by hand.
The structurally strongest shelter is made of frame blocks and
reinforced concrete sections; the least strong shelter is made with
frames in the form of a disjointed contour (v vide nezamknutogo
kontura) (from sloping revetments made of poles).
The following data describe the average structural strength
of light-type shelters. The installations do not-suffer damage at
shock wave pressures less than 1.0kg/cm2 at ground level, but at
pressures of 1.0 to 3.0kg/cm2 they suffer light damage.
Light-type shelters of the construction given above protect
personnel at a distance of 0.4km from the center of a surface or
from ground zero of a low air burst of a low-yield atomic bomb and
at a distance of 0.6km with a burst of a medium-yield bomb.
Troops can remain in hermetically sealed shelters equipped with
filter-ventilating systems when the terrain and air are contaminated
with toxic and radioactive materials.
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IRONBARK
1 A.
CSM-3/650, 080
~-- ioao
doscn
Figure 124.
Light-Type Shelter of Frame-Block Construction
A.
Top View C.
Longitudinal Section
1.
Outline of cover
1.
Log, d = 12cm
2.
Panel
2.
Earth
3.
Plank beds
3.
Insulating material
(clay,etc)
.4.
Panel
4.
Earth
5.
Frame of shelter
6.
Gravel shock absorber
7.
Protective door
8.
Hermetic doors
9.
Heating unit
10.
Panel
11.
Filter-ventilation unit
GROUP 1
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Y L.
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SF FT
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650, 080
Q
A. Top View,
1. Hermetic doors
2. Protective door
3. Plank beds
4. Heating unit
5. Filter-ventilation unit
Figure 125. Light-Type Shelter of Reinforced Concrete Sections
B. Cross Section
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E ET
S \\CR
C. Longitudinal Section
1. Reinforced concrete
2.
3.
section "V"+"
Earth
Reinforced concrete
section "T-2M"
4. Gravel shock absorber
5. Boards 5cm thick
6. Boards 5cm thick
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Covered Machine Gun and Observation Works of the Field Tyne
Covered machine gun and observation works are constructed with timber and
earth, of reinforced concrete sections and with armored end pieces (covers).
//7//
fp1H( 'r0 cM
Figure 126. Covered Machine Gun Emplacement Mde of "T-l" Reinforced
Concrete Sections
A. Cross-Section B Top View
1. Fixed camouflage cover 1. "T-l" section
2. Wire brace
3. Camouflage cover attached
to movable panel
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
When constructing machine gun and observation works the following re-
quirements are met:
-- entrances to the works are equipped with protective doors and the gun
ports and observation slits are fitted with protective devices (of the panel
and flap type) in order to prevent the shock wave from penetrating into the
installation;
-- alongside the casemetes (especially in works with armored covers),
where possible, shelters are built for the protection of the crew from
penetrating radiation.
During construction special attention is given to the secure attachment
of the covers (ogolovok) to the frame of the installation.
The construction of the machine gun installation from "T-l" reinforced
concrete sections is shown in Figure 126; the construction of an observation
installation with armored cover is shown in Figure 127.
