THE RUSSIAN POPULATION OF SINKIANG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80-00809A000600030452-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 452
• Publication Date: January 22, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECIIRITY Ih'F'aB 1TION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1111FORMAT ON REPORT
China (Sinkiang)
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE
ACQUIRED L
DATE OF ltd OBMLTION
THIS IS UN
DATE DISTR..d. Zq,v 53
NO OF PAGES 4
NO. OF ENCLS. I(apples)
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A M,S
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
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3_ Zimhar in The Russians living in Sinkiang are also referred to as
aueir-Lora (naturalized people). According to a 1941 survey they numbered
13,408 or slightly less than .47% of the total population of Sink.
2. Hiatesv in Sir.ki.nc: The relationship between the peopleA and governments of
China and Russia, up to 1917, was filled with mutual trust and was unusually
cordial and friendly. lip until the twentieth century other foreigners in
China were referred to, by the Chinese, as "white devils". Russians were
excluded from this esategory. As further concrete svidenoc of good relationship
bebreem China rend Iapsrial Russia,, it is iatsrestia to note that despite tbsir
lecgtby oos:aon frontier; up until the sod of the Tsarist tale ad the sdasst
of Soviet Government, Russia had never been invol?-(+d in a war with China. The
only exception to this statement would to the Tozer Uprising (1900), when
Russian troops joined an international force to quell the killing of foreign
residents in China.
In Sinkiang, Chinese-Russian relations were equally gored. During the akub
Beg rebellion (1862 to 1874), however, Russia brought to tits attention of
the Chinese Government the unrest and disorder along the Russian-SLuklaa
border and offered to help admin.ster the region until China could do it
herself. The Chinese Government at that time was too b^.sy with the internal
strife in China proper and therefore ignored Ruesiass complaints together
with her offers of assistance. Under these circumstances, Russia was fortod
to tc-::e the matter into her own hands. She dispatched her troops into Sinkiang
wider the command of Genoral Lolpakoveky in 1871. Russian troops occupied
the northwestern portion of Sinkiang, the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions,
axed brought peace and order to that portion of the province. The main balk
of her troops were stationed at lake Sairam Nor and in the village of Tara
3u, in the Borokhoro Range. Evidence of these two encampments is still to
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ba seen. In July 1881 a treaty was concluded between Russia and China concerning
Sinkiang. Under this agreement, Russia withdrew her troops from Sinkiang, but
was granted the right to conduct free trade there and to establish and maintain
four Russian consulates for the protection of its citizens in Sinkiang. These
consulates were established in Chuguchak (Tahcheng), Kuldja (Ining), I>rumohi
(Tihwa) and Kashgar (Shufa). Only one other country was allowed to establish
a consulate in Sinkiang. That country was the UK, it established its consulate
in Kashgar. In the four cities wifere the Russian consulates were maintained,
they were allowed to also maintain their own residential concessions, in which
they owned property such as homes, churches and warehouses. No other government
was granted this privilege in Sinkiang.
Up until the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russians residing in Sinkiang
were small in number and consisted mostly of merchants, traders, technicians
and professional men. In Maq, 1918, the first group of Russian Cossacks entered
Sinkiang. This group consisted of approximately 500 Semireohinskii Coasaokr.
When the new anti-Bolshevik front was established in southern Siberia, this
group requested from Governor Yang Tsang-hair (Governor of Sinkiang from 1911
to 7 Jul 28) permission to reenter tke Semiroohie region, nob part of the
Kazakh SSR. They were not only allowed to re-enter Semireohie, through
Chuguohak, but Governor Yang had he goodness of returning their arms to than.
This was a period of intense civil and military strife in Semireohie, where
Cnssaok bands held positions along the frontier until the collapse of Admiral
Kolohak forced first one group and then others to cross into Sinkiang.
After the fall of Semirechie and Siberia; in Ma.-eh 1920, the Sin]iang border
was crossed by the remains of the Semirechinakii Cossack brigades of Atemau
A I Dutov and Ataman General N P Scherbakov, and the Semireohinekii Cossack
partisan divisions of Atamaa B V Annenkov and a corps under Geraral Bakich.
These Cossack forces; which totaled more than 20 thousand men, were partially
disarmed by Sinkiang border `,coops and given the choice of either remaining
in the province or proceeding farther east. The officers were allowed to
retain their arms for the purpose of controlling their men. The Sink1Rng
authorities, and espacial.ly Governor Yang himself, less very sympathetic and
provided every possible comfort and aid to these men. For instance, the
troops under Ataman Dutov in Suiting and those under General Bakich outside
of Chuguohak remained as military units for almost two years, being fed,
clothed:, and she:tcrad entirely by the Sinkiang Provincial Goverment. After
these men started breaking away from Their military units and either settling
in Sirlki.ang or moving an farther oast,-they were a!4ed in accomplishing thou
choice by either the Sinkiang Government, or more often by personal funds of
Governor Yang Tsang-)sin.' Those who elected to remain in Sinkiang fzund a
true and'sincere friend ir. Governer Tamg. He not only used a few as his
personal advisora but employed large numbers in the Sinkiang Provincial.
