THE INVASION OF GRENADA--IT FOCUSED ATTENTION ON A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE NEW MEDIA.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100020154-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 154
• Publication Date: January 19, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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ABC NEWS VIEWPOINT
19 January 1984
KOPPEL: The invasion of Grenada--it focused attention on a conflict between the
Reagan administration and the news media. Are present goverment efforts to
control information essential for national security? Or do they deprive the
press and the public of needed information? We'll explore these and other issues
tonight.
ANNOUNCER: This is ABC News Viewpoint. Now reporting from Dallas, here is Ted
Koppel.
KOPPEL: Of one thing you can rest assured this evening, each side can and will
lay claim to doing only what is in the best interest of the nation. This is not
an argument between good and evil but rather a question of when virtue becomes
distorted by exaggeration. Is there, should there be such a thing as perfect
security for a government and its agencies, neither leaks of accountability for
classifying material. If you come to this issue with an open mind, you'll likely
find yourself swinging backwards and forwards as the arguments are laid out. As
you do, please remember that it is only within a vibrant democracy that such
issues are even debated. Later in this broadcast, we'll through the discussion
open to questions from our audience. But first, let's meet tonight's panelists.
With us here in Dallas, Michael\Burch, assistant secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs; Richard\Willard, acting assistant attorney general in charge of the
Justice Department's Civil Division; Floyd\Abrams, one of the nation's leading
First Amendment lawyers who argued the Pentagon Papers case before the U.S.
Supreme Court; and Jack\Nelson, Washington bureau chief of the Los Angeles times.
And joining us from our Washington bureau, New ?1 k Times columnist
William\Safire and Patrick\Buchanan, commentator and co-anchor of the Cable News"
Network program Crossfire. Pat, why don't we begin with you, and let's see if
you can outline for us what you believe the issue to be. BUCHANAN: Ah, well,
basically, Ted, we've got a conflict here between the press and the
administration. But just as ABC News realizes its got to maintain the
confidentiality of its sources and the inviability of its dicussions and
deliberations, I think the Washington press corps, which is succumbing to
something of a chicken-little fever, if you will, ought to understand that the
president of the United States, National Security Countil, Department of States,
CIA have a right to the confidentiality of their communications, too, because the
national security is at stake. And every directive and proposal they've made, I
think, is in within reason for achieving that legitimate objective.
KOPPEL: William Safire, if indeed, ah, only the National Security is at stake,
then what's the issue? SAFIRE: I think those of us, like Pat and myself, who
were in the Nixon administration should make a special effort to be careful that
a obcession with leaks doesn't pervade the administration and push us into a
situation where the solution is worse than the problem. Burt Lance had a
wonderful thing to say once, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.' And I don't
think our security apparatus is broken. I don't think it needs any extreme
measures to make sure that censorship is'applied and free speech is stopped in
this country.
CONr7NUED
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KOPPEL: Mr. Willard, if anyone seems to think that the, ah, that the apparatus
is broken and is trying to fix it, I suppose the finger points at you. Why are
you trying to fix it, and what are you trying to do? WILLARD:--During the last
decade, in the wake of, ah, Watergate....
KOPPEL: Just move in a little closer to your mike, if you will. WILLARD:
During the last decade, in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, there's a great
trend towards openness in government, uncovering secrets. But during the 70s,
the pendulum we think swung too far, too much openness, a loss of confidence that
our government could keep a secret when it really counts. We're trying to
restore some of that balance. At the same time, though we recognize that
openness in government is very important. We only want to protect a small number
of limited secrets.
KOPPEL: How, Floyd Abrams, does one successfully protect a small number of
limited secrets without in some way impinging and infringing upon the rights of
everyone? ABRAMS: Well, you first have a rational classification system by
which you make a decision as to what the small number of secrets are. And then
you hire good people, ah, you try to keep them. And what you don't do, and what
Mr. Willard has drafted and the administration has supported, is to say that
because there are a small number of secrets which could get out that 127,000
people now have to be subjected to lifetime censorship, which is what this
administration has proposed with respect to all toplevel officials who have had
access to high-level intellence an defense information.
KOPPEL: What does.... ABRAMS: It seems to me it goes much too far.
KOPPEL: What does lifetime censorship mean? ABRAMS: Quite literally it would
mean that people who have had access to certain -types of intelligence information
while they're in the government must for the rest-of their lives submit --to
whoever is in power at that time, whichever party may be in power, whoever may be
there, anything that they wanna write or publish in any form, so long as it
relates to intelligence in any way. What it means literally is that if this had
been in effect in past administrations, that if people had wanted to criticize
the, ah, intelligence failures in Beirut, for example, leading to the loss of so
much American life, they would have had to submit that first to the
administration that they were criticizing. Tha,t it seems to me, antithetical to
any kind of notion of the public's right to information.
KOPPEL: Mr. Burch, ah, can one concede, while working for the government and
while being concerned, ah, about leaks, that it is possible to go too far, that,
that, that, I mean, one would have to assume, I suppose, that had these kinds of
regulations been in effect that secretaries of State, former presidents, former
secretaries of Defense who want to write their memoirs, would have a great deal
of trouble doing so? BURCH: Well, I don't think that's the intent of the
legislation. The fact that you have to submit for review items that you had
access to, dealing with the top secrets of this government and protecting them I
think is, is being responsible. I think that this whole game that the press is
playing and priding themselves in reversing or in revealing the nation's defense
secrets has gotten out of hand. It strikes me as sort of pathetic that the press
would respect the confidentiality of, ah, let's say the Redskins' and the
Raiders' play books for the Superbowl, ah, because that would be violating
sportsmanship but they don't have the same respect for our nation's best secrets.
