CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #36
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T01017R000707350001-8
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T
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Document Creation Date:
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Document Release Date:
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Publication Date:
July 1, 1986
Content Type:
MEMO
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
JULY 1986
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #36
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America North and South
Branches, ALA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains
information available as of 31 July 1986. Questions and comments are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, A 25X1
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July 1986
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #36
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Perspective: Regional Implications of New US Aid to the
Nicaraguan Insurgents
Nicaragua
EI Salvador
Honduras
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Panama
Nicaraguan Military Buildup
Significant Nicaraguan Political Events
Nicaraguan Human Rights Chronology
Insurgent Human Rights Record
Sandinista Human Rights Record
Nicaraguan TravelsNisits
Coming Events in Central America During August
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Regional Implications of New US Aid to the Nicaraguan Insurgents
Despite some strong support among Central American leaders for new US aid to
the anti-Sandinista insurgents, US Embassy reports indicate several are worried that
intensified fighting in Nicaragua resulting from the aid will increase regional tensions.
The Central Americans are concerned about insurgent activity in their own territories,
Sandinista retaliation through subversion and terrorist attacks, and the potential influx
of additional refugees. EI Salvador and Honduras are emphasizing the potential
Sandinista threat in order to get increased US military commitments.
Tegucigalpa has publicly welcomed US aid to the anti-Sandinistas with the clear
expectation that it would lead the insurgents to vacate "provisional" camps inside
Honduras. We believe that renewed Honduran tensions with the insurgents--and the
US--are likely if the guerrillas fail to reduce their presence on the border and make
military progress within six months after US aid resumes. Moreover, the detention of
two US reporters during July suggests that Honduran interest in minimizing public
knowledge of its role will be a continuing problem.
Honduras also is concerned about Sandinista retaliation. Tegucigalpa fears
bolder--and more embarrassing--cross-border attacks on insurgent cams
EI Salvador remains the most willing among the Core Four to express support for
US policy publicly because of its belief that the longterm effect will be to reduce
Sandinista aid to the Salvadoran rebels. President Duarte, however, has told US officials
that he fears that the Sandinistas in the near-term will retaliate by sponsoring a
guerrilla offensive in EI Salvador or supplying the rebels with SA-7 missiles. He has
sought assurances that the US will provide the means necessary to defeat such a
response.
Costa Rica's President Arias, who earlier expressed opposition to US aid to the
anti-Sandinistas, told US officials this month that he still does not believe the rebels
can win and that he worries the aid will give Managua new excuses for repression.
Government officials publicly acknowledge the likelihood of expahded fighting in
southern Nicaragua as a result of the aid, but they have stressed that Costa Rica will
not permit use of its territory for military purposes. Costa Rica reinforced its stance by
promptly expelling two Nicaraguan guerrillas who reportedly provoked Sandinista
shelling of Costa Rican territory earlier in the month and by promising to dismiss any
government officials found to be aiding the rebels.
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Guatemala's President Cerezo, who also has had misgivings about US aid, appears
intent on maintaining Guatemala's balancing act in the region. While expressing his
policy as "active neutrality," he has deliberately avoided an actions that would i I t
Nicaragua.
ome uatemalan leaders have told US officials that their
refusal to criticize Nicaragua publicly has reduced Nicaraguan support for Guatemala's
In our view, the new US aid has reinforced the positions of the Central American
democracies at the regional peace talks, and their reactions to the aid generally parallel
their role in the Core Four. Honduras and EI Salvador, for example, have been
increasingly firm in their objections to the latest Contadora treaty draft. Although 'the
four have not been totally unified, a US Embassy report indicates Guatemala reluctantly
agreed near month's end to join the other three Foreign Ministers in discussing their
next moves. They share similar objections to the June Contadora proposal and appear
disposed to minimize the mediators' role in future talks. According to US Embassy
reports, they intend to propose direct ne otiations with Nicaragua on an agenda
focusing on commitments to democracy.
Even though the Contadora countries continue to oppose US aid, they have not
been strident critics and appear unwilling to organize an initiative at regional ceace
talks in an attempt to stave off US action.
the mediators are disillusioned with the lac of progress, and they apparently have
allowed the initiative to shift to the Central Americans for now. Despite their inactivity,
the Contadora countries do not appear willing to abandon the talks altogether, and we
believe that they would bring new pressure for a settlement in the event of a serious
rise in tensions or a demonstration of flexibility by any of the Central Americans.
Managua has taken advantage of the aid vote to tighten restrictions on opposition
groups and has warned the nation of increased economic sacrifices ahead. Bouyed by
recent military deliveries, the regime is focusing on military preparedness and appears
unwilling to make domestic political concessions to forestall Senate action on the aid.
