NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200790001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Supplement
28 February 1986
Directorate of
Intelligence
Near East and
South Asia Review
MASTER FITCOPY
BUR ihU y t$
oil BAR UN
28 February 1986
Copy 2 6 0
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Near East and
South Asia Review 25X1
Grumbling from military officers about the conduct of the war with
Iran, increasing disgruntlement among Iraqi Shias, and
fragmentary but mounting evidence that Iraqis perceive a
weakening of President Saddam Husayn's grip on power strongly
suggest Saddam will face increasing domestic challenges this year.
Iran is pressing ahead on efforts to produce arms and ammunition
because it wants to reduce its dependence on foreign suppliers. It,
however, is unlikely to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of
significant weapons and military equipment any time soon
The South Yemeni armed forces suffered crippling losses of
personnel and materiel in the recent civil war and will require
substantial time and outside assistance to recover. While rebuilding
its armed forces, South Yemen will be forced to adopt a conciliatory
policy toward North Yemen
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Soviet-Afghan Efforts To Destabilize Pakistan's North-West 13
The Soviet-Afghan campaign to press Islamabad to curb insurgent
movement across the Afghan-Pakistani border has increased in
intensity, raising intertribal tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-
West Frontier Province, but the campaign will not deflect the
Pakistani leadership from its support for the Afghan insurgents.
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NE SA NE AR 86-006CX
28 February 1986 25X1
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Afghanistan in January
The increased tempo of winter combat operations noted in January
1985 was repeated this year, with the Soviets initiating small-unit
ambushes to cut insurgent supply lines and the insurgents staging
numerous harassment raids on regime and Soviet garrisons and
resupply convoys.
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but
the contents normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other
offices within CIA. Occasionally an article will represent the views
of a single analyst; these items will be designated as noncoordinated
views.
Top Secret
NESA NE A -006CX
e ruary
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Iraq: Morale Continues
Downward Trend
Iran's capture of Al Faw on the west bank of the
Shatt al Arab-an important defensive and
psychological objective-is likely to accelerate the
decline in morale of Iraq's war-weary population.
Grumbling from military officers about the conduct
of the war, increasing disgruntlement among Iraqi
Shias, and fragmentary but mounting evidence that
Iraqis perceive a weakening of President Saddam
Husayn's grip on power, strongly suggest Saddam will
face increasing domestic challenges this year unless
Iraq's fortunes change dramatically. If battle setbacks
continue, officers are likely to conclude that Iraq is
certain to lose the war if Saddam stays in power.
Morale in the Military
Morale has fallen among all ranks of the military,
believe victory is a distant and perhaps unachieveable
goal, an attitude that has contributed to increased
drunkenness.
because of the continued state of alert since mid-
December. The defense attache admits, however, that
military morale, while declining, is surprisingly good,
considering the length of the war and the high
casualties.
Lower morale within the military and the success of
Iran's latest offensive have led to further grumbling in
the officer corps.
are openly complaining about
the war and the need to end it quickly and are
blaming the regime for starting the conflict.
Government efforts to combat morale problems by
rewarding military officers and enlisted men
generously and avoiding casualties have hampered the
effectiveness of the armed forces.
Ithe soldiers
are well fed and provided good defenses, comparative
comforts, and frequent leaves
the Army, which only infrequently
conducts offensive attacks to keep casualties low, can
no longer react swiftly and effectively to Iranian
attacks. He claims to have observed a gradual decline
in the capability of the Iraqi armed forces over the
past two years.
Civilian Morale
The US Embassy describes the public as profoundly
depressed-although not defeatist-by the possibility
of an unending war and the prospect that more
relatives will be lost. Popular resistance to service at
least in the militia is increasing
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Army
length, many men have served several six-to-12-
month tours in the militia in addition to time in the
Attitudes Among the Shias
We share the view of US diplomats in Baghdad that,
while Shias-a majority of both the population and
the armed forces-are unenthusiastic about the
Sunni-dominated Ba'thist regime, most of them fear
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NESA NESAR 86-006CX
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Iranian domination more than they resent Baghdad's
rule moderate Iraqi Shia
clergy and aity, particularly in the Baghdad area, are
disenchanted with Iran and do not wish to see
Saddam replaced by a regime sympathetic to Tehran.