LQ1T, LAVED
12,
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KOPPEL: Jack Nelson, we're really talking about two different issues here. On
the one hand we are talking about a press, which in many people's eyes has gone a
little bit too-far. "And, on the other hand-we're talking- about ? a 'government
agency, which if it is permitted to carry out what it intends, maybe it is feared
also going too far. See if you can, see if you can define for us a little more
closely what those two issues are. Then we'll take a look at a taped report, and
then we'll come back for more conversation. NELSON: Well, let me say this, that
I think to begin with when Mr. Burch says that, that the press, ah, is playing a
game, that's not true at all. The press is trying to find out what the
government is doing not only in the Defense Department but in other areas of the
government. And there are people within the government who are not playing a
game but who think that, ah, there are things in the government that the people
oughts know about. And so, that's what it really comes down to. It's not, it's
not a question of any game-playing at all. And I've gotta say this about this
administration, too, and William Safire's right about that. I think that he and
Pat Buchanan, of all people, people who've been in the Nixon administration,,
oughta think about that. This administration is obsessed, absolutely obsessed
with leaks. They have, ah, given lie detector tests, proposed giving lie
detector tests to the very highest officials in this administration. I was :told
by somebody in the White House just two days ago that Secretary of State George
Shultz walked in on a meeting with President Reagan and, and, William Clark.at
the time was the national security director, and Ed Meese was there, and that
George Shultz says, 'The minute you try to give me a polygraph test, I. walk out.'-
And that's the kind of administration it is. I talked to two different people in
the White House who said they found the investigations of leaks in this -
administration to be absolutely hair-raising and harrowing. And so, I think
that's really the issue here. And I, I believe that William Safire framed it
very well..
GREENFIELD: The general principal that some secrets should not be aired finds
agreement among journalists as well. PHILIP TAUBMAN (New York Times): There are
times when we have agents-in the field whose -operations- should?be -compromised if-
the press-publishes things.
KOPPEL: I, I'd like to, uh, address a quick question to Mr. Willard. And, and
the question, I guess, is this: Do you recognize that much of the leaking.that
goes on in Washington is, in fact, done not by dissident members of.the
administration, but by senior members of the administration who wanna get out a
piece of information without having to accept the responsibility for it on the
record? WILLARD: Well, I understand that is the way Washington has done
business, but we're-trying to change that. One of our goals is to change
attitudes. There's a double standard that if you're high-ranking enough, you can
get away with leaks, but the low-ranking people are the ones who, who will- be
gone after. Uh, Mr. Nelson was saying earlier on the show how White House staff
members were complaining because for once, leak investigations were coming after
them. That is the top, and no one is immune from being held Co a, a standard of
trust and that is, it's wrong to leak.
TLVZTED
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KOPPEL: All right. We've only got about a minute-and-a-half left in this
segment, so Jack, is it, I, I, and maybe it's unfair to address the question to a
member of the press, but is it possible to function in Washington without
leaks... NELSON: No, it isn't.
KOPPEL: For, for either the press or the government? NELSON: No, no it isn't.
And as a matter of fact, and Mr. Willard must certainly know this since he's in
government, that many, most of the leaks that come out of there are what we call
official leaks. They come from people within the administration who are, for
example, floating trial balloons, and you know that. And sometimes they do
involve matters that could be classified as national security.
KOPPEL: No, I, that's a, but Jack, I think, I think Mr. Willard has freely
conceded that point and says he's against those, too. NELSON: Oh, I know. But,,
but, but I think it's, I don't wanna say naive, but I think it's naive to say, to
think that this could be stopped, because this is at the very highest level, and
I'm sure in many cases it done with the presidential knowledge. So you're not
gonna stop leaks like that. I mean, I think that'.s ridiculous to say you'd stop
that kind of a leak.
KOPPEL: Go ahead, Mr. Willard. Take another 30-second crack, and then we'll
take a break. WILLARD. Well, I mean, that's, uh, that is the traditional
Washington attitude is nothing can be done. Uh, Bill Safire, in his column
today, said, 'the best thing we should do about leaks is nothing.' 'Course, he
said the problem was imaginary. Uh,'we're trying to change those attitudes.
KOPPEL: All right. We'll be back with more questions from our audience here in
Dallas when we return.
KOPPEL: Our topic again, government efforts to stop press leaks and control
information to the media. We're ready for more questions. Go ahead, sir.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK. My question is that, does the U.S. administration really
seriously think that by asking the top officials to submit their speeches for
approval will stop the leakage of secrets, and if so, how?
KOPPEL: Mr. Willard, I guess that's most appropriately directed to you.
WILLARD: Well, the obligation appli'es, we think, to current officials to avoid
making unauthorized disclosures, uh, but also to former officials, people, once
they leave the government, especially who've had-very high office, uh, carry
around a lot of secrets with them, and that's the purpose of the prepublication
review program. Uh, they don't have to submit everything they ever write, but if
they wanna write about intelligence operations, uh, then they do submit it for
clearance.
KOPPEL: Don't we have the, the extraordinary situation where: an administration
in power is usually in the position, then, of declaring whether the papers of an
administration out of power and usually unfriendly, are, ought to be, remain
classified or become declassified? Isn't it likely that a little friendly
political rivalry might play a role there? WILLARD: Well, that's why we've
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tried to build a number of safeguards into the system.. The main one is judicial
review. Uh, if we want to censor material that's submitted, we have to be able
to prove in court that every word we want to take out is classified and properly
classified. So there is this safeguard, and one we've traditionally relied upon.
KOPPEL: Bill Safire, you did, indeed, today write a, a column critical of this
whole movement. Uh, explain to us why you're so critical. SAFIRE: Well, I was
just about to toss in a question to Mr. Willard. Uh, isn't the president, under
his plan, exempted from, uh, that lifetime censorship? WILLARD: President, uh,
is not legally bound by employment agreements. (audience laughs) Uh, neither
are members of Congress. Uh, so the, uh.-.. SAFIRE: Everybody in the
administration is except the president and vice president. WILLARD: And members
of Congress. SAFIRE: Right. So why, if President Reagan believes that this is
a good idea, is he not willing to embrace it for himself as well? WILLARD: Uh,
the reason is there's no legal basis for requiring that of elected officials.
