MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ENGINEER SUPPORT OF AN ARMY DEFENSIVE OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000302250001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1976
• Content Type: MEMO

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Engineer Support of an Army Defensive Operation
by
Colonel General of Engineer Troops A. Tsirlin
The problem of engineer support for a defensive operation basically
amounts to carrying out in a limited period of time a group of engineer
measures aimed at increasing the aggressiveness and stability of the
defense and at creating conditions for a subsequent going over to the
offensive. These measures consist principally of engineer preparation of
the terrain. Based on maximum utilization of natural features and skilful
employment of engineer forces and means, this preparation should ensure the
swift formation of a defensive grouping of troops and their protection,
paralyze an enemy maneuver, promote an increase in the effectiveness of the
fire system and bold, decisive maneuvering by the second echelons and
reserves in the tactical and operational depth of the defensive zone not
only of the army but also, as was shown by the experience of the D.NEPR
exercise conducted in September 1967, on the scale of the front.
The proportion of engineer measures, their sequence, and the
thoroughness and time limits for carrying them out depend directly on the
nature of a given operation, and particularly on the goals of and
conditions surrounding the going over to the defense, on whether the
belligerents are employing nuclear weapons, and on whether the army and the
front go over to the defense at the beginning of the war or while it is in
progress.
In this article we shall principally examine problems related to
engineer support of an army defensive operation.
At the beginning of a war, the routes by which the troops move to and
deploy in the designated defensive zones and areas acquire particular
importance. After the troops have moved into these zones and areas,
measures taken to ensure that the most important and advantageous lines on
the threatened axes are firmly held play an increased role. This applies
primarily to the preparation of positions for the conduct of fire,
especially antitank fire, and the setting up of a reliable obstacle system.
The importance of engineer tasks in support of aggressive actions by
troops on the defensive increases sharply during a defensive engagement.5ox1-xurvi
During the preparation for a defense, engineer measures to prepare the
terrain are carried out, as a rule, by all branch arms. With the beginning
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of a defensive engagement -- when it is an indispensable condition that the
troops be ready to carry out decisive counterattacks and counterthrusts --
missile and tank large units will have to be relieved of this work as much
as possible; it is turned over mainly to the engineer troops.
The moment the enemy delivers a counterattack during a front
offensive operation, even if the operation began with the employment of
conventional means of destruction, the threat of nuclear strikes against
army troops will increase sharply. The successful repelling of such a
counterattack will. depend primarily on the readiness of the army to employ
nuclear weapons, and on its ability to quickly form a defensive grouping
after forestalling the movement of the enemy to advantageous lines, and to
provide protection for its personnel and equipment. When the army goes
over to the defense in such a difficult situation, engineer measures must
not only promote rapid regrouping but also the timely fortification of the
terrain, thus making up, as it were, for the comparatively low density of
the troops that are subjected to the first enemy strikes.
In the short period of time that is allotted to the preparation of a
defensive operation, it is practically impossible to organize a continuous
defense along the entire front and, moreover, there is no need to do so.
Combat actions, obviously, will be based on strong defense of only the most
important axes, coupled with extensive movement of forces and means to the
threatened sectors. This gives rise to the need for an individual approach
to the engineer preparation of the terrain in an army defensive zone
depending on the operational importance of a particular axis.
Reconnaissance of the army defensive zone is of great value in making
a correct determination of these axes and the nature of their preparation
and in choosing advantageous lines, areas, and positions for the troops.
When the defense is being organized along the state border, such
reconnaissance presents no special difficulty. The army commander
personally conducts it with the assistance of the chiefs of the branch arms
and services while it is still peacetime. Those lines which large units
and units have been assigned in advance to defend will also be
reconnoitered by the commanders of those large units and units together
with the chiefs of the branch arms and services; they will determine the
sectors and areas of the defense and even the most important strong points,
the disposition of fire means, and the places where engineer obstacles are
to be erected. The defensive lines and switch positions which the reserves
are to occupy during the course of the engagement may be determined by 50X1-HUM
groups that have been specially allocated for this purpose and are headed
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by officers from the army staff. March and deployment routes for the
troops and positions for the covering units should be reconnoitered with
particular care.
