LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01184R000201120001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 23, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Latin America
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Relations between the two countries are improving, as reflected in
closer Mexican control over the activities of Salvadoran Government
opponents in Mexico and an exchange of visits by senior government
officials.
Guatemala's reluctance to cooperate fully with Honduras, El
Salvador, and the United States on regional affairs reflects the long
held Guatemalan sense of strategic importance that has been
reinforced by recent counterinsurgency successes and a feeling of
Perez, a former president and currently leader of the ruling
Democratic Action Party, has used his international stature to
launch foreign policy initiatives that often place President Lusinchi
on the defensive and sometimes create confusion abroad regarding
Venezuelan intentions.
The interim government has inherited a crippled economy beset with
severe foreign exchange shortages, depleted government revenues,
and soaring unemployment. The economy in 1984 probably will
register little, if any, growth.
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ALA LAR 84-021
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Mexico's leaders are making some changes in the PRI to try to avoid
a repetition of embarrassing defeats the party sustained in local
contests in northern Mexico in 1982 and 1983.
Student unrest earlier this fall was the first serious challenge to
public order since President Lusinchi took office last February and
provides some clues to his performance under pressure.
President Jorge Blanco's visits to Jamaica and Haiti last month
underscore Santo Domingo's determination to improve bilateral
relations with its neighbors.
Mexico-Colombia: Presidential Visit
Mexico-Guatemala: Status of Refugee Transfers
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Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis, telephone
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Mexico-El Salvador: Signs
of Rapprochement
Relations between Mexico and El Salvador, which
have been poor in recent years, are improving. The
warming trend developed after Mexican President de
la Madrid came to power in December 1982 and has
accelerated since Salvadoran President Duarte
assumed office last June. It has been reflected in
closer Mexican control over the activities of Duarte's
opponents in Mexico and an exchange of visits by
senior government officials. San Salvador almost
certainly wants to improve relations with Mexico City
to enhance the Duarte government's international
stature and to undercut Mexican sympathy for
Salvadoran rebels. The de la Madrid administration
probably views closer bilateral ties as consistent with
some of its foreign policy aims but unpopular with
Mexican leftists. In the future, Mexico will be more
likely to respond favorably to Salvadoran proposals to
upgrade diplomatic relations-they are now at the
level of charge d'affaires---if Duarte's efforts to
achieve a dialogue and reconciliation with his
opponents show greater promise of succeeding.
Past Differences
Mexican-Salvadoran relations significantly
deteriorated in the late 1970s. At that time, the Lopez
Portillo administration in Mexico began openly to
condemn repression by Salvadoran security forces,
and Mexico's ruling party established contacts with
Salvadoran insurgent groups. Prominent in the
Mexicans' thinking, according to the US Embassy in
Mexico City, was the belief that El Salvador's
political evolution would follow the pattern of
Nicaragua, where the Sandinistas were bringing down
the authoritarian Somoza regime.
Bilateral relations further plummeted in August 1981,
when Lopez Portillo and the Mitterrand government
in Paris issued what came to be known as the Franco-
Mexican Declaration. In this joint policy statement,
Paris and Mexico City recognized the Salvadoran
insurgent groups-the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR)-as a "representative
political force" which should be included in
negotiations to end the widening military conflict in
El Salvador
The Salvadoran junta deeply resented the declaration,
according to press San Salvador 25X1
maintained that the declaration accorded the
insurgents an international and domestic standing out
of proportion to their popularity in El Salvador or
their battlefield strength. The junta also complained
that the initiative violated Mexico's traditional policy
of nonintervention in the affairs of other states, and
that it would make it easier for unfriendly countries, 25X1
such as Cuba, to increase aid to antigovernment
forces, prolonging the insurgency.F__1 25X1
Lopez Portillo took other actions to support the
Salvadoran opposition as well. During his
administration, Mexico City:
? Allowed the FMLN/FDR to establish political
offices in the capital and Salvadoran guerrillas to
transit Mexico on their way to Cuba and the USSR
for military training.
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? Granted asylum to small groups of Salvadorans, an
action consistent with the government's policy of
giving refuge to political exiles.
? Expressed solidarity with the Salvadoran opposition
by tolerating, if not covertly sponsoring, various
prorebel activities organized by Mexican leftists and
Salvadoran exiles, including rallies, cultural events,
and fundraising benefits.
We have no evidence that the Mexican Government,
either under Lopez Portillo or de la Madrid, has
directly supplied arms to Salvadoran rebels or allowed
them to train in Mexico.
Nonetheless, the Lopez Portillo administration did
provide modest financial assistance to Salvadoran
opposition groups in Mexico, and possibly to
antigovernment forces in El Salvador, according to
the US Embassy in Mexico City. Such support, which
may have been channeled through Mexico's ruling
party, probably has now ended, according to Embassy
observers
Recent Developments
Since de la Madrid came to power in late 1982, there
has been a gradual trend away from Mexico's
proinsurgent tilt. This has particularly been the case
since Duarte assumed office last June.
The first major indication of such a shift was
Mexico's cool response in late 1983 to an
FMLN/FDR request that the rebels be allowed to
transfer their political leadership and support offices
from Managua to Mexico City. Although some
members of the Salvadoran opposition have since
moved to the Mexican capital, the de la Madrid
government did not facilitate the transfer and,
The de la Madrid government has since then reduced
its public support for the Salvadoran opposition and
may quietly be backing away from its commitment to
the Franco-Mexican Declaration. In addition,
a number of
Salvadorans in Mexico City have been arrested in the
past year, apparently as a part of a broader
government effort to monitor and control the
activities of Central American exiles in Mexico.
Mexican Foreign Minister Sepulveda's attendance at
Duarte's inauguration in June served to highlight the
policy shift. It was the first public visit by a high-level
official of either country to the other since 1977 and
demonstrated that Mexico City viewed the Duarte
government, which had come to power through
popular elections, as legally constituted.
Salvadoran Foreign Minister Tenorio last month
visited Mexico City and held talks with de la Madrid
a.-.d other senior Mexican officials. Although the
discussions focused on the Contadora peace
negotiations rather than bilateral concerns, the US
Embassy in Mexico City termed the visit a
"landmark" in Mexican-Salvadoran relations.
Motives
The Mexican Government probably welcomes
improved bilateral relations insofar as they make
Mexico appear more evenhanded in the current
Central American peace talks. Mexico City may also
believe that in pursuing closer relations with San
Salvador it can please Washington, whose assistance
Mexico requires in dealing with its economic
difficulties.
