AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000301510001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
M A T"N%
LIN.-
Africa Review
copy
t
5
ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
copy 3 9 3
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Articles Zimbabwe: Movement Toward Political Merger I 1 25X1
A formal declaration of unity between the ruling Zimbabwe African
National Union and the Zimbabwe African People's Union may be
possible within the next year if power-sharing arrangements can be
worked out.
The devaluation of Zambia's currency well below President
Kaunda's goal and sharply increased inflation may cause Kaunda to
suspend or impose controls on the foreign exchange auction, the
centerpiece of his economic reform program.
Although President Doe has purged suspected dissidents in the
Army and increased the influence of officers belonging to his Krahn
tribe since a coup attempt last year, chronic pay arrears and tribal
animosities are continuing to fuel tensions in the military. F_~
Uganda: Sputtering Relations With the USSR, East Germany, 11
and Cuba F__~
Uganda's relations with the Soviet Union and its East German and
Cuban allies have improved marginally since President Museveni
took power last January, but Kampala remains wary because of
Moscow's close ties to previous Ugandan governments and its
refusal to forgive debts accrued by those governments or grant new
military aid.
Secret
ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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Liberia: Political Maneuvering
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief
Production Staff Office of African and Latin American Analysis,
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Zimbabwe: Movement Toward
Political Merger
Long-stalled unity talks between Prime Minister
Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU) have recently shown some
signs of moving forward again. In the last several
months, ZANU and ZAPU leaders have agreed on
a name for the new party and on a party emblem.
Although there is opposition to the merger within
both parties and power-sharing arrangements have
yet to be worked out, we believe a formal declaration
of unity may be possible within the next year. -
spoken out in favor of a ZANU-ZAPU merger and
has met with Nkomo on several occasions when unity
talks appeared deadlocked. He also has sought to
head off opposition to political union within his own
party.
Mugabe has recently taken steps to foster an
improved climate for unity talks. In August he
ordered the release of 10 senior ZAPU political
officials and military officers who had been arrested a
year ago for alleged coup plotting. He announced that
his government was reviewing charges against about
For Mugabe, establishment of the new party would be
a major step toward his goal of creating a one-party
state. A merger-depending on how it works out-has
the potential to ease deeply rooted tribal and regional
tensions between the majority Shona, who largely
support Mugabe, and the minority Ndebele, who
overwhelmingly favor Nkomo. In the near term,
however, the outcome is unlikely to satisfy ZAPU
militants or end armed dissidence. At the same time,
any agreement is likely to intensify internal rivalries
among the Shona factions, some of whom may seek to
ally themselves with the Ndebele to enhance their
political influence. A merger would tend to reduce the
influence of Zimbabwe's white and other minor
political parties, which increasingly are becoming
politically irrelevant. F__1
Recent Progress
Mugabe and Nkomo, despite mutual suspicions, have
expressed vague support for political unity for several
years. Only since last year's parliamentary elections,
however, in which ZAPU demonstrated its continuing
appeal in its traditional stronghold of Matabeleland,
has Mugabe clearly signaled his interest in proceeding
toward unity. In the past year, Mugabe has publicly
200 others detained on political grounds. Most
important among those still in detention is Dumiso
Dabengwa, a key leader of ZAPU's former military
wing, who retains a large following within the party.
Meanwhile, several important sticking points in the
merger talks have been removed, according to the US
Embassy. Nkomo has reluctantly conceded that
Mugabe will head the new party and that it will retain
the name ZANU. Mugabe and Nkomo have agreed
that the new party emblem will include both a
cockerel, representing ZANU, and two bulls,
symbolizing ZAPU.
Impetus for Union
Mugabe almost certainly views amalgamation of the
two parties as consistent with his goal of a one-party
state, a development that is likely to occur next year
if, as we judge probable, the country's constitution is
amended to eliminate provisions reserving seats in
Parliament for whites. He also may believe that
ZANU-ZAPU unity will reduce chronic but low-level
Secret
ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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armed dissidence in Matabeleland, which began after
a major falling out between the two parties in 1982,
and discourage any South African involvement with
ZAPU dissidents. In our judgment, the recent
deterioration in relations between Harare and
Pretoria increases chances that the South Africans
will look for ways-such as aiding the dissidents-to
undermine the Zimbabwean leadership. In addition,
Mugabe might use a merger as an excuse to shuffle
the senior leadership of the ruling party and Cabinet,
and, we
believe, put some ZAPU leaders in nominally
important positions.