Government and placed Cossack officers in charge of provincial troops. By
1928 there were no more than three thousand white Ruasianu remaining in
Sinkiang.
In 1928 the second Crave of Russian emigrants streamed into Sin'cieng,'continuing
until the fall of 1933. It coincided with the collectivisation of fares and
the subsequent famine in the ereas of the M SR vhich adjoin Sink e*+g. Thi.p
wave brought approximately 28 thousand Russians into Sinkiang. Of this number
some 20 thousand settled in Kuldja, four thousand in Chuguchak, three thousand
in the Altai Region and one thousand in Urumchi. Thus, by 1933 the Russian
population in Sinkiang had swelled to well over 31 thousand people.
After the assassination of Governor Yang on 7 Jul 28, the White Russians in
Sinkiang lost a great deal, of their influence but still managed to get along
fairly well. Their position was strengthened after the start of the Mohammedan
relJ,ious uprising in February 1931. Governor ..hin Sher-jen upon finding his
own forces poor in quality enlisted the aid of the White Russians to fight
against the Tungan General Na Chung-yin, leader of the Mohammedan forces.
Their participation in this military struggle on the side of the Sinkiang
Provincial Governme.t was an important factor in the victory over General
Na Chung-yin in 1934. Governor Chin was replaced, as Governor of Sinkiang,
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by General Sheng Shih-tsai on 12 Apr 33 with the aid and backing of the White
Russian forces. It was learned by the White Russian troops, during the seige
of Urumchi, the ccpital., that Governor Chin was planning to have than annihilated
and replaced by Soviet troops which were standing by at Changki. These Soviet
troops consisted of two regiments of one thousand men each, who wore Chinese
uniforms and who claimed to be White Russian volunteers from the Tarbagatai
and Altai Regions. The White Russians refused to be disarmed and to march
out of the city as ordered by Governor Chin. Instead, they joined forces with
the Manchu troops of General Sheng, defeated the Chinese forces of Governor
Chin and proclaimed General Sheng as toe new Governor of Sinkiang. in the
autumn of that year it became evident to the White Russian leaders in Sinkiang
that Governor Shang, as Governor Chin, also had strong pro-Soviet leanings.
Therefore, to prevent the Soviets from gradually taking over the province the
White Russian leaders, General P P Papengut, General K V Gmirkin, General
N I Behteev, Centurion I V Mogutnov, Colonel A V Hilovsky and Lieutenant
P P Voieikov undertook a plan to throw White Russian know-how and troops in
support of General Ma Chung-yin, who then would be assured of final victory.
This move would have terminated further Soviet penetration of Sinkiang, which
was the main concern and interest of the White Russians. A message written by
Papengut to Gmirkin was intercepted by Governor Sheng and thi's the plot was
revealed. The above mentioned six men were immediately arrested, imprisoned
and never heard from again. Governor Sheng continued as Governor of Sinkiang
until 2 Sep i,4, permitting the Soviets a free hand in the province. The White
Russian population during his term as Governor of Sinkiang decreased from
31 thousand to approximstel.y 13 thousand. The difference of 18 thousand people
was due to the White Russians either having been killed in battle,. imprisoned
and executed by Governor Sheng following the revelation of the plot against
him, or being arrested, imprisoned and then returned to the Soviet Union for
public trial, and execution. The Latter was done for the purpose of impressing
the people of the USSR that all enemies of the Statjk, no matter where they may
seek refuge, are eventually caught and punished. For a detailed description
of the role that the White Russians played in the Sinkiang war against General
Ma Chung-yin and his Moslem follswers, see enclosure.. This information was
furnished by a different source/ :5rom 1933 to 1943, Sinkiang as almost
completely dominated by Governor Sheng'J Soviet advisors. In 1943 Governor
Sheng made a complete turnabout in his policy toward the USSR. The white
Russians who came to Sinkiang prior to, or during, the Bci hevik Revolution
were all eliminated. Therefore, of the 13,408 remaining-in Sinkiang in 1941,
almost all were of tho type who took no firm political stand. Prior to 1943,
the White Russians who remained in Sinkiang were forced to accept Soviet pass-
ports and the approximately 1,200 who resifted in Urumehi were ordered to
move to either Kuldja or Chuguchak and some ultimately to the USSR. After
the Soviets withdrew from Sinkiang in 1944 they were able, in September 1944,
to sponsor a rebellion in the northwestern part of Sinkiang which again put
them in control of the Ili, Tarbagatai and Altai Regions of Sinkiang. These
three regions proclaimed their independence from Sinkiang and took on the name
of the Bast Turkestan People's Republic. Thus, the remain',ug Russians in
Sinkiang again found themselves under Soviet control. A few of those residing
in Kuldja were able to escape to the out in late 1946 during a temporary
relaxation of East Turkestan-Sinkiang border controls. The Sovistd used a
trick in 1947 to weed out the remaining Russians, in the East Ti;.destan
People's Republic, who were not content to remain under their infiuzence.
