FOR THE RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00418R000100050040-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2012
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 16, 1988
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Newsweek
Time
U.S. News 8, Word Report
Date
For the Record
STAT
By Donald T. Regan
NANCY REAGAN STAMMERS
slightly when she is upset, and her
voice was unsteady when she called
me from Bethesda Naval Hospital on
Friday afternoon, July 12, 1985, to
tell me that her husband, the President of the
United States, would require surgery for the re-
moval of a large polyp in his intestinal tract. In
illnesses of this kind, speedy treatment is essen-
tial, and so I was concerned-apprehensive
would be a better word-when she told me that
the operation might be delayed for a day and a
half.
"I'm reading something into this," I said,
speaking cautiously because we were on the tele-
phone. "Am I on firm ground in doing it?"
"Yes, possibly," the First Lady replied.
Her answer worried me. I feared two things-first, that
President Reagan's condition was more serious than his wife
had been able to tell me over the telephone. and second, that
the First Lady was choosing the date for surgery in consulta-
tion with her astrologer. Of the two possibilities the second
seemed the more likely. Virtually every major move or decision
the Reagans made during my time as White House chief of
staff was cleared in advance with a woman in San Francisco
who drew up horoscopes to make certain that the planets were
in a favorable alignment for the enterprise.
Nancy Reagan seemed to have absolute faith in the clair-
voyant powers of this woman. who had predicted that "some-
thing bad" was going to happen to the President shortly
before he was wounded in an assassination attempt in 1981.
Before that. Mrs. Reagan had consulted a different astrologer.
but now she believed that this person had lost her powers.
The First Lady referred to the woman as "My Friend."
Although I never met this seer-Mrs. Reagan passed along
her prognostications to me after conferring with her on the
telephone-she had become such a factor in my work. and in
the highest affairs of the nation, that at one point I kept a color-
coded calendar on my desk (numerals highlighted in green ink
for "good" days. red for "bad" days, yellow for "iffy" days) as
an aid to remembering when it was propitious to move the
President of the U.S. from one place to another, or schedule
him to speak in public, or commence negotiations with a for-
eign power.
When the timing of his surgery was raised with the Presi-
dent. however, he settled the issue himself. Why wait? he asked
the doctors. Do the tests and go ahead with the operation. I can
function just as well in the hospital as at home.
Although the President would sometimes remind me. when
I suggested a change in plans. that certain days were not good
for a public appearance. I never knew for sure whether he was
aware of the role played by the astrologer in making his sched-
ule. But on this occasion, if the Friend's powers were invoked,
the Chief Executive apparently decided to ignore them. I later
learned that the Friend had failed to predict the discovery of a
malignancy in the President's bowel: a 5-cm growth.
During his recuperation. the President asked that visitors
be kept to a minimum. But I never imagined that he would re-
fuse to see anybody at all. Vice President Bush. who had com-
ported himself with his usual flawless tact and loyalty during
the crisis, wanted to pay his respects. Robert C. ("Bud")
McFarlane. the National Security Adviser, was pressing for a
meeting with the President on what he described as a matter of
great importance.
His sense of urgency was obvious. At the time, I had no
idea that McFarlane wanted to discuss a verbal message from
the Prime Minister of Israel raising the possibility of a dialogue
between U.S. officials and members of Iran's government. I
scheduled both Bush and McFarlane for Monday.
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0Z
Mrs. Reagan was angry. She had heard that Vice President
Bush and I might go to Bethesda by helicopter. The First Lady
objected vehemently to my travel by helicopter-a presidential
form of transportation. Listening to her voice. I jotted down the
words' very mad." [ had hardly hung up when Edward Hickey,
who handled White House transportation, called to warn: "I'd
cancel the helicopter if 1 were you. Don. The First Lady's staff is
talking about it."
"I'm just trying to save time." I said. "I've got to go out
there seven days a week-that's more than ten hours down the
drain in a single week."
"That would be a good reason under normal circum-
stances." Ed replied. "But the buzzards are out. Don. Be careful
what you're doing."
His language took me aback. So did the realization that my
actions were being monitored by the First Lady's staff and
turned into a subject for gossip. This was something new in my
life and I did not welcome it.
"O.K.." I said. "Cancel the damn helicopter."
Monday morning I arrived at the White House by 7:15.
Soon Mrs. Reagan called me again to argue against a visit by
Bush and McFarlane. I explained that McFarlane had an ur-
gent reason to see the President. "Whatever it is. Bud can put it
in writing," she said. -Ronnie can read. But talking to visitors
will tire him out. Besides, it would be very bad for anybody to
see him while he still has tubes in his nose."
The situation could not continue. Stories were beginning to
appear in the media suggesting that I was freezing out McFarlane
and feuding with Bush. Reporters were asking members of the
staff if I had become some sort of Prime Minister or acting Presi-
dent. Nancy Reagan and I were the only people they ever saw
going in and out of the hospital. A rumor was abroad that I would
only approve pictures of the President in which I. too, appeared.
When I complained to Mrs. Reagan about the unfairness of
this. she did not sympathize. "Pull back." she said. "Keep a low
profile. Don't be seen out too much: people are talking."
It was a losing battle. In obedience to the First Lady's wish-
es. I was the only one besides herself who was seeing the Presi-
dent. Because he is news incarnate. that made me news. "It's
unconscionable." I told Mrs. Reagan. "and damn curious to the
press and foreign governments that the President isn't seeing
anyone from his National Security Council staff."