When the army goes over to the defense during the course of a front.
offensive operation, even under the most favorable conditions (when
helicopters are employed), it will be possible to fully reconnoiter only
some of the most important axes and areas, as, for example: siting areas
for the missile units and large units; sites for army control posts;
concentration areas for the second echelon; deployment lines and movement
routes to be used when delivering the counterattack; and individual sectors
of army defensive lines and switch positions. Obviously, only subunit and
unit commanders can carry out detailed reconnaissance. Topographic maps
containing data on the protective features of the terrain will prove
extremely useful under these conditions as a means of appraising and
selecting the areas that are most protected against the effects of nuclear
weapons. The employment of helicopters and aircraft will prove to be of
great assistance, as will advance aerial photography of the proposed army
defensive zone.
Fortification work is the most labor-consuming part of engineer
preparation of the terrain. The problem is to find possible ways of
reducing the time needed to perform this work while simultaneously
increasing its effectiveness. Obviously this problem can be solved only by
considering it as part of the whole.
When solving it the nature of the pre aration of the defensive zones,
positions, and areas of the army troops should be considere first of all.
Under present-day conditions, company and platoon strong points should be
prepared with pits for armored personnel carriers, infantry combat
vehicles, and other attached fire means. Pits for combat vehicles will be
linked by trenches and communication trenches only within the limits of the
platoon and company strong points. This makes it possible to set up strong
points in battalion defensive areas in a short period of time.
An analysis of the conditions of modern armed combat demonstrates that
when the protection of the troops is at issue, some measures should not be
preferred a priori to others without a detailed evaluation of their
effectiveness in the given situation. The defense should consist of the
optimum combination of various operational-tactical and technical measures
designed to decrease the vulnerability of the troops and increase the
reliability of their use of armament, as well as provide comprehensive
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protection as a whole.
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The dispersal of troop battle formations during the defense continues
to be one of the essential factors ensuring their protection even in a
non-nuclear period. However, in order to create the density of fire
necessary to repel enemy attacks, it is necessary to make the battle
formations of regiments and battalions more compact by decreasing the
distance between battalion defensive areas and company strong points, and
to provide them with dense cover by means of fire and obstacles. This
gives rise to the requirement that subunits take full advantage of the
microrelief of the terrain and that they erect such fortification works in
defensive areas as would ensure the conduct of fire and aid in protecting
personnel and equipment against conventional and nuclear means of
destruction.
When combat actions employing nuclear weapons are conducted and troop
vulnerability sharply increases, protective measures against nuclear
attack, taken on an operational scale and based on a more comprehensive
prediction of the possible development of the defensive engagement, play a
greater role. The army commander and staff will have to quickly decide on
the most important means and methods for the comprehensive protection of
the troops, with due regard for their role and tasks in the defensive
operation, and correctly select lines, positions, and areas. At the same
time, this does not in the least decrease the role of measures taken on a
tactical scale. In particular, the protection of the troops with
fortifications will be more effective if it is combined, first of all, with
protection of the weapons themselves and their crews.
If we take an individual approach to the problems of field.
fortifications in an army defensive zone, then these fortifications are
most urgently needed, in the interests of comprehensive protection against
nuclear attack, by the personnel and equipment of air defense units,
missile troops, control posts and second echelons, as well as first-echelon
divisions that are defending the most threatened axes. In connection with
this, obviously the engineer forces and means will first have to reinforce
those units whose defensive sectors are situated on terrain that has
unfavorable natural protective features. Under all circumstances they
should endeavor to build field fortifications in defensive areas at the
same time as the defensive grouping is being formed and the fire system is
being set up.
In order to counteract any enemy attempt to envelop and surround the
main grouping of the defending army, and in order to create the conditions
for destroying enemy forces that have broken through by using all avai3ahh1
fire means, nuclear strikes and air strikes, counterattacks and 50X1-HUM
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counterthrusts, it is essential to have in the operational depth of the
defense fully reconnoitered defensive lines and switch positions which,
when located on the most important axes, have been given engineer
preparation. Their preparation and equipping have always been the concern
of the army staff and the chief of the engineer troops of the army.
Occasionally during exercises this task is turned over to second-echelon
divisions and engineer position preparation units, but this cannot be
considered advisable. They are able to prepare only individual fully
reconnoitered sectors of lines and positions under the supervision of a
representative of the army staff.