At the same time, de la Madrid will have to take
account of the views of Mexicans who identify the
Salvadoran insurgency with the Sandinista takeover
in Nicaragua in 1979 and Mexico's own revolutionary
struggles in the early decades of this century. Leftists
inside and outside of the ruling party will continue to
urge greater support for the Salvadoran rebels and
will oppose closer relations with Duarte. At present,
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,ecret
the Mexican left appears increasingly weak and
fragmented, however, and de la Madrid probably sees
less need to accommodate its wishes than in the past.
The Duarte government almost certainly would like to
upgrade diplomatic relations with Mexico City but is
unlikely to do so unless the de la Madrid
administration reciprocates. Nonetheless,
conservative opposition parties in El Salvador and a
significant portion of the military officer corps remain
bitter toward Mexico's perceived duplicity over the
years and its ties to Cuba and Nicaragua.
Prospects
In the near term, San Salvador is likely to seek closer
ties to Mexico City as a means of enhancing the
Duarte government's international image and
discouraging Mexican diplomatic or other support for
the Salvadoran opposition. San Salvador appears to
have much to gain from a rapprochement with
Mexico and little to lose.
From the Mexican perspective, to exchange
ambassadors would prove less controversial
domestically if Duarte succeeded in curbing rightist
terrorism and in engaging his opponents in a genuine
dialogue. Although we have no evidence that the two
governments plan to establish full diplomatic relations
in the near term, we do not rule out the possibility,
particularly should Duarte pay an official visit to
Mexico City. On the other hand, if Duarte is
incapable of controlling the death squads in El
Salvador, peace talks stall, or the insurgents recapture
the military initiative, bilateral relations are likely to
improve more slowly, if at all.
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Guatemala. Reluctant Central
American Partner
Recent political successes have bolstered the image of
Guatemala's de facto military regime and at least
temporarily given Chief of State Mejia added latitude
in dealing with domestic and foreign policy issues.
Even so, both Mejia and Foreign Minister Andrade-
the chief foreign policy decisionmakers-continue to
pursue regional policies that are closer to those of
Mexico than to those of Honduras, El Salvador, and
the United States. In our opinion, their policies reflect
the nation's long held views of its strategic role in the
region and are consistent with the present regime's
goals of securing the resources necessary to fight
domestic insurgents and improving the country's
international reputation.' Although the recent renewal
of some US military aid and increased economic
assistance may help influence Guatemala's regional
policies, we believe that the country largely will
continue to adopt positions that may be at variance
with US interests.
Impact of Political Successes
The honesty and efficiency of the Constituent
Assembly election held on 1 July, followed by the
formal inception of that 88-member body a month
later, we believe, have enhanced Guatemala's
standing abroad and may be acting as a catalyst
that---over the long term--will help end that
country's regional and international isolation.'
Widespread praise for the military's neutrality in the
voting, and public pledges that it will remain so in
national elections tentatively scheduled for next year,
also has helped to promote a degree of trust between
the armed forces and the country's various political
parties.
In September, Mejia's efforts to improve his
government's international standing paid off with the
selection of a Guatemalan as a vice president of the
39th UN General Assembly session and the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Spain,
which were broken in 1980 after Guatemalan security
forces raided the Spanish Embassy to evict protestors
who had seized the building. Progress toward
democracy also is helping to improve relations with
Costa Rica, which recently invited Mejia to make a
state visit to San Jose early next month. Even church-
state relations have warmed as a result of the
improving political climate. The US Embassy reports
that the Papal Nuncio recently praised the
democratization process and stressed the Vatican's
satisfaction with recent events in Guatemala.
The Guatemalan Policy Perspective
Despite the added flexibility that we believe these
events have given the government, Guatemala's
leaders remain reluctant to cooperate fully with
Honduras, El Salvador, and the United States in
regional affairs-particularly regarding Contadora
and policy toward Nicaragua. Their aloofness reflects
the long held Guatemalan sense of strategic
importance and national pride that has been
reinforced over the last few years by the government's
counterinsurgency successes and a feeling of
international isolation. Their attitude also reflects
security considerations and resentment toward the
United States.
control over regional initiatives.
that their country's size, population, and relative
economic and military strength entitle it to a
preeminent leadership role in Central America with
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they view the issue of "Core Four"
unity at ontadora, for example, as US inspired and
probably see little immediate or direct advantage in
unconditionally endorsing hardline positions toward
Nicaragua that, from their perspective, are mainly of
benefit to Honduras, El Salvador, and the United
States. They want to deal directly with Washington
on regional issues important to the United States, and
not with their southern neighbors, who they believe
have little to offer in return for Guatemalan support.
We believe the national sense of pride and strategic
importance has been strengthened by the country's
counterinsurgency successes and by entreaties from
other countries for Guatemala's backing in their
disputes with Nicaragua. Indeed, statements by both
Mejia and Andrade over the past several months
indicate that such courting of Guatemala has led
them to believe that they have leverage with the
United States and others in the region, including
Nicaragua. Nicaraguan Foreign Minister D'Escoto,
for example, recently reinforced this view by
supporting Guatemala's bid to be the regional
spokesman at the EC-Central America conference in
San Jose in September because "Guatemala had kept
itself removed from the Central America crisis."
Thus, a neutral posture at Contadora and related
issues probably has the dual effect of boosting
Guatemala's self-image and improving its standing
with an international community keenly focused on
the dynamics of the peace process.
Security Considerations. Foremost among
Guatemala's foreign and domestic policy concerns are
security-related issues, especially control over its own
insurgency. Guatemalan leaders do not see Nicaragua
as a direct military threat. We believe they fear that a
Contadora settlement imposing stiff restrictions on
the Sandinista military-as proposed by the other
"Core Four" countries-could infringe on
Guatemala's sovereignty by placing similar
constraints on its own armed forces and paramilitary
Civil Defense Force, which now number more than
700,000 members.
Although Mejia is aware that the Sandinistas are
providing material and training assistance to the
Guatemalan insurgents and has publicly accused
them of doing so, he and other Guatemalan leaders
apparently do not view Managua's support as critical
to the guerrillas. Moreover, the Guatemalans-
especially military officers-consider the spread of
Communism in the region, represented by the
Sandinistas, as largely a US problem-part of the
East-West struggle whereby the Soviet Union and
Cuba seek to weaken the United States. Thus, they
believe that policies aimed at undermining the
Nicaraguans benefit mainly the United States and
that the Sandinista threat is a problem that should be
addresssed primarily by Washington.
In our view, the key security question for the
Guatemalans remains the extraction of concessions
from Mexico on border issues
Mejia believes that the Guatemalan
insurentsus e of Mexican territory is a more
important factor in their survival than Sandinista
support. Thus, both he and Andrade probably see
moderation at Contadora as part of their strategy to
obtain Mexican cooperation.