Finally, on Thursday. July 18. Mrs. Reagan reluctantly
gave permission for McFarlane to visit the President. Bud
spoke to the President for 23 minutes. This meeting. which was
to have such fateful consequences, seemed routine at the time,
and it seems routine in memory.
I was present throughout. My notes say, "Middle East,
Hostage Release problem." then "Soviet Geneva arms talks."
I do not remember that the hospital meeting was marked by a
sense of drama.
McFarlane asked the President if he was interested in talk-
ing to the Iranians. reasoning that the U.S. ought to be estab-
lishing contacts if and when a new government came into be-
ing in Tehran. The hostages were discussed in a general way.
The sense of this part of the conversation was that the Iranians,
who had been helpful in
connection with the hi-
jacking of TWA Flight 847
in June. might be disposed
to be helpful in other situa-
tions if we were more
friendly to them. Nothing
in my notes or in my mem-
ory suggests that the idea
of swapping arms for hos-
tages was mentioned by ei-
ther man.
Iran took up ten or
twelve minutes. McFar-
lane spent at least half his
time talking about arms ne-
gotiations, another subject
close to the President's
heart. It hardly seems like-
ly that an entirely new poli-
cy, involving a brusque de-
parture from past practices
and established principle-and bringing in a third country. Is-
rael, as middleman in a secret arms sale-could have been de-
cided on in such a brief encounter. The President said later he
had no recollection of this meeting. That did not surprise me. I
wonder if I would have remembered it if I hadn't had such a
difficult time persuading his wife to let it take place.
"Watch out." he said. "I
may take you up on that."
On Dec. 18, Mike
Deaver. White House dep-
uty chief of staff. joined us
at Baker's house for lunch.
Deaver listened with the
polite air of a man who had
already heard what he was
now being told. In my in-
nocence the thought that
Deaver had cleared the
plan with the First Lady
before discussing it with
me, or even with the Presi-
dent, did not occur to me.
"Yup." Deaver said at
last, in a decisive tone. "It's
a good idea." He listed his
reasons: the beginning of
the second term was the
natural time for a change
of chiefs of staff: I had been loyal to the President; I had no dis-
cernible personal agenda: nobody had to worry about my run-
ning for public office a la Al Haig. Even my age, just shy of 66.
was in my favor.
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\3.
"This would be your terminal job, Don," he said, turning a
memorable phrase. "Let's go to the President with it."
Deaver later claimed that he broke the news of the Baker-
Regan job swap to Ronald Reagan with the words, "Mr. Presi-
dent, I've brought you a playmate of your own age." I don't re-
member this witticism, but the atmosphere was certainly
relaxed, even lighthearted, when Baker, Deaver and I called on
the President on Jan. 7. 1985.
Omitting preliminaries. Deaver said, "Mr. President, Don
has something he wants to discuss with you that he's talked to
Jim and me about. We'd like to know what you think about it."
I could see that something was up with you three. Reagan
said. Let's have it.
There was a twinkle in his eye: Deaver-bald, small and
bustling-projected a sort of cheeky familiarity, and Reagan
seemed to enjoy his irreverence.
I explained what Baker and I had in mind. Reagan seemed
equable, relaxed-almost incurious. This seemed odd. Deaver
had ideas about leaving, and Ed Meese was soon to become Attor-
ney General. Now Baker, the last of the three advisers who had
been at Reagan's side all during his two successful campaigns for
the presidency and his first term. wanted to go elsewhere. A new
chiefof staff would be taking over duties formerly carried out by all
three men. The President could not afford a mistake.
In the President's place I would have put many questions to
the applicant. Reagan made no inquiries. I did not know what to
make of his passivity. I said after a moment. "Maybe you'd like
to think about all this." Reagan waved away the suggestion. Tell
me a little more. he said.
"You know me well enough after four years to know what I
stand for." I said. "And I think that you and I see things alike."
Regan nodded affably. This thing does make sense, he said.
Yes. yes-I'll go for it.
Less than 30 minutes had passed since the meeting began.
The President seemed to be absorbing a fait accompli rather
than making a decision. One might have thought the matter had
already been settled by some absent party.
After I arrived at the White House. Deaver remained in his
office Ithe one closest to the Oval Office ) for about three months,
continuing to handle scheduling and imagery. His fundamental
style. that of a man who advances himself by doing favors for
others, was not one that I admire, but he was very useful to the
Reagans and seemed more secure than any other person on the
staff in his relationship with them. He treated the White House
like the residence of an indulgent aunt and uncle. bringing his
friends home to play tennis and eat in the mess. Deaver was affa-
ble and accommodating in his dealings with me-and of course
he was the leading expert on the temperament and methods of
the First Lady.
Deaver's function had as much to do with the mysterious
process of managing this shadowy distaff presidency as with his
visible role as custodian of the presidential image. Although Mrs.
Reagan's considerable staff handled her affairs with great effi-
ciency, it was Deaver who was entrusted with im-
portant missions. By long habit he knew how to
relieve Mrs. Reagan-at least momentarily-of
the worry, irritation and impatience that seemed
to be her constant companions.
If Mrs. Reagan was unable to persuade the
President to act on her advice on an official mat-
ter. she would put Deaver in play. As I found to
my cost. he devised ways to communicate Mrs.