The structural strength of covered machine gun and observation in-
stallations and their protective properties are described by the data
presented in Tables 132 and 133,
Figure 127. Observation Post with Armored Cover, Type TIP
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IM SECRET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Figure 127. (continued)
A. Longitudinal Section
1. Earth
2. Clay, 10cm
3. Log, d= l6cm
4. Observation slit
5. Spike
6. Support frame
7. Cross bar, d= 16cm
8. Log frames
Structural Strength of
B. Top View
1. Light type protective door
2. Supports., d= 12cm
3. Drainage pit
4. Poles
5. Limit log ceiling
6. Log frames; d = l6tim
Fie" e
fable 132
Type of Structure
Pressure Ap in kg/cm2 at which
the installation sustains
Total de-
Moderate
S? ig'?t
stru tion
damage
damage
Timber-earth machine
1.1
0.8
o.6
gun works of crown
(venchataya ,con-
struction
Timber-earth observa-
0.8
o.6
0.4
tion works of frame
construction
Machine gun and obser-
2.5
1.6
0.8
vation works with re-
inforced concrete
domes
Observation works with
1.1
o.6
0.5
armored covers on wood
foundations
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'n'
IRONBARK
Protective Properties of Covered Machine
Gun and Observation Works
CSDB-3/6508 080
Table 133
Type of structure
Distance in km at which the installation
ensures protection of personnel
From atomic bursts
From atomic bursts
of low yield
of medium yield
Timber-earth and rein-
0.75
1.0
forced concrete machine
gun works
Timber-earth observation
0.8
1.2
structures
observation structures
with reinforced concrete
domes and armored covers:
with observers under
1.0
1.3
the dome (armored
cover)
with observers in
0.5
0.8
covered position -
1
1 -1
The best protective properties are possessed by installations with
periscopic observation. Such installations, depending on their importance;;
may be constructed as dugouts or light-type shelters.
Dugouts and Shelters for Guns and Mortars
Shelters of the pit type are constructed for guns with calibers
up to 100mm intended for direct fire.
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IRONBARK
50, 080
The shelter is made in the form of a pit connected to the gun site by a ramp.
If materials and time are available the position is made with a cover of logs.
The entrance to the shelter is covered with joined panels made of beams (logs).
Shelters are constructed for guns firing from concealed positions so that
the gun is covered to the upper edge of the shield.
Dugouts for antiaircraft guns, recoilless weapons and mortars are dug to a
depth which does not interfere with firing.
Dugouts are built for the concealment of crews.
The location of dugouts relative to gun sites depends on the protective
properties of the terrain and the expenditure of the minimum amount of time for
occupying them on receipt of the warning signal of the danger of an atomic attack.
Slit trenches with recesses are built for ammunition. Sectors of slit trenches
with recesses are covered (and if time permits, the whole slit trench is covered).
Trenches for guns, rocket launchers and mortars are shown in Figures 128 to 132.
57mm pun 3 00
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Figure 128. Trench with a Wide Field of Fire for 57mm, 85mm and lOOmm Guns.
VOW-Sk-
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110 120 -30
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SECET
IRONBARK
Figure 128 (continued with its description)
A. Top View
1. Concealment for L;un
2. Ammunition niches
3. Dugout
4. Possible connecting trench
5. Drainage pit
CSDB-3/650,080
~CTj,~-~ 1~~20
n7w'!wrll . -t,0 f
Figure 129. Excavated Emplacement with Wide Field of Fire for 122rnm Gun, 122mm
and 152mm Howitzers and 152mm Gun - Howitzer (A and B without revetted
slopes, C and D with slopes revetted with poles)
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IRONBARK
Figure 129 (continued with its description)
A
Cross-Section
Top View
.
1.
Excavation for tube
B.
Top View
2.
Stakes, d =7cm
1.
Excavation for tube
3.
Dugout
Dugout
4.
Ammunition niches
Drainage pit
5.
Guywires, d =3 to 4mm
Ammunition niches
6.
Possible connecting
Possible connecting trench
Ramp
7.
trench
Drainage pit
8.
Supports, d : 10 to 12cm,
C.
Cross-Section
every 0.9 to 1.0cm
1. Poles, d= 5 to 7cm
9.
Ramp
Figure 130. Emplacement for 85mm Antiaircraft Gun.
B. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Ammunition niche
3. Drainage pit
4. Ammunition niches
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IRONBARK
or 82mm guns
Y225501275
220,420
or 107mm ns
00 350
3 0' 0
CSDB-3/650, 080
Dimensions of-Emplacement in cm
D R b
2 ammunition niches are made
for 82mm gun
Figure 131. Emplacement for 82mm and 107mm Recoilless Guns
A. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Ammunition niches
3. Drainage pit
4. Possible connecting trench
S RET
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SF?QFT
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Figure 132. Emplacement,with Circular Field of Fire for the 120mm (82mm) Mortar
A. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Ammunition niches (for mortar shell)
3. Drainage pit
4. Possible connecting trench
B. Cross-Section
Note: Dimensions in parentheses are for the 82mm mortar
-23-
IWIIV T
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IRONBARK
CSDB -3/650,080
The protective properties of gun emplacements and shelters are
given in Table 134.
