EUROPEAN REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00289R000200580001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 3, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/08: CIA-RDP87T00289R000200580001-4
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European Review
EUR ER 86-001
3 Janugry J 9$a6
Copy IU I
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Secret
European Review
West Germany: The Greening of the CDU
West Germany: No Speed Limits
Turkey-USSR: Chief of Staff Visits Moscow=
East Germany: Politburo Wrangle=
Hungary-Romania: Budapest Toughens Tactics on Minorities
Yugoslavia: Change in National Anthem Proposed==
Yugoslavia-UAE: Progress Toward Diplomatic Ties =
Articles West Germany: Elite Views on Security
Democrats win an absolute majority in January 1987.
Surveys of politically influential West Germans highlight sharply
differing perspectives on security issues among leaders of the
Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party.
Elites in both parties agree on NATO membership and the need to
pursue detente, but they disagree over the Soviet military threat, the
East-West military balance, and the utility of nuclear deterrence.
Their conflicting attitudes probably will make it difficult for them to
restore West Germany's frayed security policy consensus or form a
Grand Coalition if neither the current government nor the Social
Yugoslavia: Croatia Defends Status Quo
Croatia, Yugoslavia's second-largest and second-most-developed
republic, has long been a problem for officials in Belgrade.
Croatians have worried that Serbia, the largest republic and site of
the federal capital, is intent on dominating national policy and have
fought to protect their regional interests. The present leaders-most
installed by Tito after he broke up the liberal Croatian movement of
1971-continue the struggle to retain power at the republic level,
despite generally orthodox ideological views. F__1
authors
will be designated as uncoordinated views. Comments may be directed to the
Some articles are preliminary views of a subject or speculative, but the contents
normally will be coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Occasionally an article will represent the views of a single analyst; these items
Secret
EUR ER 86-001
3 January 1986
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West Germany The Greening of the CDU
West Germany's Christian Democrats increasingly are stressing environmental
problems, which polls indicate are second only to the economy as a concern of the
electorate. Last October, a state CDU congress in Baden-Wuerttemberg adopted a
"Green Charter" with numerous proposals-some of them controversial-for
limiting pollution. In November, the Hessen Christian Democrats passed a similar
program urging that environmental damage become a production cost for industry
along with capital and labor. The party's youth affiliate in Hessen has suggested
the creation of an environmental ministry in Bonn similar to that formed by the
new SPD-Green state government in Wiesbaden.F_~
The Christian Democrats will hope to capitalize on the issue in the campaign for
the Bundestag election in January 1987. Their new tactic is likely to win over some
middle-class voters from the Greens, who already are falling in the polls following
the decline of peace movement activity. Another result could be greater reluctance
by CDU-led state and local governments to support US military construction plans
and other measures that might threaten the environment. F__1
West Germany No Speed Limits
Bonn has decided against a national speed limit on the autobahns. A 10-month,
large-scale test showed that a 60-mph limit would reduce nitrogen oxide pollution
by only 10 percent. The government has concluded that catalytic converters will be
a far superior method to reduce emissions and is calling on drivers to switch to cars
equipped with this device. Such cars now make up only 26 percent of new auto
sales, but market specialists predict that with tax incentives now in effect this will
reach 75 percent by 1987.F_~
Automakers, who regard unrestricted autobahn speeds as a strong selling point for
their high-performance cars, are pleased with the decision. The opposition Social
Democrats and Greens, on the other hand, have been sharply critical, calling the
experiment a fraud. The Social Democratic state governments in the Saar and
Bremen say they will impose speed restrictions of their own. The decision also is
likely to upset West Germany's neighbors. A speed limit would have helped their
own automakers compete with West Germany's and, in addition, the EC
Commission wants a uniform EC speed limit.
1 Secret
EUR ER 86-001
3 January 1986
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Table 2
Current East-West Military Balance
Percent of total Table 3
Military Strength
a Precondition for Detente?
Just over half of the Social Democrats agreed, but
over 40 percent said Soviet policy was basically
defensive.