There is for people who are employed "by the government. That was the basis of
the Supreme Court's_decision in the.*Snep case, which- is the basis for_this._
SAFIRE: Certainly, though, if, if President Reagan, uh, agrees with you and
thinks this is a good thing for every member of his administration, he should
certainly take the lead and set an example by saying 'this is what I'm gonna do,
too.' WILLARD: Well, I'm sure that the president will take steps that, when he
leaves office, uh, to make sure that he doesn't disclose classified information.
VOICE OF BUCHANAN: Ted, Ted, can I make a point on this?
KOPPEL: Yeah, go ahead, Pat, and then I do wanna move on to another question.
BUCHANAN: Uh, right now, the members of the. Central Inte~li nr ency, as a
consequence of the Snep decision, they are not allowed to profit by exploiting
secrets that they've been given while in the service to the country in -the_ CIA.
They're not allowed to make a lot of money on it by taking thse secrets and
publishing them. As I understand it,' all that's being done is applying this rule
to people in the National Security Council, Department of Defense and the rest of
it. And I don't think that anyone who signs a statement sayin' 'I won't exploit
these secrets' and then goes out and does it oughta make a commercial profit from
it.
KOPPEL: You know, it, it sometimes reaches rather extraordinary lengths, though.
I just saw Frank Snep out in California, uh, a few weeks ago, where he's now
teaching, I believe, at USC. BUCHANAN: Right.
KOPPEL: Do you realize that the regulations now are so strict that he cannot
even take notes to deliver lectures because the government would have the right
to subpoena those notes? BUCHANAN: -No, I was unaware of-that. But I do know
that his book, where he did take those secrets and try to make a bundle out of
them, was wrong. And if he had gotten away with that, everybody in the CIA'd
been doin' the same thing.' I don't think...
KOPPEL: Yes, yes... (pointing to someone in audience) Go ahead, Pat. Finish
the sentence. BUCHANAN: No, no. Go ahead.
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KOPPEL: I'm gonna on to another question. Go ahead, sir. UNIDENTIFIED MALE:
Yes, uh, my question's for Mr. Willard. Uh, given the government's proposals,
what is the Justice Department's response to the debate among the experts as to
the scientific validity of polygraph examinations and their admissibility in a
court of law? WILLARD: There is a great deal of controversy about use of the
polygraph, and we think that the government should be very careful about using
it. It has been, uh, a regular part of CIA security procedures for some years.
The same for the National Security Agency, another part of our intelligence
community. Uh, we think use of the polygraph should be limited to very narrow
circumstances, primarily people who have access to very high security information
where it's, uh, important to leave no stone unturned to make sure that people are
trustworthy.
KOPPEL: And yet, you're talking about 120-some-odd thousand employees of the
federal government who would fall under this rubrick, right? WILLARD: Well,
127,000 sounds like a lot, but when you consider...
KOPPEL: Yes, it does WILLARD: There are 5 million federal employees, 2.5
million of them who have, uh, clearances for classified information, uh, the
number we're talking about'-is very small:- ---
KOPPEL: All right, sir, let's go to your question. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'd like
to ask this question also of Mr. Nelson or to you, Ted. I'd like to know, I
think one reason the Reagan administration appears somewhat paranoid is they feel
that perhaps the press will report the, uh, matter in an irresponsible way. T'd
like to know what sort of internal procedures you have for screening the
information'if, in fact, it does involve something that could breach our national
security or endanger some future operation that we have. Are there channels that
the reporter has to go through before they can, you know, print those stories?
KOPPEL: Let me, if I may, defer to Jack, because Jack is also the bureau chief
of the Los Angeles Times and, therefore, has the administrative role as well as
that of the journalist. NELSON: Well, let me, let me say this, that every story
that comes into the Los Angeles Times-Washington bureau, as an example, goes
through two different editors, goes to Los Angeles and goes through at least two
other editors. Now, "do they go over this story to see if it may jeopardize some
operation? I can't say that that's true, that they would look as to whether or
not a particular operation might be jeopardized. But I also don't think that,
that's our job. Our job is to get the news and the best we can do to get all the
news, and to write it in an impartial manner. Uh, if we had some idea that, uh,
a life was at stake, I'm sure that that would be taken into consideration. But
outside of that, that's not really our job.
KOPPEL: Let me give you one small... WILLARD: Could I...
KOPPEL: Yeah, go ahead. -?'WILLARD: I, I-just-wanted to-comment-on,that,-Ted.
Uh, I think, uh, Jack's comment is typical of what most people in the press feel.
That is, their job is to find out news, try to report it accurately. Their job
is not to safeguard national security information. That's our job in the
:t~11~11NII D
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government. NELSON: That's true. WILLARD: Uh, and our program in this
administration is designed to try to make government employees do a better job of
keeping things secret that oughta be kept secret. We have not proposed to put
new restraints on the press. I agree with Floyd Abrams. NELSON: Well, that's
not... WILLARD: That would be, uh... NELSON: Now, wait a minute, though...
WILLARD: Unconstitutional and... NELSON: That's not really true, though. You
are putting restraints on the press when you put people under threat of lie
detectors, when you close off sources of information, which you do, and in the
Defense Department, the sources of information have been narrowed tremendously.