Table 134
Distances in km at which installa-
tions ensure protection of guns
and mortars
From atomic bursts
of low yield
with guns located on the platform 0.7 1.0
with guns located in the shelters 0.5
lacements and. Sheltersfoi Tanks Assault Guns and Armored Pe::so ?,nei C;B!ri~ie:rss
Emplacements with circular or limited fields of fire are constructed
for tanks and assault guns. In cases where firing is not anticipated.,
shelters are constructed for tanks and assault guns. Shelters.. as a rubes
are constructed for armored personnel carriers. The construction of em-
placements and shelters is shown in Figures 133-134.
Slit trenches or dugouts are constructed near the emplacements
(shelters) for the protection of the crew.
-24-
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SE~RET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Figure 133. Emplacement for Tanks and,Assault Guns
A. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Breastwork not made in
assault gun field of
fire
3. Longitudinal axis
4. Ramp
-25-
SCRET
B. Longitudinal Section
1. Drainage pit (constructed
when there is not slit
trench for crew)
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SFC T
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
3
Figure 134. Emplacement for Tanks, Assault Guns
A. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Tracks constructed if
earth is soft
3. Slot for gun tube
4. Ramp
SE"ET
GROUP 1
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declassification
and Armored Personnel Carriers
B. Longitudinal Section
1. Grade 1:3 or 1:4
2. Drainage pit
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SEC ET
IRONBARK
Features
e
Legend
Dimensions
Emplacement and shelter
a
For emplacements- width of
width along the bottom
vehicle + 50cm; for shelter-
width of vehicle + 100cm
Length of pit of emplace-
b,c
For emplacements- yength of
ment and shelter along
vehicle + 50cm; for shelters-
the bottom
length of vehicle + 50cm
Emplacement depth
d
According to location (must
permit firing). Usually 90
to 2.00cm without breastwork
Shelter depth
e
Height of vehicle
Height of trench for the
-
Height of the zero line of
tube in a shelter
the gun minus 40cm
Length of trench for the
-
Tube length + 30cm
tube in a shelter
Incline of the revetment
-
Not more than 45 to 600
of the emplacements and
shelters
Height of breastwork
-
40 to 50cm
CSDE-3/650,080
Emplacement and Shelter dimensions are given in Table 135.
Table 135
lacement and Shelter Dimensions
-27-
E ET
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IRONBARK
3/650,080
Tanks, assault guns and in shelters are not tossed
about by the shock wave, as a result of which the radius of the zon s
of severe and moderate damage to vehicles is diminished. Emplacements
protect armored equipment to a lesser degree, since damage to the t=ret
and gun is not prevented.
The protective properties of emplacements and shelters are des-
cribed by the data given in Table 136.
Table 2.36
p
r
Type of equipment, protected
.
Distance in km at chic. the protected
equipment retains its combat effec-
tiveness
During atomic
Do-ring atomic
bursts of low
bursts cf me1 um
yield
yield
Heavy and medium tanks and
assault guns:
in shelters
0.25
0.40
in emplacements
0.3
0.4
Light tanks, assault guns and
armored personnel carriers in
shelters
0.4
0.6
Light tanks and assault guns
in emplacements
0.5
0.8
-28-
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'FRET
acements and, Shelters
erties of
otective Pro
P
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iR SEZSRET
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
Note: The radii of the zones of slight damage (damage to external equipment)
of tanks and assault guns in emplacements and shelters are significantly greater
than given in the table. They are approximately equal to the radii of the zones
of slight damage to vehicles situated in the open.
Concealed Positions for Tractors, Special-Purpose
Vehicles and Engineer Vehicles
Concealed positions of the pit type with ramps for entrance and exit are
constructed for tractors, special-purpose vehicles and I engineer vehicles
(Figure 135). Dimensions for such concealed positions are given in Table 137.