The Sandinistas probably anticipated that their domestic actions would be criticized
abroad, but calculated that the World Court decision declaring US support for the
anti-Sandinistas a violation of international law would yield favorable propaganda that
would more than offset disillusionment with their tough policy at home.
Nicaragua's diplomatic activity in the months ahead will probably be geared to
keeping international attention focused on US policy and its regional allies, and the
regime is unlikely to make significant concessions in regional talks any time soon.
President Ortega's appearance before the UN Security Council at month's end was
calculated to have the maximum impact on US public opinion to influence the Senate
vote on Contra aid. Nicaragua also plans to bring its case to the UN General Assembly
and to ask the World Court for reparations from Honduras and Costa Rica.
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On the war front, the Sandinistas sought to assure that anniversary celebrations in
Esteli--in northwestern Nicaragua--on 19 July would not be upstaged by insurgent attacks
The took un recedented security measures, and
the de to ment there of 1 rm d helicopters as well as radar-directed
antiaircra a i ery. the Sandinistas conducted almost daily
patrols and fired BM-21 artillery rockets into Honduras, moved at least five
counterinsurgency battalions into screening positions north and east of Esteli, and flew
numerous reconnaissance flights along the border. No rebel activity was noted in the area,
although intense fighting was reported in northern and central Nicaragua during thw first half
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During July, Managua, probably encouraged by limited international reaction to the 25X1
closure of the country's only independent newspaper, stepped up its crackdown against
domestic opponents, especially the Catholic Church. A prominent bishop was exiled, two 25X1
wring t e ast al of the month, state security officials
strip-searched a private sector leader at Sandino airport, temporarily detained several
mid-level officials of the Social Christian Party, and confiscated the notes of two US
journalists who had conducted extensive interviews with dissidents. Underscored by
President Ortega's comments in his anniversary address that those dissatisfied with the
regime should leave the country, Managua has indicated that it will not abide domestic
opposition.
Key opposition leaders are rethinking their commitment to remain in Nicaragua in the
wake of stepped-up regime pressure. Several mid-level opposition leaders have told the US
Embassy they may leave the country. A Conservative Party delegate to the
Sandinista-dominated National Assembly, stripped of his immunity on trumped-up charges,
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sought asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in Managua. A gradual exodus might help the
Sandinistas avoid the political costs of international criticism that would accompany massive,
forcible expulsion of regime opponents.
On the economic front, the Embassy's latest food basket survey indicates that in July
inflation was higher and consumer shortages worse than at any time since the Sandinistas
took power. Food prices increased 35 percent, and all staples were in extremely short
supply, with meat, cooking oil, tortillas, eggs, and bananas virtually unavailable at any price.
In his anniversary speech, Ortega said corn rations would have to be tightened, and other
officials admitted to severe food shortages.
EL SALVADOR
Deteriorating economic conditions have hurt President Duarte politically and prompted
him to press for additional US aid. The US Embassy reports that the economic measures
adopted last January have neither solved budget problems nor stimulated growth and have
had a harmful impact on workers and peasants, Duarte's traditional constituents. The
Embassy reports that democratic labor unions are opposing a new devaluation and, as a
result, the President will be reluctant to implement any additional necessary reforms.
Moreover, he has begun to intensify requests for more assistance from Washington to shore
up the economy without taking any unpopular austerity measures.
Meanwhile, the guerrillas continued political maneuverings in preparation for the third
round of dialogue with the government to be held 28-30 August. In a radio announcement,
they demanded that the government be reorganized to include them and that both sides
retain their arms and territorial control in a ceasefire to be followed by new elections. The
US Embassy reports that the rebels' proposal is little changed from their position at talks in
1984 and that Duarte and the armed forces continue to reject negotiations on the basis of
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powersharing and abrogating the Constitution. The guerrillas also refused calls by the
Catholic Church for both sides to meet privately in advance to plan an agenda for the
dialogue and tried to put the government on the defensive by challenging it to a public
debate. Embassy reporting indicates that even though Duarte supports
the idea of a private meeting, t e government has set the date for formal talks to
demonstrate that the guerrillas have nothing new to offer.
On the military side, the insurgents have tried to take advantage of the drawdown in
largescale government operations during the rainy season to reinfiltrate former base areas.
The armed forces, meanwhile, have mounted new operations in the suburbs north of San
Salvador to rout guerrillas from safehavens there,
(destroy
safehouses, disrupt plans for sabotage, and rid the area of criminals and suspected
guerrillas.
HONDURAS
While relations with Nicaragua and the anti-Sandinistas dominated Honduran politics in
July, labor troubles again reminded Tegucigalpa of the need for greater attention to
domestic issues. The US Embassy reports that workers at the US-owned Rosario Resources
Corporation--Honduras's biggest mineral producer--went on strike in late June, demanding
a 20-percent wage increase over the next two years. Rosario, which predicts a $15-million
loss this year because of declining prices and has put the mines up for sale, refused the
workers' demands and conditioned reopening the mines on reductions in taxes and
electricity rates. The government granted the company's requests, according to the US
Embassy, and the strike was ended when President Azcona authorized a $1-million
"indemnity" payment to the union in lieu of a wage increase. The government's political and
financial ability to grant such special concessions to companies and workers in troubled
industries is severely limited, however, and the overall stagnation of the economy suggests
that many employers will be unable to meet worker expectations in the coming months.