Nkomo and some ZAPU leaders probably are
resigned to unity as their best hope of maintaining
even a small slice of Zimbabwe's political pie.
Otherwise, they probably reason that the government
would increasingly restrict ZAPU activities, further
harass ZAPU members, and ultimately even dissolve
the minority party. Many rank-and-file ZAPU
supporters probably go along with the concept of unity
because they know Nkomo has endorsed it, although
they want significant concessions from the
government.
Opposition to Merger
Mugabe and Nkomo will have to work hard to sell the
plan to their respective parties. Some ZAPU loyalists
contend that a merger would merely legitimate
ZANU's dominance and forever relegate ZAPU to a
subservient position. Moreover, they fear that Nkomo,
who reportedly is tiring of political life, is capitulating
to Mugabe so that the ZAPU leader can assume the
role of elder statesman or retire in peace. F__-]
At the same time, there is opposition within ZANU
from those who believe unity would undercut their
tribal, regional, or personal interests. In particular,
members of the Zezuru and Manyika subgroups of
the Shona tribe, who now dominate the government
and the ruling party, believe that the large and
influential Karanga subgroup could cross tribal lines
to form a powerful alliance with the Ndebele to try to
deprive them of significant political power. In
addition, some government officials, such as Home
Affairs Minister Nkala, privately express reservations
about unity because they think it would lessen their
personal influence. Nkala, who is the senior Ndebele
in the present government but highly unpopular
among his own ethnic group, apparently has
concluded that his personal power would be greatly
diluted if more Ndebeles joined the government and
the ruling party. F_~
Zimbabwe's white and other minor political parties
probably correctly believe a merger would reduce
their influence further. Nonetheless, such groups
appear resigned to the eventual formation of a one-
party state and the fact that they will become
increasingly irrelevant politically. F_~
Prospects
We believe that a formal announcement of a merger
of ZANU and ZAPU could take place within the next
year if key issues are resolved. The status of
remaining ZAPU detainees will have to be
determined. Perhaps most important, Mugabe, with
some advice from Nkomo, will have to apportion
political offices to current members of ZANU and
ZAPU. We expect Simon Muzenda, currently the
second-ranking official in ZANU and the
government, to be named first vice president of the
new party and Nkomo to be designated second vice
president. Similarly, it is likely that Zimbabwe will
have two deputy prime ministers-probably Muzenda
and Nkomo. ZAPU probably will demand several
senior party and Cabinet posts, but Mugabe is
unlikely to reserve many positions for ZAPU leaders,
and they almost certainly will contend that they
deserve more.F__~
On balance, we believe the formation of a single party
offers the potential over time to reduce strains that
now exist between ZANU and ZAPU adherents. In
the near term, however, the outcome is unlikely to
satisfy ZAPU militants or end armed dissidence,
especially if Pretoria becomes more deeply involved.,
At the same time, we believe that unification, at least
at the outset, will foster greater competition among
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present ZANU leaders for party and government
posts. As a result, rivalries among Shona subgroups
are likely to intensify. Mugabe, consistent with his
past practice, almost certainly will seek to remain
above the tribal and personal infighting and, to the
extent possible, maintain a balance among key
officials and interests.)
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Zambia: Problems With the
Foreign Exchange Auction
The danger that Lusaka will temporarily suspend or
impose controls on the year-old foreign exchange
auction that makes up the centerpiece of an ambitious
economic reform program is growing, in our
judgment. President Kaunda's heretofore vocal
support for the auction may be eroding because of the
current devaluation of the kwacha to about 12 cents,
well beneath his goal of 20 cents. In addition, a sharp
increase in inflation to more than 50 percent is
spurring substantial domestic criticism of the auction
system. We believe that Kaunda may use the issue of
sanctions against South Africa to divert attention
from economic hardship and possibly as an excuse to
interfere in the auction in order to forestall further
devaluation.)