Guatemala has been especially interested in the
removal of Guatemalan refugee camps in Mexico-
which Mejia and other military officers have long
charged are a source of insurgent propaganda and
support-away from the border area. Guatemalan
and Mexican officials began negotiating a settlement
of the refugee problem earlier this year, and, as a
result, UN officials in Mexico estimate that nearly
14,000 refugees have been moved by Mexican
authorities since relocation efforts began last May.
While we have no firm evidence that a quid pro quo
deal has been struck with the Mexicans, past
statements by both Mejia and Andrade have tied a
Guatemalan posture at Contadora consistent with
Mexico's to the latter's willingness either to assist in a
voluntary repatriation program, or at a minimum, to
move the camps from the border area.
We believe that Guatemala's "fence sitting" at
Contadora also reflects its dependence on Mexico as a
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major petroleum supplier. According to US Embassy
sources, Guatemalan officials visited Mexico in July
and successfully negotiated a 90-day credit for oil
covering three or four shipments worth roughly $25
million.
Resentment Toward the United States. Guatemala's
military successes against leftist guerrillas have taken
place without US assistance. The resulting "go it
alone" attitude and resentment toward the United
States color the Guatemalans' policy perspective and
continue to place limits on their willingness to
cooperate with Washington without anything other
than moral support. The Guatemalans do not view
themselves as any worse than the Hondurans or the
Salvadorans regarding human rights. Thus, they
believe that US human rights policy has
discriminated unjustly against Guatemala and
created an imbalance between the treatment received
by their country and that received by its neighbors-
Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica-in terms of
US military and economic aid.
In our view, the resumption of some $300,000 in US
military education and training assistance in October
and the authorization for up to $40 million in
development assistance funds for the next fiscal year
will help reduce somewhat Guatemala's resentment
toward the United States.
the Guatemalans-who
probably place as much symbolic importance on the
restoration of aid as they do on its tangible benefits-
are highly pleased by the aid renewal and see it as an
important step toward improving their country's
international image. Nevertheless, the limited size of
the aid package is unlikely to stem substantially the
frustration with what Guatemala perceives as
Washington's myopia, particularly in light of much
larger sums of assistance provided to Honduras, El
Salvador, and Costa Rica.
Outlook
We believe that Guatemala's policy in Central
America does not depend on the personal orientations
of the current policymakers but rather is based on
broader, and therefore more permanent, national
values. Consequently, we do not expect the extent of
future Guatemalan cooperation with the United
States on Contadora and other regional issues to
change dramatically any time soon. In our judgment,
only the provision of substantial US military aid in
the form of credits or outright grants-or the prospect
of an impending insurgent victory in El Salvador-are
likely to move Guatemala toward more active support
of US interests.
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Venezuela: Carlos Andres Perez's
Role in Foreign Policy
Since his inauguration last February, President
Lusinchi repeatedly has confronted challenges on
foreign policy issues from Carlos Andres Perez, the
forceful leader of the ruling Democratic Action
Party's left wing. While recognizing former President
(1974-79) Perez's wide popular following, Lusinchi-a
moderate social democrat--has cut him out of the
policymaking process and rejected his Third
World--oriented advice. Undeterred, Perez has used
his international stature to launch foreign policy
initiatives that often place Lusinchi on the defensive
and occasionally create confusion abroad about
Venezuelan intentions. Because Perez's views
command considerable support within the party, the
President may opt for concessions on foreign policy
next year in an effort to shore up his leftist flank at a
time when, we expect, his popularity will begin to
erode because of government-sponsored austerity
measures.
Perez's Foreign Policy Perspective
Viewed as a hardline interior minister in the 1960s
because of his actions against domestic guerrillas,
Perez began his evolution toward a Third World
orientation in an effort to blunt leftist critics during
his 1973 presidential campaign. Once elected, Perez
sought to take advantage of his country's burgeoning
oil revenues to propel Venezuela into greater
international activism, especially in Central America
and the Caribbean. He promoted regional aid
projects, campaigned for the Panama Canal treaties,
provided political support and weapons to the
Sandinistas, and urged that Central America be
treated as a "zone of peace," free of intervention by
either superpower.
Since leaving office Perez has tried to use his
influence to assure that succeeding governments
adhere to a "progressive" foreign policy. Although his
hopes for playing a. dominant role in international
affairs under Lusinchi were quickly dashed, he has
continued to promote his own foreign policy agenda
through public activism and behind-the-scenes
lobbying with the President. He has been aided by the
fact that his views are shared by many party
members, including some who hold senior government
positions. The lack of coordination within Lusinchi's
Foreign Ministry and the President's preoccupation
with domestic issues have provided Perez with
additional maneuvering room.
Perez's Foreign Policy Initiatives
Perez's principal goals have been to legitimize and
moderate the Sandinista government in Nicaragua,
press for a dialogue between the Salvadoran
Government and the guerrillas, normalize Venezuelan
relations with Cuba, and promote a Latin American
debtor's cartel.)
In Nicaragua, Perez has tried several tactics to bolster
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International. His attempt last summer to mediate
between the Sandinistas and an Eden Pastora-led
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front was designed, in our view, both to bring
insurgents into the Nicaraguan election process and
strengthen the position of less doctrinaire voices in
Managua. His subsequent efforts with other leaders
of the Socialist International to broker an
arrangement that would permit Democratic
Coordinating Board presidential candidate Arturo
Cruz to participate in the Nicaraguan election
probably were similarly motivated. We believe Perez's
continuing faith that the Sandinista revolution can be
returned to a more democratic course explains his
attempts to persuade Lusinchi to assist the regime by
renewing shipments of Venezuelan oil to Nicaragua.
Perez's position on El Salvador reflects his
longstanding ties to Guillermo Ungo, the leader of the
political arm of the guerrilla movement and fellow
member of the Socialist International. It also stems
from his resentment of the affinity between
Salvadoran Christian Democrats and their
counterparts in Venezuela's Social Christian Party
(COPEI), the leading opposition to Perez's
Democratic Action. Perez argues that President
Duarte's victory in the election last May was tainted
because the left did not participate, and he contends
that a solution in El Salvador requires guerrilla
participation in the political process.
For this reason Perez persistently has pushed for a
dialogue between Duarte and the guerrillas, and
has suggested both to Lusinchi and to Ungo that
Venezuela serve as an intermediary. By signing a
letter from the Socialist International to Duarte last
May encouraging negotiations, Perez tried to exert
international pressure on the Salvadoran President. In
August, Perez met with Spanish Prime Minister
Gonzalez and prominent members of COPEI in yet
another attempt to coax Duarte into holding talks. He
also personally presented the case for dialogue when
he met with the Salvadoran President in Caracas in
September, but Duarte appears to have
outmaneuvered Perez and his other critics in the
Socialist International by taking the initiative to meet
with insurgent leaders. We expect that Perez's efforts
to influence Venezuelan policy toward El Salvador
will be further complicated by the growing personal
ties between Duarte and Lusinchi.