New strikes, while not likely to pose an immediate threat to the stability of the government,
probably will lead to increased pressure on the President to get moving on the economic
revitalization program he announced in May and to devote less time to international
relations.
GUATEMALA
President Cerezo's state visit to Mexico dominated events in Guatemala this month,
with talks centering on several topics, including border issues and economic assistance. The
two Presidents agreed only to continue limited cooperation on border issues and, despite
press reports, do not plan to establish a joint refugee commission. According to the US
Embassy in Guatemala, Mexico promised to increase its military presence along the border
to prevent Guatemalan guerrillas from using Mexican territory as a base for cross-border
infiltration in exchange for stepped up Guatemalan action on border drug trafficking. While
in Mexico City, President Cerezo met with exiled members of the Guatemalan Communist
Party to discuss their chances for returning to the country.
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In domestic affairs, a peasant demonstration calling for land reform aroused the
interest and concern of the military,
the Guatemalan military was upset about the participation of Cerezo's wife and
two cabinet ministers at the rally, which attracted approximately 5,000 participants, according
to US Embassy estimates. The officers reportedly were concerned that the trio's presence
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increased the farmers
militancy and that future protests might become violent,
Guatemala's powertul private sector also harshly criticized the "official
character" of the rally. Cerezo repeatedly has denied that he will undertake traditional
agrarian reform--involving the expropriation of land--and, indeed, we believe prospects are
unlikely. In our opinion, Cerezo may hope to use protests like these to push for some less
drastic social reforms later in his term. His failure to manage this sensitive issue properly,
however, could lead to a deterioration of his good relations with the military and an increase
COSTA RICA
San Jose got temporary relief from its financial problems during July, but
negotiations with the IMF are proving difficult. Although the government received $80
million in delayed World Bank and USAID funds last month, most of it was used to pay
arrearages to commercial creditors. Reaching agreement with the IMF on a new standby
accord will mean placing limits on both the public sector deficit and salary increases,
involving significant political costs. The new government's effort thus far to keep private
sector wage increases in line has angered organized labor, prompting calls for
demonstrations. Meanwhile, ineffective leadership and indecision by the ruling party's leader
iq the Legislative Assembly has eroded President Arias' prestige, according to the US
Embassy. Arias's campaign promises to pass legislation creating more housing and jobs
have been stymied by the impasse, and, in our view, the President is likely to engineer the
eventual replacement of his legislative lieutenant to repair the damage.
PANAMA
The war of words between the government and the opposition press spilled over into
the streets in July, as the military became increasingly sensitive to domestic and
international criticism. The government effectively blocked the reopening of an opposition
radio station and temporarily detained a former announcer and college professor, touching
off student demonstrations that forced the closure of the university for three days, according
to the US Embassy. A noted journalist for the leading opposition newspaper, La Prensa,
sought asylum in Venezuela, fearing incarceration by the government. The regime
apparently was preparing to fine or close down the newspaper. Meanwhile, Defense Chief
Noriega kept up Panama's official counterattack against US media allegations of Norieaa's
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NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILDUP
Mid-July
Late July
Managua hopes to sign new five-year, military cooperation
agreement with East Germany when Nicaraguan dale ation head
by Humberto Ortega travels there in September.
aircraft, including MIG-21 s.
Press reporting from Managua indicates construction of Puerto
Cabezas Airfield on Atlantic coast completed and runway extended
to 8,250 feet, long enough to accommodate most Soviet military
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4 July Sandinistas expel Bishop Vega from Nicaragua for makin
"unpatriotic" statements in Managua and Washington. ~ 25X1
SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS
15 July Managua rejects appeal from Nicara uan Episcopal Conference to
allow Bishop Vega to return. ~ 25X1
18 July
Two US journalists who interviewed opposition figures are held
for interrogation by Sandinistas and deported from Nicaragua on
charges of having ties with the CIA.
19 July
attendance.
President Ortega addresses seventh anniversary celebration in
Esteli, with five of the nine National Directorate members in
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NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY
In July, Managua continued to accuse the rebels of various human rights abuses. The
Sandinistas focused on insurgent killings of Nicaraguan civilians and protested the kidnaping
of another internationalist volunteer in northern Nicaragua. Meanwhile, regime persecution
Insurgent Human Rights Record
3 July
Managua charged the insurgents with killing 32 civilians, including 12 women and 12
chiphen their vehicle hit a mine in Jinotega Department, according to press reporting.