When you attack the Freedom of Information Act, when you roll back openness in
government policies that have been developed since Watergate, uh, you've said so
yourself, that in the '70s because of Watergate we had a much more open
government. We did. Under the Reagan administration, we've got a much more
closed government. And as a matter of fact, there's no indication it's gonna
become any more, any less closed. In the, in the three years of the Reagan
administration, the reporter's committee of freedom of the press has catalogued
30 different steps that this administration has taken to cut down on information
that was once available to the public. And so that the Grenada news blackout was
really no more than a logical extension of the kind of policy that this
administration has in dealing, and it's not just dealing with the press, this is
dealing with- the public. WILLARD: Well, but I think you miss my point. Uh, by
your own admission, you said the press, once they get a story, will run with it
if they think it's accurate and newsworthy. NELSON: That's right. WILLARD:
Uh, therefore, if we're going to keep these vital- secrets about intelligence
operations, military plans and weapons, uh, from getting out, uh, we have to be
careful, in the government, to do a better job of keeping it secret in the first
place. We don't propose to go after the press and punish them for finding
information out and publishing it. What we wanna do is do a better job of
keeping it from getting out in the first place. And let's keep in mind, uh,
American citizens aren't the only ones who read the newspapers. Uh, the KGB does
also.. ABRAMS: Yeah, but one of the problems is that when you talk about vital
secrets, uh, you seem to suggest that vital secrets are leaking out every day.
Uh, in the testimony given before the House Government Affairs Committee, uh, by
you and other people in this administration, it was, there were two examples in
total over the last five years of information of the sort that might have been
prevented from being published if your secrecy order had been in effect, two
examples of sensitive, compartmented information. Now, the House Committee on
Government Operations concluded that with that small an amount, it was an
extraordinarily exaggerated reaction of the administration to get into this
127,000-person, at this point at least, the government being the size it is,
restriction on what people can say. And on lie detector'tests, we're talking
about 2.5 million people, as you said earlier, who would be subject to lie
detector tests. Now, that, that's, that's being bitten by a flea, Mr. Willard,
and if you wanna tell us what sort of information has gotten out, just by way of
example, it would be very helpful. WILLARD: Well, I think...
KOPPEL: Mr., Mr. Willard, give your response, and then we are gonna have to take
a break, so... WILLARD: Well, I think you're going, playing fast and loose with
,carvrEVUF_n
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the, uh, statistics, Floyd. That same, uh, House committee found there had been
328 leaks of classified information in the last five years. In terms of use of
the polygraph,..weve not proposed to give it 2.5 million times, but to use it as
a tool of last resort in investigating these cases, which has been" done,- by the way, in the Carter administration as well.
KOPPEL: When you're talking about those 300-plus leaks, of the variety that you
were describing before, of, of high intelligence, or that would jeopardize
national security? WILLARD: Many of those were. Now, what Floyd was talking
about were leaks in published books or speeches of the category known as SCI, and
that's where the number two comes from. But in terms of the anonymous leak, the
kind of leak we saw in the opening scenes of this show, uh, those leaks, there're
many more than two.
KOPPEL: All right. WILLARD: There're hundreds.
KOPPEL: Thank you. UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Seems to me that the issue is, uh, one
of free speech as opposed to license. Uh, I think the public perception of the
media in this country has become, uh, that the, the, the media is extremely.
critical of our government and certainly not nearly as critical as it should be
of the Soviets and some of the things, the atrocities that they are perpetuating,
for example, on the people of Afghanistan. Uh, when you say, Mr. Nelson, that it
is not your job to, uh, to safeguard the national security of our country, uh,
you're there to report the news, I would suggest that along with the rights and
privileges of exercising your profession in this country, you might. perhaps
consider that there are duties and responsibilities of citizenship which.perhaps
would require attention to whether or not the national security of our country
would be jeopardized through your published stories.
KOPPEL: Jack? NELSON: Well, let me say that if I left the impression that I
would do anything to endanger national security, _1 didn't mean to leave that
impression. What I do say is my job is not to go around trying to find out
whether or not the information that I get ahold of is something that involves a
national security operation that would cause some problem for the government.
Most of the information that we get ahold of, when they complain that it's
national security and it's causing the government a problem, it's more of an
embarrassment than anything else. Now, uh, when Mr. Abrams was answering, uh,
Mr. Willard over here, Mr. Willard talked about the 328 leaks. He didn't give
you any information as to how many of these leaks actually resulted in any danger
to the United States, and if you'll look back over the years, this, I mean, I
really think this is a red herring about all the danger that may be caused to the
national security of the United States by anything we ever publish. 'If you look
back over, ask Mr. Willard, in the past 25 years, for example, ask him how many
instances the press have, has published anything that resulted in any danger to
the national security of the United States. I'd like to hear some examples.
JcoMINVEn
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KOPPEL: I'll tell you what. We're gonna give Mr. Willard two-and-a-half minutes
to think that over. We'll continue in just a moment.
KOPPEL: We're back again from Dallas. When we left, Mr. Willard, Mr. Nelson had
challenged you to cite some instances over the past 25 years when leaks that were
published in the press had jeopardized the national interest. WILLARD: Well,
what he knows is that I can't give and won't give precise examples, because
they're classified. (audience laughs) The, uh, I'm sure he would like to have
me reveal some classified information on the air tonight; I'm not going to do it.
But can give, uh, categories of damage that are caused, Uh, intelligence
sources, agents abroad, have their lives endangered by some of these leaks. Our
ability to obtain intelligence information-is-out-off.. Uh,..specific sources.of
information we have in sensitive parts of the world which could be very valuable
in protecting American fighting forces are choked off as a result of leaks. Uh,
expensive technical collection systems are compromised and no longer produce the
intelligence they once could. Uh, plans for military weapons and operations get
out and into the hands of potential adversaries. Those are the kinds of things
that happen, and I am frankly astonished that anyone who is as familiar with the,
uh, Washington and government could take the view that leaks don't damage
national security. They do. The question is, uh, what's the best way to get at
the problem? And that's what we've tried to do is strike a balance. We want to
do something about the problem in a reasonable way. ABRAMS: What astonishes me
is that we sit here tonight and Mr. Nelson asked you a question about 25 years of
American history, not yesterday, not last year. Why don't you try for us, just
try... (chuckles are heard) to think of a single instance, not of categories,
but of fact, and tell us what it is? WILLARD: Floyd, I wasn't here 25 years
ago, I wasn't here 20 years ago. Uh, I can't do that. Uh, we have, however,
provided this information in closed hearings to members of Congress. ABRAMS:
The same people who are not persuaded by the need for the very things that you
have been advocating. WILLARD: Well, I unders... I see no member of Congress
is here tonight to take that position publicly, uh, and to defend the legislation
that has blocked the implementation of the president's programs, uh, in this
area.' Uh, we're going to appear on Feb. 7, in fact, before a closed hearing of
two House subcommittees to present that same, uh, evidence and those examples.
