SOVIET COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100280001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000100280001-4
 By Dr. Jacob W. Kipp
I ROM AN AMERICAN perspec-
tive, nothing sounds so strange
as the words culture and theory
juxtaposed in the title of this arti-
cle. Yet in the Soviet military lexi-
con, these terms are connected in-
timately and shed special meaning
upon the process of doctrinal de-
velopment now transpiring in the
Soviet military regarding com-
mand, control, communications
and intelligence (C31). Staff culture
is an alien term to the U.S. military
where there is no tradition of a
general staff as a repository of mili-
tary theory. Staff culture has been
defined by the Soviet military as a
totality of qualities that make for
"successful control action."'
While the concept embraces many
aspects familiar to graduates of the
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, including the ability
to draft field orders quickly, accu-
rately and in a superior fashion, it
also extends to the general level of
education of the officer and implies
a commitment to continued profes-
sional study. Officers of the Soviet
General Staff are to be autodidac-
tic, i.e., to continue their profes-
sional education after completion
of their formal military schooling.2
Recently, P. A. Zhilin, Director of
the Soviet Academy of Sciences
Institute of Military History,' called
attention to B. M. Shaposhnikov's
interest in military history as one
aspect of staff culture. Zhilin ap-
provingly notes that the genshta-
bist devoted two hours every day
to reading new books, including
professional works on military the-
ory and history.'
Gen. lu. V. Chuev
Gen. lu. V. Chuev came to
prominence in the early 1960s
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0 te
when he authored a study of U.S.
cruise missiles. While this technol-
ogy has again assumed strategic
importance with a new generation
of cruise missiles, which have radi-
cally improved flight and guidance
characteristics, in the 1960s Soviet
air defense specialists attached to
PVO Strany had to consider U.S.
plans for the development and de-
ployment of such ground-to-ground
and air-to-ground systems in Nava-
ho and Hound Dog as major strate-
gic threats. In his assessment of the
threat, Gen. Chuev did not confine
his remarks to existing systems but
tried to determine the likely course
of future cruise missile develop-
ment. He pointed toward two con-
tradictory trends: the effort to in-
crease speed and height by using
rocket planes and the search for
concealment from air defense
forces by reducing the flight alti-
tude.8
In his volume on cruise missiles,
Gen. Chuev cited only 14 items in
his bibliography, but one of these
works had a profound impact on
the further development of his ca-
reer. The work was a Russian
translation of U.S. work on opera-
tions research.9 The Soviets trans-
lated such works in the 1950s, and
Gen. Chuev appears to have been
one of the first officers to embrace
the method. In 1965, he was the
chief author of one of the first
volumes on operations research
written for the Soviet armed
forces.' Gen. Chuev quickly came
to the forefront of Soviet applica-
tions of operations research to mili-
tary affairs. In 1967, he and I. B.
Pogozhev published an article on
"hierarchical system of task opti-
mization," which put them into the
vanguard of those researchers in
the Soviet Union searching for
ways to bring about the "mathe-
matization of knowledge." Gen.
Chuev's publications, which were
extensive over the next several
years, often involved co-authors
and frequently appeared in publica-
tions of the All-Union Academy of
Sciences or those of a republic
academy. These articles put Gen.
Chuev in the company of Soviet
academics who were trying to de-
velop and apply cybernetics to sys-
tem control and the "scientific or-
ganization of labor." This is a topic
that Adm. A. I. Bero, a scholar and 0
-
engineer with X
se se ties to the de-
velopment of Soviet radar, had
linked to the growth of cybernetics
in 1962."
