SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP05S00365R000100030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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DDI-9100-160-77
//Ov /6c - 7 7
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ecse.
irate . ence
SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS
SINCE THE OCTOBER
1973 WAR (U)
NATIONAL SECURIiY" INFORMATION
Unauthorized -D sclasu'r& Subject to Criminal Sanctions
j~ 4,2
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SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR (U)
DDI-1100-160-77
Information Cutoff Date: September 1976
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
prepared by the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division,
Directorate for Intelligence Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency
Ground Forces/MBFR Branch,
Classified by DIA 00.1
SUBJECT TO GENERtq. DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS
DECL,SSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1985
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(U) This study was undertaken to determine if trends in
Soviet tactics since the October War have been influenced by
than conflict. Analysts of the available data indicates that
evolving Soviet: tactical concepts have been influenced by
Soviet analysis of the war.
(U) Addressees are requested to forward information
which will supplement or correct this paper. Questions and
comments should be referred in writing to the Defense
Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-1B4), Washington, D.C. 20301..
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUl24ARY -----------------------------
1. INTRODUCTION ---------------------------------
2. SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR --------
a. Command and Control ----------------------
b. The Defense --------------------------------
C. Offensive Operations -------------------
d. Attrition ---------------------------------
e. Surprise --------- __ _ _______
f. Conclusions Regarding the War -------------
3. SOVIET TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR
a. Equipment and Organization ---------------
b. Command and Control -------------------------
C. Offensive Doctrine ---------- -_______~-_
4. CONCLUSIONS ------------------------------
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure
1. The SA-s CAM /CATtjt:ttt .s
~~r??:~a a '06e
(STRAIGHT FLUSH) --------------
Page
vii
1
1
1
1
2
7
8
8
9
9
15
15
20
Page
Destroyed Israeli armor outside Suez city ------
Egyptian heliborne operation --------------------
The 203mm howitzer, M-1921M and the 240mm
.6. The towed D-30 (122mm) and the self-propelled ju
122mm gun, M-1974 ------------- - 11
--------------
7. The BM-21 rocket launcher on the URAL 375 truck- 12
8. The 152mm self-propelled gun, M-1973 -------
---- 12
9. The SA-9 SAM (GASKIN) ------------------------- 13
10. The ZSU-23-4 -------------------------- 13
---------
11. Soviet ponton bridging -___-______ 14
12. The BTR-50PK mineclearer and the GMZ
armored tracked mechanical minelayer --------- 14
13. Combined arms operations -----------------------
14. Soviet infantry attacking a strong defensive 16
position --------- ------------------------- 18
15. Reconnaissance is vital -------------
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(u) Soviet tacttcat .trends since the Octobet 1973 coat
.,.teSeeet Soviet obeetvati.ons oS -tha.t con6e.ict. Soviet
wvi rings indicate that the coat nesu?.ted .ut a teevatuat.ion e6
doc.ttinat concerts resat tt ng in the i.etea.tn.irg 06 some
tesaons and the -Leemphascs oS others. No rcccdica.t changes
in Soviet ,tacticae pnocedutes have. o.ccwvted, but pe:t-aietent
eSSonta have been made to 6wthet .irnptove combined anma
openationa, with the tank. nemain.ing as the backbone o6
g.wund uan6aie.
(u) Soviet wnLtings on the wa,t contain 6actuat c.ivwns
and omit key data. One may only speca&tte why this L6 so.
(U) --The-Oc to ben-ttr 010tuttiratzildti1q. the . e o, a c.tt
o6 cwvtenz soveei aocct.cne conzcnues to be (ubntd Wa,t 11.
Tl e ,[ c e East an did not have the dumatic .impact on
Soviet 6thategic and tactica.t concerts that it had in some
western countni.es.
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SOVIET TACTICAL TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR (U)
1. INTRODUCTION
(U) Soviet .analysis of the Middle East War provides a
relevant framework for the examination of Soviet tactical
trends since October of 1973. These tactical trends have
coincided with certain equipment and organizational changes
designed to strengthen Soviet offensive capabilities.
2. SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR
a. Command and Control
(S) The War reinforced Soviet thinking concerning
the increased demands placed on c wmanders.tu=ensure more
effective command and cuntril. Improvements in command and
control technology include t'ie more rapid collection and
evaluation of data. This in turn accele.?ates the decision-
making process making timely communications critical. Many
of these improvements can be attributed to both the improved
automation of troop control and .pure powerful high-speed
communications at various control. echelons. The Soviets
- - Process or seeking improvements in
these areas.
. (S) A fundamental principle noted by the Soviets
was the strict centralization of command and control of
Israeli, Syrian, and Egyptian ground, air, and naval
operations.
(.') The Soviets also recognized the need for
command posts and other control facilities to be brought
closer to units in contact.
b. The Defense
(U) The wa_ revealed to the Soviets the increased
capabilities and lethality of defensive weapons systems.
Soviet concern was best described by Marshal Grechko:
It should be noted that modern defensive
systems, in connection with the appear-
ance of powerful fire weapons in the in-
ventories, have become more stable. This
is caused primarily by the fact that the
main striking force during an offensive
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operation--tanks--has become more vulnerable,
while their use on the battlefield has become
more complex. The continuing process of im-
proving antitank weapons has imposed grave
tasks for science and technology. These tasks
have to do with substantially improving the
survivability of tanks, troops, and developing
more effective means and methods that would be
reliable in neutralizing antitank defense
measures.
(U) Other Soviet writers have commented exten-
sively on the greater densities of antitank systems, the
increased role of antitank guided missiles (ATCMs) and
helicopters with an antitank role, and he greater depth
of troop and weapons echelonment.
(U) The Soviets believe that the backbone of a de-
fensive system is its antitank weapons--the primary threat
to Soviet offensive doctrine.
(S) Another acne. r .,? V"- a,.c_-_
commented upon by the Soviets was the effectiveness of air
dnf n eyn'GWg i- statfrpo ns antj as mo _e systems
,in offensive operations. Surface-to-air missiles, such as
the SA-6 GAINFUL (Figure 1) played a key role in
countering and, temporarily, neutralizing the strong
Israeli air attacks. The massive employment of a variety
of air defense weapons by Arab forces restricted opera-
tions of hostile aircraft at low altitudes, and forced
them to higher altitudes where they became vulnerable to
other air defense weapons.
C. Offensi3e Operations
(S) It must also be emphasized that the Soviets,
while impressed with the increased lethality of defensive
systems,. also recognized the increased capabilities for the
offensive, a point frequently neglected by Western
analyses of Soviet "lessons learned." Light antitank
weapons and mobile antiaircraft artillery (AAA) and
surface-tu-air missile (SAM) systems greatly contributed to
the rapi.J Egyptian advances early in the war. These
lessons have not been lost on the Soviets who, while
concerned over antitank defenses, are continuing to concen-
trate on perfecting their offensive doctrine. A recurrent
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Figure 1. The SA 6 SAM (GAINFUL) am' ? ,tar
(STRAIGHT FLUSH). (U)
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theme of Marshal of the Soviet Union Kulikov (Commander in
Chief, Warsaw Pact), General Shkidrhrnko(Deputy Commander
for Combat Readiness, Groups of Soviet Forces Germany -
GSFC) and others is that further improvements in military
technology will lead to further increases in the maneuver,
firepower and the striking power of troops.
(S) Regarding offensive operations In the Middle
East War, Soviet writers showed g&eat Interest in combined
arms operations, that is, the closely coordinated efforts
of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and com-
bat support units. The Soviets criticized Israeli and
Arab offensive execution early in the conflict. Israeli
tanks were initially committed without infantry and
artillery support and suffered heavy losses. Arab
offensive ground operations at the beginning of the war
were conducted on a broad front, without established plans
to continue the advance toward key objectives along main
axes of attack. While the Soviets credited the Egyptians
with a brilliant water-crossing operation, they condemned
them for failure to follow up. With this exception, the
crossing was a classic reflection of Soviet doctrine.