The growth in dissatisfaction with the weekly auction
comes at a time when it is yielding increasingly
positive economic results, according to reporting by
the press and the US Embassy in Lusaka. Although
no hard data on economic performance since the
beginning of the auction are available, perceptions in
some government and business circles are that a sharp
improvement in the distribution and availability of
foreign exchange has led to higher capacity utilization
in industry and to increased labor and capital
productivity. In addition, the steep devaluation of the
kwacha is beginning to stimulate exports other than
Zambia's export mainstays of copper and cobalt.
Auction Purposes
At its initiation, Kaunda portrayed the auction as the
key element of a reform program designed to
overcome the impact on the economy of falling copper
prices and production and rising prices for imports.
Industry data show that production of copper, which
historically has accounted for roughly 90 percent of
Zambian exports, has declined by more than one-
third since it peaked in 1976. Falling world copper
prices and rising import prices have reduced the
foreign purchasing power of each ton of copper by
three-fourths over the same period. F_~
The Foreign Exchange Auction
The auction involves a four-stage process:
? Importers submit requests for foreign exchange to
commercial banks, including information on the
amounts wanted, the purpose, and the kwacha/
dollar bid rate.
? The banks set aside the required amounts of
kwacha from the requestors' accounts and send the
bids to the auction secretariat.
? The secretariat arranges the bids from highest to
lowest and, at 1500 hours on Friday of each week,
allocates the available foreign exchange beginning
with the highest bidder.
? The secretariat publishes an official rate equal to
that which exhausts the amount of foreign
exchange on offer that week, but each bidder pays
the rate that he bid.
After trying a series of devaluations through early
1983 followed by a system of basing the value of the
kwacha on the exchange rates of major trading
partners, Kaunda decided-at IMF (International
Monetary Fund) urging-to try the auction in order
to let market forces set the exchange rate. Reporting
by the US Embassy and the IMF indicate that the
objectives of the auction were to eliminate
overvaluation as an obstacle to improving Zambia's
competitive position in world trade and as the
incentive for a thriving black market in foreign
exchange in Zambia. More broadly, the auction was
to be the key element in a program designed to reduce
Zambian living standards to match the reduction in
foreign purchasing power because of the decline in
copper. F__1
Positive Results
Following a dramatic devaluation from 45 cents to 20
cents in the first week's auction on 11 October 1985,
the exchange rate has drifted down to about 12 cents.
Secret
ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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The principal immediate impact in October-
November 1985 was virtually to end the black
market, where traders had been able to purchase
about 11 or 12 cents per kwacha before the auction.
Other positive results have been slower in coming and
less clear-cut. The devaluation was instrumental in
improving the bookkeeping picture of Zambia's
copper mining conglomerate-Zambian Consolidated
Copper Mining (ZCCM)-from a loss of 96 million
kwacha (K96 million) from April to September 1985,
to a K40 million profit between October 1985 and
March 1986. At the same time, however, the
devaluation was the main factor behind an increase of
K3.2 billion in the local currency valuation of
ZCCM's foreign debt, according to reporting by the
US Embassy in Lusaka. ZCCM's heavy dependence
on imported capital and operating inputs, moreover,
sharply reduces the impact on the company's
economic performance of the improvement in its
financial picture in terms of local currency. F___-]
Zambian businessmen and farmers feel that a sharp
improvement in the fairness with which foreign
exchange is distributed represents a major plus for the
auction, according to US Embassy reporting.
Capacity utilization, capital and labor productivity,
and exports other than copper all are beginning to
increase because of the improved availability and
distribution of foreign exchange and the positive
impact of the devaluation on profitability, according
to foreign press articles. The improving business
climate may weigh in positively in a pending decision
by H. J. Heinz, Inc., according to US Embassy
reporting, about whether to undertake a large
investment in Zambia.)
Problems anticipated by opponents in operational
aspects of the auction have not materialized. Statistics
showing that less than one-fifth of auction funds have
been spent on imports of consumer goods have
countered fears that capital goods importers would
lose out in auction bidding to well-off Zambians
buying luxury goods. The Foreign Exchange Auction
Committee has carried out its weekly task of deciding
which bids to accept and which to reject without
evidence of corruption.F_~
Exchange Rate Problems
The principal auction problems have revolved around
government efforts to prop up the exchange rate.