In 1970, Gen. Chuev published
what became the standard Soviet
military work on the application of
operations research to military af-
fairs. A year later, he collaborated
with G. P. Spekhova in a work
devoted to "technical tasks of op-
erations research," which was in-
tended for "leading workers of sci-
entific-research' institutes, con-
struction bureaus and enterprises,
engineers engaged in planning any
technical structures and students of
higher technical institutes. ".12
When B. M. Shaposhnikov
wrote of the general staff as "the
brains of the army" in the 1920s, he
was' drawing attention to what
would become one of the chief con-
tinuities between the tsarist and
Soviet armies, i.e., the central role
of the general staff in the,develop-
ment of military science, art and
doctrine. While Shaposhnikov
spoke of an absolute subordination
of the armed forces to the civil
SIGNAL, DECEMBER, 1985 R7
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authority of the Communist Party,
he clearly viewed the general staff
and its officer corps as the logical
centers for the exercise of foresight
and military planning.4 Shaposhni-
kov was concerned, along with oth-
er senior Red Army commanders in
the 1920s, with the problem of "fu-
ture war," which occupied a con-
spicuous place in the speculations
of such Red Army intellectuals as
V. K. Triandafillov and M. N. Tuk-
hachevsky.5
Appointed Chief of the General
Staff in 1937, Shaposhnikov served
in that post until 1940 when he was
replaced by K. A. Meretskov and
then G. K. Zhukov. However, with
the outbreak of the war, Shaposh-
nikov resumed leadership of the
General Staff, serving until 1942
when declining health compelled
him to give up his duties. Appoint-
ed Deputy Commissar of Defense
in 1942, Shaposhnikov still retained
his close ties with Stalin, Stavka
and the General Staff. From 1943
until his death in 1945, he served as
Chief of the Military Academy of
the General Staff. In these various
roles, Shaposhnikov had a pro-
found influence on the develop-
ment of staff culture.6 M. V. Zak-
harov, one of Shaposhnikov's sub-
ordinates and long-time Chief of
the General Staff (1960-1963, 1964-
1971), gave the clearest expression
to this function of the general staff
as the "unwinking eye," charged
with gazing into the future while
not losing sight of the general
trends of development in military
affairs .7
Examined in this light, the writ-
ings of general staff officers take on
special importance for the Soviet
military system. The military edu-
cation system places a high premi-
um on writing and publication of
works in military science. Senior
officers continue to publish, act as
editors for author collectives and
play a leading role in formulating
new innovations in military theory
and science in that process John
Erickson has so well described as
"ordered ferment."
This article will not discuss a
particular case of ordered ferment,
but will examine the intellectual
biographies of three Soviet officers
who have made major contribu-
tions to the development of air de-
fense theory in the period of the
scientific-technical revolution in
military affairs: Gen. lu. V. Chuev,
Gen. V. V. Druzhinin and Gen. I.
1. Anureev.
Four years later, Gen. Chuev
joined lu. B. Mikhailov and V. I.
Kuz'min to author Forecasting
Collective Characteristics of Pro-
cesses, which, like his earlier work
with Spekhova, appeared under the
imprimatur of Sovetskoe Radio, a
publishing house with close ties to
the defense establishment. In the
same year, Gen. Chuev and Mik-
hailov also collaborated on Fore-
casting in Military Affairs. In this
volume, the authors provided a
textbook introduction for officers
and scientific workers to the appli-
cation of futuristic, mathematical
and composite forecasting tech-
niques to military affairs. They spe-
cifically acknowledged the method-
ological linkage between their ef-
forts and the work done by others
in the areas of systems analysis.
They called special attention to the
work of Dzh. M. Gvishiani of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences.
While foresight has been a recog-
nized element of military planning
for well over a century, Gen.
Chuev and Mikhailov sought to dif-
ferentiate foresight from forecast-
ing. Forecasting involves the appli-
cation of mathematical techniques
to a broad range of tasks: "fore-
casting the military-political situa-
tion and related problems in the
fields of strategy, operational art,
and tactics ... the quantity and
quality of the armed forces and the
characteristics of weapons and mil-
itary equipment. " 13 Under contem-
porary conditions with rapid
changes in technology a reality, the
timeliness of forecasts has taken on
even greater importance.