They advertised in all the Russian language papers in the East Turkestan
People's Republic to the effect that all Russians must register with their
local police as to their country of ,preference. This notice continued to
explain that an agreement had been concluded with the US, U6, France and
other eon-Soviet nations that they would accept those Sinkiang Russians who
wished to move to their countries. Most of the Russians saw through this
ob7ious trap and indicated the USSR, or Sinkiang, as their preference. Those
who failed to see through the trap, or would not let themselves see it, and
indicated the US or some other country other than the USSR, n*ysteriougl3'
disappeared never to be heard from or seen again.
3. Connemtraticnss Most of the White Russians in Sinkiang used to live in the
urban centers of Knldja, Chuguchak and Urumehi. There were, however, very
few, if any, Russians residing in Urumchi between the years of 1943 and 1949.
Another concentration of Russians was located in the Altai Region, in and
around Sharasume (Chenghwa).
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4. d L: As the group with highest average of edaoation and technical
training in the province, the White Russians have been useful both in tine
of peace and in periods of internal strife. },.t of then are peasants and
labazws; rowerer, they have also served as autaenbile drivers sad nechanios,
aided in the traiteing of -provincial military farala and made us of; their
military esperiacc, in actual eaatat. Namaally they lend an exiateaoe Mich.
like that of other White Russian emigre oaaounities in China.. 2bi had their
own organisations, published their own newspapers and otherwise attespted.to
preserve their cultural identity. In comparison to the other peoples of
sinkiaag they were considered to-be heavy eaters, their diet consisting of
approximately 50% cereal, 40% moat and 10% vegetables. In general they
aooaesnodate theousivee to shifting political tides in so far as these do not
threaten their very existence.
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Khan, the "Tiger Prince" of Hami and Hodja 2ij Hadji went to Luau Province
to persuade General Ma Chung-yin to be their military leader. He accepted and
in April 1931 made an amazing dash across the Gobi Desert, with an initial
force of 500 Amgen cavalry troops. Governor Ltu Shu- jen, found that his
Chinese troops 'sere no match for these skilled Tongan warriors and so enlistcd
the aid of the White Russians, who were remnants of Cossack forces end therefore
were also skilled horsemen and fighters. The first White Russians to be
mobilized into the Chinese Army were those who resided in Urumchi and in other
eratern arena of Sinkiang.
?.,, In the spring of 1932 the Sinkiang Government mobilizedthe male White Russians
in Kuldja (Ining), for the purpose of replacing the Russian divisions which
were stationed in Chikurting (Teikiotsing), near the town of Hami. They were
able to mobilize only three hundred men. The normal quantity should have been
approximately 500-550. Each group cf one hundred men was an independent unit.
There was no overall command and each unit left a weak apart, one sf;;er the
other. The unit into which I was mobilized, left Kuldja on l.Oct 3.. We were
ordered to Turf= and in proceeding them we did not use the main roadway but
travelled through the Tien Sham mountains. Each unit was ouperviaed by a
Chinese officer. The entire three units, of one hundred men each, were not
armed. Our unit arrived in Turfan on 25 Oct 32 and the men were quartered
in the local camel caravan-sarai. We were later joined, in Turfan, by one
of the other units. The third unit, we learned, was sent to Shanshar (Pichan).
In the middle of November, the brother of Sj;ggg Tupan (General Shang Shih-tsai)
visited both Shanahan and Turfan and trought with him, from Urumchi, rifles
for all the men and 13 shells per person. In the middle of December we received
orders to advance on Hami. Our two units left separately, as before, and
stopped at Chikurting. We later learned the reason wry, for such a long
period of time, our units were not armed. It turned out that the Chinese ../
first disbanded the Russian division in Chikurting, sent all the men to Urumchi
through Kuchengtze (f.itai), and then passed their weapons on to us. Prior to
the arriial of the Minister of War, f c n Urumchi we wars assigned duties and
commissions.
Bsaul Qadgabaan was appointed
er 01 our unit. van as evich nay was appointed Senior Officer
and Commander of the first platoon of our unit. The second platoon was to be
commanded by I4nb~?rf .h? , the third by Lazar ;S g, the fourth by Podesaul
Shevela and the quartermaster for the entire unit was to be ZLjaqAUi. The
latter was also appointed Chaplain,
In February 1931 a Mosley uprising started in the oit of Hami (Qomul). Sinkiang
Provincial troops were dispatched from Urumohi (Tihwa) to punish the inhabitants
of Hami for killing a government tax gatherer. The Moslems within the walled
city of Hami fought off these Chinese troops with rifles and boiling oil, but
finally were forced to retreat to the nearby mountains. The word of this
uprising spread throughout Sinkiang and soon all the Mohammedan peoples of
Sinkiang flocked to the area to jcin the "Religious War". It vs.e decided
by the Sinkiang Islamic peoples to enlist the aid of General j I Chungg ~
"Big Horse", a Tongan warlord who dominated western Kanau Province.