KOPPEL: I don't wanna cut you off, but Mr. Buchanan wants very much to get into
this discussion, and then we'll go to another question. BUCHANAN: Yeah. Ted,
if memory serves me, back in 1965, there was a leak of the U.S. fallback position
in the SALT negotiations. I believe it was one pf the leaks that triggered the
initial wiretaps in which my colleague here was, was tapped unfairly and wrongly._
But nobody, the American people did not demand to know what:the'United States
fallback position was. This was a reporter who got this story, got it out and,
in his own judgment, printed it. And as far as I know, it was a serious matter.
Jack Anderson's leak from the National Security Council that the president had
said that the United States should tilt toward Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war.
Now, I don't know how that served the, the real needs of the American people, but
you know that damages United States relations with the country of India and the
subcontinent, uh, probably as much as the initial tilt itself did. So there's a
lot of cases here, I think, in which leaks have damaged. We've got,,uh, Mr.
.corns
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McFarlane, there was a report that Bud McFarlane had recommended possible
American airstrikes on Syrian positions in the National Security Council at the
very time he was about to return to the Middle East. Now, a leak of something
like that, if it was true, could very well get Mr. McFarlane killed. So I think
the idea that there's been no leaks that've been serious inside the
administration is, uh, is really fallacious.
KOPPEL: All right. We're, we're gonna have to go without a question in this
segment. Jack, if you wanna respond to that, we'll... NELSON: Well, I think
that the last one that Pat mentioned, and I think he knows this, is a phony.
McFarlane himself never said anything about being in any danger, and I think it's
been pretty well accepted that he wasn't in any danger.
KOPPEL: What about the other two? BUCHANAN: Well, let me talk to that...
KOPPEL: What, what, what- about--hold -it--Pat--what, what,-what about...-- NELSON:.
Well, I know about the Jack Anderson leak, and I guess it upset India. I can't
see why that was any great national security matter for the United States.
KOPPEL: Well, and I remember the fallback position on the SALT talks. NELSON:
And the fallback position on SALT, I mean, I don't know that that was any
catastrophe. And if that's the only three things that you can name in the past
25 years, I'd say that that's a red herring. BUCHANAN: But the American...
NELSON: I do not think that newspapers, as a general rule, or television
stations or networks, are printing leaks that endanger national security. I
mean, I've been a reporter for 35 years. I really just can't tell you of any
instances I know of where I think national security has been endangered.
BUCHANAN: Well, the American people didn't elect you, Jack Nelson, to determine
what's in the national security interest. (applause) NELSON: Well, I, I...
BUCHANAN: They elected the president of the United States, who's got the right
to determine what is classified as secret and not secret, and you have exercised
a unilateral right in doin' it, I think, in an irresponsible manner, because you
don't answer to anybody. NELSON: 'Well, that's all right. But I am at least
entitled to my point of view, as you are to yours, Pat. BUCHANAN: .You are.
KOPPEL: All right, mam, go ahead. UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: I would just like to
point out that this lifetime censorship'really didn't originate with this
administration. I worked for a Bureau of Ordinance project back in the late 40s
on guided missiles, and I signed such a statement at that time. And what I can't
understand is why its gets so important to use classified information in your
writings. Why can't you write whatever you want to and make it interesting
without using something that would jeopardize the security of our country?
KOPPEL: Well, I think, I think we're confusing a couple of issues here. I mean,
first of all, the regulations that are being discussed here are, are not
impediments to journalists, I mean directly. They're indirect impediments. No
one's talking here about, about journalists having to sign any kind of pledge.
These are government officials that we're talking about. UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE:
But I mean people who have been in classified, have been having access to
classififed information having to sign that. I can't see that that's such a, a
terrible inconvenience to them, ah, to be under that restriction.
. 0NTJNtTEV
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KOPPEL: OK. Mr. Safire, do you wanna respond to that? SAFIRE: Well, more and
more people are moving from government into journalism and vice versa, and that's
a good healthy thing. Whenever you leave government, you know the way it really
is, you know how things work and you have a body of knowledge so that when
somebody comes and says something startlingly wrong, I mean basically mistaken
but clothed in that wonderful, official gobbledygook, you, as somebody who's
left, can say, 'Now, wait a minute. You're saying that this classified
information that you're quoting from is the truth, and I know it's not the
truth.'
KOPPEL: Yeah, but Bill, we're not talking about your, your enhanced ability to
distinguish gobbledygook from the truth. We're talking about whether you, based
on classified information that you, that, that, that was accessible to you while
you were in government, have the right to use that information now as a
journalist. SAFIRE: When I see that somebody is using classified information to
-confuse or mislead, I, remembering the classified information I got 10, 12, 15
years ago, feel absolutely bound, duty bound to say, 'No, that's not right! And
I know it's not right. BUCHANAN: Let me talk to that, Ted. Look, when I was
in, had the shared offices with Bill Safire, we both had access to a bit of, ah,
I'm sure top-secret information. I knew the Cambodian incursion was coming and a
few other things. Now, it would have been a dishonorable thing for me, disloyal,
a betrayal of the president, a betrayal of the trust everybody put in me for me
to take and put that information out in the public to damage some policy. Now
the problem we have is journalists out there are getting the benefit of that kind
of disloyalty, and they're profiting from it. Now, why is it wrong for me to
have put that material out as a government employee but somehow right and a
wonderful thing for me to do to publish that same kind of information when I
become a journalist?