Gen. Chuev then went on to au-
thor the entry on systems analysis
in the Soviet Military Encyclope-
dia. He described it as a "method
for preparing well-founded solu-
tions to complex problems of a
political, military, social, econom-
ic, and technical nature."14 Squar-
ing the circle, Gen. Chuev in-
formed his reader that operations
research was seen by the 1970s as a
part of systems analysis and that
both operations research and sys-
tems analysis could be applied to
the resolution of a wide range of
problems, including determination
of major policy alternatives, plan-
ning and development of weapons
systems, selection of alternative
tactical solutions in combat situa-
tions and supervision of rear serv-
ices and logistics.15
In this brief treatment of Gen.
Chuev's published works, we can
see his growth and development
from the immediate, practical con-
cerns of his early work on cruise
missiles to problems of cybernetics
and troop control via operations
research and concluding with an
involvement in the application of
systems analysis to torecasting. He
has been in the forefront of what
Soviet authors, notably LTGen. M.
M. Kir'ian, have identified as the
second stage of the scientific-tech-
nical revolution in military affairs,
i.e., the application of cybernetics
to the problem of troop control.16
Gen. V. V. Druzhinin
Gen. V. V. Druzhinin, like Gen.
Chuev, came to prominence in the
1960s when he authored a volume
on the radar electronic warfare
troops of PVO Strany. This vol-
ume, which was published by DO-
SAAF (The Volunteer Society of
Assistance to the Army, Aviation
and Navy), was intended for a
broad audience, especially Soviet
youth who were described as the
"future fighting men of PVO
Strany." Gen. Druzhinin described
the radar electronic warfare troops
(radiotekhnicheskie voiska) as the
third leg of the PVO troika and the
"eyes and ears of modern air de-
fense."" Gen. Druzhinin's earlier
ties with PVO Strany are unclear.
Thanks to research by Professor
John Erickson, the author was able
to identify one V. V. Druzhinin,
who in the postwar period seems to
have been employed in the Physics
of Metals Institute at Sverdlovsk.
This Druzhinin published frequent-
ly in the Academy of Sciences jour-
nals on topics relating to ferro-
magnetism.18 The author has not
been able to establish definitively
whether this is the V. V. Druzhinin
of PVO Strany. However, the area
of interest for a Soviet officer-engi-
neer is not all that remote and
would have put him in the field of
electrical engineering with an inter-
est circuitry.
In 1982, V. V. Druzhinin auth-
ored a brief article on General of
the Army A. F. Shcheglov on the
occasion of his 70th birthday.
Shcheglov joined PVO Strany in
1949. An officer of the General
Staff, he was appointed command-
er of the Baku Air Defense District
in 1959. In 1966, he became First
Deputy Commander of PVO
Strany, holding that post until 1974
when he was assigned to the air
defense staff of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization.19 Since it is Soviet
practice to have junior officers
write such retrospective articles on
senior commanders, it is likely that
V. V. Druzhinin served under
Shcheglov, probably during the Tat-
ter's tenure as First Deputy Com-
mander of PVO Strany, 1966-1974.