Repeated comments in speeches by Kaunda and Bank
of Zambia head Leonard Chivuno, who chairs the
auction committee, reflect their feelings that the
exchange rate should be maintained at no less than
about 20 cents. One tactic used a number of times to
support the rate has been to change the requirements
for documentation of bids, thus reducing the number
of successful bids until bidders mastered the new
procedures. In July this ploy temporarily yielded a 20-
cent exchange rate-up from 12 cents in prior weeks.
Lusaka's longer term strategy to boost the exchange
rate, however, has been to overfund the auction at the
expense of alternative priority requirements for
foreign exchange. Funding averaged almost $11
million a week during the period from August to mid-
October, well in excess of the $5 million originally
budgeted. The diversion of funds to the auction by
Lusaka has been one reason for serious shortfalls in
foreign exchange allocations for ZCCM, which by
mid-September had received only $70 million of the
$320 million that had been budgeted for 1986,
according to US Embassy reporting. In August, the
Bank of Zambia diverted funds to the auction from a
foreign commercial bank loan that had been taken out
to pay arrearages owed to the IMF.
The most recent tactic by the Bank of Zambia to
boost the exchange rate has been to promise more
foreign exchange in each auction than has been
available. As a result, the bank has fallen four to five
weeks behind in providing funds to successful auction
bidders, according to US Embassy reporting. F___1
Auction Prospects
Despite statements of support by Kaunda, the danger
that Lusaka will suspend the auction temporarily or
impose controls on the exchange rate probably is
increasing, in our judgment. The basic issue is
whether the government will be willing to let the
exchange rate continue to fall enough to offset
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Zambia: Exchange Rate Decline
US Dollars/Kwacha
1.80
Nb1 jo~ Q Q~ ee"QSC `Q~c ?h~ e'e -b Ir'V 6 6 Ot O Sir e6?0
,ta d' d'
* Devaluation
** Tied to a selected group of Foreign currencies
*** Auction
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declines in copper production and in Zambia's terms
of trade until alternative exports are developed. Both
Kaunda and Chivuno are already frustrated by their
inability to halt the decline at 20 cents. Despite
overfunding by Lusaka, high demand for foreign
exchange in comparison with the amounts that the
Bank of Zambia has agreed to disburse has depressed
the rate to about 12 cents in recent weeks.
Prospects for development of alternative exports on a
scale sufficient to offset the decline in copper any time
soon are poor, in our judgment, because of Zambia's
uncompetitive capital and labor resource bases outside
the copper industry. Although a project funded by the
World Bank is under way to slow the decline in
mining output, preliminary data indicate that copper
production will be down to about 460,000 tons this
year, from 479,000 tons in 1985.
Inflation resulting in part from the impact of
devaluation on import prices is cited by opponents as
the main drawback of the auction. Inflation has
jumped to an annual rate in excess of 50 percent since
the beginning of the auction, according to US
Embassy reporting, compared with about 20 percent
earlier. Although we believe that inflation probably
stems as much from nonauction-related economic
reforms such as goverment removal of subsidies and
price controls, the auction has high visibility as a
political target because of its weekly recurrence and
the high consumption by relatively well-off
government officials of now more expensive imported
goods.F__1
Kaunda's push for sanctions against South Africa
may offer a cover to interfere in the auction. Kaunda
hopes to protect the government against popular
resentment at growing economic hardships by
focusing attention on the external threat posed by
sanctions and by asking for special treatment by the
international community because of sacrifices
Zambia must make to help others in the region,
Similarly, Kaunda
might argue that interfering in the auction process is
unavoidable because of external factors beyond
Lusaka's control.
We believe, however, that strong IMF, US, and other
foreign support for the auction will prevent Kaunda
from abandoning the auction or halting it for any
lengthy period. Roughly half of the foreign exchange
that has flowed through the auction over the past
year-about $350 million-has been provided by
foreign donors. Abandoning the auction would further
jeopardize prospects for new IMF support that
already is threatened by Lusaka's failure to meet
budget targets in last year's IMF program. F_~
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Liberia: The Military
One Year Later
President Doe has moved to consolidate his grip on
the military since the unsuccessful coup attempt by
former commanding Gen. Thomas Quiwonpka last
November. A review of US Embassy reporting
indicates that Doe has purged suspected dissidents
and expanded the number and influence of troops
belonging to his Krahn tribe. These kinsmen now
appear to control key units in the capital and serve as
his bodyguard. In our view, in the near term the
military is unlikely to challenge Doe, but chronic pay
arrears and tribal animosities are likely to continue,
fueling tensions among both officers and enlisted men.