Party elites also differ over the East-West military
balance. Majorities in both parties agreed that a
military equilibrium is important to preserving peace,
but over 60 percent of the Christian Democrats said
that the East currently is militarily superior to
NATO. By contrast, two-thirds of the Social
Democrats said both sides are equally strong.
Probably as a result, the Christian Democrats were
almost twice as likely as the Social Democrats to say
that increases in conventional forces are important to
the Alliance.
Support for NATO and Detente
West German elites are even more united than the
general public in endorsing West Germany's
membership in the Alliance. One elite study notes a
unanimous and "unshakable" conviction that NATO
will remain essential for the foreseeable future. In the
1983 Berlin Science Center survey, large majorities in
both parties rejected neutralism and said Bonn's
influence would be less if it did not belong to the
Alliance. Nonetheless, many Social Democrats were
skeptical of NATO's concrete benefits. A third denied
that NATO had been essential to maintaining peace
in Europe since 1949, and a large minority said
NATO was a constraint on Bonn's policy toward the
East.
Elite members agree on the need to pursue East-West
detente. In the Berlin survey, Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats overwhelmingly said detente is
of at least moderate importance for West German
policy, although SPD members were more likely to
assign it extreme importance. Seventy percent of the
Social Democrats and over half of the Christian
Democrats said progress toward disarmament is
important for Alliance cohesion.
The Social Democratic leaders, however, strongly
tend to support detente as a value in itself, while
Christian Democrats saw it only as a single aspect of
Alliance policy. For instance, most of the Social
Democrats said military strength should not be a
precondition for detente, that detente should be
pursued independently of the military balance, and
that East-West trade should be kept separate from
political considerations. The Christian Democrats
overwhelmingly disagreed on all three counts. The
results suggest the SPD leaders would support detente
despite virtually any conceivable Soviet armaments
measures or military actions outside Western Europe.
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Table 4
West German Unilateral Disarmament
Percent of total Table 5 Percent of total
Nuclear Weapons Have Assured Peace
The Christian Democrats theoretically link detente to
maintaining the military balance, but they also stress
that NATO's pursuit of good relations with the East
is essential to maintaining public support for an
adequate defense.
Military Issues
These differing perspectives lead to disagreements
over West German military policies. The Christian
Democrats, for instance, are almost twice as likely as
the Social Democrats to say that national
commitments to strengthen conventional forces are
important for Alliance cohesion. The Christian
Democrats also were far more likely to say current
military spending levels are about right-two-thirds
of the Social Democrats called for reductions-and to
support real 3-percent annual increases as agreed by
NATO. Most of the Social Democrats agreed that
Bonn "should take independent unilateral steps
toward disarmament as a sign of good will to set the
process in motion"-a position the Christian
Democrats almost unanimously rejected.
The survey also found large differences on nuclear
issues:
? Three-quarters of the Christian Democrats said
peace in Europe would not have been maintained in
recent years without the existence of nuclear
weapons in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Social
Democrats disagreed by almost a 2-to-1 margin.
? Over 90 percent of the Christian Democrats said
INF deployment would increase European security,
while three-quarters of the Social Democrats said
the opposite.
? The two parties consequently differed over proposals
for a moratorium on initial INF deployments, with
80 percent of the Social Democrats in favor and 70
percent of the Christian Democrats opposed. F_
Even many Christian Democrats, however, expressed
uneasiness about NATO's reliance on nuclear
weapons. Only about a third said the use of nuclear
weapons would be justified in response to a Warsaw
Pact conventional attack-a possibility implicit in the
strategy of flexible response. Almost half said the
East and the West should agree to renounce first use
of nuclear weapons-as the Soviets have proposed
repeatedly-and 40 percent said the superpowers
should freeze their nuclear arsenals. Few thought
Bonn should strive for an increase in NATO's nuclear
weapons in order to deal with Moscow from a position
of strength. This unease about nuclear weapons
probably in large part explains the Christian
Democrats' support for both arms.control negotiations
and stronger conventional defenses.F___-]
Implications
In practice, policy differences between the major
parties probably are smaller than suggested by the
studies. Both have conducted more moderate foreign
and security policies in power than in opposition,
largely because of international constraints, pressures
from their Free Democratic coalition partners, and
the desire to win over centrist voters. Chancellor Kohl,
for instance, has continued the Eastern policies of
SPD-led governments, and his real military spending
increases have averaged less than those under
Chancellors Brandt and Schmidt.