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When our unit was leaving Turfan, Centurion Mogutnov and Baharev, f:ca: the third
unit, and I were left in Turfan for the purpose of transmitting money to Kuldja
to the families of our unit.. The money'had to be given.to a chauffeur, Grigoriy
Leonidovich Ivanov who was returning ,from Hami. He-was to transmit the money
to Yuldja. We spent three days in Turfan awaiting the arrival of Ivanov and
only on the fourth day were we able to give the money to him and leave Turfan
to catch up with our troops.
When we rode up to the fortress of Shanshan, we noticed that the city gates were
,closed and soldiers stationed all along the city walls. We walked to the fortress
to eat, since all the restaurants outside of the city gates were closed. When
we found a restaurant in the fortress and sat down to eat, we were approached
by the local Chief's interpreter who asked us to immediately report to the
local Commander. When we arrived at the local Chief's office, we were met
by his wife, who was a Russian. She immediately asked us if we had received
her message. We received no message and she was very surprised that we hadn't.
At this point, the local Chief came into our room and told us that on 25 December
our third unit had been in battle with the Moslems near a fortress, the name of
which I now do not remember. We were told that the dead and wounded were
scattered throughout the area adjoining this fortress. The local Chief
announced to us that we could go no farther because the Moslem forces in the
area totaled approximately 300 men and there was no way by which we could
penetrate th3 r lines and join our forces.. He offered that we temporarily
cootie to and live in his Yampa, which we din. After this, he summoned us and
asked us to look over the fortress so that we could give him our opinion as to
how it could be best defended in case of an attack by the Moslems. The local
Chief warned as that the 60-man garrison in the fur tress was composed entirely
of Tongan, as were also their officers. After we.. discussed the best means by
which this fortress could be defended, ve asked the Chief. to send.a telegram
to Sheng Tupan asking that he immediately send us several "ishik" (local donkeys),
shells fcY our rifles and 25 pistols with shells. We then appointed our own
guards on thb %rtress walls and a duty officer. By the way, in addition to
the two other officers and myself, we also had five Cossacks. Al]. together,
there were eight of us.
On the next day, at approximately 9:00 to l0:OC a.m., the .3uty officer informed _
us that the rebels were approaching the fortress. We Russians and the local
garrison immediately took positions on the fortress walls and awaited the
rebel attack. The rebels did not'imgediately attack the fortress, they stopped
and grouped themselves in a largo orchard five to six miles from the fortress.
When dusk was approachi.n', the rebels went to the Tongan village near the
fortress. In the early morning they began their attack on the fortress but
did not attempt to penetrate. They merely tried to feel. out our strength and
influence the local garrison; all Tungans, to join them. They shouted that
the garrison should turn against the Chinese Chief and their officers because
this was a religious var and since they, the Tungans, have the same faith,
they have no business defen?!14-, the Chinese. The Tu.ngan garrison, at our
direction, retorted by giving several valleys as a reply to their proposal.
The rebels withdrew from the adjoining village back to the orchard and remained
there until, the next day.
6. (Cr. 2? e:~s r??. - a:; 3:00am.the rebels again advanced on the fortress and within
half an hour hid already broken through the gates and captured most of the
fortress city. The Tungan garrison retreated to their quarters and fought off
the rebels from there. The rebels made no concentrated or serious effort to
capture them, but turned all of their attention on us and to looting the town.
We occupied a corner of the Yaaen and were under constant and heavy attack
from all directions. At this timo, in addition to the eight of us, there were
also two Chinese officers who had brought us the shells, rifles and pistols
from Urumchi. We had to hold off the attack until 9=00 e.m, and only at this
time did we receive the unexpected news that all three Russian units of 100 men
each, and a Chinese squadron under the command of General Sign, had forced the
rebels to evacuate the fortress and to take up battle on the open fields
surrounding the fortress. One of our units sent a platoon to the fortress,
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which we were able. to hoist up to the fortress wall by use o a rope and then
clear out the fortress of all rebel forces. By this action we were able to
clear the fortress and open the doors to allow one of the units to enter the
fortress. and to garrison the _ror tress walls. With sunset,the rebels withdrew
to the nearby mountains. In this battle, the Moslem residents of Shanahan and
the surrounding area, totaling approximately one thousand people, took part
in the firing against our forces. Some of the Moslem troops were armed with
fire-arms, but the majority were armed with steel spears which were formed
out of telegraph wire. That' obtained this -telegraph wire by cutting the
existing telegraph connections and utilizing the cable.