On Cuba, the US Embassy reports that Perez relates
to Castro as both a friend and a competitor. Believing
that Cuba cannot continue to be excluded from
regional affairs, the former President advocates
normalization of relations with Havana and has
pressed Lusinchi to do so. Lusinchi repeatedly has
told the US Ambassador that he opposes closer ties
with Cuba, but many ruling party leaders-including
some of Lusinchi's closest advisers-side with Perez
on this issue. We believe the chances are better than
even that Lusinchi will relent and that over the next
year or so relations with Cuba will be normalized.
Perez has been a major proponent of solidarity among
Latin American debtors. In April, he publicly
supported Venezuela's participation in a Latin
American bailout loan for Argentina. When Lusinchi
refused to be stampeded into signing a Latin joint
declaration on debt in May, Perez considered
publicizing his opposition to the ruling party's stance,
Although
Venezuela eventually participated in the meeting in
June in Cartagena-in order not to isolate itself in the
region-members of the Venezuelan delegation who
share Perez's orientation failed in their efforts to
insert a Third Worldist tone into the final
communique.
Outlook
Perez's desire to secure his party's presidential
nomination in 1988 ensures that he will continue to
maintain a high profile on foreign policy issues. His
rivalry with Lusinchi is not likely to abate, but their
differences on foreign policy may begin to narrow.
Faced with growing criticism from his labor-based
constituency because of government austerity
measures, the President may look for foreign policy
initiatives that would mollify ruling party leftists. For
his part, Perez has established himself through his
recent activism as probably the most prominent Latin
American statesman outside of government circles.
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Moreover, by cultivating such figures as Alan Garcia,
who is favored to win the presidential election in Peru
next year, Perez continues to expand his informal
network among left-of-center leaders with a view
toward preparing for a hemispheric leadership role in
the years ahead.
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Grenada. Rebuilding the
Economy
The interim government that was installed following
the US-led intervention in Grenada in October 1983
inherited a crippled economy beset with severe foreign
exchange shortages, depleted government revenues,
and soaring unemployment. Despite US-sponsored
reforms aimed at revitalizing the economy and
generous US aid, the economy in 1984 probably will
register little, if any, growth. As a result, the jobless
rate probably will exceed the roughly 20-percent
unemployment during most of the years of Prime
Minister Bishop's rule. Moreover, rising imports and
debt servicing are largely offsetting the increase in
exports and tourism receipts and are keeping the
island's foreign payments bind tight. The
administration that wins the election on 3 December
will have to deal quickly with Grenada's high
unemployment and deteriorated power, transport, and
other facilities that are discouraging badly needed
foreign investment. Should the unity of the coalition
government be undercut by postelection squabbling
over sharing power, fledgling efforts to get the
economy on track could stall.
The Bishop Legacy
Grenada's current financial difficulties have their
roots in the Bishop era. Bishop's unchecked spending
policies caused large budget deficits, which had to be
covered by the sale of government securities, heavy
foreign and domestic borrowing, and funds siphoned
from the National Insurance Scheme. In addition, the
Bishop regime built up arrearages of $3.6 million in
its obligations to regional and international financial
already serious financial situation was compounded
by the death of Bishop and the US intervention, which
temporarily interrupted the collection of business
taxes and import duties.
High unemployment also was a leftover from the
Bishop years. Available data on the labor force is
sketchy, but the interim government estimated
unemployment before Bishop's death at about 20
percent, although it probably was higher.
Immediately following the US intervention, some
1,600 People's Revolutionary Army and militia
members, 400 airport workers, and 125 others at
Cuban and East European projects were rendered
jobless. In addition, most island businesses-reeling in
the aftermath of the October events-at least
temporarily laid off workers, increasing
unemployment to an even higher rate.
The Economy in 1994
The nine-member Advisory Council that serves as the
caretaker government has taken initial steps this year
to revive the private sector, which languished during
the Bishop regime. These include:
? Paring the import duty in early 1984 from 20 to 15
percent to increase the buying power of businesses
and consumers alike.
? Relinquishing control of the nutmeg, banana, and
cocoa associations to the producers.
? Returning at least 10 agricultural estates to their
original owners.
? Approval of 26 private investment proposals.
Moreover, following a recommendation by the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) that
the government divest some state enterprises created
during the Bishop period, the Advisory Council has
decided to sell seven parastatals-there are potential
buyers for some, according to USAID-and large
shares in four other businesses.
Despite this promising start, cash shortages persist
and the US Embassy reports the economy will post
little or no growth in 1984. The Advisory Council
expects that export earnings, which fell by more than
10 percent during Bishop's rule of more than four
years, will rise because of resumed sales to the United
States. More than 70 percent of US-bound exports
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consist of agricultural commodities-cocoa, bananas,
nutmeg, mace, and fresh fruits. Despite increased
export volume, low world prices for most of these
products will cap the rise in agricultural earnings.
Receipts from tourism, which tumbled under the
Bishop regime, also are likely to expand slightly this
year. The major source of this money, however,
appears to be US security and official personnel
rather than the typical international tourist. Imports,
on the other hand, are growing at a brisk pace due to
reduced duties and pent-up demand for consumer and
producer goods alike.
With sizable debt repayments coming due, Grenada
this year has had to rely heavily on foreign aid-
about 80 percent from the United States-to cover
payments needs. According to US Embassy reporting,
the government, concluding that it lacked the
mandate to impose an austerity program on the
country, opted to depend on aid remittances rather
than negotiate a new agreement with the IMF. By
this fall, about one-half of the $78 million in projected
budgetary expenditures for this year had been covered
by foreign donors. The Embassy says government
revenues, currently projected at $29 million, and
official borrowing of almost $9 million will cover most
of the remainder. Grenadian officials expect
Washington to fill the remaining financial gap.
Led by US-funded aid projects, the unemployment
Table I
Foreign Assistance to Grenada
(November 1983-October 1985)
Total
United States
57.2
2.2 Disaster relief, infrastructure repair
10 Balance-of-payments support
20 Development projects, including road
repair, social services, private-sector
support
19 Completion of Point Salines Airport
6 Combat-related claims
7.5
6.1 Completion of Point Salines Airport
1.4 Other
1.1 Police training and public works
2.9 Development projects, including elec-
tric power and banana industries.