The operation was well organized, the enemy on the far
bank was neutralized at the out.,;-L, important multiple
sites were secured by forward detachrents. and crossine
equipment was skillfully used by the attacking forces
Figure 2. Egyptians crossing the Suez Canat. (U)
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(S) In their analysis of the war, the Soviets
examined each component in the combined arms team:
The Soviets believe tnat the Middle
East War did not diminish the role of the tank:
There has been no decrease in the importance
of tanks; in fact, their importance has in-
creased.
Moreover, they cite numerous U.S. and
West German sources in support of that conclusion.
Whereas initially Western writers ?:rretc that the theory of
tank warfare should be revised, the Soviets emphasize that
current Western military opinion acknowledges the leading
role of armor on the modern battlefield. Moreover, the
Soviets now term earlier Western writings questioning the
importance of the tank as radical judgments.
(2) Artillery
The Soviets were impressed by the effprriva_
mess of employment of Arab artillery to neutralize enemy
defenses. They belie-e that this disrupted Israeli de-
fenses and reduced Arab casualties.
The Mid East War reinforced the Soviet view
that well-plduned aerial and ground reconnaissance is vital
to successful offensive operations. They further con-
cluded that air crews should be trained to conduct recon-
naissance missions under the most difficult circumstances,
and that aircraft flying behind enemy lines should have at
least a minimum of intelligence-gathering equipment. To
further aid the ground force offensive, enemy antitank
forces and possible ambush sites must be identified by
reconnaissance.
(4) Lifantry
Soviet commentary on the use of infantry
during the war concentrates on its role as an important
component of he combined arms team. One of its primary
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uses was to prbvide support for armor in the elimination
of antitank weapons. The Soviets stress the losses to
Israeli armor wlien it was not properly s=rpportcd by
infai.try (Figure 3).
Figu'e 3. Destroyed Israeli armor outs de Suez city. (Ul
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The Soviets also noted the frequent use of
heliborne troops in special purpos./diversionary roles.
Both sides used commando detachments and groups to disrupt
command and control and seize key terrain (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Egyptian heliborne operwinn. IU)
Soviet writers were impressed
by
the
uses
and potential of helicopters, particularly in
the
antitank
role and As a carrier for special purpose/diversionary
forces.
Surprisingly, Soviet analysis of the
Israeli employment of helicopters in the antitank role is
inaccurate. According to numerous Soviet sources, the
Israelis frequently employed helicopters against armor,
when in fact this was not the case. Soviet interest in the
helicopters as an antitank weapon is, however, strong. .
The Soviet union may have received
erroneous information from the Arabs or some military
theorists may be strengthening the case for a larger role
for Soviet helicopters in antitank operations.
d. Attrition
(U) The heavy personnel and equipment losses
sustained during the war were also noted. Marshal of thi
Soviet Union Crechko, describing the increased comb. t
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capabilities of weapons, greater depth of operations and
faster tempos of attack, also acknowledged the possibility
of "heavy losses."
(S) Significantly, in exercises since the October
War, the Soviets have placed increased emphasis on their
personnel replacement system.
e. Surprise
(U) At the 24th Party Congreas, Grechko said
"...the armed forces should be capable of crushing a
sneak attack, in any situation, involving nuclear or non-
nuclear weapons..." In numerous writings on the initial
period of war, the Soviets have often expressed concern
over being taken by surprise. Events in the Middle East
War seem to have exacerbated these fears.
f. Conclusions Rec.i-d-ing the War
(U) Soviet analysis. of the October War and their
use of W,-stern critiques of the conflict clearly illus-
trate contf.nuing Soviet faith in combined arms doctrine
with the tr,nk providing the primary means of successfully
implementing -that_doct ed-seem--
basically undistinguishable from those of the foreign
Correct use of tariks (particularly with
infantry, artillery, antitank weapons and
air defense means) ensures the achiev,.oent
of operational success, despite heavy
losses;
Tanks retain their ability to overcome
moderndefences, especially centers of
resistance, after neutralization of the
antitank weapons and artillery.
Success in the use of tanks is achieved by
the side which acts with initiative and
resourcefulness, widely employing maneuver,
cooperating with aitborne landing forces
and being capable of changing from one
method of action to another.