7. On the next day by the order of General Siun,?who took ocmmand?of all of our
forces, all the three Russian,units formed into one group and as a result of
a vote taken amongst the Russian officers, Centurion Mogutnov was appointed
Commander. Mogutnov in turn appointed Shevelsv as his Chief of Staff. I was
appointed Quartermaster for the whole Russian division. The next-few days were
spent in pursuing the rebel forces. Cn?7 Jan 33 General Siun gave oo iand to
the Russian division and his squadron to move on to the Lukchun (Lukotetn)
fortress and from there to -the town of Turfan. The reason for this was that
we had obtained information that the rebel forces whi.;h ae had dispersed had
decided to move against this town; We stayed there overnight and than- headed
in the direction of Turfan.? Upon reaching the rillage'of Halahaeho, we'were
met by the rebel forosa and fought -With them 'for two days. They seemed to
lack rifle fire using primiti'e fire-throwing weapons and steal spears
exclusively. General Stun did not execute the plans that he 'himself had -avade.
He was unable to join our forces -and was captured by the rebel forces which
had already captured Turfan. On the third. day, .having lost our.0camander
and !realising that we did not have sufficient a9munitiony and Turfam having
already been w.ntured by the rebels who were able to regroup -and rearm there
?deoidsd to withdraw our headquarters in to Shanahan where we had left's supp y
of ammunition.
8. We had- to withdraw under fire and whom. our wagons with the wounded, under
protection of one group of 100 men, reach Hrlakooha they were approached by
two rebel mess ers, =9 of which was a Russian, FnltavaUX, and the other
'a Tatar, Gaica,(his family name I do not ramembsr~ but-he was a former
Russian effacer).. The messengers announced that Turfan was in?their'haad.)
General Siun and those Russisne.who were with hie were captured -but ?are:alive
and being treated well. They offered that we?proeeed?to Turfan to see, with
Our OVA eyes, 'that they are being treated wall and later -turn in our?weapons
for which they would guarantee our immediate return to Euldja. The messengers
also demanded that -the wagons which were carrying the wounded and the accom-
panying group of 100 men also return and proceed to Turfan. Centurion Nogutnov,
it seems, agreed to this offer and dispatched Captain JAM= with the order
that we return immediately. The wagons with the wounded were under my charge.
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or anpr any an our or woe Captain ev
again a his appearance and said that we were once again commanded-to return
to Halakocho, because- hat is what the rebel messengers demanded. We held a
meeting of all the officers, discussed our position and announced: that not
only we, but the Cossacks also would'not return, but would proceed -to
Shansban where we have additional ammunition and where we could leave our
wounded. Early the next morning Captain Tokarev announced to us that we could
proceed to Shanahan, but that he would keep a few Cossacks and remain in Lukchun
for- the purpose of keeping Lukohun.from falling into the hands of the Tangans.
'.That night we arrived at Shanahan, and several hours later Captain Tokarev
also arrived with his small group. The following night Eeaul ZJIVjy arrived
from Ralahocho and announced that the regiment, under Centurion Mogutnov would
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leave that evening destined for Shanahan and that he was sent to us -.Ath a
fictitious command to return to Halahoeho, but that. this was merely to confuse
the rebels. Sure euDugh, after several hours, our forces under the command of
Centurion,Mogutnov arrived and Mogutnov thanked us for not obeying his command.
It.seema that our refusal.to return prolonged the negotiations, gave them a chance
to regroup and await the eight moment for withdrawal from the area. We learned
that after the withdrawal of our wagons and men the rebels had completely surrounded
the remaining forces. ,
9. When our division arrived in Shanahan the rebels gave us.only one hour to rest and
then started a battle by attacking the fortress. The battle was hard and constant,
.from the hour of 9:00 a.m. to sunset and continuing for two days. Our position
became very critical because of the loss of many men and the shortage of ammunition.
In addition to the rifles, we had two machine guns, but the rebels not only had
many machine guns but also cannons. After the last battle, wa decided to retreat
to the mountains and traverse the mountains to Kuchengtze. This plan was quite
hazardous because the mountains were covered with snow. However, we realized
that we could not hold off in Shanahan indefinitely.. By this time, there was no
ooamumication with Urunehi or a y other towns because all telegraph lines had
been severed. After the last battle we moved the wagons, with the.wounded,,into
the mountains under, the protection of one group of 100 men and left two groups
in Shanshan. The following morning the rebels approached Shanahan with a fares
of several thousand horses and men, and with orders to immediately captute,the
fortress. This battle raged all day and by evening the rebels had penetrated
our flanks. We thus bad to retreat within the walls of the fortress.. One group
took up positions within the fortress and the other one immediately outside. The
rebels this time did not retreat to the hills, but stationed their forces in a
village post outside of the fortress walls, At dusk, an airplane appeared and
dropped a message into the fortress. The message asked as to hold on to the
fortress since addfional forces. were on their way to rescue us.. This message
raised our spirits, but we were uoncerned about our wagons with the wounded and
the Group of one hundred man that accompanied it. We were almost ready to send
.parties, out to starch for them when it got dark, when our guards informed-us that
something 1'as moving on the road to Shanahan on "arbui" (cants). We sent a party
to investigate and when they returned it was reported that it was our group of
100 with the wagons returning because they had met a O;hiness divioion.whioh wi
coming to our aid.. This information vtw correct b-cause after several homes our
forces and the wagons returned, following the,artil'ery and tanks. The cavalry
and infantry detaehments.of the Chinese division together with their Commander,
General Sheng, atationari themselves outside of the fortress walls. On the
following day, early in the. morning, there was a battl,, and the rebels after holding
off for several hours retreated to Turfan.