During this period, Gen. Druz-
hinin coauthored one of the most
intriguing and stimulating works on
88 SIGNAL, DECEMBER, 1985
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decision making and .automation in
troop control. This volume, Con-
cept, Algorithm, Decision ap-
peared in 1972 as part of the Offi-
cer's Library series and was in-
tended for `,'commanders,
operators, and engineers, desiring
to complete and deepen their
knowledge in the area of means of
automation for the preparation of
decisions." Voennoe Izdatel'stvo
published the volume in a 30,000
edition. The book also carried an
introduction by. General of the
Army S. M.. Shtemenko (1907-
1976), who then was serving as
First Deputy Chief of the General
Staff and Chief of Staff of the Uni-
fied Armed Forces of the Warsaw
Treaty. Organization.20 In his intro-
duction, Shtemenko admitted his
initial reluctance to write a fore-
word to what he considered a nar-
row, technical study. On reading
the 'manuscript, however; he con-
cluded that the book was.an asset
to any profession because, it,
"forces one to think" about deci-
sion making in automated control
processes.21
Concept, , Algorithm, Decision
explored the problem of bringing
computer technology into the.staff
process. Since modern air defense
forces were one of the first areas of
warfare dealing with complex, dy-
namic threats within short periods
of time involving the coordination
of combined arms teams (radar
electronic warfare forces, surface-
to-air missile batteries, and inter-
ceptor aviation), the ability.of staffs
to. make ' timely and appropriate
decisions had taken on critical im-
portance. Gen. Druzhinin and
Kontorov were trying, to get other
military staffs to recognize the need
for structuring the man-machine
system in order to optimize deci-
sion making in a variety of military
situations.22 As the authors stated
the problem:
The processing of information at
the conceptual level will become
a routine activity in the very near
future. Thanks to automation,
collective thinking will become a
potent factor in progress. The
combined experience, group ac-
tivity and intellectual integration
of commanders, operators, and
engineers in situation analysis
and decision making will immea-
surably enrich human capabili-
ties and will create new pros-
pects for progress.23
Speaking of the computer as a
consultant, assistant and comrade-
in-arms, the authors presented var-.
ious approaches to staff informa-
tion management with an eye to-
ward improving troop control and
combat effectiveness in modern
combat operations.24 A shortened
version of the three sections of the
book dealing with- organizational
decision, operational decisions and
collective activity. appeared in
Voennaia mysl' in the same year
the book was published, suggesting
that the dissemination of this infor-
mation was deemed of substantial
importance by the General Staff.25
It could be reasonably argued
that Gen. Druzhinin's and Kontor-
ov's concerns about automated de-
cision making were so far in front
of Soviet capabilities that the
theme was remote from the practi-
cal concerns of serving officers.
But such a view misses the central
point of staff culture, which is to
articulate approaches to - future
problems and thus begin their reso-
lution. In the Soviet military, the-
ory does not emerge full-blown. It
evolves out of a tension between
theory and praxis where the former
directs the latter and in turn, is
informed by it.26 Thus, Concept,
Algorithm,, Decision should be
seen as a part of an ordered fer-
ment, just then beginning over the
process of adapting staff practice to
the revolution in troop control, at a
time when the technical 'Character-
istics and potential of that process
were not yet completely clear.
Gen. Druzhinin and. Kontorov
have continued their collaboration
and in. 1976 they published Prob-
lems of Military Systems Engineer-
ing. The. term military. systems en-
gineering is a translation of the
Soviet term sistemotekhnika,
which is a most recent addition to
the Soviet lexicon. According to
the Military Encyclopedic Dictio-
nary, military systems engineering
embraces "the decision of the com-
plex of theoretical and practical
tasks which arise 'in the planning;
designing, and development of
large-scale systems (complex ' sys-
tems). such as PVO, PRO, PKO,
ASUV (air defense, rocket de-
fense, space defense, and automat-
ed systems of troop control) and
others. "27
The Gen. Druzhinin and Kon-
torov volume on military systems
engineering contains a number of
interesting features including the
emphasis upon adapting the art of
leadership to the demands of the
latest round in the scientific-techni-
cal revolution in military affairs.
Art in this context, however,. is not
simply the traditional concept of
art as practice but embraces art as
the linkage between the numerous
natural and social sciences upon
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000100280001-4
which contemporary military
stands. For the authors, art as an
approach to control processes is
grounded in a dialectical world
view that seeks out and examines
the interconnections and interde-
pendencies of all processes and
phenomena in their totality and
unity.28 Military commanders have
always engaged in "doing their
sums," but Gen. Druzhinin and
Kontorov demand that officers
move from stereotyped, intuitive,
decision making to scientific fore-
sight with the aid of mathematical
techniques. Here art and foresight
join in a competitive process in
which one commander attempts to
use them "to discern the course of
the enemy's reasoning and to fore-
stall and direct his actions." For
the authors, decision time has be-
come the most crucial element of
this latest revolution in military af-
fairs. The infusion of cybernetics
and mathematized knowledge into
the command process has become
a key to freeing the commander
from uncreative functions and to
speeding up the decision cycle.29
System engineering embraces
much more than aiding officers to
make prompt decisions in combat
situations. Modern weapons sys-
tems demand a systematic ap-
proach to weapons development
decisions within the context of the
complex interdependencies and in-
terconnections affecting all combat
arms and embracing those of the
probable opponent. In contradic-
tion to. the sterile debates often
heard about offense and defense as
principles of war, the authors intro-
duce the crucial qualifiers of initia-
tive, surprise and maskirovka. If an
adversary has superior intelli-
gence, initiative can be an invita-
tion to defeat. Surprise still can be
decisive, provided that optimal use
is made of the speed, range and
striking power of modern weapons.