Reagan's demands to the President by planting
stones in the press that the President was bound
to read and by creating a climate of expose with
which the President was forced to deal. Some-
times gossip-the suggestion that someone had
lost the President's confidence-was enough to
solve the problem without engaging the President
directly: some people left Reagan's service con-
vinced that he wanted them to go. when in fact he
had little or no idea that they were going.
As Deaver's departure drew nearer. I began to
deal more with Mrs. Reagan. Some of her requests seemed so far
out of her proper area of competence that I was disposed to ignore
them. Her husband. for example, was all but incapable of flung a
subordinate, and I suppose she had become used to supplying the
missing determination. Her purpose was to protect the President
from embarrassment and insulate him from associates who might
tarnish his reputation.
Deaver's consistent advice was to humor her. "I wouldn t
phrase it quite that way."
he would advise. on read-
ing a draft that touched on
some subject of interest to
Mrs. Reagan. "... I
wouldn't push that ... I'd
be careful on that one." I
was left with the impres-
sion, which proved accu-
rate. that walking on egg-
shells was a useful skill to
cultivate if you were going
to deal with Mrs. Reagan
day-to-day.
And then there was
the question of the astrol-
oger's influence. Before I
came to the White House.
Mike Deaver had been
the man who integrated
the horoscopes of Mrs.
Reagan's Friend into the
presidential schedule. He
did so with the utmost
tact. leaving the impres-
sion with the dozens of
people who wait on any
presidential scheduling
decision that he. Deaver.
was the ditherer. I found
this odd because Deaver
was remarkably punctual
and efficient in everything
else. Although in theory Deaver was empowered to make any
entry he wished on the Presidents calendar. he never agreed to'
any trip or outside event on the spot. "Let me play around with
this." he would say: "let me see what can be done." Sometimes
weeks would pass before a decision was made. This caused in-
convenience and grumbling. Deaver was. of course. waiting for
approval from the First Lady's Friend, and it is a measure of his
discretion and loyalty that few in the White House suspected
that Mrs. Reagan was even part of the problem-much less that
an astrologer in San Francisco was approving the
details of the presidential schedule.
When. after a few days on the job. I asked
Deaver to explain the delay and uncertainty sur-
rounding the Presidents schedule. he was plainly
uncomfortable. "Ssshhh." Deaver said. throwing
up his hands and casting furtive glances. -Dona
bring that up. Leave it be.-
The confusion continued even after Dearer
left the White House. [ complained to Bill Hen-
kel, the President's chief advance man. Poor Bt It.
who had been in on the secret for some time but
was not at liberty to disclose it to me. made no
excuses.
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But Henkel finally did persuade Deaver to
tell me the facts. He said I had to know them or
the entire scheduling process would collapse.
Deaver came to see me and explained the mys-
tery , I thought at first that he was joking. but he
made it plain that he was not.
Deaver told me that Mrs. Reagan's dependence on the occult
went back at least as far as her husband's governorship. when
she had relied on the advice of the famous Jeane Dixon. Subse-
quently. she had lost confidence in Dixon's powers. But the First
Lady seemed to have absolute faith in the clairvoyant talents of
the woman in San Francisco.
Apparently. Deaver had ceased to think there was anything
remarkable about this long-established floating seance: Mike is a
born chamberlain. and to
him it was simply one of
many little problems in
the life of a servant of the
great. "At least, ' he said.
"this astrologer is not as
kooky as the last one."
As [ discovered in my
turn. there was no choice
but to humor the First
Lady in this matter. Still.
the Presidents schedule is
the single most potent tool
in the White House. be-
cause it determines what
the most powerful man in
the world is going to do
and when he is going to do
it. By humoring Mrs. Rea-
gan we gave her this
tool-or. more accurately.
gave it to an unknown
woman in San Francisco
who believed that the zo-
diac controls events and
human behavior and that
she could read the secrets
of the future in the move-
ments of the planets.
When the Geneva sum-
mit was held in Novem-
ber 1985. 1 couldn't resist
reflecting that a heavy
burden must have been placed on the poor woman. She was
called upon not only to choose auspicious moments for meetings
between the two most powerful men on our planet but also to
draw up horoscopes that presumably provided clues to the char-
acter and probable behavior of Gorbachev.
Mrs. Reagan. who talked to her Friend mostly on Saturday
afternoons from Camp David. once complained to me in budget-
ary terms about revisions in the schedule. "I wish you'd make up
your mind." she said testily. "It's costing me a lot of money. call-
ing up my Friend with all these changes."
The President's view of the situation was never discussed.
That he permitted it to exist and never reversed any of the situa-
tions created by his wife's intervention was regarded as sufficient
evidence that he was willing to tolerate the state of affairs.
[ had never dealt with anything like this in nearly 45 years of
working life.-Maybe your Friend is wrong." I would suggest to
Mrs. Reagan. She did not think so: her Friend had not only pre-
dicted the assassination attempt nearly to the day but had fore-
seen the explosion of a
bomb planted in a TWA
plane that was damaged
over Greece in 1986. and
had been right about other
things. including a premo-
nition of -dire events" in
November and December
1986-that is. the Iran-con-
tra scandal.