Moreover, should the financially strapped government
be unable to pay the units responsible for Doe's safety
on time, the President's ability to counter either
civilian or military challenges may be tested.
The Coup Attempt and Its Aftermath
Quiwonpka's 12 November coup attempt
demonstrated that Doe had, at best, a narrow base of
support in the 6,500-man Liberian military, in our
view. According to US Embassy reporting,
Quiwonpka's 35-man group quickly seized Monrovia's
two key radio stations, prompting sympathetic
responses from the Coast Guard and Army troops at
Barclay Training Center, located just outside
Monrovia.
uring the early stages of his attempt.
Doe's vulnerability was underscored when six
insurgents held elements of the 800-man EMG at bay
for more than six hours.
Contrary to public expectations, Doe did not launch a
massive purge of suspected military dissidents, but
sporadic reprisals against Quiwonpka sympathizers
occurred in late November.
about 20 persons were arrested
and others were dismissed for alleged involvement
in the coup attempt.
in reprisals immediately after the coup
attempt, temporarily heightening tribal tensions. We
agree with the US Embassy's assessment that Doe
could not risk massive dismissals without fueling
political tensions. Last June, Doe unconditionally
pardoned nearly 150 soldiers, and the Embassy
believes that all troops detained last year have been
released.
The Senior Ranks
US Embassy and
that Defense Minister Allison and Chief of Staff
Dubar-key advisers to Doe-would like to retire
soon. The US Embassy reports that Allison, more "a
plodder than an innovator," has often swayed Doe
from irrational decisions. Western observers also
credit Allison with instilling a degree of discipline in
the Army. Dubar, who suffers from hypertension, also 25X1
has sought to make the military more professional,
but he reportedly wields little influence over midlevel
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In our view, although Doe will temporarily be hard
pressed to replace Dubar and Allison with officers of
similar stature, the retirements may offer
opportunities for disgruntled midlevel officers.
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Smith, a
feffl-ow- ran who rallied his troops during the coup
attempt, has daily access to Doe.
Divisive Issues
Tribal Rivalries. Although Quiwonpka's coup
attempt was not tribally based-only a few members
belonged to his Gio tribe-it highlighted the divisive
nature of Liberia's ethnic rivalries.
while a majority of the Coast
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ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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Guardsmen who rebelled belonged to the Kru tribe,
Gio officers assigned to the 1st Batallion performed
well in support of the regime. Nonetheless, some non-
Krahn soldiers resent their lack of representation in
the senior officer ranks and Krahn domination of
Army units in Monrovia, according to the US
Embassy. however, that
Kpelle and Loma tribesmen still constitute the
majority in the Army.' For their part, Krahn soldiers
believe their defeat of Ouiwonpka's forces was a
"tribal" victory,
Since the failed coup attempt, Doe has bolstered the
role of his fellow Krahns, and is creating "an army
within an army,"
of the four
key batallions-1st, 2nd, 6th, and the EMG-are
Krahn, and Krahns increasingly dominate the officer
corps. some 45
percent of the Liberian military is Krahn, and the
tribe holds 80 percent of key military positions.
last summer
nearly 500 Krahns were recruited-outside of normal
channels-and they will be placed in units in
Monrovia following basic training.
The Pay Issue
The government's continuing inability to pay the
military on time may also erode its support for Doe.
morale
generally remains low, and grumbling over pay
arrears ranging from two to four months is fairly
common.
dominated 1st Batallion and the
EMG before other units. Dissent is likely to increase
if Doe goes ahead with plans-announced in
August-to make deductions from the salaries of all
military personnel to pay for repairs on workshops and
aircraft hangers,
The Praetorian Guard
For the near term, Doe will continue to rely on his
Krahn-dominated EMG to keep him in power.
' The Kpelle make up some 20 percent of the population and the
Loma 6 percent. The Gio and the Kru each amount to 8 percent,
while Doe's Krahn tribe is less than 5 percent, according to US
Embassy reporting.F_~
According to defense attache sources, the Guard
remains his most loyal unit. Moreover,
some EMG soldiers claim they will
never let civilians take power if Doe steps down,
probably because they fear their loss of influence.