Maskirovka as deception, conceal-
ment and disinformation, still can
serve to confuse an opponent. The
key lies in the search for an optimal
relationship between initiative and
surprise. In modern battle, the
commander who relies upon Su-
vorov's intuitive instinct to seek
maximum concentration and deci-
sive action to grasp the initiative
takes a grave risk. Initiative with-
out adequate information invites
defeat. Adequate information,
however, is a relative term, reflect-
ing a commander's. advantageous
position vis a vis his opponent.30
The case for the radical transfor-
mation of C31 as a decisive element
of modern war could not be put
more strongly.
Gen. I. L Anureev
Unlike
Geri.. Chuev
a
nd Gen.
Druzhinin,
MGen. I.
I.
Anureev
was not
connected
with PVO
Strany. Gen. Anureev was much
closer to the altar of staff culture
than either Gen. Chuev or Gen.
Druzhinin. He apparently joined
the Voroshilov Academy of the
General Staff in the 1950s, about
the same time that M. D. Soko-
lovsky's Voennaia strategiia was
being written by a collective of
authors associated with the acade-
my. Marshal Sokolovsky served as
Chief of the General Staff in the
1950s and Voennaia strategiia,
which listed him as editor-in-chief,
appeared to have been done by
members of the Academy's staff.
Revised in 1963, a year after its
appearance, the work went through
major revisions in the mid-1960s
for the third and final edition in
1968. Gen. Anureev, a graduate of
the academy and a long-time staff
member, was already involved in
working out theoretical problems
associated with fighting a nuclear
war.31
In the 1960s, Gen. Anureev,
along with other officer instructors
at the Academy of the General
Staff, explored the application of
mathematical models and cyber-
netics to command and control
problems. In September 1966, he
published an article on that topic in
Voennaia mysl'. 32 He followed this
with an article on using mathemati-
cal techniques for determining the
correlation of forces in a nuclear
war. In this article, Gen. Anureev
transcended the categories of
counter force vs. counter-value tar-
getting to embrace the concept that
top priority in such exchanges
should. go to command and. control
capabilities.33 The entire exposition
of his argument was in terms of an
appropriate model that would em-
brace the interactions and interde-
pendencies in the conflict. In his
conclusion, Gen. Anureev called
for detailed studies. "to find the
optimal variants of combat opera-
tions of nuclear forces and the pos-
sibilities of applying scientifically-
based foresight and use them cor-
rectly in combat operations of
modern warfare. "34 If a further
clue was necessary regarding An-
ureev's ties with the operational
concerns of the Strategic Rocket
Forces, it appeared in 1968 when
he coauthored a 10 year retrospec-
tive on the Soviet space program.35
Gen. Anureev's later articles and
books expanded upon his earlier
themes. In the summer of 1971,
Gen. Anureev made a compelling
case for the application of mathe-
matical modeling to military deci-
sion making. He put his argument
squarely within Marxism-Lenin-
ism's laws of the dialectic, as ap-
plied to warfare and emphasized
the compatibility between an his-
torically grounded phenomenology
and the application of mathemati-
cal models. to achieve foresight in
military affairs. Such modeling
could make it possible to test a
wide range of alternative solutions
until an optimal one could be
found.36
In the same year, Gen. Anureev
put his proposition to the test by
publishing a major study on anti-
missile and space defense weap-
ons.37 He began this volume with a
treatment of the ballistic missile as
a qualitatively different weapons
system, considered early efforts to
counter such weapons beginning
with the British attempts against
the German V-2's, and then treated
the interactions and interdependen-
cies of strategic offensive and de-