Eventually, to separate
myself from all this as
much as possible: I pro-
posed giving Deaver's old
title, deputy chief of staff. to
Dennis Thomas. who had
been at Treasury. The idea
made Deaver nervous. "I.
uh. don't think this will fly
with the First Lady." he
said. Nevertheless. I
phoned Mrs. Reagan and
said. "There should be
somebody on the Presi-
dent's staff you can call on. Dennis will be very good at the job."
Silence. Finally Mrs. Reagan said. "I don't think you need a
deputy, Don. You can handle this yourself."
"Well." I replied. "I thought that somebody should be atten-
tive to your needs in the way that Mike was."
"When I need something, I'll call you directly." the First
Lady said. "I don't see any need for an intermediary."
Fateful words ...
Slow Poisons and Quick Ones
WHEN. IN ROBERT GRAVES' NOVEL 1. Claudius, the in-
quisitive Claudius asks his grandmother Livia whether she pre-
fers slow poisons or quick ones to dispose of someone. she replies
that she preferred "repeated doses of slow tasteless poisons which
gave the effect of consumption." In the novel. Livia is a clever but
ruthless woman who rules the Roman empire from behind the
scenes by manipulating her husband Augustus Caesar.
Without stretching things too far. it can be suggested that the
most popular poison in 20th century Washington is bad publici-
ty. In massive doses it can destroy a reputation outright. When
leaked slowly into the veins of the victim, it kills his public perso-
na just as certainly, but the symptoms-anger. suspicion. frustra-
tion. the loss of friends and influence-are often mistaken for the
malady. The victim may realize that he is being poisoned: he
may even have a very good idea who the poisoners are. But he
cannot talk about his suspicions without adding a persecution
complex to the list of his faults that is daily being compiled in the
newspapers.
The meeting at Bethesda Naval Hospital between the Presi-
dent and Bud McFarlane in July 1985 proved. of course. to be the
first in a sequence of events that very nearly led to the fall of one
of the most popular presidencies in the history of the U.S. But.
like that meeting with McFarlane. the events that snowballed
into the catastrophe that came to be known as the Iran-contra af-
fair made little impression at the time that they happened. Much
of what went on was hidden from the President (and, incidental-
ly. from me) by McFarlane and his successor as National Securi-
ty Adviser. Admiral John Poindexter, and by that remarkable
young Marine who was a virtual stranger to both of us. Lieut.
Colonel Oliver North.
M1 ? 4-_~
C? a"~iTtl~
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On Nov. 4. 1986, a Lebanese newspaper was quoted as stat-
ing that the U.S. had been supplying military items to Iran. and
that McFarlane had visited Tehran to seek the release of hos-
tages held by terrorists in
Lebanon. I thought the sto-
ry would metastasize and
advised the President to re-
spond to it at once. He
shook his head no. In no
way. he said in an adamant
tone unusual for him, would
we discuss publicly the
methods used to gain the re-
lease of the hostages.
But Presidents. like ac-
tors. Live and die by the
public's favor. Ronald
Reagan. who has practiced
both crafts, understands
this in his bones. In the
end, he gave a television
address on Nov. 13 and
held a press conference on
Nov. 19 to tell the truth and
clear the air once and for
all. Unfortunately, the raw
material came from people
on the NSC staff who were not prepared to tell the President
the truth.
Then. on Nov. 24. Attorney General Meese informed the
President that his investigation had discovered a possible diver-
sion ,:i funds from the Iran arms sale: $18 million was unac-
counted for, and some had gone to the contras. The President.
normally a ruddy man with bright red cheeks, blanched. No-
body who saw his reaction could believe for a moment he knew
about the diversion before Meese told him about it.
That evening I received a phone call from the First Lady.
Her mood was furious. and there was no mistaking her message:
heads would roll. I had the impression that mine might very well
be among them.
Before the scandal broke, the Reagans had made plans to
spend Thanksgiving at their California ranch. On Thanksgiving
Day in Santa Barbara. the White House press corps was in a
prosecutorial fever over the Iran-contra scandal. Given the cir-
cumstances. this was not surprising. Since Viet Nam and Water-
gate. many of the big-time media have tended to regard every
public official as a suspect from the day he takes office, and pub-
lic service as a crime waiting to happen.
Because in a sense I was the only game in town-the Presi-
dent was inaccessible on his mountaintop-I was sought after by
these excited men and women. Questions were being shouted at
me: What did I know, and when did I know it'? What did the
President know? What were we going to do? Had I known that
money was being diverted? Later that evening. on the telephone
with Nancy Reagan. I said, -Obviously I'm becoming the center
of attention for the press, and I don't understand it. If this keeps
up. it will be a major problem by next week."
My staff had picked up many signs of a campaign of leaks
designed. they thought, to destroy the President's confidence in
me. I mentioned this to the First Lady and asked whether she
thought this was paranoia or reality. Instead of answering. she
lapsed into silence. Not until later did I realize the full signifi-
cance of the First Lady's stony response.
In early November Richard Wirthlin's polls showed that
70rc of the American people approved of the way the President
was doing his job. A month later a New York Times CBS News
poll found that the President's job-approval rating had dropped
below 50ce. The First Lady's staff and her confidants from out-
side the Government. known collectively as the "East Wing" in
White House jargon. were especially worried. Reports of their
gossip filtered into my office. and I knew this was a sign that it
would soon start pouring into the press.