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3. SOVIET TRENDS SINCE THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR
a. Equipment and Organization
(S) At this time, it is not possible to draw any
cause and effect relationships linking the Middle East War
with new Soviet equipment. Since the early 1960s, Soviet
generals have advocated infantry combat vehicles, self-
propelled (SP) artillery and better tanks. Research and
development of self-propelled artillery and the T-72 tank,
however, began prior to the October War. Other events,
such as the placing of the SAGGER and SWATTER ATGMs on
Soviet helicopters, have occurred since the
October
1973
War and have considerably augmented. Soviet
antitank
capa-
bilities. Research and development on these systems,
however, preceded the October War.
.(S) Neither may we say with certainty that cer-
tain post-1973 organizational changes occurred as a result
of the October War. Such changes may in fact have occurred
prior to 1973, but were only discovered by the West later.
The correlation, however, between Soviet lessons learned
from.the October War and the type of organizations desired
to implement Soviet offensive doctrine is clear. Key
organizational changes are as follows:
(1) Infantry
The addition of a motorized rifle (MR) company
to tank regiments in tank divisions in GSFG increases
infantry support for armor. This could be the precursor of
MR battalions becoming organic to tank regiments. At any
rate, the Soviets clearly perceive the need for infantry-tank
teams and a high level of coordination between them.
In recent years, the Soviets have added inde-
pendent tank battalions (40 tanks) to the MR divisions and
increased the number of tanks from 31 to 40 in the tank
battalions of motorized rifle regiments (MRRs). In light
of Soviet observations of the October War, the tank in-
creases may have occurred to offset anticipated higher
casualties. The increases also give the Soviets greater
flexibility to task organize combat formations.
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'Soviet artillery changes since the October War
have been quantitative and qualitative. They include the
reintroduction of 203mm howitzers and 240mm heavy mortars
(Figure 5) and significant increases in the number of guns
within motorized rifle divisions and nondivisional artil-
lery regiments. A great number of. MRRs within the USSR
increased their number of artillery pieces three-fold. One
MRR in GSFG equipped with the BMP (infantry combat vehicle)
went from six towed D-30s (122mm) to 18 SP M-1974s (122mm)
suggesting that as sufficient quantities are produced, B11P
regiments may have a battalion of self-propelled guns
(Figure 6). The 34th artillery division in GSFG added a
..fifth regiment containing 72 multiple rocket launchers
(Figure 7). The 34th also replaced one of, its towed 152mm-
equipped regiments with self-propelled 152mm guns
(Figure 8). Such quantitative and qualitative increases
indicate a greater capability for nondivisional artillery
units to provide increased allocations of artillery to
support combined arms operations.
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Figure 6. The towed D-30 (122mm) (A) and The self-propelled 122mm gun, M-1974 (B). (U)
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Figure 7. The BM-21 rocket launcher on The URAL 375 Truck. (U)
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Since October 1973, SA-8 GECKO missiles in
limited numbers, and SA-6 GAINFUL systems have been re-
placing the S-60 (57mm towed AAA). Moreover, SA-9 GASKINs
(Figure 9) are being deployed at regimental level,
augmenting ZSU-23-4s (Figure 10), thereby considerably in-
creasing Soviet air defense capabilities.
Figure 10. The ZSU?23-4. (U!
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(5) Engineer
There are indications that the Soviets are in-
creasing army and.front-level punton bridgirg by one-third
(Figure 11). They are also speeding up deployment of mine-
clearers (such as the BTR-50PK) and minelayers (such as the
GMZ armorcd.tracked mechanical minelayer)--figure 12.
UNCLASSIFIED
Figure 11. Soviet ponton bridging. (U)
Figure 12. The BTR-50PK mineclearer (A) and The GMZ armored track mechanical minelayer 11131. (U)
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b. Command and Control
(S) Since October 1973, the Soviets have continued
to develop an automated support system for command, control,
and communications. Successful completion of such a system
depends on the compatability of automatic data processing
(ADP) components, software and communications.
(S) Automated command support has been tested
during command post and field training exercises. Thus far,
the Soviets have concentrated their ADP efforts on troop
control, communications and fire control. Although some
steps have been taken since 1973, a fully operational
automated command, control, and commi,nic:ations system is
not expectcd before 1985.