The US Embassy says the teachings of Ayatollah
Khoi of An Najaf, the most respected living Iraqi
Shia clergyman, are so low-key that they are not
likely to stir up the masses. Moreover, the regime has
attempted to ensure Shia loyalty by offering them
economic and political benefits.
Still, there are signs that Shia youth are becoming
more disaffected. According to the Embassy, a well-
connected Arab Ambassador claims to have evidence
of a new generation of Dawa sympathizers in Iraq
who are willing to organize if the Bath Party's grip on
the country weakens. Reporting on Shias in Saudi
Arabia, whom the Embassy believes tend to reflect
the views of their coreligionists in southern Iraq,
supports this belief. Shia contacts of the US
Consulate in Dhahran say about 40 percent of the
Shias in Qatif oasis support the activist course charted
by Ayatollah Khomeini.
-1 a split is deepening in the oasis between the
generally older conservatives and the younger
followers of Khomeini and Abdallah Shirazi, leader of
the Iraqi dissident group, Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of
the Imam). We believe a similar split is occurring in
The Effect on Saddam
We believe that Iraqis perceive a weakening of
Saddam's political strength, a development that, if
unchecked, is likely to embolden dissidents and
further sap his position.
? US and other diplomatic observers are detecting
signs that political and military leaders increasingly
are blaming each other for hampering the war
effort.
? The Bath Party-Saddam's power base-is
showing less enthusiasm for the war, according to
the US Embassy
that Ba'thist officials turned away laughing when
they observed a desecration of Saddam's portrait at
a ceremony.
expense. The US Embassy relates that similar
behavior is evident in Baghdad.
Iraq have openly begun to tell jokes at Saddam's
residents of northern
? Senior government officials, who usually present a
confident demeanor in conversations with foreign
diplomats, are no longer forecasting an early end to
the war, according to the US Embassy.
? During Shia holy days last September, the
government eased restrictions on religious services,
permitted limited self-flagellation, and lifted
roadblocks that had prevented Shias from visiting
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their shrines. Although at the time the US Embassy
interpreted the moves as a sign of regime
confidence, we now believe they reflected efforts to
lessen criticism of Saddam.
Prospects and Indicators
The US Embassy holds that morale has been poor
since the early days of the war and that Iraqis are
depressed by the prospect of an unending conflict.
Against this background, they view the current drop
in morale as a short-term effect of recent Iranian
offensives
We acknowledge the cyclical nature of Iraqi morale
but believe that Iraqi esprit is experiencing an overall
downward trend. Although we agree with the
Embassy that attitudes among Iraqi civilians and
military personnel are not yet defeatist, we are far less
sanguine on the prospects for the coming year. We
share the US Embassy's view that the potential for
major subversion by Iraqi Shias would increase only if
the regime appeared on the verge of losing the war-
and we believe this judgment extends to Ba'thists and
Sunni military officers as well.
In our view, any of the following developments would
signal a further erosion of Saddam's strength:
? Unrest by university and high school students.
Student demonstrations have preceded nearly every
coup since the fall of the monarchy.
? More frequent rotation of Army commanders to
keep them from developing a following, a practice
followed by Saddam since the war began.
? More terrorist incidents by Dawa and other Shia
dissident groups.
? The appearance of graffiti and demonstrations
against the war and military conscription.
? More frequent reports of assassination and coup
attempts against Saddam.
? Reports of secret trials and executions of military
officers and Ba'thist officials.
? A significant shakeup of Saddam's Cabinet.
? Shakeups and assassinations in the security services.
? Open criticism of Saddam in the streets
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Iran's Defense Industries:
Slow Expansion
Iran is pressing ahead on efforts to produce arms and
ammunition because it wants to reduce its dependence
on foreign suppliers. It is rebuilding arms industries
installed under the Shah and using the assistance of
foreign experts when necessary. As a result, although
indigenous production is inadequate to meet Iran's
wartime needs, it has eased serious shortages of
infantry weapons and ammunition. We believe
Tehran's efforts to improve production capabilities
and its emphasis on self-sufficiency will lead to
substantially expanded defense industries after the
war.