On Dec. l2 the Washington Post reported that the President
had met with Bill Rogers. Secretary of State during Richard Nix-
on's first term. and Robert Strauss. former chairman of the Dem-
ocratic National Committee. The meeting was conducted in
great secrecy. I learned later that the conversation soon came
around to me. The First Lady felt that I had become a liability to
the President and should go. Strauss agreed that there were
strong arguments for getting rid of me.
The press hates and mistrusts Regan. the President was told.
and believes he has mishandled the crisis. The impression was
being created that I bore major responsibility for the disaster en-
gulfing the presidency. Whether this was true or not was irrele-
vant-in politics. appearance is reality, and the momentum of
the press campaign was so great that matters could only get
worse. I was going down fast. and the President's friends were
afraid I would drag him down with me. The President's place in
history was at stake.
Hitting Him When He's Down
ON MONDAY. DEC. 15. Bill Casey collapsed in his office at
the CIA. On Dec. 18 doctors at Georgetown University Hospital
operated to remove a growth on the brain that proved to be can-
cerous. The prognosis was bleak.
Casey had been severely roughed up in the media and on
Capitol Hill over the Iran-contra scandal. As a result of the up-
roar. Nancy Reagan came to regard Casey. too, as a political
millstone. Just before Christmas she rang to ask, for the third or
fourth time since Casey's surgery, what I was doing to get rid of
him as director of Central Intelligence.
"Nothing." I said.
"Why not?" Mts. Reagan asked in her familiar stammer.
"He's got to go. He can't do his job: he's an embarrassment to
Ronnie. He should be out."
"But. Nancy. the man had brain surgery less than a week
ago. This is no time to pull the rug out from under him. It's
Christmastime. It wouldn't be seemly for Ronald Reagan to tire
anybody under these circumstances. much less Bill Casey. We're
not going to do it."
Mrs. Reagan. who had already shown signs of irritability.
now became angry. "You're more interested in protecting Bill
Casey than in protecting Ronnie!" she cried. "He's dragging
Ronnie down' Nobody believes what Casey says: his credibility
is gone on the Hill."
"All that may be true." I replied. knowing that some of it
was. "But Bill Casey got your husband elected. and he's done a
lot of other things for him too. He deserves some gratitude and a
better break than you're giving him. Nancy."
Early in November, just as the Iran-contra scandal broke.
the First Lady informed me that the President had an enlarged
prostate. The condition would be relieved by transurethral resec-
tion. which eliminated the need for incision of the skin. on Jan. 5.
1987: the President was expected to be in Bethesda Naval Hospi-
tal for about four days and to have a rapid recovery.
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G.
Before the surgery. Mrs. Reagan phoned to talk about the
President's schedule. She said
routine beeseen to b ha active
and capable of carrying a normal hos-
pital. I agreed. "He hasn't had a press conference since Nov. 19."
I said. "What about having one on Jan. 20?"
The First Lady's voice rose. "No." she said. "No press con-
ferences for at least three months." Her protective instincts were
fully aroused. and I assumed, too, that she had been talking to the
astrologer.
"We have activities all lined up." I said. hinting at the prob-
lem.-But I need your help on the actual dates."
Mrs. Reagan stammered. "I'll. uh. uh. uh, have a discussion
about that and get back to you," she said. This conversation was,
for the most part. friendly and devoid of her usual references
("Are you still here. Don?"( to resignation.
A few days later, although the President was recuperating
nicely. Mrs. Reagan suddenly ruled out any travel or other im-
portant outside activity until April. Her concern for her hus-
band's health was understandable. even admirable. But it
seemed to me excessive. particularly since the President himself
did not seem to think there was any need for him to slow down to
the point where he was lying dead in the water. But Mrs. Rea-
gan's Friend had told her that January was a bad month for him.
This had the effect of immobilizing the President. His schedule
was in a state of chaos.
Mrs. Reagan's determination to oust Bill Casey. mean-
while. had not abated. On Saturday. Jan. 24. she rang me from
Camp David to tell me she had learned that Bill would be inca-
pacitated for the foreseeable future. I told her that the Presi-
dent was probably going to send Casey a gentle letter soon. ask-
ing him to step aside.
"Send it to his lawyer." Mrs. Reagan said. "because Sophia
[Casey's wifel won't let it be delivered to Casey. Do it Monday.
Ronnie is ready. so why wait?" Later the President himself
called me from Camp David and asked if I had arranged a
meeting with Sophia Casey to discuss Bill's resignation.
Ed Meese and I called on Casey in his hospital room on
Thursday. Jan. 29. He was devastated physically and intellec-
tually. He had lost a great deal of weight and all his hair. He
was incapable of coherent speech. He waved his hands about
weakly and made inarticulate sounds in answer to questions.
Sophia interpreted the sounds he made. I took her aside and
asked if we could talk to her husband now about his job. She
nodded. [ went back to Bill's chair and. standing beside him.
said. "Bill. I'd like to talk to you about the agency and you.-
I had a letter signed
by the President relieving
Casey of his duties. Bill
may have sensed this. He
waved his hands and ut-
tered a string of incompre-
hensible sounds. Sophia in-
terpreted. "He says. 'Get
the best man you can.' "
An other words." I
said. "you're saying you
want to be relieved of your
task, and we should look
for someone else."
He seemed to nod. I
said. "All right. Bill. then
Ill tell the President about
your decision. But when
you re ready to come back.
the boss wants you next to
him as Counselor to the
President-Ed Meese's old
job." Tears filled Casey's
clouded eyes. He gripped my hand with surprising strength.