Figure 135. Emplacement for Tractors,
Special-Purpose Vehicles.
A. Top View
1. Dugout
2. Ramp
Engineer Vehicles and
B. Longitudinal Section
1. Drainage pit
2. Grade
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SECTET
IRONBARK
CS B-3/653, 080
Table ]37
Basic Dimensions o f Concealed Positions f r Tractors,
Engineer Vehicles and Spe ^ial-PE2ose Vehiciar,
t'r'ansport Vehi les
GAZ - 69
GAZ - 63, GAZ - 51
ZIS - 150, ZIS - 151
Amphibious tracked
transporter K-61
Amphibious vehicle
BAV
Amphibious vehicle
MAV
Vehicle with pontoon
section
Tank truck
ARS-12D
Decontamination ve-
hicle AIN-48D and
disinfection-shower
vehicle DDA-53
13.2
3.2
3.2
10.0 10 911 2.9
7.0 8.0 2.8
5.6 15.5 2.8
3.5
Table 137 continued on next page
-30-
130
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IRONBARK
CSM-3/650, o8o
Table 137 continued
Power unit APB
1.5
2.5
5.2
1.4
13
Power unit SPO (SPL)
3.5
6.0
8.5
2.3
95
Power unit 1-AP-1.5
2.5
3.3
1.1
1.9
40
Radiotechniccal sta-
4.5.
7 5
85
2.3
135
tion
Radar station
3.0
6.5
3.0
0.8
Tta ctor-Prime
Movers and"
aaea? ?e3~iris
Tractor S-80
3.3
X4.3
10.5 2.8
105
Prime Mover M-2
3.6
5-e0
9.3 2.5
2.010
Light prime mover
3.0
.5 .2
8.2 2,2
70
Medium prime mover
3.4
i
5.9
9.7" 2.6
110
Heavy prime mover
4.0
7.0 1
1, .8
T65
Excavator E-255
4.2 1
4.3 1
13.01
3.5
185
Excavator KZ?-65
403 '
9.4
14.5
3.9
330
Bulldozer 1)-27:L
4.0 J
5.4 1
10.5
4.2 ;
8.6 1
13.8
3?
280
Concealed positions for - bats special an transpu~~-1, vehi 1-s a:
tractors are completely destroyed at pressures greater than 0.8: g%,;;r
they sustain moderate damage at pressures of 0. 5kg/ cnf and s1i,ght _-nage
at pressures of 0.35kg/C'n2.
The protective properties of concealed positions are Sys :ribe~~
the data given in Table 138.
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Oft SMUT
IRONBARK
CSf-3/6 0, 080
Tab .e 138
Protective Properties of f)concea e~i Pcsitions
Kind of Equipment
Transport and speial
vehicles
Tractors and combat engineer
vehicles
0.6
it ~_el
Sri a t and P ar Area Eccuipment
From atomic
bursts of
mr yield
1-3
0.9
Concealed positions for the preser' 3ation of ammo, nit one fue? 9
lubricants and rear area equipment are b=: i 1t; if there are no natural
shelters (ravines, pit depre ;si, s )
I .
Vaults (Figure 136) or pit-type ahe..ters ( igu re 1,37) are ex-
cavated for storing ammunition.
Pits are excavated for star r),g f el and 1-'-nricants --In :-,':_ntainsZs,
barrels and cans. When materials are a a ~a~; ea the pits are ;sere .
It is recommended that large c4'~ntainers with fuel be buried and
covered with a layer of earth. It is * ee:~essar?y to construct wooden
-32-
GROUP 1
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Distance in km at which a concealed
position protects equipment
'er:=m at.omi 3 ' u sts
of ..oFq yield
o. 85
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650, 080
frames over the. filler neck (gorlovina) of the tanks, which, at the level of the
top of the fill, is covered with a wooden lid whose upper surface is covered with
iron.