Press accounts indicate one civilian was killed and seven others wounded when
insurgents attacked a river ferry between Rama and Bluefields.
7 July
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A US Embassy source in Tegucigalpa reported insurgents forcibly recruited 26 Indians
in Honduras during June. 25X1
11 July
The proregime press alleged that insurgents were killing Miskito Indians in Honduras
and that some 300 other Indians were captured by insurgents in April and another 29 in
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22 July
A Western press service reported that insurgents kidnaped a Belgian volunteer worker
in northern Nicaragua. ~~ 25X1
28 July
According to a western press
representatives of the Sandinista g
pickup trucks in northern Jinotega.
service, th
overnor n
ree West Europeans and two civilian
were killed when insurgents ambushed two
The proregime press announced insurgents attacked a cooperative in northern
Nicaragua, killing five civilians, including four children, and wounding 26.
~~
Sandinista Human Rights Record
2 July
A Spanish press service indicated that the Nicaraguan Permanent Human Rights
Commission receives no less than 150 charges monthly about government human rights
violations--including deaths, torture and disappearances. Moreover, there are no less than
10,000 political prisoners in Sandinista jails.
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3 July
The US Embass iy n~ua reported that eight nuns were raped by state security
forces in July 1985. ~ ~ '
7 July
homes in Jinotega Department, killing three elderly civilians and wounding two others.
Sandinistas bombarded several civilian
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15 July
The International League for Human Rights based in New York claims the Sandinista
regime is guilty of thousands of human rights violations, including torture, illegal
imprisonment, and the suppression of religious and press freedom. The League indicated
that between 3,500 and 6,500 political prisoners are imprisoned in Nicaragua at any given
time and that prisoners have reported beatings, rape, mock executions, food and sleep
deprivation, prolonged isolation, and submersion in water.
18 July
red, and killed by a Sandinista patrol.
n in central Zelaya was kidnaped,
Sandinista officers beat a civilian woman and killed her on in northern Nicaragua,
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In northwest Nicaragua, an opposition activist died in May while being interrogated as
she was giving birth to a baby, according to ~~ the La Prensa newspaper.
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Foreign Minister D'Escoto travels to the Hague to attend
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National Directorate member Tirado heads Nicaraguan delegation
to 10th Congress of Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw.
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COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING AUGUST
5-21 August Salvadoran President Duarte travels to Colombia and the
Dominican Re ublic to attend presidential inauguration
8 August Costa Rican labor confederations plan public demonstrations to
protest government's wage policies. ~~ 25X1
12 August
Third annual military parade commemorating Panamanian General
Noriega's tenure as Defense Forces Chief and the formation of
13 August Central American Vice Presidents to meet in Guatemala to discuss
Central American Parliament. ~~ 25X1
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Distribution
Copy #
- Legislative Liaison - 7604
- Director, Legislative Liaison
- D/OIA -
- Executive Registry - 7E12
- DDI - 7E44
- DDO - 7E26
- PINS/BOG/GB - 1 E4846
- NIO/LA - 7E62
- NIC/AG - 7E47
- Mr. Daniel Childs, Comptroller - 7C21
- C/DDI/PES - 7F24
- SA/DCI/IA - 7E12
- Vacant
- Mr. Doug Mulholland
- Dr. Darnell Whitt
- Special Envoy Philip Habib
- CAJIT
- DCI - 7D60
- DDCI - 7D6011
- Executive Secretary - 7D60
- Vice Admiral John Poindexter
- The Honorable Elliot AbramslWilliam Walker
- Mr. Donald Gregg
- HPSCI
- SSCI
- Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots, USA
- Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
- Mr. Raymond Burghardt
- Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA
- LTG John H. Moellering, USA
- Ambassador Morton 1. Abramowitz
- PDB Staff - 7F30
& 35 - D/ALA - 3F45
- C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
- DDO/LA/0- 3D5309
- C/DDO/LA - 203
- C/DDO/LA - 3844
- C/LA 3644
& 42 -ALA/PS - 4F21
- ALA Research Director- 3F44
- 47 -CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
- DDI/CPAS/IBS - 7G40
- CPAS/CDPB/CC - GH25
- DC/RIG/BONA - 5E25
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51 -
52 -
53 -
54 -
55 - C/MCD
56 - DC/MCD
57 - C/MX
58 - C/CAR
59 - C/CU
60 - C/CAS
61 - C/CAN
62 -
63 -
64 -
65 -
66 -
67 -
68 -
69 -
70 -
71 -
72 -
73 -
74 -
75 -
76 -
77 -
78 -
79 -MCD Files
80 -CAN Files
81 -CAS Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/CAS/CAN
C/LA/LDA - 1 H39
- SIO/CPAs - 7F27
- PPS/PO/RPB - 3D02
24
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