In deciding the question of the nature of the engineer preparation of
such lines, we should not predetermine in advance the structure of the
battle formations of large units and units that may occupy them only during
the course of a defensive engagement. In a number of situations it
obviously is advisable to set up multipurpose positions on these lines that
are equally suited for use by motorized rifle, tank, and artillery subunits
either to repel an enemy offensive or to deliver a counterattack. At one
time the effectiveness of preparing multipurpose positions for the purpose
of reducing the amount of time needed for engineer preparation of the
defense was repeatedly substantiated in our periodical press. It obviously
is not necessary to raise this issue again.
A further reduction in the amount of time needed to prepare the field
fortifications of an army defensive zone may be achieved while
simultaneously improving the protection of the troops by equipping combat
and transport vehicles with light and effective entrenchuigmeans. TIE
s
would enable each unit to use the horsepower of the combat and transport
vehicles to prepare the terrain; at the present time the majority of the
pits and shelters for these vehicles must be excavated by hand. The
scientific research institutes of the M nistry of Defense are successfully
carrying out work along these lines.
At the same time new designs for pits and shelters must be developed
and introduced. The resulting structures should be simple, should permit
the maximum possible use of the combat capabilities of the troops'
armament, should have very good protective features, and should require a
minimum expenditure of labor so that the units and large units can build
them quickly, using their own forces and means. Accordingly, we consider
fully justified the trend toward equipping units and large units with the
minimum necessary quantity of special engineer means that would promote the
timely completion of tasks to furnish protection against conventional and
nuclear weapons, provided that personnel are well trained in the methodssoX1-HUM
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and procedures of building field fortifications and entrenching means are
extensively used.
A substantial portion of these specialized means consists of the
highly efficient excavation machinery in service with engineer units. It
is able to completely mechanize the digging of trenches and sharply reduce
the amount of time needed for the engineer preparation of siting areas for
rocket troops and surface-to-air missile troops and of areas where the
control posts of the army, large units and units are to be located.
However, they must be correctly used. This requires sound knowledge of
their tactical characteristics and specifications, and necessitates taking
into consideration specific soil conditions, operating procedure, and the
procedure for the various relocations when determining output and the
amount of time needed for the completion of the fortification work. We
would recall that a reduction in the amount of time needed can be achieved
only if there is inte ated mechanization of all types of work: the
excavation of trenches, the assembling of structures, and t ei.r covering
and camouflage.
The use of prefabricated structural components makes it possible to
greatly reduce the amount of time needed to build shelters. However, their
relatively high cost and the large number of motor vehicles needed to
transport them ccmpels us, for the time being, to use them primarily in the
siting areas of missile and surface-to-air missile troops and at control
posts. We have every reason to assume that in the near future these
structures will be widely employed by all branch arms.
A large number of firing emplacements and shelters for personnel in
defensive zones and areas are still being built of timber. The
availability of large tracts of forest in the European theaters of military
operations ensures that the timber needed by the army can be procured, and
the use of mechanized means makes it possible to accomplish this task in a
short period of time. However, the need for camouflage must not be
forgotten when selecting logging areas, organizing their clearing,
transporting timber, and operating timber mills.
As regards the nature of field fortifications in an army defensive
zone, we must point out that versatile types of field fortifications of the
terrain must be used and that the range of them should be sufficiently
great. They must meet the requirements of troop defensive combat actions
as fully as possible, especially those related to the preparation of main
and alternate areas for the location of the second-echelon large units 50X1 HUM
the reserves of the army, and of lines for their deployment to deliver a
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counterattack.
Since the second-echelon large units and the reserves of the army are
dispersed, camouflaged and sheltered in their areas, they are able to use a
portion of their forces to prepare the terrain so as to more effectively
meet the enemy with fire from fixed positions should his armored groupings
penetrate the depth of the army defense. It may not prove necessary to
reinforce these units and large units with engineer forces and means for
this purpose; it will be sufficient to allocate to them the sectional
structural components needed to erect the most important structures. At
the same time as the main disposition areas are being prepared, it is
advisable to reconnoiter alternate areas, and their preparation may be
begun after the deployment lines for the counterattack have been prepared.