fensive systems. Gen. Anureev
concluded that antimissile and
space defense were future areas of
weapons development, but he
viewed the technologies upon
which systems could be based as
still in their infancy.38 In the con-
text of, the then ongoing SALT I
negotiations, Gen. Anureev's work
made a compelling case for offen-
sive, force modernization and de-
ployment and the acceptance of
restrictions upon antimissile, and
space defense technologies. Their
potential was as yet unknown.39
Gen. Anureev did, however, have
a very good idea of the direction of
weapons development. In 1972, he
authored an article pointing to
trends in the development of the
natural sciences and military sci-
ences that might work qualitative
changes in military affairs. He
pointed specifically to laser and
particle beam development.40
Gen.. Anureev joined an author
collective, composed of staff at the
Academy of the General Staff, to
contribute a ,chapter to a book on
scientific-technical progress and
the revolution in military affairs.
Although Professor. Colonel-Gen-
eral N. A. Lomov was listed as the
chief editor, it was, in fact, Col. M.
1. Galkin who headed up the au-
thors collective. Gen. AnUireev
contributed a chapter devoted to
"the characteristics of new means
of conducting war," in which he
discussed nuclear weapons, their
delivery systems, various types of
military satellites, ABM systems
and means of space defense.41
Troop control featured prominent-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05S00365R000100280001-4 'MBER, 1985
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP05SO0365R000100280001-4
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDPO5SOO365ROO0100280001-4
ly in Gen. Anureev's analysis of
the strategic dimension of the sci-
entific-technical revolution in mili-
tary affairs. He predicted that the
pace of such changes would accel-
erate, bringing about "revolution-
ary changes in military affairs."42
In 1975, Gen. Anureev was al-
ready a senior consultant at the
Academy of the General Staff and a
respected member of its Scientific
Counci1.43 At that time, he pub-
lished a volume on multiuse space
transports based upon NASA's
plans for the development of the
"space shuttle." Although pub-
lished by Voennoe Izdatel'stvo,
this volume contained few refer-
ences to the militarization of space
or the Pentagon's plans for the use
of the Shuttle. Instead, it was a
rather judicious evaluation of the
proposition that reusable space
transports would make it possible
to begin the exploitation of space in
earnest. Gen. Anureev did note
that Pentagon requirements for the
modification of the Shuttle were
likely to increase the Shuttle's
costs and reduce the cost benefits
of such craft.44 In an era of detente,
his argument was that such craft
provided one possible road to the
exploitation of space. Gen. Anur-
eev's volume appeared six years
before the U.S. Shuttle became op-
erational and should be considered
an exercise in military systems en-
gineering: an effort to get a timely
assessment of the potential and im-
pact of a potential adversary's fu-
ture technology so that timely and
appropriate decisions could be
made on the Soviet side. Since it
appears that the Soviets them-
selves are testing a smaller space
plane and a craft of similar charac-
teristics to the Shuttle, it would
appear that their assessment of
such technologies was positive.45
In conclusion, these brief com-
ments on the intellectual biogra-
phies of three senior Soviet officers
suggest much about the role of staff
culture in the development of Sovi-
et military theory and its applica-
tion to the revolution in troop con-
trol. Western analysts would do
well to examine the corpus of such
officers' publications as a way of
assessing the evolution of Soviet
military theory.
Footnotes
'Voennyi entsiklopicheskii slovar', (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1983), p. 821.