Shah's Arms Expansion Disrupted by Revolution
The Shah used Iran's increased petroleum revenues to
finance a large buildup of military industries in the
mid-1970s aimed at reducing his country's
dependence on imports. Iran's defense production
capabilities were among the best in the Middle East
by 1979, though still modest compared with those of
industrialized countries and insufficient to fight a
major war. Output consisted of small arms and
ammunition, propellants, communications equipment,
and selected types of large-caliber rounds of
The war with Iraq stimulated Tehran to resume
military production in 1981, but the arms industries
were slow to recover.
by mid-1982 Iran's defense industries still
were in serious disarray:
? Foreign contract arrangements were frequently
disrupted by inexperienced Iranian managers.
? Many factories were closed because of shortages of
raw materials and of technical and other trained
personnel, especially foreign experts.
? Sabotage and industrial accidents reduced output in
operating factories.
Table 1
Iran: Estimated Defense Industry Output
Before the 1979 Revolution
Antitank grenade launchers, 40/85-mm
(Iranian version of RPG-7)
155- and 105-mm howitzers
230,000
35-mm antiaircraft
100,000
120- and 81-mm mortars
240,000
20-mm aircraft cannon
50,000
40/85-mm rocket-assisted grenades
50,000
7.62-mm (NATO) and small arms,
calibers .22, .30, .45, and .50
61,000,000
Tehran Persevering
Despite production problems, Tehran is continuing to
rebuild the military production apparatus set up
Organization (NDIO), subordinate to the Ministry of
Defense, probably has ultimate responsibility for
output.
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NESA NESAR 86-006CX
28 February 1986
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SA-7 surface-to-air missile launcher (top) and
RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher (bottom). The
Iranians are trying to produce their own versions
Although only fragmentary information on Iran's
military industries is available, we believe the NDIO
has been able to resume and in some cases even slowly
expand military production during the past few years.'
Tehran announced the opening in late 1985 of a
factory at Esfahan-actually begun but never
completed under the Shah-to manufacture
antiaircraft ammunition and two new production lines
for ammunition for Soviet-model rifles and T-55
tanks. In mid-January Tehran claimed it had sent the
first consignment of domestically produced 60- and
120-mm mortars to the front.
Tehran may be producing 130-mm artillery
the Iranians have
overcome technical problems to increase production of
antitank rockets and 122-mm artillery rounds at one
plant
Seeking Foreign Help Slowly
Iran has increased only gradually the level of foreign
technical assistance in its arms factories.
kiLZL
Iranian Officials attending a ceremony for the
opening of a production line for Kalashnikov
sign of the new regime's inadequacies. Delays in the
resumption of foreign assistance also resulted from
contract problems and probably from
mismanagement by incompetent officials appointed to
the NDIO after the revolution. In addition, foreign
firms viewed Iran as a poor investment risk in the
early 1980s. Some firms demanded payment of large
sums of money owed by Iran for work completed prior
to 1979 before they would consider providing
additional assistance.
We believe the strain of fighting a long war with Iraq
and Iran's inability to make substantial gains in
military production on its own have caused Tehran to
become more pragmatic about using foreign expertise.
Iran is seeking
assistance in military production from many foreign
companies, and Tehran apparently is willing to offer
lucrative contracts to attract them. A calmer domestic
situation and changes in leadership in the NDIO to
improve management-there have been at least six
directors since 1980-may also have smoothed
dealings with foreign firms:
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after the revolution Tehran was reluctant to accept
foreign offers of assistance with its arms industries
because it feared that such help would be viewed as a
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Table 2
Iran: Principal Military Production Facilities,
January 1986
Tehran Armaments Plant/ Rifles, machineguns, RPG-7 antitank grenade The plant was established in 1939 and expanded
Mosalsalsassi, eastern Tehran launchers (Iranian designation is Nadar) in the 1970s. Although the factory is operating,
its level of production is unknown.