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Table 6
Use of Military Force
Conventional only in response 4 23
to conventional attack
Nuclear, in response to 40 24
nuclear attack
Nuclear, in response to 36 8
conventional attack
Alliance defenses. Further, the parties are likely to
play up their differences on a range of issues-from
length of military service to SDI participation-in the
runup to the election in January 1987. As a result,
both parties would find it hard to form a
CDU/CSU-SPD coalition if both the current
government and the Social Democrats fail to win an
absolute majority in the election. We do not rule out
that possibility, but it almost certainly would provoke
more dissent within both parties than did the Grand
Coalition of 1966-69, when security issues were much
less contentious between the parties.
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Nonetheless, we believe the studies accurately
measure underlying attitudes prevalent among both
parties' activists and leaders. Those attitudes may
make it difficult for the parties to moderate either
policies or rhetoric to maximize their electoral appeal.
SPD chancellor candidate Johannes Rau, for
example, is trying to cultivate a pro-NATO image,
but various high-ranking Social Democrats continue
to castigate a range of Alliance and US policies. A
rightwing faction within the Christian Democratic
Bundestag group is criticizing the Kohl government's
pursuit of better relations with East Germany and
Poland and its general emphasis on East-West
detente.
Conflicting attitudes on security also limit prospects
for revitalizing the consensus on military and Alliance
issues that was shaken by the INF debate. Bundestag
hearings in 1984 reached agreement on the need to
raise the nuclear threshold by relying more on
conventional defenses, and leaders of both parties
have said that NATO must continue to depend on
nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. The
parties' conflicting assessments of Soviet foreign
policy and the military balance, however, make
agreement unlikely on concrete measures to bolster
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Yugoslavia:
Croatia Defends Status Quo
Croatia, Yugoslavia's second-largest and second-
most-developed republic, has long been a problem
case for officials in Belgrade. Croatians have worried
that Serbia, the largest republic and site of the federal
capital, is intent on dominating national policy, and
they have fought to protect their regional interests.
The present leaders-most installed by Tito after he
broke up the liberal Croatian movement of 1971-
continue the struggle to retain power at the republic
level, despite generally orthodox ideological views.
Croatia and Reform: Defending the Status Quo
Croatian leaders rhetorically support the reformist
economic stabilization program adopted by the
Federal Government and party in 1983 but are among
the most vocal critics of specific proposals for change.
Unlike their Slovene neighbors, however, the
Croatians offer no coherent alternative to current
reform proposals-generally formulated by a coalition
of southern leaders and some federal officials-but
rather defend the status quo. US diplomats report
that many senior Croatians prefer a static political
and economic environment and favor cautious change
"within the system."
Senior Croatians generally resist efforts by the
southern regions to return power to federal authorities
on many economic matters. The republic repeatedly
has fought to prevent loss of its power to Belgrade,
most recently joining Slovenia in obstructing
fundamental changes in the country's foreign
exchange system. Officials in Zagreb expect
Croatians at the federal level to support these efforts.
Croatian leaders
are angry that Premier Planinc, a former Croatian
party head, is a leading proponent of strengthening
the federal government's economic authority. Planinc,
however, does not appear concerned that republic
leaders will deny her a leading position at home when
her unrenewable term expires next May
Senior politicians-many of whom distrust free
market practices-rarely express outright opposition
to unleashing market forces, but many undercut such
a policy in practice. On the surface, the republic
government does not appear to retain as tight a grip
over enterprises as in most other republics. Instead,
individual Croatian leaders apparently manipulate
economic decisions for their own purposes through a
web of personal connections and patronage.