Semi-excavated storage areas or shelters of the dugout type are constructed
for the preservation of clothing, rations and forage.
Figure 136. Vault for Ammunition Storage
A. Top View
1. Drainage pit
B. Longitudinal Section
-33-
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I SE SRET
IRONBARK
57
85mm gin
100mm gun
1 howitzer
122mm gun
Vault d:~meneions in m
C8 -3/650,,080
'ol sae o '
excavated
earth in
x,. '2 2.0 16
2 3.5 22
O 5.0 27
152mm howitzer
152 mm gun-howitzer
203mm howitzer
1.0 4.5
82mm mortar
bo 2o
120mm mortar ton
160mm mortar .e0 4~o
?3,1a
27
29
25
14.
1.7
22
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IRONBARK
CSM-3/650, 080
A. Top View
1. Floor made of poles, d - 6 to 8cm
2. Tracks lade of planks, d= 20/2
3. Drainage pit, 40 x 60cm
B. Longitudinal Section
Note: Volume of earth excavated - 90m3.
Construction time (including con-
struction of tracks and floors)
-- 24.5 man-days.
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i '~ SE~RET
IRONBARK
~(,','s S:,-3 /650,, 030
The protective properties of these shelters are describei by the
data given in Table ,3 9.
Table 139
Protective Properties of Concealed Positi ,::s
Type of equipment and
Distance in kin at which prctection
of e ; ipment is ensured
means of storage
From bursts of
From bunts of
low-yield a~ onai-o
meh to m-yield
wea on s
at, is weapnns
Fuels and lubW ideas is
0.?
i..6
metallic drums in f it.. t p,e
shelters (trenoLes
Lubricants in wooden ron-
tainers in pit??tcvpe
shelters (trenches)
Fuel in underground re-
0.3
0. 4'.;
servoirs
Rear area suppit ee (c . th-
c). 65
1.57
ing, rations and forage)
in storage vaults of up-
right,, pit-type construe-
tion
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IM SEC~{2ET
IR NBARK
CSC-3; 650,480
Shelters at Water Sapp Point:'
At water s ,,apply points shelters are con.strua t',G Rio
-- for wells, shafts and pump gear.
-~ for materials used for purification and storage of v a ter;
-- for personnel and means of transporting water.
Shelters for well shafts and pumps are shown in Figure 738. P:".ts,
niches and covered slit trenches ensure the pro eetion of we. "' shafts,
drilled wells, and pumping gear moi;nted on them from burst, of atonic
weapons of medium yield at distances of 0.4 to O.6km, an f-_-, m smalL-
yield weapons at distances of 0.25 to 0.4km.
The protection of drilled wells, set up in dugouts, is ensured
from bursts of atomic weapons of medium yield at distances of 0.3 to
0.35km and from weapons of low yield at "stances of about 0. m.
Water purification facilities, mounted on vehic:l.es, are, placed it
shelters of the pit type and portable facilities are ploaced in trenches
or covered slit trenches.
Pits are prepared for the cover of authorized water st,, rage equipment,
It is necessary to cover water tanks (type RTe-6003) with canvas in
order to avoid radioactive fallout.
-37-
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IRONBARK
B. Longitudinal Section of A
Earth - 40 to 60cm
Clay - 8 to 10cm
Ceiling, d = 12 to 14cm
Q _ 270cm
1. Ceiling, d e 12 to 14cm
2. Poles, d s 5 to 7cm
3. Post, 10 to 12cm
240cm
4. Water Table
C. Bucket-chain Pump
1. Wooden cover
2. Stone covering
3. Intermediate protective
covering
4. Clay barrier
D. Band rump
1. Clay barrier
2. Well pipe
E. Hand Pump
1. Clay barrier
2. Well pipe
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SFC~FT
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
The construction of shelters and the disposition of storage tanks within
them is shown in Figure 139?
Pit type shelters will protect authorized storage tanks from bursts of
atomic weapons of medium yield at distances of about 1.2km, and from small-
yield bursts at distances of about 0.8km.