Parchin Complex/ Parch in, RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers (Nader), 122-
30 km southeast of Tehran mm rockets (Iranian designation is Arash), pro-
pellant charges and explosives, unidentified acids
and chemicals, replacement parts for machinery
used at the complex
The complex consists of at least six plants, includ-
ing explosives and rocket plants and a facility for
one a ess, Iran pro a y is gra w-
ally expanding the capabilities of the complex
Esfahan Explosives Plant/ Explosives Construction of the plant was begun under the
Esfahan Shah. Part of the plant has been completed with
Swedish assistance. Although the Iranians plan
eventually to produce a variety of explosive pow-
ders at Esfahan, we believe the plant currently is
producing only nitric acid for explosives.
Tehran Ammunition Plant/ Large- and small-caliber ammunition, including
Saltanatabad, northern suburbs 155-, 130-, and 105-mm rounds
of Tehran
Tehran, however, claims to have opened at
two new production lines, probably at Sal-
tanatabad, in November 1985.1
Shiraz Plant/Shiraz TOW missile launchers, possibly light weapons The Iranians, with Czechoslovak assistance, prob-
ably have completed the plant, begun before the
revolution by a US firm. Because of technical
problems, the plant may not be producing any
TO W s.
Unidentified facility/Aliabad, Chemical weapons The NDIO may be using the facility to manufac-
near Qom ture artillery shells and bombs to deliver chemi-
cals. Neither the types of chemicals used nor
output of weapons is known, but we believe the
number of chemical weapons produced, if any, is
small.
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? In 1984 a Swedish firm resumed construction of an
explosives plant at Esfahan contracted for under the
Shah, according to a reliable source. Part of the
plant may already be operational.
Self-sufficiency remains a key goal of Iran's defense
industries,
In March 1983 President Khamenei publicly
proposed the creation of a deputy for self-sufficiency
in the armed forces. We have no confirmation that
such a post has been created
Besides expertise from the West, Iran has been
seeking and in some cases receiving help from East
European countries, North Korea, and China,
Most of the
assistance is in the form of parts and raw materials,
but Tehran appears to be attempting to use more non-
Western technicians in its military factories.
Czechoslovaks have been supervising production of
TOW missiles since mid-1984 at a plant in Shiraz
that was originally built by a US firm for the Shah. In
March 1985 they were having problems with the
guidance system for the missiles, however, and we are
not certain whether the plant can produce the TOW.
At the opening of an ammunition production
line in November 1985, Revolutionary Guard
Minister Rafiq-Dust gave his support to indigenous
efforts:
The military industries organization has a major
role in supplying the needs of the warriors of
Islam.... We believe that every step we
take ... makes our victory at the fronts more
certain, since the bullet that is made in the
hands of our compatriots pierces the enemy's
heart better than the bullet sold to us by our
enemies.
Tehran's defense industries also are benefiting from
source reported in March that the management
of Iran's Parchin rocket plant, where production is
high compared with previous years, was in the hands
of an efficient group of young Army captains who had
graduated from the Technical University in
We believe Iran's
military factories will benefit further as engineers and
managers return from education abroad and as
foreign experts train personnel inside Iran.
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Research and Development Efforts
The effort to better equip its forces against Iraq and
the problems encountered obtaining foreign military
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ITon Secre
Over the past year Iran has shown particular interest
in building surface-to-surface missiles.
foreign sources of supply.
? The public focus on self-sufficiency represents
part, an effort to stress Iran's independence w
Tehran at the same time looks abroad for mili
supplies it considers essential to pursue the w~
? Over the long term, Tehran wants indigenous
production to significantly reduce its need for
infantry army.