10. After the withdrawal of the rebels, Sheng Tupan asked for. Centurion Mogutnov to
report to him and they decided to change our division to a regiment consisting
of three hundred men. The Commander of the regiment was to be Centurion I'I,gutnov
and the Chief of Strff, JAJM&, They named me quartermaster for the regiment and
adviser to the Commander on all matters pertaining to supply and finance. After
spending approximately ten days in Shanahan, Shang Tupan left two regiments in
Shanahan, under the command of General DM, and the rest of his troops and our
regiment advanced on Turfan. They left me in Shanahan with the wounded and
assigned ten men for garrison duty. The forces that left Shanahan occupied both
Turfan and Toqsun (Tokosun). After this, Sheng Tupan left for Urumchi taking
Centurion Mogutnov with him, The Commander of the remaining forces was General
and Rekut was left in charge of our foreee~~ Approximately two weeks passed
when a division of rebels under the command of'Ilodja Nine Hadji arrived from
Ckikurting. This division circumvented Shanahan and occupied the fortress of
Lukchun. Some troops were sent from Turfan to Lukehun and it was liberated
from the rebels.
U. At this time we received a telegram from Urumchi through Chikirting that the
rebels were already in Urumchi and had occupied the entire city. In the same
teiee s= a ware commanded to abandon all of our past stands and to retreat in
the direction of Urumohi in two columns. We were ordered to retreat from
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Shanahan to Kuchengtze and from Kuc.hengtze to Turfan and from Turfan to Urumchi.
Everyone started preparing to retreat and we Russians who were left in Shanahan
decided to'retaeat with the Chinese forces to huchengtze. On the right of the
second day after receiving the telegram, however. our group of 100 men arrived.
They had been operating south of Luk:hun and brought me an order, that under
the protection of this force of 100 men; we were to join with the regiment in
Turfan. After many arguments with the Chinese Commander, we left for Turfan.
In Turfan we joined with our own regiment and two days after our arrival, we left
Turfan for Urumehi. Two days prior to our arrival, Centurion Rekut was relieved
of his commission and was replaced by Captain Tokurev, who was previously
Commander of the first group of 100 men. The first day of our trek was without
any spectacular happenings, but beginning with the second day and until our
arrival at Urumehi, we advanced amid battle,
12. We arrived in Urumchi in the first few days of March 1933, and after having
stayed there for two to three days our regiment, together with the Chinese
forces under the command of Shang Tupan, was sent to the mountains which lie
between Urumchi and Kuchengtze. A large concentration of the rebo]. forces
was reported to be located there. The rebels were forced to abandon.their positions
in that region but were not annihilated because they had carefully preconceived
plane for retreat. When the regiment was returning to Urumch;i, every.step of the
way had.to be won from the rebels. After this campaign, the entire regiment was
given several days leave and it was planned than to send it back to Turf-an. By
the way,.when our regiment arrived from Turfan to Uramchi, a second Bastian
regiment was already formed, composed of Russians from Urumehi and Chuguohak
;Tahoheng). After several days three more separate groups of 100 man each .
arrived from Kuldje. These were assigned to serve in the 3rd Regiment. The
3rd Regiment was composed mo6tly of Cossacks who had served in the, let Hami Division.
13. When our regiment received orders to again leave for Turfan, the Cossacks and
their offioers asked the Commands: of the regiment, Centurion Mogutnov, to request
Governor Chin Shu.jen to postpone the march on Turfan for several days is view of
the fact that in several Jaye it would be Russian Easter and the men wished to
oelebr!-te this holiday in peace. We were to go to Turfan, together with the
Chinese forces, under the command of Shang Tupan. Governor Chin refused the
menu appeal and oommanded them to imsediately leave for Turfan. The Chinese
foroso had already left Urumohi and were awaiting our arrival south of the city.