(S) The use of mobile signal units at most
.echelonA also reflects Soviet communications, command,
and-control observations of the war.
c. Offensive Doctrine
(S) Soviet lessons learned from the October War
have not altered their basic offensive doctrine. This
doctrine, centered around combined arms combat (Figure 13)_
stresses ig rates or advance by tank and combined arms
units. Over the course of a campaign wnueA in yti.u.t-
conditions the Soviets hope to average 60-80 K1f per day and
under conventional conditions 30-50 KM per day. There are
some reports that more emphasis should be placed on maneu-
ver and speed in the attack, to increase rates of advance
up to 120 KM per day. This is in consonance with remarks
made by Marshal Kulikov, General Shkidchenkoand others.
Soviet tactical emphasis since the October War mirrors
Soviet analysis of that conflict and reveals efforts to
make each component of their combined arms forces more
viable on the modern battlefield.
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weapon n
the combined arms concept was made clear in September 1975
by the commander-in-chief of Soviet ground forces:
Despite the improvement and growth of the
effectiveness of antitank weapons, tanks re-
main the main strike force and mobile force
of the ground forces and a powerful means
capable of resolving important tasks in
modern warfare. Moreover, compared with
other types of combat equipment, they are
the best adapted for decisive, maneuvering
actions.
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To increase the survivability of the tank on
the modern battlefield, the Soviets have placed more em-
phasis on the following tactical measures by tank troops;
(a) The use of smoke and high explosive
fragmentation shells against ATGM gunners.
artillery
(b) Camouflage
(c) Proper use of terrain
(d) Observation
(e) Speed in the attack
(f) Close coordination with infantry and
(2) Artillery and Air Defenses
When nuclear weapons are not used to neuL, i-
ize enemy defenses, the Soviets plan to rely on concen- .
trated artillery fire for the suppression of antitank
systems. On selected axes of advance, artillery will be
concentrated -to-gi indirect re
support with priority to the destruction of the enemy's
-nuc-le delivery means and his antitank systems. While
large amounts of artillery and air defense systems will
remain under centralized control, individual batteries
will be assigned to advance detachments, advance guard, and
flank security elements to provide support.
Since October 1973, the Soviets have placed in-
creased emphasis on the use of air defense ambushes along
likely avenues of approach for enemy helicopters. This em-
phasis reflects Soviet concern over the tank-killing heli-
copters possessed by NATO and seeks to capitalize on a major
Soviet strength--great numbers of mobile and accurate air
defense systems.
(3) Motorized Rifle Troops
Infantry-tank-artillery coordination during
the initial stages of the war is one of the most persistent
themes in current Soviet doctrinal writings, which also
discuss some unresolved questions (such as the optimum
employment of the BMP).
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The Soviets clearly expect to dismount :fR
troops to overcome antitank dofer.ses which have not been
neutralized (Figure 14). Dismounted attack drills are
probably more numerous today than prior to 1973, but it
must be emphasized that the Soviets continue to stress
speed in the attack. Whenever it is tactically feasible,
the Soviets emphasize maneuvering around strong defenses.;
when this is not possible they will attack dismounted.
The BMP, invulnerable to 50 caliber fire except at very
close range, is ideally suited :o operate with armor in
fast moving operations. It is also capable of operating
independently of armor, and of supporting dismounted
troops with effective antitank and antipersonnel fire.
Current Soviet emphasis, however, is clearly on the organi-
zation of combined infantry-tank-artillery formations.
r/r
Figure 14. Soviet infantry attacking a strong defensive position. (U)
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Reconnaissance.