$1.48 of this is an interest-free loan
repayable over 25 years including 7
years grace, the remaining $1.42 is a
grant
EEC (STABEX) 2.2 Balance-of-payments and budget sup-
port ($1.1 million in 1983, $1.1 million
in 1984)
rate is likely to improve somewhat by the end of this
year but still may be slightly higher than under the
Bishop regime. The US Agency for International
Development currently is funding a project designed
to provide temporary employment for about 1,500
people. An additional 300 people were hired to
complete the Point Salines International Airport.[
Looking Ahead
We believe that foreign investment is essential to lay
the groundwork for sustained recovery, because a
large portion of domestic revenues are already
earmarked for other uses, and the tiny private sector
is too small to provide much investment over the next
year or so. Increased capital outlays, particularly in
tourism, agribusiness, and light manufacturing would
spur growth, expand the island's export earnings, and
help ease unemployment pressures. The improved
political and economic climate already has piqued
foreign investor interest, but so far, only two of the
approved investment projects have been implemented.
A major factor inhibiting a rapid inflow of investment
is Grenada's weak infrastructure. The completion of
the Point Salines Airport has substantially enhanced
the island's transport capabilities. We believe,
nonetheless, that the electricity supply, road and
telecommunications network, and the water and
sewage systems need to be significantly improved
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before Grenada can compete effectively with large
Caribbean countries for foreign investment. The
Grenadian Government estimates that this will cost as
much as $90 million and take several years to
complete. In addition to the $19 million allocated to
complete the airport, USAID has pledged $8 million
for repairs to the infrastructure (excluding the $6
million for combat-related claims). Canada and the
United Kingdom have also pledged small sums
Improvements in the investment code would also help
attract investment to the island. Despite a recent
revision, the code still lacks enough incentives for
foreign investors, according to a team of USAID
economists who recently visited the island. In
addition, the approval process-which includes review
by an investment committee and the Council-is
burdensome to both government and prospective
investors and needs to be streamlined.
Experts also agree that the tax system should be
revised. According to a study,
business taxes are prohibitive, import taxes should be
further decreased, and export taxes should be
rescinded. The study suggests that the government
look to increased property taxes, selected user
charges, and improved tax collection for additional
revenues. Further action on the tax reform issues has
been delayed until a more thorough IMF report is
completed early next year
Despite the recent promising efforts to revive the
private sector, much remains to be done to make it an
engine of investment, growth, and employment for the
island over the longer run. Council Chairman
Brathwaite has advocated sweeping economic
reforms, but the Advisory Council has been slow to
act on some of the most complicated issues. The major
ones-tax revision, further divestiture of state firms,
and overall fiscal reform--are complex, and
Grenadian expertise is relatively thin. Although
additional consultative services are being offered by
the United States, the US Embassy reports that the
government has been wary about accepting them,
because the Council does not want to be seen as
implementing policies formulated by Washington.?
The New National Party-a three-party centrist
coalition led by Herbert Blaize-appears to have
enough popular support to win the December election.
It will face stiff economic challenges upon taking
office. Embassy reporting indicates that the electorate
expects the new government to reduce unemployment
and improve the country's weak infrastructure.
Moreover, government resolve will be needed to
implement needed economic adjustments. Squabbling
in the NNP over power sharing and obstructionist
tactics by Eric Gairy's Grenada Labor Party could
undermine the effectiveness of the new government.
In the unlikely event that former Prime Minister
Gairy wins the election, we believe his government
would be incapable of providing the type of leadership
necessary to right the economy. A Gairy government,
in our view, would be characterized by incompetence,
widespread corruption, repression, human rights
abuses, and lawlessness. Moreover, a Gairy win
probably would provoke a rapid increase in social
unrest and political violence by those who fear a
repeat of the abuses of his former administration.
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Mexico: Reforming the
Ruling Party
Mexico's leaders are seeking to strengthen the ruling
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) before
important elections next year. The changes are
intended to avoid a repetition of embarrassing defeats
the PRI sustained in some local contests in northern
Mexico in 1982 and 1983. Party officials also are
concerned that the PRI has lost much of the
dynamism and popularity it possessed in the first
decades after it came to power in 1929. As a result,
the leaders have endorsed measures designed to
enhance internal party democracy, reinvigorate local
PRI organizations, and rebuild public confidence in
the organization. Although the reforms appear
modest, party officials probably lack the ability or will
to implement more than a few token changes.
The Need for Reform
According to the US Embassy, many PRI leaders
believe the party must improve its image if it is to
prevent new opposition inroads in national, state, and
local elections next July. They know that a growing
number of Mexicans blame the PRI for mismanaging
the economy and for not taking stronger action to
combat corruption.
In addition, Embassy officials report that the PRI has
fallen out of favor with some Mexicans because of its
failure at times to select qualified candidates for
office. Nominees for federal deputy, senator,
governor, and lesser posts have generally been
designated from above. Choices have often been based
more on personal connections than knowledge of
issues or local support.
Demographic changes also have tended to undermine
the party's hold on power. Mexico, which was 75-
percent rural in 1929, is over 67-percent urban today.
Urban voters historically have been less inclined to
support the PRI than their rural counterparts.
Recent Reforms
In an effort to enhance the effectiveness and
popularity of the PRI, party leaders endorsed a
number of proposals at a major party gathering last
August. The proposals fall into four general
categories:
? Democratizing the Party. The PRI has called for
greater use of primary elections to select party
candidates. Proponents of primaries maintain that
the PRI will attract greater support if it nominates
candidates who have shown themselves to be
popular with voters. In the past year, intraparty
primaries have been introduced in several states
with mixed results. They caused little controversy in
Nayarit, but did not live up to the expectations of
many party members in Mexico State and Yucatan.
? Curbing Corruption. Consistent with President de
la Madrid's commitment to moral renovation, PRI
leaders have announced the party will root out
dishonest and corrupt members. A few tentative
steps have been taken in this direction
for example, de
la Madrid has ordered party officials in Mexico's
Federal District to purge their organization of
corrupt members.
? Instilling Greater Discipline. The party also has
sought to tighten internal party discipline. PRI
leaders have called for greater accountability and
have set up commissions to coordinate party policy
and monitor official behavior.
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? Strengthening Grassroots Organization. The PRI
has encouraged local party groups, which normally
only meet during electoral campaigns, to remain
active throughout the year. Local parties also are to
participate in various social action programs to
develop closer ties to their communities. At the
same time, they are to recruit more members from
among women, youth, Indians, and other groins
that have been underrepresented in the PRI.
Prospects
It is unlikely, in our judgment, that the PRI
leadership will be able fully to implement the reforms.
It may succeed in elevating the status of women and
youth in the PRI-earlier this year a woman was
named party Secretary General-and in improving
communications with the rank and file. To lessen
corruption and to increase internal party democracy
will prove far more difficult.