KOPPEL: I don't think that's what Bill was saying, though. I he was saying if
he uses, ah, his knowledge of that classified information in the sense that it
tells him that something he is being told by a government official is wrong, that
that'somehow is, is more acceptable. You don't buy that? BUCHANAN: Well, no.
I think what he's sayin',.I guess I buy he's sayin'. And look, if he's sayin'
the knowledge and information he's gotten in government makes him a far better
journalist, ah, A, I agree with him and, B, I don't see any problem with that.
But what I'm talkin'.about-is,-is look, what I'm sayin'--:is.if it's, it requires
an act of disloyalty in the part of an individual to get top-secret information
into the public's hands. And journalists oughta say to themselves, 'Look, what I
am feeding off of, living off of is breaches of trust and acts of disloyalty on
the part of government employees, and that's a problem.' SAFIRE: But, Pat,
what, ah, Brother Willard over there is saying is that you will not be able to
write about what you know happened 12 years ago that had anything to do with
national security without first submitting it, if the law goes through, without
first submitting it to a censorship board. You wanna do that? BUCHANAN: But
look, if I've, if I've signed, if I've gone in and I've said, 'Look, give me
$60,000, Mr. Reagan, and put me on your National Security Council,' and I've
signed that agreement that I will not reveal that or use that, exploit that
information for personal profit and I. go out, 'then I think I oughta be remained
faithful to that trust. I don't think I should break it and have a right to make
money doin' so.
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KOPPEL: All right. Floyd, Floyd Abrams, go ahead. ABRAMS: I think, Pat, the
questions is not whether you should break it. The question is whether you, if
you'd signed Mr. Willard's agreement, should have to submit for the rest of your
life everything that you write about national security or intelligence
matters.... BUCHANAN: Well, Floyd, that.... ABRAMS: ...whenever you've
learned it, whatever it is. BUCHANAN: Floyd, you know contract law. If I've
signed an agreement, made a statement I'll do it, what right do I have to break
it? ABRAMS: Well, the question, Pat, is whether we oughta have the agreement.
There is no agreement like that now. Mr. Willard wants the agreement. No
administration has ever had an agreement like this, which would have compelled
you and Bill Safire to submit for the rest of your life everything you wanna say
about intelligence. That's new. BUCHANAN: There's 11,000 guys at the Central
Intelligence Agency that are doing that right now. What is wrong with applying -
that to the NSC? ABRAMS: And you two weren't any one of them. I mean, it seems
to me the idea of applying Ctandards across the whole range of top-level
government officials is one of the things that's wrong with what Mr. Willard
wants to do.
KOPPEL: All right. Mr. Willard, you, you get a, you deserve a chance to
respond, and then we're gonna have to take another break. WILLARD: Well, but
that's exactly the point, that is, there has been in the past this double
standard, one set of standards for the working intelligence agents in CIA that's
very strict and yet when you get to the State Department or the White House, all
bets are off. What we're trying to. do is introduce some leveling of standard so
that the same standards apply to people who have access to this very sensitive
information. It's a simple matter of fairness, ah, with regard to these
employees.
KOPPEL: OK. Let's take a break. We'll be back with more in just a-moment.
KOPPEL: As our long-suffering affiliates know, this program has an insatiable
appetite for time. We have almost run 90 minutes already. We're going to run a
little more. So, please be forewarned we.'re gonna go over just a bit. We're
ready now for another question. Go ahead, sir. UNIDENTIFIED MALE: This is a
question for Mr. Burch or Mr. Williard. And what I'm interested in finding out
is whether you think the Reagan proposal and especially the threat of the
polygraph will essentially chill all whistle-blowing, including leaks such as the
Defense Department paying a hundred dollars for a bolt?
KOPPEL: Mr. Burch? BURCH: Let's first, ah, talk about paying a hundred dollars
for a bolt. Most of the stories that you see reported in the press come from,
ah, our own audits and our own investigations. And, in fact, those things are
put out in news releases at, at the Pentagon. We, in fact, encourage
whistle-blowing. We have a hot line, and, ah, we publish this number on all our
bases and installations. We even run in the New York Times and encourage people
if you see waste, fraud and abuse to call this number and report it so we can
investigate it. What we're interested in with polygraphs is protecting our
nation's most vital secrets. It's, it's that simple.
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KOPPEL: All right. Let me just follow up, then. If indeed the objection by
some of the highest and, ah, Jack Nelson's story about George Shultz is not the
first time I've heard that story or seen it, if the secretary of state feels that
strongly about, ah, and if indeed other senior members of the government feel
that strongly about it and if indeed the science, in quotes, of lie-detecting is
not all that perfet, you still gonna press ahead? BURCH: Polygraphs have worked
for years at, ah, the National Security Agency. I brought along a few examples
where the National Security Agency uses it as a screening process for perspective
employees. Samples: One applicant admitted contacts with the Soviet embassy,
and he planned to, ah, defect, yet he was seeking employment with the National
Security Agency. In another, a contractor admitting to having, admitted to
having passed secrets to a foreign national and said he would do it again. This
was revealed through a polygraph investigation. Another, an applicant admitting
having worked for another country's intelligence service and if employed by the
NSA he would pass information to his-former employer. And in a fourth incident,
.an applicant admitted that he would have no compunction about selling U.S.
secrets if it would guarantee him a profitable living.
KOPPEL: These, these don't sound like the kinds of questions, ah, that, I mean,
used in a polygraph where you get kind of a yes and no. (Laughter) Ah, I mean,
don't, don't you think that would have come out in a, in a fairly. tough job
interview all by itself? BURCH: No, not entirely. Ah, it is used as a
screening process for applicants in the National Security Agency and in' other
positions that require access to, ah, to our highest 'secrets. And if you want to
get into other types of investigations, the polygraph is, is not the only form of
investigation that's used. It's, it's only used to compliment the investigation.
It's not an end unto itself.