Despite the efforts of the NDIO, Iran is unlikel,
achieve self-sufficiency in the production of
significant weapons and military equipment any
soon. Iran probably will not be able to produce
aircraft, armor, and many types of heavy milita
equipment and will have to seek replacements f
foreign suppliers. If Iran continues to receive ra
materials and technical assistance from abroad,
within the next three to five years it may be abl
produce enough small-caliber weapons and
ammunition to supply the peacetime-and perh
much of the wartime-requirements of a light
push ahead with similar programs
When the war is over, Iran's defense industries
probably will devote most of their efforts to the
production of relatively less sophisticated infant
weapons and equipment. Tehran most likely wi
expend only slightly more of its resources to be;
acquiring production capabilities for armor and
artillery. Missile and chemical weapons develor
probably will continue, and perhaps increase
significantly, because Tehran believes Baghdad
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Outlook and Implications
The revitalization and expansion of Iran's defense
industries are likely to remain a priority regardless of
the status of the war:
? Tehran probably hopes improved output of materiel
in the near term will ease shortages at the front and
help it continue the war.
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South Yemen's Military:
Picking Up the Pieces
The South Yemeni armed forces suffered crippling
losses of personnel and materiel in the recent civil war
and will require substantial time and outside
assistance to recover. Rebuilding efforts will be
seriously hampered by counterproductive regime
policies-harsh security measures, purges, military
pay cuts-and lingering tribal animosities. While
rebuilding its armed forces, South Yemen's
counterinsurgency capabilities will be seriously
diminished, and Aden will be forced to adopt a
conciliatory policy toward North Yemen.
major ammunition dumps were destroyed in the Aden
fighting. Fuel shortages seriously hampered
movement of units throughout the country, and many
could not move their vehicles out of garrison, probably
because of mechanical failures and spare parts
shortages.
The Air Force, most of which supported the current
government, suffered heavy pilot losses and
presumably must rely heavily on Soviet pilots to fly
Heavy Losses in the Fighting
At least four of the Army's 12 brigades, most of
which supported the new regime, suffered serious
losses in the heavy fighting around Aden and in
Abyan province from mid-January to early February.
We estimate the Army lost at least 150 of its 400
The small South Yemeni Navy, which backed
Hasani, also suffered heavy personnel and equipment
losses and is virtually destroyed as an effective force.
the Navy's
newer armored vehicles.
Figures outside Aden are not complete, but the
armored brigade at Mukayris lost at least 20 of its 30
T54 tanks in one week's fighting last month
The Army also expended a high percentage of its
equipment probably is in need of major repairs.
during the fighting around Aden and
Mukayris, units carelessly expended thousands of
eight Osa-II missile boats, one or two were probably
sunk during the fighting, two are in Aden harbor,
probably with heavy damage, one sat out the fighting
at Perim Island, two remain in Ethiopia, and one is
missing. Two of the Navy's four LSTs were heavily
damaged and are presumed out of commission.
The intense fighting sharpened tribal differences
among South Yemeni military personnel, and the
loyalty of many units to the new regime remains
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At least two
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Regime Measures Worsen the Situation
Aden's efforts to rebuild the military and cut costs
have worsened the serious military manpower
Regime efforts to ensure the political reliability of the
armed forces have -further lowered orale
and reliability military
leaders who fought for the new regime are unhappy
that the government does not include any significant
military representation
South Yemen's officer corps has been bracing itself
for a purge of suspected Hasani supporters.
Outlook
The South Yemeni armed forces will require many
months and massive Soviet support to rebuild. Aden
will look to Moscow to replace equipment lost in the
conflict in addition to continuing advisory and
maintenance services. The loss of scarce skilled
personnel from deaths, desertions, or political purges
can only increase South Yemen's reliance on Soviet
technical expertise. Soviet pilots and ground force
advisers will continue to provide combat support in
South Yemeni counterinsurgency operations
it to stop supporting pro-Hasani insurgents.