2The entire point of works like the series "Offi-
cer's Library" is to encourage Soviet authors to
read and to think about professional topics. The
same theme can be found in texts from the Acade-
my of the General Staff. A particularly good exam-
ple is I. I. Shavrov and M. 1. Galkin, eds., Metodo-
logiia voenno-nauchnogo poznaniia. (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1977). In this work, the authors urge
Soviet officers to develop their own processes of
cognition and warn against the dangers of school
solutions based upon internal principles.
3P. A. Zhilin, 0 voine i voennoi istorii. (Mos-
cow: Voenizdat, 1984), p. 530.
4B. M. Shaposhnikov, Mozg armii. (Moscow:
Voennyi Vestnik, 1927-1929), I, pp. 243-258; II,
pp. 13-18.
SSovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe Slovarno-Entsiklopedicheskoe
Izdatel'stvo, 1933), II, cc. 834-844.
6B. M. Shaposhnikov, Vospominaniia, voenno-
nauchnye trudy. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974). See:
Marshal M. V. Zakharov's foreword to this vol-
ume for an appreciation of Shaposhnikov's impor-
tance to the modern Soviet General Staff.
7M. V. Zakharov, "On the Eye of World War II
(May 1938-September 1939), "Soviet Studies in
History, XXIII No. 3 (Winter 1984-1985), p. 101.
81u. V. Chuev, Krylatye rakery (samolety-snar-
iady). (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), pp. 77-79.
91bid., p. 84.
10Iu. V. Chuev et al., Osnovy issledovaniia
operatsii v voennoi tekhnike. (Moscow: Sovetskoe
Radio, 1965).
"Pravda (October 24, 1962), p. 4. For a discus-
sion of the debate within Soviet scientific circles
about the nature of cybernetics see: David
Holloway, "Innovation in Science-the Case of
Cybernetics in the Soviet Union," Science Stud-
ies, No. 4 (1974), pp. 324 if. Chuev and Pogoshev
collaborated on several articles including: "ieark-
hicheskaia sistema zadach optimizatsii," in: Ma-
terialy k simpoziumu "Issledovanie operatsii i
analiz razvitiia." (Moscow: Nauka, 1967); and
"Nekotorye voprosy matematizatsii poniatiia slu-
chainosti i neobkhodimosti," in: Materialy konfer-
entsii "matemazatsii znanii." (Moscow: Izda-
tel'stvo Instituta Filosofii, Akademiia Nauk SSSR,
1968).
121u. V. Chuev, Issledovanie operatsii v voen-
nom dele. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1970);'and Ibid.,
and G. P. Spekhova, Tekhnicheskie zadachi issle-
dovaniia operatsii. (Moscow: Sovetskoe Radio,
1971), inside title page.
13Iu. V. Chuev and In. B. Mikhailov, Forecast-
ing in Military Affairs. (Washington, D.C.: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1979) Soviet Military
Thought Series. Volume 16, pp. 9-10.
14Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1976-1980), VII, p. 363.
15lbid.
16M. M. Kir'ian, ed., Voenno-tekhnicheskii pro-
gress i Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR. (Moscow: Voen-
izdat, 1982), pp. 281-282. LTGen. Kir'ian is a
most prolific writer with a major interest in the
revolution in troop control. He authored the entry
on forecasting for the Soviet military encyclope-
dia. See: Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia. VI,
p. 558.
17V. V. Druzhinin, Radiotekhnicheskie voiska
protivovozdushnoi oborony strany. (Moscow: DO-
SAAF, 1968), pp. 3-4.
'BI am indebted to Professor John Erickson of
Edinburgh University for bringing to my attention
the technical publications of V. V. Druzhinin.
Professor Erickson, in his own extensive research
of the problem of troop control, developed these
leads and shared them with me. I am in his debt for
much more than this information.
19V. V. Druzhinin, "Army General A. F.
Shcheglov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. I
(January 1982), pp. 87-89.
20V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Ideia,
algorithm, reshinie. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972),
p. 327.
211bid., pp. 1-3.
221bid., pp. 21-41.
231bid., p. 324.
241bid., pp. 311-320.