For the shelter of personnel serving a water supply point and for those
coming for water, dugouts or covered slit trenches are constructed and pit
type shelters are constructed for water transport gear.
Figure 139. Emplacement for Reservoirs (RYe-6000)
A. Top View
Volume of earth excavated - 6m3
Construction time - 15 man-days
34. Protective Measures Against Shock Wave Penetration into Installations*
Shock Wave Penetration into installations through doors, air vents, gun ports,
and other apertures may lead to destruction of the garrison and damage to the in-
ternal equipment of field defense installations even at distances from the center
(ground zero) of an atomic burst where the protective features of the installations
do not suffer real damage. Therefore special attention must be paid to the pro-
tection of apertures through which the shock wave may penetrate.
Note: * The protection of installations against the penetration of radioactive
materials is ensured by measures carried out by antichemical defense and is
not considered in this Guide.
00111101111111*
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CF\\)CDr-T
IRONBARK
Protection of Entrances and Gun Forts
Protective doors are used (in dugouts, shelters, covered machine gun and
observation installations) for the protection of field defense installations
against the penetration of the shock wave through entrances. Detachable panels
are used in covered trenches.
Depending on the construction of the installation, the type of entrance
and the availability of materials, protective doors may be made of wood, metal,
or reinforced concrete. Metal or reinforced concrete doors are used in
especially important underground or reinforced concrete installations. In
addition, metal doors may be used in installations nude of assembled reinforced
concrete sections. Wooden doors are used in the majority of field defense in-
stallations (Figures 140, 141).
A.
Door Frame
C.
Overall View
1. Boards, 5cm thick
1.
Assembly A
2.
Assembly B
B.
Door Panel.
1. Door clamp
D.
Cross Section of
Metal hinge
Assembly A
Oiled papers between
layers of boards
E.
Cross Section of
Assembly B
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mom c\\rDr T
IRONBARK
B. Door Panel
1. Metal hinge
2. Oiled paper between
layers of boards
CCDB-3/650,030
Various types of hinged panels, flaps and plug:, are used to protect the in-
terior compartments of installations against the nenetruti.on of the shock wave
through gun ports and observation slit.
In reinforced concrete fire positions permanent type gun ports are protected
with special protective armor devices.
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S'1CRFT
IRONBARK
C$>JB-3/650, 080
Protection of Ventilation Apertures and Chimneys
-- gravel filter-shock absorber;
-- filter-shock absorbers combined with valve cut-off for the shock wave;
antiblast valves with by-pass channels;
hermetic valves closed manually; and
electromechanical antiblast devices.
Figure 142. Construction of Gravel Filter-Shock Absorbers From
1.
2.
3.
Materials at Hand
Earth
- 15cm 4.
Clay
- 5cm
Logs,
d = 18 to 20cm 5.
Metal barrel 6.
Wooden support
Air intake pipe,
d = 100mm
Gravel, d = 3 to 4cm
Wooden housing
10 x 10cm
GROUP 1
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In order to protect ventilation apertures and chimneys against shock wave
penetration the following are used:
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CGfCDGT
IRONBARK
CSns-3/650,080
Gravel Filter-Shock Absorber (Figure 1142) is the simplest and a sufficiently
effective means of damping a shock wave. The damping coefficient (the ratio of
the shock wave pressure at the entrance to the shock wave pressure at the exit)
depends on the magnitude of the pressure at the entrance, the thickness of the
gravel layer and its density. With a layer of gravel 60em thick the damping
coefficient fluctuates within the limits of 5 to 10.
The coarseness and thickness of the layers of gravel are selected on the
basis of the resistance to the flow of the air collected by the ventilator, which
may be equal to a 15 to 20mm water column with manual, and a 25 to 30mm water
column with mechanical operation of the ventilator.
A gravel shock absorber does not completely damp the shock wave of an atomic
burst, therefore besides filter-shock absorbers, manually operated hermetic valves
are installed on water lines and stove pipes in field installations.
1.
Body
Valve cut-off disc
2.
Lid
Valve cut-off return
3.