The weakness of South Yemen's armed forces will
complicate the regime's efforts to consolidate its
control of the country, while forcing it to adopt, at
least temporarily, a conciliatory policy toward North
Yemen. The Army's counterinsurgency capability is
particularly weak in Abyan province, where Army
personnel remain sympathetic to ex-President Hasani
and where North Yemen focuses most of its support
to the insurgents. Nonetheless, Aden may discreetly
encourage insurgent activity in North Yemen to force
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Soviet-Afghan Efforts To
Destabilize Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province
The Soviet-Afghan campaign to press Islamabad to
curb insurgent movement across the Afghan-
Pakistani border has increased in intensity, raising
intertribal tensions and strife in Pakistan's North-
West Frontier Province (NWFP). We believe that fear
of Kabul's meddling in the tribal territories
precipitated Pakistani Government intervention in the
Khyber Agency in December, although Islamabad
billed the operation as an antinarcotics campaign. We
do not believe the Soviet-Afghan campaign will
deflect the Pakistani leadership from its support for
the Afghan insurgents.
The Campaign Heats Up
The Soviet-Afghan campaign apparently
seeks to pit Pashtun clans against each other,
reinforce traditional mistrust among these highly
individualistic groups, and divide the Afghan
insurgents from the people of the North-West
Frontier Province in the hope of limiting insurgent
movement of men and supplies across the border into
An official in the Pakistani
Much of the Pakistani-Afghan border area is
inhabited by highly independent tribes, many of
whom frequently live on both sides of the Durand
Line. The Tribal Territories include the Bajaur
Agency (inhabited by Utman Khel and Tarkhani
tribesmen), Mohmand Agency (Mohmand and Safi),
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Agency (Orakzai and Gangash), Kurram Agency
(Turi, Mengals, and Bangash), and North and South
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The Pakistani Government has followed the British
precedent and exercised only loose control of the
tribesmen of the North-West Frontier Province. Late-
19th-century treaties granted the tribes limited
autonomy from the central authorities. Islamabad
has allowed the Pashtun tribes to maintain their own
tribal assemblies and to cross the frontier relatively
unimpeded. The government has been able to
maintain peace along the frontier by a judicious use
of bribes for good behavior and periodic forays by
paramilitary forces.
The Durand Line-the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan-cuts deep into the Pashtun tribal area
that is the traditional home of the dominant Afghan
ethnic group. Pashtun tribesmen since the beginning
of this century have sought to create an independent
Pashtunistan in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province, where they form a majority; Pashtun-
dominated Afghan Governments in Kabul have
espoused the cause of their separated brethren. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and
Islamabad's subsequent decision to support the anti-
Kabul insurgents have riveted official attention on the
people of the North-West Frontier Province as major
actors in the regional struggle. The influx of nearly 3
million Afghan refugees into 239 camps spread across
Pakistan and increased narcotics smu lin have
made the situation even more volatile
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the US Embassy that
there were 46 sabotage incidents last year-resulting
in 51 dead and 156 wounded-a nearly 20-percent
increase in incidents over 1984.
The sabotage campaign escalated at the end of 1985
from attacks on insurgent homes and businesses to
attacks on Pakistani Government facilities. The
bombing of the control room of the Peshawar center
of Pakistani television on 16 October and the
explosion at the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)
office in Peshawar on 22 January highlighted the
saboteurs' ability to strike at conspicuous and well-
protected government facilities. The bombing of the
PIA office in Peshawar generated a series of protest
marches in Peshawar by Pakistani civilians angry at
the Afghan refugees for bringing the war to Pakistan
and prompted calls in the National Assembly for a
review of government policy toward the Afghan
insurgents.
Pakistani politicians and Afghan insurgent leaders are
concerned about the impact of the uncontrolled arms
traffic on public order in the frontier region. Simple
disagreements, authorities believe, have often
exploded into major gun battles. According to press
accounts, rocket launchers and other advanced
weaponry were used in a clash between Pakistani
tribes in September and a violent clash between
Afghan refugees and Pakistani tribesmen in Bajaur
Agency in early November.
We believe Afghan and Soviet authorities are
increasing direct military pressure on Pakistan as part
of the destabilization campaign.
Afghan-Soviet Inducements
Money. The Soviet-Afghan destabilization program
involves buying the loyalty of border tribal groups.
Pakistani officials believe that KHAD pays out $4-6
million a month to the tribes, but we doubt Kabul has
been that generous. In exchange, Afghanistan expects
the tribal groups to inhibit insurgent transit through
their territory when possible.
