PROSPECTS FOR THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR IN 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000501760015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: SNIE

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Central 25X1
ICI Intelligence
Prospects for the
Angolan Civil War
in 1987
Special National Intelligence Eadmate
Memorandum to Holden
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SCOPE NOTE
The military dimension continues to dominate the situation in
Angola and both sides are promising new military initiatives. This
Memorandum to Holders of SNIE 71-86, Angola: Short-Term Pros-
pects for UNITA, published in February 1986, focuses on the changes
in the military situation as a result of the fighting last year, new
strategies considered by the two sides, our assessment of the most likely
outcome of both the fighting and political activity this year, and the
roles of external forces in Angola.
The 1986 Estimate looked at the implications of what was expected
to be the most significant military development of the year-a major
government offensive against UNITA-held territory in southeastern
Angola. The anticipated offensive did not materialize as expected, and
the implications discussed in the Estimate were moot. In a sense, last
year was a hiatus in the progress of the conflict and, as anticipated, nei-
ther side made gains that altered the military picture decisively. The
government remains committed to a military solution and has not, as
anticipated, made any realistic approaches to UNITA for reconciliation.
Despite the unprecedented . scale of preparation during 1986,
Luanda apparently became embroiled in an internal debate over the
timing and scope of the offensive, postponed and rescheduled the
operation on several occasions, and ultimately decided in favor of a
more cautious but sustained approach. None of the reasons that explain
the lack of an offensive-logistic shortfalls, UNITA operations in the
north, and threat of South African intervention-were unfamiliar. In
retrospect, however, they were not given sufficient weight, although
logistic shortfalls, among other reasons, was cited as a reason the
offensive might be delayed and slow to develop.
The various factors considered in assessing the implications of the
offensive remain generally valid. The government, as expected, contin-
ues to be focused on Mavinga as the general objective of its operations
and deployments. Preparatory moves continue to be oriented in that
direction. UNITA also expected the offensive and, as anticipated,
adopted a strategy that attempted to derail the buildup, although the in-
surgents apparently now are considering some changes. The principal
outside backers, the Soviets and Cubans for the government side and
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South Africa for the insurgents, played their roles much as anticipated
in the Estimate and hewed to established patterns. Recent indications
that Pretoria is considering some limits on its involvement were
generally anticipated, with the expectation that South Africa's actions
would be carefully calculated and limited to a measured respons
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Military initiatives by either side in the coming year are not likely
to produce a resolution of the conflict or swing the initiative decisively
in either direction.
Both Luanda and UNITA have reoriented their strategies for the
campaigns this year. UNITA apparently is planning to put more
emphasis on guerrilla warfare to increase pressure on the government.
The insurgents plan to increase activity in central and northern Angola
but anticipate losing some territory to the government in the southeast.
UNITA, however, probably will make a stand at Mavinga if it is
threatened. The government wants to keep the pressure on the insur-
gents and plans large, cautious advances with carefully consolidated
gains. The government intends to minimize its risks in the belief that
time is on its side
Key Factors
There are several key factors that will affect the ability of either
side to carry through with its plans:
- UNITA probably can increase its activity in central and north-
ern Angola where it has previous experience, but operations
near the capital or- against the oil industry will be difficult.
Logistic support for expanded guerrilla activity will be difficult.
- The government's intention to launch slow-moving, multibri-
gade operations takes advantage of its strength in conventional
weaponry. The road-bound - government forces, however, de-
pend on a vulnerable supply line and will fight in a trackless re-
gion where UNITA controls the countryside. Moreover, UNITA
has had appreciable - success in blunting government airpower
and armor advantages.
- Degree of popular- support, Army morale, leadership resolve,
and state of the economy bear strongly on the situation. Changes
in these factors this year probably will not be sufficient to cause
a decisive swing in events.
- South Africa's commitment to UNITA will remain strong,
although there are indications that Pretoria is considering
limitations on its involvement because of increasing risks, costs,
and other priorities. Nevertheless, if the insurgents were to be in
serious danger, South Africa most likely would intervene io
remove the immediate threat.