Although their morale is generally thought to be
good,
are jealous of oe s personal bodyguard unit,
believing that it receives better equipment and higher
pay.
Doe also depends on his predominately Krahn 100-
man bodyguard force, the Special Anti-Terrorism
Unit (SATU) for security, but its troops are
occasionally ill-disciplined, and some are probably not
loyal to the government. Billeted on Executive
Mansion grounds, SATU answers only to Doe,
although EMG commander Smith reportedly is
responsible for the unit.
at least one SATU member was dismissed for
participating in the Quiwonpka coup attempt, and
last April 45 members
were transferred to border posts because of
questionable loyalty.
Outlook
In our view, the coup attempt and its aftermath have
heightened tribal tensions, but the non-Krahn
elements in the Army-increasingly stationed outside
the capital-cannot easily launch a successful coup
attempt. Moreover, a survey of US Embassy and
defense attache reporting does not identify an officer
of Quiwonpka's stature who could generate
widespread support to challenge Doe. The military
almost certainly will continue to suffer from ethnic
bickering, poor organization, flagging morale, and
pay arrears. For the near term, Doe can probably rely
on key Army units to remain loyal in the face of
relatively limited urban unrest. If Doe, however, fails
to pay these heavily Krahn units on time-
particularly the 1st Batallion and the EMG-his
ability to stay in power could be challenged by
disgruntled junior officers or enlisted men. F
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Uganda: Sputtering Relations
With the USSR, East Germany,
Uganda's relations with the Soviet Union and its East
German and Cuban allies have improved marginally
since President Museveni took power last January,
but the two sides still appear somewhat wary of each
other. In the eyes of Museveni and his National
Resistance Movement (NRM), the USSR remains
suspect because of its previous close ties to the former
regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Kampala also
appears frustrated with Moscow's failure to be more
cooperative with the NRM government and with the
Soviets' deflection of Ugandan requests for debt
forgiveness and military assistance. East Germany
and Cuba have tried to breathe new life into their
relations with Uganda, but they have little to show for
their efforts.)
Although Museveni espoused Marxist rhetoric as a
student at the University of Dar es Salaam in the late
1960s, and some NRM training manuals are marked
by socialist jargon, Museveni does not appear to place
a high priority on quickly improving relations with the
Soviet Union and its allies. On the contrary, his
government has pursued more vigorously its
frequently contradictory ties to regional neighbors,
Libya, and the West. In our judgment, Museveni is
likely to continue this approach as long as his
government is able to keep regional relations on an
even keel, to obtain sufficient military assistance from
Libya, and to acquire enough developmental aid from
the West.
Political Relations
Museveni's seizure of power apparently caught the
Soviet Embassy in Kampala by surprise, and initial
contacts between the two sides were slow to get under
under Western influence, and in mid-February a
Soviet Embassy officer in Kampala stated that
oscow was concerned that Museveni appeared to be
government
Although Soviet officials in Kampala made regular
visits to NRM political education camps in March
and April to discuss socialism and show Soviet films,
this practice ended
abruptly in early May when a senior NRM official
refused to sanction further visits and stated that his
government did not want the Soviets meddling in the
training facilities.
In May the Soviet Embassy sponsored a meeting of
the Ugandan-Soviet Student Union that was attended
by Soviet-educated Ugandans and NRM officials,
The keynote
speaker, Rehabilitation Minister Kirunda-Kivejinja,
however, stunned his hosts by attacking Moscow for
its past support of the Amin and Obote regimes and
its failure to send Soviet officials to devastated rural
areas-as Western capitals had done-to assess the
damage and determine recovery needs. Foreign
Minister Mukiibi echoed Kirunda-Kivejinja's
Despite these criticisms, a brief prepared in mid-
October by the Ugandan Foreign Ministry for
Museveni's first meeting with the new Soviet
Ambassador ignored problems and stressed the
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ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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yearly installments beginning in 1990,
interest on the debt in exchange for a pledge by the
Obote government to pay off the debt with 15 equal
Military Assistance
Despite high-level Ugandan appeals, the Soviets thus
far have refused to provide new military assistance, in
part, we believe, because of an outstanding $31
million debt for military aid acquired by Amin in the
1970s. In 1983 the Soviets reportedly agreed to cancel
In August Ugandan Minister of State for Defense
Bata led a delegation to Moscow to seek credits that
would enable Kampala to purchase a wide variety of
Soviet military equipment, including artillery,
helicopter gunships, mortars, armored personnel
carriers, and Strella missiles,
Soviet military delegation met with Museveni in
Kampala to request that Uganda begin making
payments on the military debt accrued by Amin.