Base plate of the cut-off
valve
8.
spring
Adjustment nut
4.
Connecting sleeve to air
9.
Shock absorber filler--
intake or chimney
metal shavings or coils
5.
Base plate of shock
absorber
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IRONBARK
CSDB-3650, 080
Filter Shock Absorber (Figure 143), combined with shock wave cut-off is a more
improved device for damping the shock wave of an atomic burst. The cut-off reduces
the shock wave action time in the shock absorber as a result of the closure- of the
air intake aperture by the disc-cutoff.' located in the upper horizontal partition of
the shock absorber, as a consequence of which such a shock absorber reduces the pres-
sure approximately 20 times. The filter-shock absorber combined with a cutoff is
used in light-type installations for the protection of ventilation apertures and
chimneys.
Antiblast valves with bypass channel (Figure 144), at the moment of a burst,
automatically close the ventilation or exhaust apertures by means of a piston dis-
placed by the impact of the shock wave. The presence of a bypass channel ensures
closure of the. aperture before the shock wave reaches it through the bypass channel.
VALYE P/ ST b 14 d 11 ,?
Figure 144. Basic Diagram of an Antiblast Valve with Bypass Channel
*Closure time for the disc of the filter-shock absorber placed in a
filter ventilation system equipped with filters FP-50, must be not more
than -lm/sec where Qp exits = 0.2kg/cm2 and the computed pressure at
entrance t'p.entrance 5kg/cm2. f--vykh'~vkh
-44-
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CG
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/050, 080
The PVK-100 valve (Figure 145) consists of three concentrically arranged
steel tubes with diameters of 100, 150, and 200mm. A piston moves in the center
tube; it has a series of apertures on its side. In the initial position of the
piston these apertures coincide with the apertures in the central tube, and air
enters the installation along the lines indicated by the arrows. Under the im-
pact of the shock wave the piston is shifted and the lateral walls close the
apertures.
1.
Basic Data
2.
Size - 10 220 x 1700
column of water
3.
Weight #-100kg
Bypass channel of
4.
Bypass channel length
the valve
L?=2.5m
10.
Stop pin
5.
Piston weight G 0.5kg
11.
Valve piston
6.
Piston stroke Y 17.5mm
12.
Retaining mechanism
7.
Piston area S = 89.8cm2
13.
Return mechanism
14.
Base ring
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
SRFT
IRONBARK
CSDI3-3/650, 080
An antiblast valve of different construction, also designed for the pro-
tection of apertures with a diameter of 100mm, is shown in Figure 146. The
bypass channel of this valve is in the form of an elbow of a tube with a dia-
meter of 100mm. The sealing gaskets ensure a tighter seal of the air duct with
a valve of this type.
Figure 146.
Antiblast Valve with Bypass Channel and Sealing Gaskets
A.
Side View B.
Longitudinal Section
1.
Air intake
1. Retaining mec
hanism
2.
Valve closing device
2. Valve piston
3.
Bypass channel
3. Sealing gaske
t
Basic Data: size - 2300 x 250 x 120mm; weight - 60kg; length of bypass
channel - L = 3.6m; piston weight - G 0.5kg; piston stroke -
Y - 80mm; piston area - S 78cm2; resistance - 12mm column of
water.
SEN2ET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650, 080
The valve, shown in Figure 147, consists of two separate elements: the
valve itself and the bypass channel in the form of an elbow chamber made of
steel tubes. This allows the chamber to be installed in the protective fea-
tures of the installation during its construction and the valve to be installed
during the equipment assembly.
Antiblast valves with bypass channels are intended principally for the pro-
tection of apertures in heavy type defense installations.
V~pai, 4 IC- Ageow K
0194
Figure 147, Antiblast Valve with Bypass Channel in the Form of an
Elbow Chamber of Steel Tubes
-47-
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
SFk'PFT
In Figure 148 a PVK-300 valve is shown installed in a reinforced concrete
installation for the protection of a ventilation aperture with a diameter of
300mm? The 2.5 meter long bypass channel of the valve is situated in the thick
protective wall of the installation. The route of air movement in the install-
ation is indicated by arrow's on the sketch.