Training. Pakistani authorities believe that the
Afghan Government provides training bases in
Afghanistan for dissident Pakistani tribesmen to
instruct them in sabotage and terrorism. Islamabad
believes that the kidnaping in Baluchistan of an
Australian couple working for the World Bank and
four Chinese coal technicians in the summer of 1985
was directed by Kabul and intended to embarrass
Islamabad by exposing the government's vulnerability
to cross-border activity.
Narcotics. We believe that Kabul has acquiesced to
traditional tribal smuggling activity-including
narcotics production and distribution-to curry tribal
favor and to disrupt Pakistani security and
antinarcotics efforts in the border regions. According
to a reliable source of the US Embassy in Islamabad,
major Pashtun narcotics traffickers have for several
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UMBRA
The Destabilization Campaign: A Chronology
August 1984 Khyber Agency Pakistani authorities note an upsurge in sabotage and
terrorist incidents in the Khyber Agency. According to
press reports, they attribute the increase to Afghan
instigation.
Early March 1985 Khyber Agency Elements of the Pakistani Frontier Corps conduct military
sweep through Khyber Agency searchingfor Afridi leaders
who are believed to be cooperating with the Afghan
Government, according to press reports.
Bombing of control room of Peshawar center of Pakistani
television.
1 December 1985 Khyber Agency A 3,000-man Frontier Corps sweep the Khyber and Kurram
Kurram Agency Agency begins ostensibly to control drug smuggling along
the border.
1 January 1986 Khyber Agency Dissident Afghan tribesmen are bottled up; very little
Kurram Agency fighting occurred after first two weeks of the Frontier
Corps' operation
14 January 1986 Kurram Agency Pakistani officials claim to have shot down intruding
Afghan MIG-21 aircraft using Stinger surface-to-air
missiles
18 January 1986 Kurram Agency Pakistanis claim to have fired-and probably hit-a
second Afghan fighter aircraft using Stinger missiles,
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years received the backing of the Afghan Government
and have been provided with refuge from Pakistani
security personnel. Press accounts report that poppy
production has increased in the border region because
poppy fields are rarely disturbed by combat
operations.
Pakistan Responds
Pakistan has reacted to the destabilization campaign
by upgrading its air defense capabilities, launching
military operations against errant tribesmen, and
trying to reassure the skittish civilian population that
Islamabad is prepared to protect them.
The pre-positioning of antiaircraft gun and missile
batteries and the placement of forward observer posts
with secure communication lines indicate that since at
least early November the Pakistanis have been
prepared to fire upon intruding Afghan aircraft.
Islamabad also launched operations against Wali
Khan Kukikhel-leader of a fractious clan of the
Afridi tribe who has had longstanding ties to Kabul.
The Frontier Corps sent 3,000 men to subdue the
Afridi and Shinwari tribes in the Khyber Agency.
This operation followed a security sweep last March
in which the fortified home of Wali Khan was
destroyed. While publicly aimed at capturing Wali
Khan and curbing narcotics smuggling, the December
campaign was intended to signal to the tribes that
challenging Islamabad's authority in the NWFP and
cooperating with Kabul would not go unpunished.
Wali Khan Kukikhel ... age 74
... presides over Afridi clan at
about 70,000... biggest land-
lord of the Khyber Agency ...
close ties to the Kabul regime
We believe the forceful Pakistani response to Wali
Khan's challenge has successfully undermined the
support he had from other border tribe leaders:
? The fate of Wali Khan-bottled up for two months
between insurgent forces and the Pakistani Frontier
Corps in a remote, inhospitable region of the
NWFP-will probably discourage other tribal
leaders from following his example.
? Many tribesmen blame Wali Khan for inciting the
Pakistani military response through his abuse of
Pakistani provincial leaders and his acceptance of
money and arms from Kabul.
? The increased presence of the paramilitary Frontier
Corps in the Khyber and Kurram Agencies has
created economic hardship and loss of traditional
freedom of movement for all of the tribal groups.