Minutes after I returned from the hospital to my office in
the West Wing. the telephone rang. "Well. whats the news on
Casey:'" Nancy Reagan asked. I told her that he had agreed to
be relieved of his duties. "Good," the First Lady said.
Blood in the Water
SEVERAL IMPORTANT WHITE HOUSE aides had
planned, like me, to leave after the midterm election. Larry
Speakes had resigned and been replaced by Marlin Fitzwater,
who had worked for me at Treasury and as Vice President
Bush's press secretary. Mitchell E. Daniels. the political direc-
tor, had decided to practice law. Pat Buchanan would be leav-
ing March t as director of communications.
The First Lady, who always took a close interest in White
House staff appointments, called me at home at 9:46 a.m. on
Feb. 7. a Saturday. to talk about her candidates for these vacan-
cies. She recommended Frank Donatelli, who had worked in
all three Reagan presidential campaigns. for political director.
For Pat Buchanan's old job. Mrs. Reagan favored John O.
Koehler, a German-born American recommended by Charles
Z. Wick, director of the U.S. Information Agency.
On another topic, the First Lady expressed unhappiness
over a growing tendency in the press to criticize the President's
lack of activity. I suggested that the way to overcome the me-
dia's pent-up hostility and ill-informed criticism was to get the
President out into public view. A full month after his release
from the hospital. his schedule was still a dead letter because
Mrs. Reagan's Friend had not provided a list of auspicious
days. "Please. Nancy." I said. "get us some dates. He didn't
even appear in public on his birthday."
The next morning Mrs. Reagan told me that she had done
so. The First Lady's Friend had previously looked with favor
on Thursday. Feb. 26. for a press conference, because it came
about a week after the Tower board planned to issue its report.
"I hope you haven't discussed that date with anybody," Mrs.
Reagan said. "I'm not sure we should have a press conference."
"Why not. Nancy?" I asked. "We need one. Feb. 26 would
represent a period of three months since his last press confer-
ence on Nov. 19. We can't have him talking to himself in the
West Wing. It looks like we're shielding him."
"What do you mean. 'shielding him'?" Mrs. Reagan asked.
"We're not shielding Ronnie: the press is just writing it that
way. [ wish you'd never said he could have a press conference.?
"But [ have said it.
And there is going to be a
press conference,"
"O.K.:" Mrs. Reagan
cried. "Have your damn
press conference."
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"You bet I will!' I said.
The press reported
soon after this incident
that I had hung up on the
First Lady. That may be
true, but if it is. it is only
because I was quicker than
Mrs. Reagan. It seemed to
me that it was a race be-
tween two angry people to
slam down the receiver. I
really don't know who
won.
Five days later the
Tower board asked for yet
another postponement.
Now the board hoped to is-
sue its report on Feb. 26. In the afternoon Marlin Fitzwater, the
new White House spokesman. told me that the First Lady had
phoned him to say he didn't have to be quite so firm in defend-
ing me before the press. Fitzwater. who had been in his difficult
job for only 2V2 weeks. was puzzled. I explained the situation
and suggested he stand back out of the way.
The First Lady had continued to advocate Jack Koehler. I
was reluctant to act until the background investigation was
complete. I had no premonition: I was just exercising routine
prudence. The next morning. Friday. Feb. 13, the President
pulled a note out of his pocket and read it. [ think Frank Dona-
telli should be the one for the political job, the President said
amiably. And this Jack Koehler ought to be the communica-
tions person. On Monday morning. Feb. 16. referring to anoth-
er scrap of paper, the President raised the subject again. An
hour later, the President consulted the scrap of paper again.
You're taking care of Koehler and Donatelli? he asked.
"Yes. sir." I replied. "I'm taking care of that." The Presi-
dent crumpled up his scrap of paper and threw it into the
wastebasket.
Jack Koehler was appointed director of communications
on Thursday. Feb. 19. That same day NBC reported that
Koehler had been a member of the Hitler Youth during his
boyhood in Nazi Germany. Somehow this information had
never surfaced in the pre-employment background checks.
Asked for an explanation. Koehler said he had joined when he
was ten years old to see whether he liked it. The Hitler Youth
was a sort of German Boy Scout movement. he explained.
This revelation was all the more embarrassing because the
press already knew, as a result of leaks that had detailed the
reasons for the discord between Mrs. Reagan and me, that
Koehler had been the First Lady's candidate. The Washington
Post reported that I had told the staff that "the 'East Wing' was
responsible for an oversight in checking EKoehler'sl
background."
At 10:10 a.m. on Monday. Feb. 23, Vice President Bush
called me into his oice, which was next to mine. He said.
"Don. why don't you stick your head into the Oval Office and
talk to the President about your situation'?"
I asked Bush why. The President already knew that I
planned to leave after the Tower report came out but not be-
fore; he and I had agreed on that.
"Well." Bush replied in his usual courteous tones, "the
President asked me if I knew what your plans were."
At about 10:15, I went into the Oval Office. [ asked the
President if he wanted to talk about my situation.
I think it's about time. Don, he replied.
I felt drained but combative. "All right, Mr. President." I
said. "Why don't you tell me? Where's your head on this? What
do you think I should do?"
The President leaned back in his chair, a sure sign that he
was disturbed. Well, good Lord. Don, he said. This last week-
end the airwaves were tilled with all that stuff about Nancy.