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- Angola's Soviet and Cuban backers are no doubt concerned by
developments in Angola, but, as long as the regime or their
influence is not in immediate danger, they probably will
continue with their traditional roles of supplier and backer. A
serious deterioration in the security situation or major South
African intervention would most likely prompt increased or
more direct involvement.
Alternative Outcomes
Uncertainties over the influence of the key factors on the military
initiatives by either side suggest that alternative outcomes are possible.
(S NF)
More Likely. Neither side is likely to gain a decisive advantage.
Steady government pressure in the southeast is likely to produce some
territorial gains; Mavinga may be threatened, but UNITA headquarters
at Jamba most likely will remain secure:
- Insurgent activity probably will increase in central and northern
Angola, but not to the extent that Luanda will be forced into a
major pullback from the southeast. -
- The Soviet and Cuban commitment is likely to continue at
about present levels as will South African aid to the insurgents.
A serious threat to Mavinga, however, probably would prompt a
South African intervention in considerable force.
- There is an increased chance for small-scale conflict along the
_ Angola-Zaire border this year, but Luanda is not likely to
sponsor a major-attack. Increased Zairian insecurities, however,
are most likely to stimulate new requests for security assistance
from its Western supporters.
Less Likely. The situation could tilt more favorably toward either
side although it is highly unlikely that the shift will be decisive:
- Careful military moves by Luanda combined with less than
expected insurgent resistance could allow government forces to
move faster and farther. A serious threat to Mavinga and a
major South African intervention could provoke a direct con-
frontation with Cuban troops. In the event of a clash, it is not
likely that either side would immediately push toward a major
escalation of the conflict.
- On the other hand, successful UNITA harassment of the
ponderous government columns combined with a significant
increase in northern guerrilla activity would present Luanda
with the dilemma of whether, or not to abandon its southeastern
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operations to enhance defenses around the capital or vital oil
facilities. A deterioration in the security situation probably
would, as in the past, lead to increased Soviet and Cuban
support in arms or Cuban troop augmentation.
Diplomatic Arena
Luanda's concentration on a military solution, in our view, under-
estimates UNITA's political and military strengths and South Africa's
commitment and makes serious movement toward reconciliation with
UNITA virtually nil. UNITA's price for cooperation on the reopening of
the Benguela Railroad is not likely to be acceptable to Luanda.
Implications for the United States. Luanda apparently is count-
ing on a favorable change in US policy and is not likely to be receptive
to new initiatives during the period of this Estimate.. Although the
regime probably will keep informal lines of communication open, the
conditions it has attached to resumption of serious discussions over a US-
brokered regional settlement probably will continue to stall negotia-
tions
Luanda most likely will continue its diplomatic efforts to focus
regional and international criticism on US support for UNITA. Luanda
also is likely to complement its diplomatic efforts with a public relations
campaign to offset UNITA's efforts to gain support.
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DISCUSSION
J
1. Since publication of SNIE 71-86 in February
1986, there have been several developments in the
Angolan civil war that will affect the course of the
conflict:
- Luanda failed to launch the expected major
offensive and debated its options for dealing with
UNITA. The year ended with the positions of the
combatants relatively unchanged.
- UNITA attempted to preempt government oper-
ations and distract Luanda's concentration on the
southeast. Recently the insurgents have chosen to
increase guerrilla operations, especially in the
north.
- South Africa is considering limitations on its
involvement because of increasing risk and cost.
UNITA To Intensify Guerrilla Operations
vital.
3. UNITA anticipates it may lose some territory it
has controlled since 1983, particularly in Moxico Prov-
ince. The insurgents expect the government to contin-
ue the pressure in 1987, and UNITA will harass and
resist the advancing government columns and supply
lines. UNITA probably will, however, make a stand at
Mavinga if it is threatened. To this end, the insurgents
will maintain the strength of their conventional forces
in the Cuito Cuanavale area and are organizing a
reserve at Mavinga to defend a position they consider
the northern part of the country.
in the north will produce gains and draw off govern-
ment forces from the southeast. To do so, UNITA
intends to reorganize conventional battalions -defend-
ing the Munhango and Lungue-Bungo approaches into
smaller guerrilla formations. With its guerrilla strength
enhanced, UNITA plans to increase its activity in
central and western Angola as well as intensify opera-
tions against economic and administrative targets in
2. Developments during the year in the southeast
have prompted UNITA to consider reorienting its
strategy to more directly pressure the government.