Opinions below the senior leadership are mixed. On
the one hand, US diplomats report that most
economists, enterprise managers, bankers, and mid-
level government officials favor the reformist
stabilization program. On the other hand, an equally
numerous group-which has secured its position
through personal connections or by following a strict
Marxist line-opposes changing the present system.
During the past year, more dogmatic Communists,
such as Zagreb University's "New Left" group, have
been increasingly open in assailing market
mechanisms.
autonomy.
Views on Political Reform
Croatian leaders disagree over specific changes in the
political system but generally unite in rejecting major
shifts in the national distribution of power. Leaders
from most camps publicly oppose changing the
constitution. Discussion at recent republic and federal
party plenums, however, indicates that senior figures
continue to argue over changing federal party statutes
to enhance central authority. Many Croatian leaders
appear torn between their ideological preference for a
tight system and their desire to protect their own
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EUR ER 86-001
3 January 1986
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Within the republic, Zagreb has recently proposed or
enacted changes in both party and state systems but
seemingly for purposes other than reform. Over the
past two years, for example, the republic has
mandated multiple-candidate elections for
government and some party positions. The new rules,
however, appear to be largely an exercise in domestic
public relations since all candidates will be cut from
the same cloth. One US Consulate Zagreb source
stated last year that the intent is not to offer
alternative philosophies or solutions. Moreover, last
June the Croatian party formalized republic leaders'
control over all nominations for important party
positions.
Isolated and Fragmented Leadership
Imposed from outside the republic by Tito, Croatian
leaders have been unable to establish much
legitimacy. The current leadership replaced those
officials whom Tito purged in 1972 after they joined
forces with nationalist groups in pressing for greater
autonomy and liberal changes in the Communist
system.
Severe internal fragmentation appears to exacerbate
feelings of insecurity. Even during the period when
Tito's trusted partisan comrade Vladimir Bakaric,
who died in 1983, acted as referee, personal disputes
kept the leadership in turmoil.
Compared with other regions, ethnic differences
among senior leaders appear to play a lesser role in
republic politics. Serbs, who are the largest minority
in Croatia, and other groups are represented at senior
levels. US diplomats report that Croatia tries to
provide ethnic as well as regional balance among
republic officeholders.
The number of powerful individuals at the republic
level is relatively small, but the leadership as a group
does not exercise as much authority as in other
republics, such as Bosnia-Hercegovina:
? The 11-member republic party Presidium seems to
be the most powerful political body, but policy
questions often undergo acrimonious debate in the
Central Committee before resolution.
? The republic government takes the lead on
economic policy. Premier Ante Markovic, however,
is a businessman and not a bona fide member of the
entrenched Zagreb political elite. The republic
Assembly appears to influence Croatia's economic
policy positions but acts more as a rubberstamp on
matters concerning the political system.
? On the basis of available media reports, the republic
presidency appears to deal infrequently with central
policy questions-despite the presence of several
well-known politicans.
Zagreb's authority at the county and municipal levels
seems tenuous on many matters. Media and US
diplomatic reports indicate that local officials can-
and often do-ignore or block republic policies. The
republic party Presidium, for example, proposed last
September that recent elections in at least nine
localities be invalidated because local officials had
ignored instructions to list multiple candidates and
hold secret balloting. Networks of officials in the local
party, government, trade unions, and veterans'
organization appear to wield decisive influence over
the implementation of policy at the local level.
Senior officials, in turn, often ignore lower-level
opinions in formulating policy. Media sources, for
example, reported last October that a "public
discussion" of proposed amendments to the republic
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constitution-which directly affected the status of
municipalities-occurred in only 86 of the republic's
113 localities. Local interests, however, can work
through informal channels. The US Consulate in
Zagreb reported last summer that the Croatian
business community had heavily influenced the
republic's specific proposals on the foreign exchange
system.