? Prominent Muslim religious leaders have reacted
negatively to the apparent alliance of Wali Khan
with the atheistic Communist government in
Kabul
Outlook
Many tribal groups find it expedient to accept bribes
without abandoning their tacit support to the Afghan
resistance. The Soviet effort to flood the border
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regions with arms is likely to be counterproductive
because many of those weapons will probably be
turned against the Soviets and their Afghan
colleagues. Nevertheless, the Soviets and the Afghan
Government will probably find the opportunities for
splitting the insurgency from its supporters
sufficiently enticing to continue the effort.
If the border situation in the North-West Frontier
Province were to deteriorate rapidly, civilian criticism
of the lack of security along the border would
probably push the issue to the top of the government's
foreign policy agenda. Civilian authorities will
continue to be apprehensive about the potential for
sophisticated arms spilling over into the troubled Sind
and Baluchistan provinces. Although President Zia
and Prime Minister Junejo would face increased
domestic demands to alter Islamabad's support for the
insurgents to gain a respite from Soviet pressure, we
do not believe they would back away from their
support for the insurgents. Pakistan's leaders,
however, are likely to use any deterioration in the
border situation to justify its requests for increased
US military assistance
17 Top Secret
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Afghanistan in January
The increased tempo of winter combat operations
noted in January 1985 was repeated this year.
Although concerned about the effects of bad weather
and extreme cold on troops, Soviet and Afghan forces
launched operations in Nangarhar, Ghazni,
Qandahar, and Herat Provinces. Soviet Spetsnaz
forces initiated small-unit ambushes through eastern
and southern Afghanistan in an effort to cut insurgent
supply lines. The insurgents have not stood down this
winter, staging numerous harassment raids on Afghan
and Soviet garrisons and resupply convoys.
In the capital itself, insurgents intermittently rocketed
the airport, Soviet Embassy, and Darulaman Palace.
The US Embassy reports that nighttime small-arms
fire was infrequent. Afghan security patrols within
the city appeared relatively active because of the
presence of several invited Western journalists
getting through by surface vehicles.
The US Embassy in Kabul reports an increase in
flights of Soviet IL-76 transports into the capital in an
apparent effort to bring in supplies and equipment not
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Insurgent Activity
Insurgents remained active throughout Afghanistan,
staging guerrilla attacks upon isolated border posts
and resupply convoys. The intensity of attacks ranged
from harassment fire of Afghan and Soviet garrisons
to attacks upon convoys, which killed scores of
government troops
Other Developments
Discipline Problems. The state of discipline and
morale in the Afghan Army continued to decline
despite the optimistic facade presented b Kabul
authorities quarrels
among Afghan soldiers frequently occur, and there is
general discontent about delays in receiving
replacement troops. The number of Afghan defections
remains high, casting doubt upon the ability of the
Afghan Government to raise the strength of the
armed forces to its stated goal of 200,000.
Soviet forces in Afghanistan have also suffered from
discipline problems. A drunken Soviet soldier
damaged a parked MI-24 helicopter gunship by
driving an armored personnel carrier into it
at least 10 Soviet officers and soldiers defected or
surrendered to insurgent forces during the Ghazni
campaign
Pakistani-Afghan Border. In response to an increase
in Afghan air operations along the Pakistani-Afghan
border, Pakistani Army air defense units fired Stinger
surface-to-air missiles at intruding aircraft on 14 and
18 January
Pakistani authorities claim to have hit and downed
one aircraft during each engagement. (TS U NF)
Outlook
We believe the Soviets will focus on cutting insurgent
supply lines during the late winter months. They
increasingly appear to be prepared to use Spetsnaz
forces for small-unit operations and ambushes. Harsh
weather in the mountains will tend to limit Soviet air
support for the convoys traveling the main supply
artery between Kabul and Termez. The Soviets will
probably conduct quick sweep operations along this
vital transportation link in the hope of preempting
insurgent ambushes, but, in our view, insurgent forces
will continue to be able to hit the vulnerable convoys,
particularly in the Salang Pass region.
')FY'I
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