We believe that Soviet reluctance to assist Uganda
militarily also is tied to Moscow's concern about
Museveni's staying power. The US Embassy in
Kampala reported that, just before the arrival of the
Soviet military delegation last September, a midlevel
Soviet diplomat stated that the Soviet Embassy
believed security was deteriorating and Museveni
could be losing his grip. F__1
As with the Soviet Union, neither East Germany nor
Cuba appears prepared to become more deeply
involved in providing military assistance to Uganda.
Uganda transporte
to Cuba for training in August, but Havana sent 21
back the next month when they tested positive for
AIDS.
Economic and Developmental Assistance
Soviet economic and developmental assistance has
been minimal as well and there is no evidence to
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suggest that Moscow plans to be generous in the near 25X1
term
the USSR has offered its customary portfolio of
approximately 100 scholarships for college and trade
union training, technical assistance to renovate an old
Soviet spinning mill project and an agricultural
college, and a few outdated printing presses.
The Soviets have provided limited medical aid.
approximately a
dozen Soviet doctors work at hospitals in Kampala
and Busia on the Kenyan border.
the Soviets donated some four
tons of medical supplies to Uganda last April. F_
Although there have been no concrete moves
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the Soviets may be
interested in exploiting Uganda's mineral resources.
Moscow is urging
the signing of an agreement on iron and tungsten,
the Soviets are anxious
to implement a dormant agreement on mineral
exploration initialed during the Amin era.
Soviet-Ugandan trade has been inactive since Obote's
political demise in July 1985, and neither party
appears seriously interested in restoring a significant
trade relationship in the near term. Although Uganda
has concluded barter agreements with East Germany
and Cuba, there has been virtually no actual trade,
and the agreements themselves have been thrown into
question.
Museveni ordered his staff to curtail implementation
of the arrangement with East Germany when he
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learned that the East Germans allegedly had
overpriced their products by a factor of two to three.
terms of the accord.
Uganda is unhappy with the terms of its barter deal
with Cuba. Ugandan officials, for example, belatedly
realized that the barter of coffee between two
signatory states of the International Coffee
Agreement is illegal, and that, because both Uganda
and Cuba are signatories and coffee is Uganda's only
substantial export crop, the entire agreement is
unworkable. Moreover, many of the agricultural
products Cuba wished to export to Kampala are
abundant in Uganda. As a consequence, Ugandan
officials reportedly plan to ignore the arrangement
concluded in July. The US Embassy in Kampala
reported that a resident Cuban diplomat also has
expressed skepticism that Uganda will abide by the
Outlook
Uganda's relations with the Soviet Union and its allies
show no signs of a quick turnaround. Barring a major
upheaval in Uganda or a fundamental reordering of
regional relationships in East Africa, neither
Kampala nor Moscow seems likely to alter its views of
the other. Moscow, for its part, shows little inclination
to atone for its sponsorship of Amin and Obote by
helping Uganda's moribund economy get on its feet or
helping Museveni assert control throughout the
countryside by providing military assistance. In our
judgment, the Soviets probably view Uganda as a
chronically unstable political backwater that is not
worth the expenditure of significant resources.
Moscow apparently believes that deeper involvement
now would create many headaches for negligible and
transitory political advantageF--]
For his part, Museveni generally has made cultivation
of good relations with the USSR no better than his
fourth foreign policy priority, ranking Moscow below
his efforts with Libya, regional neighbors, and
Western donors. Nonetheless, faced with
deteriorating security and economic decline,
Museveni is likely to hold open all channels to 25X1
potential aid donors and almost certainly would
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Africa
Briefs
The Mugabe government gradually is tightening its control over the Zimbabwean
media, according to the US Embassy. Information Minister Shamuyarira-one of
Zimbabwe's most pro-Soviet Cabinet ministers-lashed out last month at editors
of the Financial Gazette, the country's only major independent newspaper,
warning of "drastic action" if editorials continued to reflect alleged bias toward
the United States, the United Kingdom, and South Africa. The Minister
reportedly was particularly upset by an article pointing out the costs to Zimbabwe
of imposing sanctions against South Africa. Earlier this year, the government
threatened to detain three Zimbabwean journalists-who then fled the country-
for writing articles the government found objectionable. Harare also recently
announced a ban on manufacturing or usin rivate television dishes, which could
be used to receive foreign broadcasts.