Methods of Control
The leadership's loss of some traditional methods of
control has contributed to the fragmentation in
Croatian politics. According to the press, a Croatian
party conference held in May 1983 concluded that
many local party organizations frequently do not
function at all and that when active they generally
concern themselves with unimportant matters. The
Socialist Alliance front organization, a channel for
influencing nonparty members, apparently has all but
disappeared below the leadership level.
Croatian leaders nonetheless have a number of tools
available to keep the republic quiet. Despite known
instances of security officials aligning with local or
factional interests, the security organs can be
expected to defend the leadership from genuine
threats to its position. Moreover, senior leaders
determine the cadre lists that assign party members to
important positions. Finally, Croatian leaders use
their informal networks to monitor and influence
lower-level officials. Some party leaders publicly
complain that these informal channels often supersede
aboveboard, official communication.
The Economy: Problems Amidst Prosperity
By Yugoslav standards, Croatia's economy appears
relatively prosperous. The republic approximates the
Yugoslav average in relative reliance on industry and
agriculture in aggregate production but has a
disproportionately large service sector-especially
tourism and transportation. The standard of living is
the second highest in Yugoslavia, behind Slovenia;
Croatia also is a net hard currency earner. In the first
six months of 1985, only 7.5 percent of the labor force
was unemployed, well below the 14-percent average
for Yugoslavia.
Nonetheless, the Croatian leadership is deeply
concerned about the republic's economic difficulties:
? The republic is highly dependent on large,
inefficient industries. Croatia accounts for one-third
of annual losses in national business, well above its
share of national output. A Zagreb news magazine
reported early this year that within Croatia the
largest firms and most developed localities show by
far the worst economic performance.
? Croatia is more dependent on the sale of capital
goods for export earnings than are other regions and
is therefore extremely sensitive to the health of
Western economies. Moreover, Croatian industries
are heavily dependent on imported raw materials
and intermediate parts that require scarce hard
currency.
? The US Consulate reports that Croatian enterprises
are forgoing modernization in order to pay off debts.
Yet press reports indicate that economic sectors that
the republic has chosen to spearhead mid-term,
export-oriented growth-such as electronics-are
already far behind world technological standards.
Outlook
The leadership's ability to maintain its present thin
legitimacy will depend in part on how well it defends
the republic's economic interests. While a serious
economic downturn is unlikely, such a development
would stimulate nationalist protest and probably unite
disgruntled midlevel officials against the leadership.
Croatian leaders, therefore, will continue to oppose
major changes in the economic system.
The leadership may prove more flexible on some
political questions. Ultimately, senior leaders must
hold on to the stamp of authority given by Tito and
the party in 1972, and they will probably support
some measures intended to bolster the central party,
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such as strengthening federal party executive bodies.
Nonetheless, Zagreb will continue to resist any
significant change in the national distribution of
power, particularly through constitutional changes.
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Economic News in Brief
Sweden, Norway, Denmark implementing additional
economic sanctions against South Africa . . . follows
October agreement of Nordic Foreign Ministers to
extend scope ... Norwegian ban on oil sales and
transport are most significant measures ... Pretoria
will find other sources.
National Assembly approved issue of commercial
paper in France ... allows large borrowers and savers
to make direct deals without banks intervening and
lower interest rate to borrowers ... part of continuing
Socialist effort to free capital markets.
Ottawa has unveiled plan to levy a minimum tax on
incomes, vastly complicating tax system and
permitting double taxation of dividends ... supposed
to raise $328 million in 1986, but total certainly will
be diminished by tax-averaging provisions that allow
some deductions to be carried forward.
Hungary signed $400 million loan package in early
December ... brought total borrowing for 1985 to
nearly $2 billion ... included first note issuance
facility for a CEMA country (a line of credit extended
through the sale of Hungarian notes to commercial
investors).
Poor harvests will dim prospects for hard currency
trade by Bulgaria and Romania ... grain imports may
increase fivefold in Bulgaria and nearly triple in
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Yugoslavia's balanced federal budget for 1986 reduced
by 9 percent after pressure from republics and
provinces ... illustrates continuing regional strength
in country's decentralized political system.
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3 January 1986
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