The insurgents believe increased guerrilla operations
Growth of UNITA Insurgency
Following its defeat by Popular Armed Forces for the
Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and Cuban troops in
early 1976, a few months after Angola's independence,
UNITA withdrew into the bush. Savimbi and his re-
treating forces sought security in the sparsely populated
southeast. At first, only occasional operations were
conducted, while the major effort was devoted to
recruiting additional personnel, capturing or establish-
ing new sources of supplies, and building political
support domestically and abroad. The location of his
redoubt was ideal for receiving help from South African
forces in Namibia and from other countries. Mean-
while, FAPLA began integrating massive amounts of
new Soviet equipment and reorganizing and training its
forces for conventional operations.
The movement grew rapidly, reaching 20,000 to
25,000 men by 1981 and 35,000 by 1983, and in the
process forced semiconventional battalions that began
to be used in large-scale assaults on isolated government
outposts, such as Cangamba in August 1983 and provin-
cial capitals such as Sumbe in March 1984. Neverthe-
less, UNITA continued to place major emphasis on
guerrilla operations and on expanding the areas where
it could routinely operate. UNITA was conducting
operations in 12 of Angola's 17 provinces by 1983
.In the 1980s the government has regularly conducted
offensive operations in the dry seasons, with UNITA
increasing activity during the rainy seasons. UNITA
occasionally sought to take and hold territory but more
often became satisfied merely to demonstrate the go-
vernment's lack of control. UNITA has from its first
years sought to demonstrate to the local population its
legitimacy and its capability to govern and provide
services. By 1985 UNITA was routinely conducting
operations in provinces north of Luanda.
Luanda's Cautious Approach
4. Luanda appears prepared to carry on the main
strategic themes worked out last year, most notably its
efforts to apply steady pressure on the southeast. In
Luanda's view, time is on its side; the government
anticipates that a change in the US administration, as
well as increasing internal conflict in South Africa and
the effect of international sanctions, will force
UNITA's principal backers to cut back on support. In
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Luanda's calculation, the best move in the near term is
to sustain the pressure on the insurgents, minimize
risks, and, at all costs, avoid a major defeat. Militarily,
this means large, well-supported, but cautious ad-
vances with gains carefully consolidated before subse-
quent moves. Although Luanda is focused on a mili-
tary solution to the conflict, politically, the gov-
ernment will trail the bait of reconciliation in hopes of
generating dissension within insurgent ranks. More-
over, Luanda has reportedly devoted substantial re-
sources to a public relations campaign to negate
UNITA's effort to gain allies and international recog-
nition.
5. Recent government moves in the southeast, in-
volving an unusual rainy season operation, appear to
be the opening gambit in this strategy. According to
government officials, Luanda chose to launch the
attack during the November-April rainy season so as to
tie down insurgent forces and forestall the usual
seasonal UNITA gains. Government brigades crossed
the Lungue-Bungo River in early December, estab-
lished a bridgehead-including tactical surface-to-air
missile defenses-but have been challenged by
UNITA forces and have only advanced about 10
kilometers. Most of the government forces appear to
be tied down in rear area security
Influence of Key Factors -
6. Despite the intentions of the combatants to adopt
new strategies, there are several factors that will affect
the ability of either side to successfully carry through
with its plans.
IJNITA's Military Performance
7. The reorganization into smaller guerrilla units
probably will not present any significant difficulty,
and UNITA will have less problem with small unit
operations than it sometimes had with its. larger
conventional battalions. UNITA probably can increase
its level of activity in central Angola, where it enjoys
traditional tribal support, and in the north, where it
has had three years of sustained operational experi-
ence and recently increased its activity. For UNITA to
significantly increase the pressure on the government,
however, it will have to threaten the capital-where
the insurgents have not enjoyed major success before-
and attack the oil industry, the government's economic
buttress, which so far has proved to be UNITA's most
difficult target.