Many of the reforms will encounter resistance from
officials outside of Mexico City. Local party bosses
will object to the selection of candidates through
internal elections, because such procedures detract
from their authority. Moreover, efforts to reduce
corruption will threaten the interests of middle and
upper ranking party officials, whose views cannot be
entirely ignored
More generally, whether the reforms succeed will
depend on the degree to which de la Madrid backs
them. He, in turn, is likely to vacillate on renovation
issues as he attempts to reconcile his own apparent
desire for modest reform with the need to placate
powerful constituencies within the PRI that oppose
change.
The ruling party has never lost the presidency or a
governorship since 1929, however, and, even in the
absence of a strong reform effort, it is unlikely to lose
its preeminent position in Mexican politics in the near
to medium term. The opposition, and particularly the
center-right National Action Party, stands at least an
even chance of making a few additional gains next
year in local contests in northern Mexico, but it is
unlikely to achieve many major upsets.
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Tests Lusinchi
Venezuela: Student Unrest
Student unrest earlier this fall was the first serious
challenge to public order since President Lusinchi
took office last February, and as such provides some
clues to his performance under pressure. A shooting
incident spawned by protests over campus issues
caused an initial outbreak of violence, fostered an
atmosphere of alarm in the capital, and threatened a
confrontation between students and the government.
Lusinchi calmed the crisis by skillful negotiation with
student leaders and judicious use of security measures
aimed at preventing radical-inspired violence.
Although the universities probably will become more
volatile if economic conditions continue to worsen, we
judge that such a deterioration would be gradual, thus
allowing the government adequate time to respond.
Student Reaction to the Shooting
On 19 September, 31 students were wounded in a
shooting that occurred when they attempted to run a
National Guard checkpoint in commandeered buses
on the outskirts of Caracas. The students were en
route to the main campus of the Central University of
Venezuela to protest hikes in tuition and cuts in
student grants made necessary by the country's
deepening economic difficulties. Several key
university and government officials were involved in
the decision to detain the students at the checkpoint.
University Rector Edmundo Chirinos had asked the
Ministry of Interior for assistance when the students
seized the university-owned buses. The Ministry in
turn alerted the National Guard, whose commander
on the scene,
When news of the incident reached Caracas, sporadic
violence broke out on the university's campus.
Disturbances also occurred at the University of the
Andes in Merida, where protesters set fire to the local
headquarters of the ruling Democratic Action party
and virtually paralyzed the city. Except for isolated
incidents in Valencia and Tachira, however,
demonstrations failed to spread to other campuses.
The atmosphere of alarm began to recede when
moderate organizers of the Federation of University
Centers, an umbrella student group, postponed a
march scheduled for 27 September because of their
concern that radicals would seize control and provoke
violence. Despite incendiary rhetoric by ultraleft
sympathizers at the Central University of Venezuela,
however, provocateurs were not active in the march
held on 3 October and the size of the crowd-
estimated at approximately 3,000-was much smaller
than authorities anticipated.
Lusinchi Manages a Crisis
Through his balanced approach President Lusinchi
played a key role in helping to assuage student
concerns. He met with student leaders for four hours
on the day after the shootings, and while making no
apologies, promised a thorough investigation. The
President assured the students that those guilty in the
shooting incident would be punished, but warned that
subversive elements might try to exploit the situation.
the demonstrations got out of hand.
On the weekend following the shootings, Minister of
Interior Lepage called an emergency meeting of state
governors. According to press reports, he instructed
the governors to initiate a dialogue with the students
and to prevent police from using firearms against any
student demonstrators. Lepage also announced that
the government would accept peaceful protest, but the
security forces would use force to maintain order if
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Although Rector Chirinos took a three-month leave of
absence, Lusinchi did not accept his offer to resign or
attempt to use him as a scapegoat. In fact, the
university's acting rector announced after meeting
with Lusinchi on 1 October that he would attend the
demonstration only if there were no placards
demanding Chirinos's dismissal.
Lusinchi's combination of decisiveness with dialogue
probably helped persuade moderate student leaders to
cooperate with authorities during the march. The fact
that student leaders at the Central University are
moderates affiliated with Lusinchi's Democratic
Action party also was crucial in helping to prevent
violence
Outlook
Student agitation does not appear to pose a threat to
the country's political stability at present. Student
leaders were responsible and restrained throughout
the crisis, focusing their demands on academic
policies and a call for Chirinos's resignation.
Significantly, they stopped short of attacking
Lusinchi or his government.
Only a small fraction of the Central University's
52,000 students participated in the protest march, and
even within that energized minority, moderates
retained enough control to prevent violence. The
student protest did not spark sympathetic reactions
from organized labor, and opposition parties did not
succeed in exploiting the situation for political
advantage. These factors, and the absence of internal
dissension over the issue within the administration,
suggest that the government will be able to deal with
future student protests.
Student unrest is likely to grow, however, if economic
recession and austerity measures, along with rising
inflation and unemployment, threaten the aspirations
of the nation's university-educated jobseekers.
Cutbacks in the university budget, in education
subsidies, and in investment aimed at job creation
would aggravate existing grievances. Such a change
of climate would probably be gradual, however, and
the early warning signs-such as localized student
strikes and demonstrations, a radicalization of the
student leadership, and sporadic student violence-
probably would give the government adequate time to
respond.
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Dominican Republic: Presidential
Travel
President Jorge Blanco's visits to Jamaica and Haiti
last month underscore Santo Domingo's
determination to improve bilateral relations with its
neighbors. The President also hopes the visits enhance
his image as a statesman and distract public attention
from the country's economic doldrums. Despite the
good will created by the visits, there is little likelihood
of a sudden blossoming of relations between
Dominican Republic and Jamaica or Haiti.
Jorge Blanco's trip to Jamaica was a followup to Prime
Minister Seaga's visit to Santo Domingo in 1983. Press
reports indicate that he and Seaga exchanged views on
a variety of regional and international issues, including
debt problems of developing nations, the situation in
Central America, and the troubled status of the
Caribbean Economic Community.
The US Embassy in Jamaica reports, however, that
discussions focused on measures to improve bilateral
economic and cultural ties. In addition to agreements
establishing "preferential tax treatment for specified
products" and joint promotion of tourism, the two
countries signed a highly publicized trade agreement.
Jorge Blanco also met briefly with opposition leader
Michael Manley.
Despite the mutually laudatory rhetoric evident
during the visit, both Jorge Blanco and Seaga are
focusing most of their attention on domestic economic
and political issues rather than bilateral concerns.
Significant economic cooperation between the two
countries is unlikely because Jamaican and
Dominican exports are more competitive than
complementary. Jamaica's low level of diplomatic
representation--an honorary council--in Santo
Domingo underscores the essentially cosmetic nature
of relations between the two countries.