Somehow we found out that cur regiment was not being sent to Turfan, but for some
reason, Faa being sent out to certain massacre. At that tiiae, the 3rd Rae men.
was not armed. Whop Centurion Mogutno` arrived from Governor Chin's.heaU'yuarters
and announced the new order, the Cosaaoke refused to comply beoaus.' they had
already learned of the plan to dispose of them. The Commander of our regiment
immediately went to the 2nd Regiment and gave me the order that Cossacks from the
3rd-Regiment would arrive and that I was to issue them hand weapons, rifles end
shells. In this manner,. within several hours, we managed to arm over 100 men of
the 3rd Regiment. 0i the next Jay, this wasl2 Apr 33, Centurion Mogutnov departed
for the 3rd Regiment early i.n.the morning and after approximately one. hour s;mnt
an order to his second-in-command, Captain Tokarev, that'he slowly, several men at
a time, start sending men into the fortress. The second group of 100 .with full
military,gear and weapons was sent first and then the. third group was sent over
into the fortress in the same manner. I was ordered to remain with the wagons
and wounded men and the firet group in the Yang Han, We, who remained in the'
Yang Han, did not know whet was happening and only at about noon did we hear
shooting in the fortress. This battle within Urumchi did not continue for a long
time. After this, Captain Tokarev received from.the 2nd Regiment, orders that he
establish communication withthe fortress which had been wrbsted from the bands of
Governor Chin. Communications were immediately set up and messengers were sent
every ore or two hours. Until dusk we received messages that everything was in
our control. The situation looked very good for7zs, since the Russian forces had
full control of the city. The local arsenal was in our hands, out of which the
whole of the 3rd Regiment was armed..
14. At approximately 31.00 p.m. a messenger arrived with an order that we get the
wagons and the wounded ready and that everyone should be ready to march again.
At the exact moment that we received this message, we heard new shooting in the
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fortress. After approaimately one hour after receipt of the mesgaage which
instructed us to march out of the city2 we received a new message which ordered
us to immediately advance on the fortress in the direction of the airdrome. Captain
Tokarev decided-to retreat only if he received further orders. At about 4:00 a.m.
the wagons, protected by several Cossacke, departed from the city, but the rest
remained with Captain Tokarev?in the Yang Han. When the wagons reached the.
airdrome they were shot at from the radio station, but were able to reach the
fortress gatee anyway. Approxi:-,ately one hour later, the wagons with the wounded
were joined by the group of 100 men under the command of Captain Tokarev.
15. When we arrived in the fortreae, we four's out that the Russian leaders had heard
that Governor Chin had tithe intention of sending the let Regiment out to certain
massacre and then was intending to send the 2nd and 3rd to be annihilated, the
3rd Regiment having been ordered to leave the city without any weapons. He then
planned~to invite Soviet troops who were standing by at C , and by.this
method to rid himself of our influence and to gain the military strength of the
Soviet Army to help him crush the rebels. It was learned that. there were two
Soviet regiments standing by at Changki, awaiting word from Governor man to step
into the oonfliot. They had arrived there by truck from Chuguohak (Tehoheng)..
In view of this, the Russians decided to start a revolution of their own. They
first occupied the !amen of Governor Chin and late the fortress walls. Everything
went beautifully. Governor Chin's convoy was annihilated, his cavalry and soldiers
on the walls were also defeated. The entire fortress was in the hands of the
Russians, with the exception of some small little corner where the Ohl=se hold
out. By evening the picture had changed completely. The Chinese under-the guise
of ssiyathy with our cause, otarted going up into the fortress and onto the city
wal]-e. They brought our Oossaoks tigarettss and alcoholic beverages, but later
attacked them, killed most of the guards, took their weapons and, opened five on
the Russian forces within the city. By morning, the situation became critical
and our Cosnoander decided to retreat from M-umohi. That is.why we received the
order in the Yang Nan to retreat towards the fortress, it wee for the-purpose of
uniting all of the Russian forces. When we arrived in the fortress, sur.0csmande'
fa~rmsd a now council and decided to send Centurion Magutnow to Shang Tupen, eking
him to join his forces with ours and at the same time offered the Manehaian
officers to gather up arms srd help us. Mogutnov returned after having met Shang
Tupen and reported that h%j had agreed to jc,in our forces if we would allow him to
be the next Governor of Sinkiang. The Manchurians had also agreed to bear arms
for as. After theme councils and the a.rmisg of the Manchurians, Bheng Tupan
marched ca the fortress and the Chinese ^oreea.woes f'oed to withdraw. ~Goovvernor
Chin, with several of his officers and soldiers x oa Uru+oohi, retrsdted' to
maguehak. The fortress was then oocupl.ed by Shang Tupan and rh. Yang Han by the
Manchurians.
16. On the following morning, our regiment went ba* to the Yang Elm to,our? usigned
quarters. The 2nd and 3rd Reginenteremained in the fortress. During.the
upheaval., the rebel Moslems, stationed their armies near ttiamohi but were ln.aoms
sort of confused or divided opinion as to what their neat.move should be and
therefore, did not take adventage.of the internal upheaval. The Soviet troops
also failed to move and withdrew under the tovere,ge of darkness. After this
upheaval, which was called the revolt of 12 April and wan eelbrated every year,
our regiment rested for a long time. Part of the officers and Cossacks were-
allowed to retimn home for reasons of bad health or inflicted wounds.