8. The insurgents, however, will find it more diffi-
cult logistically to support extended guerrilla opera-
tions. UNITA's logistic officers have admitted that
northern operations have been one of their most
difficult problems and it is likely to be exacerbated by
increased demands and the potential threat to the
insurgent supply line in the southeast. UNITA, howev-
er, hopes to offset possible shortages by establishing
supply lines through Zaire, and President Mobutu
probably will be sympathetic to UNITA's requests
Military Capabilities
9. Slow-moving, multibrigade, cautious, and well-
supplied offensives will take advantage of Luanda's
traditional strengths in firepower, airpower, equip-
ment, and numbers. The government formations have
demonstrated that they can make progress against
UNITA in conventional operations, and they probably
can continue to do so. Nevertheless, the government
forces remain generally road bound and, in the south-
east, where there are few roads of any quality,
government advances will tend to be channeled along
a narrow frontage leaving the insurgents relatively
free use of interior areas: In addition, the deeper they
move into UNITA territory, the greater the demand
on forces to guard the vital supply line.
10. UNITA also is likely to have some success in
blunting government advantages in weapons. Insur-
gent use of portable surface-to-air missiles last year
apparently forced the government to cut back on close
air support and adopt more restrictive tactics following
losses of fighters and helicopters. Moreover, UNITA
has formed a specially trained antitank unit that
reportedly has been fielded successfully against gov-
ernment armored units. Countermeasures are likely,
but UNITA has demonstrated that government forces
are vulnerable.
The Internal Situation
11. The degree of popular support enjoyed by the
government, Army morale, resolve of the leadership,
and the economic situation bear as strongly on the
situation as do more narrowly focused military factors.
A major change in any of these factors this year
sufficient to swing events decisively in either direction
is not likely. The volatile situation makes more precise
prediction difficult, however. Creation of mass sup-
port is an important element of insurgent operations
and UNITA probably puts more effort into it than
does the government. Suspicions of the various ethnic
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Oil Earnings
Oil accounts for more than 90 percent of total
Angolan exports and the sharp decline in oil prices since
1985 cut Angolan earnings almost in half. Export
earnings dropped from more than $2.2 billion in 1985
to about $1.2 to $1.5 billion in 1986. In 1985 Angola
paid about half of its earnings to its Communist backers
for military support but last year was forced to request
financial relief. Some debt payments were deferred,
and Angola may have received a moratorium of as long
as two years.
groups run deep within Angolan society, however, and
national support is difficult to obtain. Morale of the
Angolan leadership is fickle and subject to wide mood
swings. The Angolan Army has always suffered poor
morale; desertions are a problem, although it seems to
muddle through without mutiny or mass refusal to
fight. The economy suffered a major blow last year
when the drop in oil prices tarnished the only econom-
ic bright spot, but the government apparently believes
it has suffered through the worst. The sharp slump in
earnings affected the government's plans to revitalize
the civilian economy and most of the plans are now on
hold. Military deliveries were continued at a high
level, but the decline. in oil revenues forced the Soviets
and the Cubans to defer some debt payments at
increased direct cost to themselves.
South African Involvement _
12. Pretoria's commitment to UNITA will remain
strong. Material support and combat assistance most
likely will continue through the Reriod of this Estimate
although there are indications that South Africa has
considered putting limitations on its involvement be-
cause of increasing risks, limited resources, and other
priorities. Pretoria, for example, is concerned by the
growth in Angolan air defenses, which extend across
most of southern Angola and cover a substantial part
of the remainder. Resupply flights to UNITA forces in
northern Angola may have been scaled back as a
result. Nevertheless, if the insurgents were to be in
serious danger, the South Africans probably would
directly intervene in the combat to the extent neces-
sary to remove the immediate threat.
Soviet and Cuban Role
13. Angola's Soviet and Cuban backers are no doubt
concerned by economic and military developments in
Angola; however, neither the regime they support nor
their influence is in immediate danger, and they
probably believe the military situation is manageable.
As long as this situation holds, Moscow and Havana are
likely to continue their established roles of rVoviding
the bulk of Angola's weapons and equipment, guard-
ing the main garrisons and key facilities, as well as
intrusive advisory' support and direction. Increased or
more direct involvement probably would be prompted
by a serious deterioration in the security situation
marked either by UNITA gains or a major South
African intervention into Angola.