If necessary the air duct may be closed by valve and by hand.
Electromechanical antiblast devices. The automatic antiblast device
APU-1 0 may serve as an example. It is activated by the impingement of gamma
rays at the moment of an atomic burst, that is, before the arrival of the
shock wave. The device consists of a gamma ray receiver (pick up), trigger
circuit (control panel), activating mechanism (two valves with electromagnets)
and packing box for cables, pick-up and battery.
Figure 148. Antiblast Valve Type PVK-300 Installed in a Reinforced Concrete
Installation
IRONBARK
cSr -3/65o,080
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13 : CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
the Win electrical circuit of the APU-100 is shown in Figure 149. Gamma
rays impinge on the pick-up, inducing an electric current in the pick-up circuit
which causes a voltage drop in the resistor R producing ignition of the three-
electrode gas discharge tube L. When a discharge is induced in tube L it becomes
conductive and closes the power circuit to relay P. The relay discharge, and
with its contacts l - 2 and 3 - 4 connects battery B to the closing electromag-
nets of both activating mechanisms (Figure 150). TD electromagnets retract the
plunger (serdechnik) connected to a movable plate which, on moving, covers the
apertures of the lattice.
Following activation of the closing electromagnets the battery is cut off.
Power for the pickup is furnished by battery B3 (see Figure 149) and for
relay P - from battery B2.
The device permits closing and opening of the valve by buttons (two-way
switches).
Power for the electrical circuit of the device is provided from direct
current sources (from dry batteries and storage batteries) or from alternating
current grids through selenium rectifiers.
During an atomic burst, the automatic antiblast device operates at those
distances where the pressure in the shock wave front changes from 12 to 0.lkg/cm2.
At these distances the mechanical stability of all its elements is ensured.
Figure 149.
Electrical Circuit of Antiblast Device APU-l00
1. Pick-up 7. To activating equipment II
2. Control panel 8. Activating equipment I
3. To activating equipment II 9. Closing electromagnet
4. Valve I -- closed 10. Valve
5. Valve I -- open 11. Opening electromagnet
6. Valve II -- open
-49-
~ SEL'~ET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
I cP)rDGT 50X1-HUM
IRONBARK
Figure 150. Activating Mechanism of Antiblust Device APU-100
a. Valve with connecting cables from the control panel
b. Valve with open aperture
The pick-up (Figure 151) is installed outside the installation in the ground
at a depth of 30 to 40cm. It is constructed of a steel tube inside of which a gas
counter, type STS-5, is placed. Basic dimensions of the pick-up: diameter - 6.5cm;
length - 26.5cm; and weight - 5.5kg.
The pick-up is connected by flexible cable to the overall circuit of the device.
By its sensitivity, the pick-u ensures dependable activation of the APU circuit with
a gamma ray dose rate of 0.1r/hr.
The control panel ensures: prompt automatic activation of two valves installed
in the air intake channel and chimney; closure and opening of these by two-way switches;
detection of radioactive contamination inside the shelter and filter-absorbers at a
radiation level of 0.1r/hr and higher.
The automatic antiblast device AFU-100 ensures dependable protection of the
filter-ventilation plant and heotinj system from the shock wave of an atomic burst
and is designed for long-term utilization in important field defense installations.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
df50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7
Gomm eCk'nrIr
IRONBARK
CSDB-3/650,080
One method of placing an automatic antiblast device in a field-type in-
stallation is given in Figure 152.
Figure 152.
One Method of Placing an Automatic Antiblast Device in a Shelter
1.
Clay seal
6. Heating syste
m
2.
Pick-up
7. Packing boxes
with
3.
Wooden housing, internal
storage batt
eries
dimensions 250 x 250mm
8. Control panel
4.
Sand
9. Filter-ventila
ting system
5-
Valve
waW rzr-~VPT
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/13: CIA-RDP80T00246AO29600060001-7