Jorge Blanco's meeting with Haitian President Jean-
Claude Duvalier-his first since taking office in
1982-went well according to the US Embassy in the
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Dominican Republic. The Presidents discussed Haitian
immigration, agricultural cooperation, and reopening
the common border-which has been closed for almost
a year-to commercial trade. No specific agreements
were reached, although a joint communique was signed
calling for continuing discussions. The visit follows
Jorge Blanco's nomination of a retired military officer
and palace insider as Ambassador to Haiti, to replace a
second-rate diplomat, a move the Haitians view as a
strong indication of the President's desire to improve
relations.
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willingness to expand trade with the Dominican
Republic. The US Embassy says influential Haitian
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early November was ordered by the Finance Minister
not to agree to reopen the border to commercial trade.
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Dominican Republic are supporting exile groups
determined to overthrow Duvalier. The US Embassy
in Haiti recently reported that Haitian leaders believe
that Pena Gomez, Secretary General of the ruling
Dominican Revolutionary Party and of Haitian
parentage, is in contact with exiles. On the other
hand, popular attitudes in the Dominican Republic
toward Haiti are condescending, and many still fear
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Latin America
Briefs
Bogota has announced that Colombian President Betancur will pay an official visit
to Mexico City from 4 to 7 December. The trip will reciprocate Mexican President
de la Madrid's two-day visit to Colombia last March, which came as his first stop
on a five-nation tour of South America.
Betancur's talks in Mexico City are likely to accomplish little of substance but will
allow the two leaders to discuss issues of common interest. Both will express
concern about rising tensions in Central America and reiterate their strong
commitment to the Contadora process, in which their governments participate as
core members. Moreover, they may complain that external forces, including the
United States, are undermining peace efforts through political and military
interference.
Betancur and de la Madrid are likely to discuss debt issues affecting their own and
other Latin American countries. They may appeal, as they did last March, for
establishment of a new international economic order to help redistribute wealth
among richer and poorer countries. The two leaders are also likely to examine
ways to increase their countries' modest bilateral trade, including Mexico's plans
to purchase additional Colombian coal in 1985.
Mexico-Guatemala Status of Refugee Transfers
Thousands of Guatemalan refugees remain in Mexico's southern Chiapas border
region despite relocation efforts begun by Mexican authorities last May. The
principal representative of the UN High Commission on Refugees estimates that
only 14,000 refugees out of some 46,000 have been relocated from Chiapas to
Campeche and to a recently opened camp in Quintana Roo. Malnutrition is a
serious problem in the Campeche camps and has prompted the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) to pledge $2 million in emergency food aid over
the next six months. Repatriation efforts thus far have also met with limited
success. Only about 630 refugees have chosen to return to Guatemala with UN
assistance, although we believe at least several hundred more have returned under
other auspices
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The opening of the camp in Quintana Roo in September indicates Mexico's
continuing concern about refugees along the sensitive southern border. The
inadequacy of available facilities, however, makes it unlikely that substantial
numbers of other refugees will be moved soon. Until they are relocated,
repatriated, or absorbed into the local border population, Guatemalan refugees
will continue to be a security problem and strain local humanitarian efforts.F-
Government efforts to divest its public companies are making little headway. Only
a small fraction of the public enterprises offered for sale have been placed with the
private sector. Leftist unions fear that private owners would cut jobs and
renegotiate generous labor contracts and have vocally opposed the sales,
At the same time, private entrepreneurs
have not shown much interest in buying public firms with high debt structures and
weak financial positions. Moreover, businessmen and bureaucrats continue to
disagree over equity positions, debt guarantees, and maintenance of union controls.
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Cuba Chronology
Havana press reports that an oil refinery being built in Cienfuegos will process up
to 120,000 barrels per day and will be the largest of its kind in Latin America.
Operations are to start in 1987.
Fidel Castro and the President Sankara of Burkina issue a joint communique
blaming Washington for the prevailing tense world situation and expressing
solidarity with Nicaragua.
The seventh Cuban-Mexican Joint Commission for Scientific and Technical
Cooperation opens in Havana. Hector Rodriguez Llompart will head the Cuban
delegation.
2 October A Colombian cargo plane is hijacked by a Cuban citizen from Colombia to Cuba.
Politburo alternate member Jesus Montane receives Elli Izebound, President of
the Communist Party of the Netherlands to discuss matters of mutual interest
concerning the international situation.
Boris Ponmarev, Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, receives
Central Committee member Lionel Soto in Moscow to discuss the international
situation.
Botswana President Quett Masire receives Cuban Ambassador Heriberto Feraudy
Espino to discuss bilateral relations. Feraudy and Foreign Minister Chiepe discuss
the international situation.
President of Equatorial Guinea Obiang Nguema receives Alberto Suarez Ortega,
Cuban Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, to discuss various topics of bilateral
interest.
The first urban passenger transportation symposium opens in Havana and is
chaired by Guillermo Garcia Frias. He says that studies are proceeding on the
creation in Havana of a mass rapid transit network.
At the UN General Assembly, Foreign Minister Malmierca charges the United
States is preparing a "new interventionist adventure" in Central America and
warns it would be met by a "war without quarter or respite."
In an article in Bohemia, Fidel Castro admits to a Cuban journalist that he suffers
from stage fright when he speaks in Revolution Square.
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Jesus Montane, Manuel Pineiro, and Venezuelan Communist Party official Jesus
Farias agree in Havana that "the current policy of the US administration
endangers the region and international peace."
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lameck
Goma to discuss the African situation, especially the independence of Namibia,
and Central America.
Foreign Minister Malmierca tells the UN General Assembly that everything is
ready for a US military invasion of Nicaragua.
Havana press announces that Cuba has rejoined the International Coffee
Organization after 16 years.
A scientific-technical cooperation protocol between the Soviet and Cuban
Ministries of Communications is signed in Havana. The protocol comprises more
than 20 projects.
Zambia's President Kaunda meets with Cuban Ambassador to Zambia, Heriberto
Feraudy Espino, to discuss bilateral relations. Kaunda reiterates his friendship for
Fidel Castro.
Hector Rodriguez Llompart and Hector Mayagoitia sign two cooperation
agreements at the end of the Cuban-Mexican cooperation meeting. Rodriguez
Llompart talks of joint cooperation in the sugar sector.
Fidel Castro meets with Burkinian President Sankara. Sankara makes a technical
stopover in Cuba after leaving the United Nations.
In a New York Times interview, John Ferch, chief of the US Interests Section in
Havana, says there has been no changes in US policy toward Cuba in recent
months.