Alternative Outcomes
14. Military initiatives by either side in the coming
year are not likely to produce a resolution of the
conflict or swing the initiative decisively in either
direction. Nevertheless, uncertainties over the influ-
ence of the key factors suggest that alternative out-
comes are possible.
More Likely
15. Without a significant change in the key fac-
tors-which is not' likely-neither side will gain a
decisive advantage. Steady government pressure in the
southeast combined with changed UNITA tactics
makes some government territorial gains likely; Can-
gamba and Lumbala N'Guimbo may be taken and
Mavinga threatened, but UNITA headquarters at
Jamba most likely will remain secure. Although pene-
tration of UNITA territory along narrow axes will give
the government some- tactical advantages and propa-
ganda bragging rights, the gains are not likely to be
decisive or enduring.
16. UNITA's intention to emphasize its -guerrilla
campaign makes increased activity in the northern
part of the country likely. The insurgents probably
will focus on its traditional objectives-government
administrative centers, transportation routes, and eco-
nomic targets-in central and northern Angola. The
diamond mines have been attacked again, and the
threat to the oil facilities on the coast probably will
increase. Nevertheless, UNITA's actions probably will
not force Luanda into a major withdrawal from the
southeast, although the regime will be concerned.
17. While the level of Soviet and Cuban deliveries
may fluctuate, the Soviet and Cuban commitment is
likely to continue at about present levels with no
significant change in the nature of their involvement,
in the absence of a major South African intervention.
Likewise, South African support to UNITA-materiel
and limited combat support-is likely to continue at
about present levels with one reservation. Should
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Mavinga be seriously threatened, Pretoria, after care-
ful evaluation, probably would intervene in consider-
able force.
18. There is an increased chance for small-scale
conflict along the Angola-Zaire border this year. Luan-
da believes UNITA is routinely operating from inside
Zaire, and has already conducted several small incur-
sions while threatening more. Luanda, however, is not
likely to sponsor a major attack into Zaire in the near
term. The border incidents and regional diplomatic
efforts to bring pressure on Zaire probably will be
unsuccessful in reducing Zairian support for UNITA.
Increased Zairian insecurities, however, probably will
stimulate new requests for security assistance from its
Diplomatic Arena
Prospects for Reconciliation
22. Luanda's concentration on a military solution
underestimates UNITA's fundamental military and
political strength ? snd the depth of South Africa's
commitment, which guarantees a continuation of the
conflict and makes prospects for reconciliation virtual-
ly nil during the period of this Estimate. Publicly,
Luanda maintains that amnesty for the rank and file is
the only alternative, and private contacts with the
UNITA leadership seem aimed at producing dissen-
sion in UNITA ranks rather than establishing an
opening.
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Western supporters
Less Likely
19. Military successes, good fortune, and opponents'
miscues could tilt the situation more favorably toward
either side, although it-is highly unlikely that the shift
would be decisive this year.
20. For Luanda, careful military moves and the-
consolidation of gains combined with less than expect-
ed insurgent resistance could allow government forces
to move farther and faster than expected, particularly
if UNITA operations in the north fail to distract the
government. If the threat to Mavinga seriously threat-
ens UNITA's forces, a major South African interven-
tion could provoke a direct confrontation with Cuban
troops and increase the risk to Soviet advisers. In the
event of a clash, it is not likely that either side would
immediately push toward a major escalation of the
conflict. Both sides probably would look for a response
that kept the military balance ai.minimum risk and
cost.
21. A more favorable scenario for UNITA would
involve successful harassment of ponderous and slow-
moving government forces in the southeast that be-
come pinned down by needs of rear area security and
desperately need reinforcement. If combined with a
significant increase in activity in northern Angola, the
government probably would be faced with the dilem-
ma of abandoning or delaying southeastern operations
to enhance defenses around the capital. Successful
attacks on oil facilities in Cabinda and the northwest
would jeopardize Luanda's ability to pay for the war,
limit economic deterioration, and attract Western
investment. As in the past, Soviet or Cuban support
probably would be increased to include additional
Soviet arms deliveries, augmentation of Cuban forces,
and a possible Cuban combat role.