She's being blamed for Koehler unfairly. I was the one who
wanted him. She never met him.
I kept silent, determined to do nothing that would make it
easy for him to play this scene. He said. I think it's time we do
that thing that you said when we talked in November.
In November I had told the President I would go quietly on
a signal from him if at any time he thought I had become a bur-
den. "I'll stick by that," I said. "I'll go whenever you say."
Well, he said. since the report is coming out on Thursday, I
think it would be appropriate for you to bow out now.
His words shocked me. I said heatedly. "What do you
mean, 'now'? You can't do that to me, Mr. President. If I go be-
fore that report is out, you throw me to the wolves. I deserve
better treatment."
My temper was up; I made no attempts to conceal it but
said a great deal more on loyalty and its rewards. My anger and
dismay took the President aback. He was shaken and not quite
sure what to do or say next. Finally he said, Well, what do you
think would be right'?
"The first part of next week," I replied. "Let the report
come out; let the world see what really happened and where the
blame lies. I'm willing to take my chances on that."
The President agreed. As we talked for a few more min-
utes, the subject of Mrs. Reagan's role in managing the presi-
dency came up. Again I spoke very frankly. The President
seemed surprised at what I had to say. Naturally he defended
his wife. I'll bet all that took place while I was convalescing, he
said.
I told him that Mrs. Reagan's activities went far beyond a
sincere wifely concern for his health. "I thought I was chief of
staff to the President," I said. "not to his wife. I have to tell you,
sir, that I'm very bitter. You're allowing the loyal to be pun-
ished, and those with their own agenda to be rewarded."
The President, who dislikes confrontations more than any
other man I have ever known, looked at me without anger.
Well, we'll try to make that up by the way we handle this,
he said softly. We'll make sure that you go out in good' fashion.
Even as I left the Oval Office, angry and humiliated, yet
understanding the rules that Presidents and their servants live
by, I believed that this President, genial and kind and good at
heart, and surely grateful for the six years of loyal service I had
given him, would do me no harm in my last hours at his side. In
that. I was very much mistaken.
"I Feel for You, Don, but That's It"
THE TOWER BOARD'S report, the last barrier to my resig-
nation as chief of staff. came out on Thursday, Feb. 26, 1987.
"There is no need for slashing of wrists," John Tower, the
chairman, told the President when they met at 10 that morning
in the Cabinet Room. Tower assured Reagan that the board
had found no evidence that the President had participated in a
cover-up, or authorized one.
I remained virtually silent throughout this meeting. It was
Peter Wallison, the counsel to the President, who asked what
was. for me, the Sixty-Four-Dollar Question. "What about the
charges that the chief of staff was in on the cover-up-is that
true' '
"No," John Tower replied. "We only have one paragraph
on Regan in the whole report. People are going to be disap-
pointed when they see that there's nothing sensational about
Don Regan."
eat
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P
As Tower spoke. I had not read the paragraph in question.
It said: More than any other chief of staff in recent memory.
[ReganI asserted personal control over the White House staff
and sought to extend this control to the National Security Ad-
viser. He was personally active in national secu-
rity affairs and attended almost all of the rele-
vant meetings regarding the Iran initiative. He.
as much as anyone. should have insisted that an
orderly process be observed. In addition. he es-
pecially should have ensured that plans were
made for handling any public disclosure of the
initiative. He must bear primary responsibility
for the chaos that descended upon the White
House when such disclosure did occur."
This paragraph is mistaken in its assump-
tions. defective in its evidence and wrong in its
conclusions. The Tower board never inter-
viewed a single member of the White House
staff besides me about anything, much less my
methods of management. and never asked me
whether I had "sought to extend [personal] con-
trol to the National Security Adviser." Lacking
such control. no chief of staff could have effec-
tively "insisted that an orderly process be ob-
served" because he would have been giving or-
ders to a man who did not work for him. The
only plan I had for "handling any public disclosure" was to dis-
cover and tell the whole truth. As to the responsibility for the
chaos that descended on the White House, that appears to have
been written in the stars.
On Thursday afternoon. Feb. 26, the day the Tower report
was issued. Vice President Bush sent word that he wished to see
me. "I guess he's the messenger," I said to my associates. At
1:30 p.m. I walked next door to his office.
"I've just had lunch with the President." Bush told me. "He
asked me to find out what your plans are ... about leaving."
My temper flared. "What's the matter-isn't he man
enough to ask me that question himself' I told him I'd leave af-
ter the Tower report came out and he said O.K. Does he want
me out today?"
"No." Bush said. "I
don't think so."
"If I go now. I'm part of
the scandal." I said. "That's
what Nancy Reagan and
Deaver and Stu Spencer
want. but I won't have it
that way. I'm determined
that I will not have it look
as if I'm going out because
of the Tower report."
The Vice President
sighed. "I know it's rough,"
he said. "But the President
wants it to go smoothly. He
mentioned that letter of
resignation you showed
him last October." This
was a reference to my
statement to the President.
before the Iran-contra af-
fair was exposed, that I
wished to leave the White House after the November electione
s.
"I don't see how its going to go smoothly. " I said. "I'v
been hacked to pieces in the press and now, after two years as
the President's chief of staff and four years as his Secretary of
the Treasury, I'm being fired like a shoe clerk. I'm bitter.
George, and you can tell that to the President."