The Director of Cubana Airlines, Dixon Arjona announces that next year Cuba
will have modern Soviet IL-76 cargo planes in its air fleet.
8 October The Camilo and Che Ideological Drive marks the 17th anniversary of the death of
Ernesto Che Guevara and the 25th anniversary of the death of Camilo Cienfuegos.
Benin's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation arrives in Havana and is met
at Jose Marti International Airport by Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs Jose Raul
Viera and Giraldo Mazola.
In an interview with a Washington Post journalist, Angolan President dos Santos
pledges to work toward the withdrawal of about 25,000 Cuban troops from
Angola.
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Dos Santos also says that "the problems of the South African occupation of
Angola and of independence for Namibia must be solved before the withdrawal of
Cuban troops can be agreed to between Cuba and Angola."
Diplomatic sources inform AFP that 12 of the 15 persons living in the Peruvian
Embassy in Havana have voluntarily left as a result of guarantees made by the
Cuban Government allowing them to return to normal life.
Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco meets in Panama with
Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon.
12 October Carlos Rafael Rodriguez attends the inauguration of Panamanian President
Nicolas Ardito Barletta on 11 October. He arrives in Panama on 9 October.
In an interview with Prensa Latina in Panama, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez says that
his country will withdraw its military advisers from Nicaragua, if the revised
Contadora agreement is approved.
Rodriguez also tells Prensa Latina that Colombia is part of a process on which "we
are working," and that he discussed Central America with Columbia's President
Betancur in Panama.
Fidel Castro meets in Havana with Mahfoud Ali Beiba, Prime Minister of the
Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, to discuss the international situation and
bilateral relations.
Talking to reporters on his plane after a trip to Spain, Pope John Paul II indicates
that he is ready to visit Cuba as soon as Cuba sends him an invitation.
14 October Socialist International President Willy Brandt is welcomed by Fidel Castro, Jesus
Montane, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez upon his arrival in Havana.
Havana press reports that a base for supertankers is being built in Matanzas at a
cost of more than $200 million. It will be built with technical and financial aid
from the Soviet Union.
Fidel Castro and Willy Brandt discuss various matters pertinent to the
international situation, especially Central America, southern Africa, and economic
relations and cooperation.
Dimitriy Kartvelishvili, Chairman of the Georgia Council of Ministers, USSR,
receives Domestic Trade Minister Manuel Vila Sosa. They discuss Central
America and Cuba's economy.
Seventy-five head of dairy cattle arrive in Guyana from Cuba in keeping with an
agreement between the two countries concluded during President Burnham's visit
to Havana last month.
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Benin's Foreign Minister Frederic Affo and Minister of Construction Abroad Levi
Farah discuss Cuban participation in a construction project in Benin.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives Beninese Foreign Minister Frederic Affo with
whom he discussed the situation in Africa, the Nonaligned Movement, and
bilateral relations. Affo departs Havana on 19 October.
Miami press reports that the Justice Department has decided that more than
125,000 Cubans from the 1980 refugee boatlift may become permanent US
residents under a 1966 law.
20 October A simulated enemy naval landing with air support marks the start of a war
exercise in Defense Zone 3 in Santa Cruz del Norte.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez says a nuclear power plant is currently under
construction in Cienfuegos. By the year 2000, another plant is proposed for
Holguin as well as one in the western part of the island.
Minister of Culture Armando Hart and Central Committee member Jose Ramon
Balaguer preside over the first Maurice Bishop Memorial Caribbean Anti-
Imperialist Intellectuals Conference in Santiago.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez meets with Poland's Prime Minister Mieczylaw
Rakowski in Havana to dicuss bilateral relations and matters related to the
socialist experience in Cuba and Poland.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Jesus Montane meet in Havana with Yasir Abd
Radbu, Deputy Secretary General, and Mamduh Nawfal, Politburo member of
the Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine.
Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov arrives in Havana and is greeted by
Humberto Perez, Vice President of the Council of Ministers. Baybakov will attend
the 39th CEMA meeting.
The "Giron-84" exercise in Matanzas begins. This exercise is to train Territorial
Troops Militia staffs and Matanzas management organizations in implementing
wartime mobilization plans.
Lisbon press reports that UNITA killed 306 Angolan Government troops and 38
Cubans while repelling a two-month-long government offensive in the south of the
country.
Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Raul Viera says that Cuba is ready to support the
Contadora peace process, noting that "the document that is acceptable to
Nicaragua is acceptable to Cuba."
Fidel Castro receives Gosplan Chairman Nikolay Baybakov to discuss economic
cooperation between the two countries in the coming five-year plan as well as for
the long term.
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Secret
Minister President of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation Hector
Rodriguez Llompart meets in Paris with French Minister of Foreign Trade and
Industrial Redeployment Edith Cresson.
27 October Minister of External Affairs of Barbados Louis Tull describes Barbados's relations
with Cuba as normal, despite differences on the Grenada issue.
Secretary of the People's Assembly Standing Commission of Mozambique
Marcelino dos Santos arrives in Cuba to attend the 39th CEMA meeting.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez receives Vietnamese leader To Huu to discuss the Latin
American situation and the Caribbean. Huu reaffirms Vietnam's support for Cuba
against US aggression.
Manuel Gonzalez Guerra, President of the Cuban Olympic Committee says that
Cuba will compete with Indianapolis to host the 1987 Pan-American Games.
28 October Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov arrives in Havana to attend the CEMA
conference. He is welcomed by Fidel Castro.
Fidel Castro opens the 39th CEMA meeting in Havana. In his speech he attacks
the United States for what he says are attempts to "wipe socialism from the face of
the earth."
In his CEMA speech, Fidel Castro says that, despite the Reagan administration's
threats forcing Cuba to prepare militarily, Cuba's economy has grown 9.8 percent
this year.
Fidel Castro and Constantin Dascalescu, Prime Minister of Romania, discuss the
increase of economic cooperation between the two countries and the need to
expand technical cooperation.
In a news conference in Tegucigalpa, Honduran military spokesman Carlos
Quezada presents 19 rebels, five of whom said they had received military training
and political indoctrination in Cuba.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez addresses the CEMA session, condemning the
discriminatory political policy, the embargo, and the trade bans that capitalist
countries have placed on socialist countries.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez holds a press conference on the results of the 39th
CEMA session. He says the session finished its work as planned, showing the unity
of the CEMA-member countries.
Fidel Castro and Nikolay Tikhonov, Chairman of the CPSU Central Committee
Politburo, sign an economic, scientific, and technical cooperation agreement
ending in the year 2000.
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Fidel Castro closes the 39th CEMA meeting. He reflects on the death of Indira
Gandhi, saying that it is a great loss to India and to the Nonaligned Movement.
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