Benguela Initiative
23. The Angolan Government supports regional in-
terest in the reopening of the Benguela Railroad as an
alternative to routes through South Africa. The line
running from the Zairian and Zambiam mines to an
Angolan seaport has been effectively closed for more
than a decade by UNITA sabotage, and UNITA's
cooperation would be required if the line were to be
refurbished and reopened. UNITA would levy a hefty
price, and Luanda is not likely to agree to UNITA's
conditions. Moreover, South Africa opposes the initia-
tive and nrobably has made its views clear to UNITA.
Implications for the United States
24.- Luanda apparently is counting on a change to
an administration that it believes will be more friendly
and is not likely to be receptive to new initiatives
during the period of this Estimate. Luanda charges
that the United States, by supporting Savimbi, has
abandoned the role of honest broker and has demand-
ed diplomatic recognition and end of aid to UNITA as
conditions for resumption of talks on a regional settle-
ment that ties Namibian independence under UN
Resolution 435 to a Cuban troop withdrawal. Senior
Angolan officials have spoken harshly about US poli-
cies; one characterized US actions as "an act of war."
Privately, the Angolans have repeated the same
themes. Although the regime will continue to keep
lines of communication open, its actions probably will
continue to stall negotiations.
25. Luanda most likely will continue its diplomatic
efforts to focus regional and international criticism on
US support for UNITA. The government moved rap-
idly to increase its diplomatic exchanges in Western
Europe following Savimbi's recent trip to France and
is likely to complement its diplomatic efforts with a
public relations campaign to offset UNITA's efforts to
gain support.
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ANNEX
Contending Forces
UNITA probably has about 60,000 armed combat-
ants of which 20,000 to 25,000 are well-trained sol-
diers organized in about 50 battalions, most of which
have been deployed in southeastern Angola. The
remainder are guerrillas that operate in varying
strength throughout the country. Most of the battalions
have 350 to 450 men armed with light weapons
including mortars and recoilless rifles, and there are a
few "regular" battalions of up to 1,500 men. The
guerrillas-company-size formations of about 150 to
200 men or smaller local militias-frequently operate
with the regular forces. In addition, UNITA has
intelligence, communications, sabotage, logistics, and
other support units. The UNITA leadership and its
General Staff direct countrywide operations through
regional "fronts," which are assigned a mix of regular
and guerrilla contingents depending on the situation.
The Angolan Government has at least 100,000 men
under arms in the regular Army, other security forces,
and a territorial force or militia. The Army consists of
about 60 brigades that average about 1,000 men each
and are reinforced on occasion with territorial units.
With the exception of a few mechanized brigades,
most brigades -are- primarily infantry units with only
limited artillery and armor support. The brigades are
assigned to military regions, and theater-level opera-
tions may be controlled by a front. The Air Foice
includes about 200 operational fighters and helicop-
ters. Additional transport aircraft provide vital logistic
support for isolated forward bases. Despite a Soviet-
sponsored training program for Angolan pilots, Cubans
fly many of the combat missions, and a Soviet military
transport aviation unit supplements airlift needs.
Radar coverage extends over most of the country,
and a substantial number of air defense missiles
defend key bases and tactical formations. However,
questions remain on the overall effectiveness of the
system.
The Angolan Army is backed by a 36,000-man
Cuban military contingent-including some 28,000
combat troops-which guards rear bases, performs
essential support services, and frees an equivalent
number of Angolan troops for field operations. The
Cubans aid the Angolans -in combat by piloting air-
craft, manning much of the air defense system, and
providing other combat support but have not been
directly involved in major combat operations. The
Soviets have some 1,200 military advisers overseeing a
full range of Angolan military activity, including
planning and directing combat operations, but Soviet
policy discourages direct participation in combat.
- South Africa has more than 20,000 troops in north-
ern Namibia, most of which are Namibian territorial
forces backed by a South African strike- force. The
Namibian territorials re carrying increasing responsi-
bility for operations in Angola, supplemented by a
South African "foreign legion" manned by black
expatriate and a small number of "special forces"
teams. Pretoria deploys its aircraft forward to Namibia
as needed for operations in Angola. Angola has the
advantage in number of supersonic fighters, but Pre-
toria has the edge in pilot skills and tactics.
11
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501760015-2 N77""17