KOPPEL: All right. Bill Safire? SAFIRE: They're an abomination. You notice
the way both, ah, government officials on the air tonight are saying, 'Well, as a
last resort and they're not the only thing we use.' They know and scientists
particularly know that we're not talking about lie detectors here. We're talking
about nervousness detectors. And good liars can beat the lie detector and often
do. And people who are telling the truth are scared, are nervous. That's a
terrible situation to be in when you're suddenly confronted and if you say
something wrong the needle will jump and you'll be ruined. So, they get nervous,
and they show up as liars. Now, the....
KOPPEL: Does not a good, does not a good examiner, Bill, is not a good examiner
able to distinguish the difference between normal nervousness and lying? SAFIRE:
The answer to that is no. Ah, sometimes he can. Often enough he cannot. And
that is why federal courts will not admit lie detectors as evidence.
under that law. I write fiction, and I can tell you that it's a horrendous
besieger. I wonder, ah, I. read in the paper some sentiment in the Congress for
even backing up a step now that -the president has .set-forwar-d the new executive.. _.
order, backing up and saying, 'Maybe we oughta back off from a lifetime
commitment, that's a long time.' Mr. Safire, do you see any sentiment at all for
limiting this kind of prepublication review to say 15 years or some reasonable
period of time after you leave government service? SAFIRE: Well, the, ah, the
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Willard plan has been stopped by the, ah, by the Congress. Senator Mathias, in
particular, of the government, Government Affairs Committee, ah, put a six-month
hold on it, and next month he'll be holding hearings on this. And I think the
virtue of a program like this is to call. attention to hearings like that, at
which people like you an come forward, testify and say that this terrible move,
ah, would attack free speech in America and there's no crisis that has called for
it. And, to come back to what I first say, 'If it ain't broke, don't fix it.'.
KOPPEL: All right. Folks, ah, we're getting into the closing minutes of this
program. Ah, we will go to a few more questions. I'd like, if possible, for you
to frame the kinds of questions that perhaps can give our panelists here an
opportunity to summarize their views. Yes, mam, in the, in the back?
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Ah, up until this point, Mr. Nelson, you've spoken about
judgment in deciding story selection. I was wondering if there are any formal
controls at all concerning story selection and monitoring stories. NELSON: Any
formal controls? UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE: Uh huh. NELSON: No, not really. I
think that, ah, you know, the editors of every newspaper, not just the Los
Angeles Times, take it very seriously. And, ah, I earlier obviously left the
impression that, ah, we go around not thinking at all ever about national
security, if it may be involved--that's not true. Newspapers have held stories
out before. I can remember one specifically that we held out, the Glomar
Explorer, which was the sub that was used, the, ah, ocean, ah, vessel that was
used to pull up a Russian submarine that had sunk. And....
KOPPEL: You got beat on the story--didn't you? NELSON: Well, we, we wound up
getting beat on the story, exactly right. And, and, and, as a matter of fact,
about 10 or 12 different newspapers, networks, ah, news magazines all agreed to
.hold it up. And Jack Anderson finally broke it on the radio. And I don't think
anybody ever showed that national security really suffered from it. But it was
one we held up. And, ah, it was done at the highest level of the newspapers and
the networks because they thought, the government argued, the CIA argued that
there was a national security question involved. So, it's not that when it's
involved we don't pay attention to it. And I, you know, I'd like to.make that
very clear. On the other hand, it really is true that it is our job to find out
what's on, going on in government. And many times people in government, like Mr.
Willard, think that it's their job to keep us from finding out what's going on.
But, thank goodness, there are a lot of people in government who think that
people are entitled to know what the government's doing. And that's why we found
out, because there are people in government who are willing to tell us.
KOPPEL: Let me just, let me just cite one more example of an instance in which
several of us kept a story back, and, and I cite it only because the reason is so
clear. It was possible for officials to point out to us that the effect of our
publishing the story would be to endanger the lives of some Americans. And the
ones that I'm talking about were the Americans who were, who were being secreted
at the Canadian embassy in Iran. NELSON: That's right.
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KOPPEL: Several of us knew about that story for several weeks and did not run it
until they were out of the country. There it was possible to show A leads to B.
With many of these stories it's much more ambiguous. Go ahead, sir.
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Mr. Willard, Mr'._ Burch, don't you find .it somewhat
disconcerning at this point to be adopting a the Nixonian philosophy that the"'
press is the enemy and that you really are going overboard, that the problem is
not nearly as great as you'd like us to believe it is and that the measures that
you're really attempting to adopt are, are very totalitarian in nature and taking
us down a very dangerous road?
KOPPEL: All right. Let's consider, let's consider this the last questions, and
we will go all the way around. Mike, if you wanna 'begin. BURCH: That's a good
question for me to summarize or.. The way the questions have been put to me this
evening, it makes it seem like I'm anti-press. I am not. I am all for.'free
speech and freedom of the press of this country. It's one of our, our nation's
greatest treasures. The newsmen that covered the Pentagon are some of the most
professional, fairest newsmen that, ah, that I've ever come across. I have gone
to newsmen before and asked them to hold a story because it endangered lives.
They did it, and we were able to, ah, to move people to safety. I think the
press can be responsible. But I'think that there has been a, ah, there have been
some barriers built between us. I don't think that they're great. I don't think
that they're insurmountable. And, ah, and I think programs like this and a
discussion such as we've had here this evening are healthy. And I, you know, I
.thank you for asking that question.
?KOPPE?.: All right. I wanna go back and forth a little bit. So, Floyd Abrams,
why don't pick up ' you ck u on, on the same question on the theme? ABRAMS: Well, I, I
suppose what troubles me most as I think back on our discussion and I think about
your question, is that as, as I react Co what I've heard and mostly from Mr.