25Druzhinin and Kontorov, "Automation and
Collective Activity in the Preparation of Deci-
sions," Voennaia mysl', No. 3 (March 1972), pp.
72-89. For a further development of the theme
"man-machine-system" and its impact upon mili-
tary affairs see: A. B. Poplin, Sist1ema; Chelovek i
voennaia tekhnika. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976).
I. A. Grudinyn, Dialektika i sovremennoe
voennoe delo. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), pp. 14-
27.
27Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'. p. 675.
28V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Voprosy
sistemotekhniki. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp.
13-20. Marshal V. I. Kulikov, who provided the
foreword to this volume, made this point even
more emphatically: "At the same time it is neces-
sary to realize that there is no science, particularly
military science, without art, as there is no art 1
without science." p. 4.
29Ibid., pp. 11-12.
301bid., pp. 21-27. Among the readers whom
Druzhinin and Kontorov thank for their comments
on Voprosy sistemotikhniki was I. I. Anureev.
31V. G. Kulikov, ed., Akademiia General'nogo
Shtaba. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 141-158.
For the complete text of all three editions of
Voennaia strategiia see: V. D. Sokolovsky, Soviet
Military Strategy, edited and translated by Harriet
Scott. (New York: Crane, Russack, 1984). Anur-
eev is mentioned in the academy history as a long-
time staff member and chief of a department. He
also had close ties with the scientific councils of
other military academies and research institutes.
(pp. 188, 215.)
321. I. Anureev, "Mathematical Methods in Mili-
tary Affairs," Voennaia mysl', No. 9 (September
1966), pp. 46-61.
331bid., "Determining the Correlation of Forces
in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," Voennaia mysl',
No. 6 (June 1967), pp. 35-45. For a review and
commentary on Anureev's views see: B. Kha-
barov, N. Bazanov and L. Semeyko, "Methodolo-
gy of Determining the Correlation of Nuclear
Forces," Voennaia mysl', No. 8 (August 1968),
pp. 57 if.
34lbid., Voennaia mysl', p. 45. In 1967, Anureev
collaborated with another member of the Acade-
my's faculty to produce a volume on the applica-
tion of mathematical methods to military affairs.
See: I. I. Anureev and A. E. Tatarchenko, Primen-
enie matematicheskikh methodov v voennom dele.
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1967), pp. 55-64.
35N. Kamarin and I. Anureev, "Ten Years of
Exploration of Space," Voennaia mysl', No. 10
(October 1967), pp. 55-64.
361. Anureev, "Methods of Military Science,"
Voennaia mysl', No. 8 (August 1971), pp. 37-43.
371. I. Anureev, Oruzhie protivoraketnoi i proti-
vokosmicheskoi oborony. (Moscow: Voenizdat,
1971), pp. 1 ff. Anureev began with a discussion of
ballistic missiles, considered space weapons, and
concluded with a treatment of ABM and space
defense weapons systems. He stressed repeatedly
the interconnections and interdependencies of of-
fensive and defensive weapons.
381bid., pp. 197-200.
191bid., pp. 236-250.
401. Anureev, 'The Correlation of Military Sci-
ence with the Natural Sciences," Voennaia mysl',
No. I1 (November 1972), p. 35.
411. A. Lomov, ed., Nauchno-tekhnicheskii pro-
gress i revoliutsiia v voennom dele. (Moscow:
Voenizdat, 1973), pp. 3, 39-72.
421bid., p. 72.
43Kulikov, Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba. p.
215.
441. I. Anureev, Rakety mnogokratnogo ispol-
'zovaniia. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 205.
45James E. Oberg, "The Ellusive Soviet Space
Plane," Omni, (September 1983), pp. 126-129,
143.
A portion of the research for this
article was done while the author
was a summer fellow with the Cen-
terfor Strategic Technology, Texas
A&M University.
Dr. Jacob W. Kipp is Professor,
Department of History, Kansas
State University.
C'^"' Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDPO5SOO365ROO0100280001-4 -