Bush was embarrassed by my outburst. He attempted to
console me by praising the job I had done and expressing his
admiration and friendship. I did not thank him for his kindness
as [ should have done.
Before we parted, he raised a question about the President's
schedule. I told him it was in the hands of an astrologer in San
Francisco. Bush listened to the history of my
dealings with Mrs. Reagan on this question with
surprise and consternation on his features.
When I was finished, he uttered what was a
strong expletive for George Bush.
"Good God," he said. "I had no idea."
He did not ask if the President knew about
the Friend. I understood his reluctance perfect-
ly. because this was a question I myself had nev-
er asked.
A few minutes later I asked Bush if he had
seen the President since our talk. He replied,
"Yes, I've told him what you told me, and the
President seemed relieved."
"Did you tell him that I would be leaving
next week-and did he say O.K. to that?"
"Yes," said Bush.
A weight lifted from my shoulders. "In that
case." I said, "the President will have my resig-
nation on Monday morning."
Bush gave me a sympathetic look. "I don't
want you to think I'm trying to flatter you," he
said. "But I think you should know that the President told me
just a moment ago that he's going to miss you. He valued your
frankness. He said that you always gave him both sides of any
question, and if he asked for an opinion, you gave it to him
straight, directly and openly."
"Then why am I being booted out?" I asked. "Why the
haste? What have I done wrong?"
"It's nothing in particular," said Bush. "It's just been a
wearing away. It's those attacks on you night after night on the
tube and the President s seeing it after he goes upstairs. He
can't stand it. He wants to make a new start."
"I understand." I said. "But I wish to hell he'd had the
manliness to tell me himself instead of using you as a go-
between.-
-I feel for you, Don."
Bush said. "but that's it."
The next morning, Fri-
day. Feb. 27, the President
greeted me and George
Bush when we arrived to-
gether as usual for the 9
o'clock meeting as if it
were an ordinary morning.
Reagan gave me a
pleasant look and said.
George told me of your
conversation yesterday.
That's fine by me. I said
nothing. The subject was
not mentioned again.
That morning, Frank
Carlucci had told me that
he had heard that Howard
Baker, the former Senate
majority leader, had al-
ready been chosen as my
.1147.
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9
successor. Later in the day at a meeting with the Republican
leaders of Congress. the President said he thought that they
would be pleased with his new chief of staff.
All this. discourteous though it was, seemed normal
enough. After all. Monday would be my last day: the arrange-
ments had been made. To get my version of my resignation on
the record, in midafternoon I talked separately to Gerald Boyd
of the New York Times and Barry Seaman and Dave Beckwith
of TIME about my departure.
As I said goodbye to the reporters at about 3 p.m.. Carlucci
was waiting. He had just heard that Cable News Network was
broadcasting a report that Howard Baker was the new chief of
staff.
I dictated a resignation letter to my secretary. It read:
Dear Mr. President:
I hereby resign as Chief of Staff to the President of the
United States.
Respectfully yours.
Donald T. Regan
Dear Don:
In accepting your resignation I want you to know how
deeply grateful I am for all that you have done for this Admin-
istration and for our country. As Secretary of the Treasury you
planted the seeds for the most far-reaching tax reform in our
history. As Chief of Staff you worked tirelessly and effectively
for the policies and programs we proposed to the Congress.
I know that you stayed on beyond the time you had set for
your return to private life, and did so because you felt you could
be of help in a time of trouble. You were of help and I thank
you. Whether on the deck of your beloved boat or on the fair-
way, in the words of our forefathers, may the sun shine warm
upon your face, the wind be always at your back, and may God
hold you in the hollow of His hand.
Sincerely.
Ron (signed)
In my time with President Reagan, I had seen many such
letters, so I knew that someone else had written it for him. ^
Tom Dawson. my executive assistant, went down the hall
with the letter. Meanwhile. Carlucci was urging me to speak
with the President. "No." I said. "That would be undignified.
And I don't trust myself to speak to him. I'm too mad. There's
been a deliberate leak, and it's been done to humiliate me."
Carlucci said I couldn't go without talking to the President.
He asked my permission to call Reagan and rushed out. A few
moments later the telephone rang. It was the President.
Don. I'm terribly sorry about what's happened, he said. I
didn't mean for this to happen.
I did not trust myself to reply. The President spoke again.
The report was accurate, he said. Howard will be the new chief
of staff. He's looking forward to talking to you.
"I'm sorry, Mr. President, but I won't be in anymore." I
said. "This is my last day. I've been your Secretary of the Trea-
sury for four years and your chief of staff for two. You don't
trust me enough even to tell me who my successor is and make
a smooth transfer. I deserved better treatment than this. I'm
through. I'm very disappointed."
Don, listen, the President said. I intended to proceed just as
we had discussed. My plan was to say that you wanted to resign
in November after the elections and had in fact prepared a let-
ter in October. Then came Iran, and so you stayed on to help in
a time of trouble. I planned to let everyone know you had told
me more than a week ago that you had made the decision to go
after the Tower report was issued and that you are now carry-
ing out that intention.
The President added that he still intended to make that
statement.
I hope you'll go along with that. Don, he said.
I could not do it. I said, "No. Mr. President, it's over. All
that's left for me to say is goodbye."
Speaking very softly, Ronald Reagan said, I'm sorry.
Although he and I have seen each other at public events,
we have never to this day spoken again.
The White House
Washington
February 27. 1987
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