Willard, it seems to me that we have before us proposals which I think are fair
to call radical in scope by this quite conservative administration and radical
wrong in scope, ah, to this degree. We can't apply, shouldn't apply standards
that have generally been applied only to ~CIAagents to the full range of
top-level government officials. It's a good thing not a bad thing for Secretary
Vance, Secretary Weinberger, top officials of the government, when the leave
office, to comment unfavorably, if they believe, on the views, policies and the
like of their successors. It's very important. It's very important 'cause in
part they know best. They may be wrong, but they know best, and in part because
what they know about is so hard for the rest of us to understand. MX missile
type arguments are scientific arguments in part. We need the people who've been
in government to comment on it. And what troubles me about the, the sweeping
scope--we're talking about the secrecy agreement now,-but I could talk about
other things--is how out of step it is with what I think is a good thing for the
public to be able to hear and how out of step it is, as.well, with the notion
that we can't trust the government to engage in the role of censor.
KOPPEL: All right. Let's.... ABRAMS: And that's what's wrong.
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KOPPEL: Let's go on to Pat Buchanan, please. BUCHANAN: Ah, well, Ted, first,
you know, this, this has gone through a theme that we cannot trust the
government. Well, there's an awful lot of Americans who do trust Ronald Reagan
and his government and don't trust the press. What we're getting here, I think,
and we're not recognizing is a tremendous dichotomy. The press at one in the
same time wants to be the neutral objective observer and then to be the adversary
It wants to say, 'Look, what you're going in Grenada is as bad as'what y
the Soviets are doing in Afghanistan' and then say, 'You must take us down to
Grenada and show us what's.going on.' The press is making the enemy as too
strong. The press is hostile to this administration's, this government's foreign
policy in Central America and in Grenada.? There is no doubt about it. And if
the press and the administration are at odds on this and have great difficult
with it, I think we're going to see a lot more of it in the future. And one
final point, it is ridiculous to the, for the press to say that, 'We represent
for the American people. We speak for the American people.' We speak for
ourselves alone. (Applause)
KOPPEL: All right. Jack Nelson? NELSON: Well, to begin with, ah, Pat's wrong
when he says the press has been talking about, ah, the United States doing the
same thing in Grenada as the Soviets did in Afghanistan. He said he read that in
the New York Times. It may be true. He may have read it somewhere else. I
don't know, but generally speaking the press has not said that. I don't believe
the press believes that. I also do not think the press is hostile to this
administration. On the contrary, this administration, in my opinion, hsa gotten
off very light. Not only that but President Reagan, the gentleman back here
earlier asked me did I hate the president of the United States. As a matter of
fact, President Reagan is a very likable person, and, and the press generally
likes Mr.?Reagan. And if you ask people in the White House, they would tell you
that. They like him. They did not like Jimmy Carter. And, but contrary to what
Pat Buchanan says, there is no hostility by the press to this administration or
to its foreign policy. But there is hostility, there is hostility by this
administration to the press. There's no question about that. And one way that
Mr. Reagan gets by with it is that he doesn't bury things the way Mr. Nixon did.
He does everything with a smile, and he does it with a joke'and a one-liner. And
what he did, for example, in Grenada, you had a ceremony in Washington where
General Jimmy Dolittle was, who led the raid on Tokyo, and Mr. Reagan turned to
him and in a very joking way said, 'General, I meant to ask you how, how did you_
manage to keep the press from going with you.on the Toykyo raid.' Well, now, you
know, that may be kind of funny, but what I'm sayin' is he doesn't take this
issue seriously. He doesn't think it is a serious issue. I don't think he
understands the role of the press in the United States. And I disagree with Pat
Buchanan. I think in some respects we do represent the public because if we
don't represent the public in finding out what's going on in the government, you
tell me who does because the average citizen cannot go out and find out.
(Applause) Cannot, cannot, cannot go out, the average citizen cannot go out and
find out what's goin' on at city hall, in the county courthouse, the state
capitol or in the White House. And so, I think that we do do that. Now, we do a
bad job of it sometimes. We're irresponsible. We're very, ah, fallible
organization, but we do our best.
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KOPPEL: Jack, if I were you I'd quit while I was ahead: (Laughter) Mr.
Willard? WILLARD: I don't, ah, it's a tough speech to follow. (Laughter) I
don't fault the press for the way it does its job at all, and I don't think very
many people in the administration do. It's the job of the press to try to find
out information and present it as they see it. But it's our job in the
government to try to do what we're supposed to do. And one of the things that
we're supposed to do is keep certain things secret. And all we want to do is to
keep government employees to live up to their trust and confidence, not to
disclose certain kinds of very sensitive classified information. Now, I know a
lot of things are overclassified. Bill Safire, in his column today, admitted to
overcrassifying a speech, ah, which, ah , would be a violation of President
Reagan's directive on the subject. But, ah, there are also a lot of real
secrets. And I think the American public has to ask do they think the government
is doing too good a job of keeping vital secrets. I don't think it is.' I think
we can do a better job and still have a very free, ah, robust press.
KOPPEL: All right. Bill Satire, you represent the robust press. You got the
last word. SAFIRE: Well, ah, Mr. Willard there is a nice and honorable and
patriotic young man. (Laughter) And I think, ah, he....
KOPPEL: That's the nastiest thing anyone's said on this program. (Laughter)
SAFIRE: I-think he embodies 1984 in the Orwellian sense. I think there is a
real danger to our, our freedom. I'm a right-winger. I have always worried
about too much government, too much-government power imposing itself on the
individual. I like to believe that a lot of conservatives and reactionaries and
right-wingers with me, ah, resent government intrusion. And in this case, what
we're seeing is unfortunately the same infection of a administration that I saw,
to my horror, in the Nixon administration. And what I'm trying to do in my own
way is to blow the whistle and say, 'Hey, fellows in the Reagan administration,
this is the same thing that led us ?down that, that primrose path, that excessive
obsession with security that attack the center of conservative priniciple, which
is.the right of the individual to speak his mind.
KOPPEL: All right. Gentlemen, I thank you all very much.
EXCERPTED
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/21 : CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100020154-9