Although they have streRsed':the importance of:
reconnaissance.'_n the-past, current',Sovietwritings reflect'
.?increased? emphasis on this vital element cf' the, combined
rms team While identification of,the enemy',s.:nuclear .
delivery means remains the first priority . of reconnaiss'ance?
troops, the location of enemy .,antitank systems is clearly
cucond (Figure 15) ,Commanders are urged-to use-their
reconnaissance assets to the maximum. degree, with Increasing
emphasis ; being placed on locating;enemy antitank systems
Soviet.,t aircrobile doctrine is'showing:signs of
becoming increasingly ic;iortant.within.the'combined'arms
concept. A`s "this. concept matures; it ;will give , the Soviets
an increased' capability to maintain high rates of advance
through use o.f sirmobile;forces to.;,sei.ze key terrain and,
communi'c3tions, couaand,.andcontrol:installations.,.,dcstroy
nuclear delivery means and storage sites, and generally to
:,
disrupt the enemy rear. area: Soviet, analysis of. heliborne
opera ions during.the?October War and'the:Vietnam-conf.lict
leaves no `doubt 'that they are impressed-bythe advantages
of : adrmobile. operationc,',.while- being fully" cognizant: of
their lismitations. Soviet airmobiie.exercises will?
probably continue to?stress operations of?battalion and
smaller'sized units.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
(U) Soviet analysis of the Middle East War is clearly
reflected in tactical trends since that conflict. Soviet
writings show that the war caused them to reexamine. their
doctrinal concepts, to re^mphasize some lessons and to
note others.
. (U) While impressed with the increased complexity of
modern defenses and the lethality of antitank weaponry,
the Soviets were a uq ally impressed by enhanced offensive
capabilities presented by mobile air defense systems and
well-coordinated combined arms operations. It is in-
structive to note that in the 1973 War tank gunnery de-
stroyed three-to-f our times as many tanks as did antitank
missiles.
(U) Soviet offensive doctrine, built around the tank
and envisioning high rates of advance, remains basically
unchanged. There are even indications that Soviet antici-
pated rates of advance may increase.
(U) The Soviets have taken numerous steps to increase
the viability of their armored forces and to alllou fnr
anticipated losses of armored vehicles. They are stressing
the nseof combined arms unsta even were then previotal ,
and there are clear indications that airmobile forces will
be assigned a greater role in their operations.
(U) Soviet writings on the war contain factual errors
and omit key data. One may only speculate why this is so.
(U) The 1973 war notwithstanding, the primary origin
of current Soviet doctrinal thinking continues to be World
War II. The Middle East War did not have the dramatic
impact on Soviet strategic and tactical concepts that it
had in some Western countries.
20.
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DISTRIBUTION
DOD AND JOINT AGENCIES
A010 AFS COL .
A024 DEF NUCLEAR AGCY
A085 NAT DEF UNIVERSITY
A104 OSD (I)/D01
A115 OASD ISA
A117 OSO (ODP&E) (2)
A205 DMATC
A300 JCS
A310 JCS/J-3 (SP OP DIV)
A315 JCS/SAGA (4)
A325 JCS/J-3
A335 JCS/J-4
A340 JCS/J-5 MIL SEC
A353 JSTPS
AMOO OSD
A009 OASD ATOM ENERGY
A034 PEP SEC DEF (2)
A048 DtF CIV PREP AGCY
A096 NEACP
A097 DIA GRP ANfCC
A1OR nASn 1R4
A124 OSD NET ASSESSMENT
A302
A357
A358
A360
A361
A362
A363
A368
A512
A835
A916
JCS/CHAIRMAN
USDOCO AIRSOUTH
USDOCO 6 ATAF
USLO AAFNE
USLO SACLANT
USDOCOLANDSOEAST
USNMR SHAPE.
USRMC/NATO:
USDOCOSTR.IKFR;OUTH
US MIL LN 7N GER
8040 DIA/DIO
8055 DIA/DT-4B
B080 DIA/SWS
8132 DIA/DE-1
8134 DIA/DE-2
B167 DIA/DT-26
B169 DIA/DT-2D
.8485 DIA/IS
21
SECRET
DIA (Cort'd)
6545 DIA/YP
B565 DIA/DB-1F1
B_66 DIA/DB-1F2
8571 DIA/DB-4G1
8573 DIA/DB-4E1
B579 DIA/DN-2B2
85b0 DIA/DB-1B6 OPO
8581 DIA/DB-13
B583 DIA/DB-1D
B584 DIA/D3-1B4 (30)
B586 DIA/DB-4D1
8593 DIA/DB-1G2
B594 DIA/LAB-1F (2)
B597 DIA/OB-IG1
8615 DIA/DN-2C
6631 DIA/DB-3E1
8632 DIA/DB-4G2
B722 DIA/15B-5B
8737 DIA/RDS-3B7 (LIB)
B787 DIA,/DB-1F3
--n
B362 DIA/DB-1B1
(5)
6363 DIP758-i
8364 DIA/DB-1B3 (2)
8563 DIA/DB-1B5 (PENT) (2)
8575 DIA/DB-1
6576 DIA/DB-1A
2644' DIA/Dd-40
8728 DIA/DB-5D
B731 DIA/UB-5F
8734 DIA/0B-5E
8777 DIA/DN-281
8800 DL-1 LONDON
8859
871
8876
B87S
6980
888'.