In our judgment, the trend toward greater curbs on the media is likely to continue
and in part reflects Prime Minister Mugabe's efforts to extend his control over
more aspects of Zimbabwean political life. Zimbabwe's five principal English
newspapers and one vernacular paper already are largely government controlled,
and Shamuyarira may now attempt to bring the Gazette under direct government
supervision. Television and radio stations have been wholly government owned
since independence.
Secret
ALA AR 86-021
31 October 1986
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are to succeed.
President Doe's decision in September to lift the ban on the United People's Party
(UPP)-Liberia's most popular opposition party-has prompted the other parties
to quietly resume talks with the regime in order to salvage some influence. These
parties-the Liberian Action Party, the Liberian Unity Party, and the Unity
Party-probably realize they will lose political leverage if they fail to gain either
Cabinet posts or legislative seats. The US Embassy reports that talks between the
government and the parties, which collapsed in late June, were revived in
September under the auspices of nonpartisan "goodwill ambassadors" and UPP
chairman Baccus Matthews. the parties have
given up their longstanding demands for new presidential and legislative elections,
as well as one-half of the Cabinet posts. Doe's
ruling party insists that the parties must agree to "respect" the President, stop
criticizing the economic situation, and refrain from "false allegations" if the talks
Liberia's economic ills, according to US Embassy reporting.
The three opposition parties have failed to rally Liberians against Doe. The parties
participated in elections one year ago and formed the Grand Coalition last March
to pressure Doe into resigning, but they lack a strong charismatic leader and a
coherent strategy, US Embassy reporting indicates. The Coalition, which was
declared illegal on 31 May, failed to capitalize on labor unrest during the spring.
Moreover, since Doe's decision in June to grant amnesty to all those charged in the
Quiwompka coup attempt, the parties have been unable to find a credible issue to
attract public support, and have failed to offer an alternative program to solve
We believe the opposition parties may undergo internal leadership and strategy
changes in the next few months. A survey of US Embassy reporting indicates that
the Liberian Action Party is in disarray. The party's nominal leader, Jackson Doe,
has played only a minor role during the past year, and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf-
probably the party's most prominent member-fled to the United States in
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September. According to US Embassy and press reporting, some Liberians regard
Unity Party leader Kesselly as an unscrupulous opportunist who is ineffective as
the Coalition's chairman. The Embassy also reports that younger party leaders
disagree with his strategy and have called for a civil disobedience campaign
against Doe. Embassy reporting also indicates that younger members of the
Liberian Unity Party are disenchanted with their leadership. F___]
French Prime Minister Chirac's visit to Comoros last month probably has at least
temporarily boosted President Abdallah's domestic standing but, in our view, did
little to resolve longstanding bilateral issues. Although Chirac's visit-his first to
Comoros since he became Prime Minister last March-appears to suggest that
Paris will continue to back Abdallah's shaky autocratic regime against a fledgling
opposition, Chirac quashed Abdallah's hope of obtaining increased French
financial assistance, now about $15 million annually. Chirac, however, did pledge
additional technical assistance and some funding for infrastructure projects,
according to the US Embassy. F__1
In our judgment, Abdallah also will try to capitalize on the continued uncertainty
in Paris over the status of the island of Mayotte, administered by France but
claimed by Comoros. Despite pressure from both Mayotte's inhabitants and some
French officials to incorporate the island as a department in the French Republic,
the US Embassy reports that Chirac told an audience during a brief stop in
Mayotte that a referendum on the status of the island will be postponed. In our
view, Abdallah is likely to continue to use his opposition to departmental status for
Mayotte to rally domestic support and distract the populace from more immediate
concerns, including the declining economy, corruption, and nepotism.
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