17. During the autumn of this year, 1933, there was a revolt in the fortress of Kure,
40 miles west of Kuldja, which was started by a Chinese commander. celled Ghana.
against Governor Sheng Shih.tsai. The reason for this revolt, as stated by
Chan, was that Governor Sheng had gone to the USSR and signed some port of.
treaty which was not profitable for China. After this revolt, all three Russian
regiments were organizing into a single Russian division whose appointed commander
was Captain Pavel Petrovich jZg: H14 Chief of Staff was to be Nikolai
Ivanovich Behteev., Commander of the Yang Hasa was to be Captain Nikolai Nikolaev'ich
fnlgwg& and the Quartermaster was to be Konstantine Vasilievich Ste. All of
theca were commissioned as generals in the Chinese Army. The rebels entered
Chuguchek and the 2nd Regiment was assigned to fight in that area. The man who
was assigned to command the 2nd Regiment was Colonel A V $jjoY . kilovaky's
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Chief of.Staff was Captain Dimitriy Ksrpovich Shelestiuk. In the autumn of the
same year, 1933, after the battles in Chuguchak for reasons not known tome,
General Papengut, General Behteev, and General Gmirkin were arrested. Lieutenant
Pavel Petrovich Voieikux, Captain Shelestiuk and Centurion Mogutnov were likewise.
arrested and killed in the Yemen in Urumchi.
18. In December 1933 Urumchi was completely surrounded by the rebel forces, which
numbered some eight thousand men. The seige of Urumchi continued for two months.
in the beginning, just as the rebels approached the town, it was proposed by
Governor Shang that an offer be sent to Kuldja to mobilize more Russians, but
this offer was declined. After the fiercest battle, which took place on 19 Jan 34,
when the rebels broke through into the town, the White Russian forces. received
a message from Governor Sheag which said that fresh forces from Terbagatai and
Altai, under the command of an officer calling himself JALQta.would soon. join
the struggle. Shortly after this message, approximately 15 biplanes,.with Soviet
markings, aterted flying over the town dropping bombs onto the positions of the
rebels. It became clear to us that under the guisa of White Russian Tarbegatai
and Altai troops, Soviet troops had entc'ed this conflict. Upon reaching Mamma
(Suilai),.the Soviet troops were unable to advaLce any further because part of
the rebel troops were withdrawn from IIrumchi and were transferred to most the
oncoming Soviet force. The 3rd Regiment of White Russian troop was dispatched
from 'umchi to aid them. These troops were under the command of Horvnshage
a , .a. With the arrival of our regiment,. the rebels were defeated and withdrew
back to Ufrumohi and the nest morning abandoned the soigo of Ltrsmchi. All of our
three regiments and the Soviet forces, which consisted of one cavalry and one
infantry regiment, were ordered to chase the rebel tarces which Mere retrssting
in a southerly direction. During this period when we fought side )v o:do with
the Soviet troop:, we were able to observe a number of things about them..They
were dressed in common Ohinose Army uniforms with no insignia at all. Their
6 MOM Oft diftsr.black = grey- fur coats with side AM. Thi NNf P MM%
ocnriatod of only four to five hundred men, whereas the infantry regiment lad a
compliment of one thousand men. They were oqU .pped with. an assartmaat of tire.
arms. Some had Sbglish oarbines, some old-type Russian rifles and others were
armed with now Soviet "trioh lineiki" semi-automatic rifles, with a five-round
olip. Those Soviet troops wars also equipped with ,many "dihmiar" machine guns, one
battery of heavy artillery, trucks and armored caret. Neal of their equipment, as
their uniforms, had any identifying markings at all. As mentioned previously,
these Soviet troops had constant aerial support. The biplanes which they used
were extremely valrable in tracing the rebel m-vements and positions. It is
interesting to note that after the initial bombing flights over oh , at which
time the biplanes were plainly marked with Soviet markings, their markings wars
painted out. I believe I can say, without prejudice, that our White Russian troops
were far superior to the Soviet troops. Their soldiers showed no individual
initiative or ingenuity, they were like automatons who only acted upon the advice,
or command, of someone else. They certainly were no match for the crafty Moslem
tribesmen. ;,uring the chase of General Me Chung-yin's. forces 'toward Haebgxr.
(Shafa) there were innumerable times when our ill-equipped Cossacks had to
rescue the Soviet forces from complete annihilation. The rebel farces were
finally defeated and. their general, Me Chung-yin, on 10 Jul 34 crossed over
with a few of his men into the Soviet territory at Irkeahtan, the rest. of his
forces remained in the town of Khotan (Hotiea). This, for all intents and
purposes it can be said, ended the religious war of that period.
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