6912
B917
B919
8.9333
3934
8878
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ARMY (Cont'd)
C020 DCS-MIL OPS (4)
C766
OACSI-INT SUP DET
C030 CH RD&A
C768
OACSI-USAITAD (6)
C090 USAMSSA
C786
OACSI-WESTERN BR
C204 TCATA
C788
OACSI-SOV/EEUR Bit (5)
C239 CO D 519 MI BN FLDA
C419
9TH INF DIV (10)
C241 FIRST US ARMY
C428
OP TEST & EVAL AGCY
C242 FORSCOM
C454
FLD ARTY SCH
C243 FIFTH US ARMY
C588
DUGWAY FRV GRD
C300 172ND INF BDE (AK) (3)
C013
ASST SEC R/D
C307 24TH INF DIV (10)
C015
CHIEF OF STAFF
C309 OFT N 500TH MIG
CO21
DCS-LOG
.-.C459 COMD-GEN STF COL (10)
C043
USAMIIA
C461 INFANTRY SCH (10)
C061
MP SCH
C463 INTEL CTR & SCH (10)
C202
III CORPS
C465 US MIL ACADEMY
C227
101ST AIRBORNE DIV (10)
C470 ARMY WAR COL
C231
2ND ARM DIV (10)
C500 TRADOC (10)
C232
3RD ARM CAV REGT (6)
C507 INSIG
C235
1ST INF DIV (10)
C509 BALLISTIC RES LABS
C286
417TH MID
C512 DARCOM
C301
193RD INF BDE (CZ) (3)
C515 EDGEWOOD ARSENAL
C305
18TH ABN DIV (3)
C523 HARRY DIAMOND LAB
C348
453D MID
C538 WHITE SANDS MSL RG
0392
486TH MID (STRAT
C539 TRASANA
C414
4TH INF DIV (1
C550 ELECTRONICS COMO
C415
5TH INF DIV (M) (10)
C557 USAIIC
U429
151 BW R) 75TH--INF
C562 TRANS SCH
C460
ENGINEER SCH
CS6K ARMCOM
C467
MSL-MUN CEN-SCH
X569 MOB EQPT R & D COMO
C471
OPGRU ARMY WAR COL
C587 -CMBT DEV EXPR COMO
C568
AIR DEF SCH
C591 FSTC (3)
C623
USAFAGOS-ARMY MBR
C605 JFK CTR MIL ASSIST (10)
C801
SIXTH US ARMY
C617 CONCEPT ANLYS AGCY (3)
C234
1ST CAV DIV
C619 MIA REDSTONE
C417
7TH INF DIV
C620 'JSASRD
C513
PICATINNY ARSENAL
C632 ORD CTR & SCH
C535
AVIATION SYS COMO
C639 CMBT & TNG DEV DIR (2)
C545
FIO DRSAR-LEF
C641 AVIATION SCHOOL
C547
ARMY NUCLEAR AGCY
C644 LOG CTR
C510
AIR MOBLTY R & D LAB
C646 CMBARMSCMBTDEVACTY
C590
TASDC
C649 SIGNAL SCHOOL
C306
82ND ABN DIV (10)
C667 IMA/CMBT & TNG DEV
C683 ASA
C697 TEST & EVAL COMO
C715 ARMOR CTR (20)
0033
STRATANALSUPPCRU
C759 COLL DET 'JSAINTA
0042
NAVFACENGCOM
C763 OACSI-S & T DIV
D159
NAVAIRDEVCEN
C765 OACSI-IOSD
D202
NAVWARCOL
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NAVY (Cont'd)
0217 NAVWPNCEN
D249 NAVPGSCOL
D507 COMINEWARCOM
D700 CGMCDEC (2)
D971 OP-009F
D972 OP-009BIP
D032 NAVPHIBSCOL
0204 NAVWARCOL/IO
D153 PACMISTESTCEN
0218 NRL WASH DC
D246 NAVSURFWPNCEN DAHL
D247 NAVSURPWPNCEN WOAK
0256 NAVSHIPWPSYSENGSTA
D506 NAVUSEACEN
D510 CHNAVMAT (MAT-09I)
0914 OP-944F
AIR FORCE
U & S COMMANDS (Cont'?d
H005
USCINCEUR.
H006
USEUCOM DEFANALCTR
H300
USAICE (USAREUR) (4)
H320
66TH MI GP
H351
10TH SFG (ABN) 1STSF
(10)
H524
HQ V CORPS (2)
H525
HQ VII CORPS (2)
H530
HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV
(6)
H007
SILK PURSE
H301
COMBINEDARM'TCGCFN
H305
USA TECH SUPT ACTY
H306
DCSI US -COMBERLIN
H315
21ST SUPPORT COMO
H526
HQ 3RD INF DIV (6)
H527
HQ 8TH INF DIV (6)
H528
1ST INF DIV (FWD) (6)
H529
HQ 3RD APMORED DIV (6)
J517
COMNAVSURFLANT
E017
J575'-FMFLANT/FMFEUR
AF/RDQA-W
J579
4TH MAB (3)
E018
AF/RDQA-C
J614
SECONDMAR (2)-
E016
AFIS/INC
J618
SIZTHMAR (2)
E046
7602 AINTELG/INOA-1
J620
FIGHTMAR (2)
J818
SECONDMARDIV (CFU)
(6)
E054
AF/INAKE
99
J 1
.
FrT
ej Ahil
E200
AAC
K005
,
CINCPAC
E303
AF/INAP
K020
COMUSTDC
E408
AFWL
K100
PACAF 548 RTG
E436
AFEWC (SUR)
K300
IPAC (CODE IC-L)
E451
AUL/LSE
K340
I CORPS (ROK/US) GP
E500
3420 TCHTG/TTMNL
K500
CINCPACFL'f
E410
ADTC
K515
COMSEVENTHFLT
E413
ESD
K516
FIRST MAF
E450
AIR UNIV
K601
FIRSTMAW
E465
USAF ACADEMY
K612
THIRDMARDIV (6)
E020
AFIS/INZA
K650
COMNAVSURFPAC
E100
TAC (9TH TIS/LDD)
K658
COMUSNAVPHIL
E317
AF/SAMI
K679
FLTCORGRU 1
E409
AMD
K314
IPAC (CODE 1-23)
E411
ASD/FTD/ETID
K315
IPAC (CODE 1-24)
E429
SAMSO (IND)
K152
FOURTHMARDIV (6)
E437
AFIS/INI
K305
25TH INF DIV (6)
K342
2ND INF DIV (6)
K610
FIRSTMARDIV (6)
U & S COMMANDS
K613
FIRSTMAR (2)
K614
FOURTHMAR (2)
G005 CINCAD
K615
THIRDMAR (2)
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K617 FIFTHMAR (2)
K621 NINTHMAR (2)
K007 COMUSJAPAN
K115 5TH AF
K505 FICPAC
K510 COMNAVFORJAPAN
K514 COMTHIRDFLT
L005 CINCSAC
L040 SAC 544TH ARTW
N005 USREOCOM (3)
OTHER
P055 CIA/CRS/ADD/SD (14)
P085 STATE (5)
P090 NSA (5)
S030 FRD LIB OF CONG
TOTAL DIA DISTRIBUTION 595 COPIES
COPIES
DIA STOCK
TOTAL PRINT 7 COPIES
24
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1*7
i7__.
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