The decisive role in an army defensive engagement belongs to troop
maneuvering and aggressive troop actions. To ensure the extensive
maneuvering of troops who, thanks to a high level of motorization, may to a
large degree be dispersed into the depth, a well-developed network of
routes is essential. This makes it possible to quickly and secretly change
the positions not only of large units and units, but of subunits as well.
The preparation of an army counterattack deserves special attention.
For a continuous advance by the counterattack grouping from its disposition
areas and for its deployment from the march, the required number of routes
-- particularly crossings over water obstacles and through almost
impassable sectors and defiles -- must be laid in advance, marked, and
maintained. Also, provision must be made for the troops to negotiate
obstacles and various obstructions and for the use of minefields to cover
the flanks of the units deploying to deliver a counterattack.
In addition to the organic engineer units of the second-echelon large
units themselves, units of engineer troops subordinate to the army are
allocated to carry out measures in preparation for the counterattack.
Provision usually is made for reinforcement from the engineer reserve. In
the complex situation which may arise in the zone of the army when the
counterattack is delivered, special attention must be given to organizing
cooperation between the engineer troops and units of the branch arms,
particularly when they are negotiating engineer obstacles previously set up.
by our can troops and by the enemy. 50X1-HUM
Under modern defensive conditions, the system of engineer obstacles
should be subordinated to the concept of ile troop actions.
It must be set up during the preparation for, and the course of, a
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defensive engagement with regard for the possible variants in the
development of the combat actions of our troops and those of the enemy. It
should take advantage of natural obstacles, and should be closely
coordinated with planned counterattacks and with the fire of conventional
means of destruction, especially antitank means. Consequently, the use of
engineer obstacles at all levels should constitute the prerogative of the
combined-arms staffs, and not the task of the engineer chiefs alone.
The need for obstacles arises the moment the army goes over to the
defense, when it is necessary to ensure the stabilization of the front by
covering those axes on the line of contact with the enemy that are
accessible to tanks. At the same time, an obstacle system in the depth of
the defense is planned with regard for the probable or already apparent
axes of the enemy offensive. Its main function is to counteract the
organized deployment, commitment to battle, and advance into the depth of
new enemy large units and to contain their maneuvering, and not merely to
cover the defensive lines and positions occupied by our troops. Once the
path of the enemy armored groupings has been blocked, the task is to help
to concentrate them within a limited area where they can be completely
destroyed by nuclear strikes, aviation and artillery fire, and by
counterattacks and a counterthrust. Consequently, it is now especially
important that the obstacle system be coordinated with the fire system in
its widest possible sense and that it contribute to increasing the
effectiveness of our strikes.
As formerly, the most effective type of obstacle continues to be the
antitank mixed minefield. However, the extent to which antipersonnel
obstacles are used has been substantially reduced in comparison with the
last war. This is primarily due to the extensive motorization of troops.
Antipersonnel obstacles are needed in the European theaters only on axes
that are inaccessible to tanks and in sectors difficult of access for
combat vehicles, and to supplement the system of antitank obstacles and
areas of demolition. Moreover, the appropriate mechanized means for the
emplacement of antipersonnel obstacles are lacking. However, these are not
adequate grounds for rejecting this type of obstacle. Even in the European
theaters of military operations, the areas where the possibilities for
using armored personnel carriers and tanks will be limited constitute a
total of about one-third of the territory. In other theaters the 50X1-HUM
proportion of them will be considerably higher.
As the experience of many exercises shows, favorable results can be
achieved during the course of a defensive engagement only by the massed and
surprise employment of obstacles. Consequently, the norms for mine
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distribution that have been accepted in practice, according to which
one-third of the total number is emplaced in advance, must not he viewed as
standard. The number of obstacles to be set up in advance must be
determined each time on the basis of specific conditions, keeping in mind
that capabilities for setting up obstacles while a battle or engagement is
in progress are limited. An increase in these troop capabilities would
promote a reduction in the number of obstacles set up in advance on both
the tactical and the operational levels.
As formerly, it is advisable that first-echelon regiments, which have
a relatively small depth of defense and fewer capabilities at their
disposal for maneuvering their obstacle means, set up the majority of their
minefields prior to the beginning of the defensive battle. The latter will
also be typical of an obstacle system that is set up in the forward
security zone. Certain areas of it that are on axes where no aggressive
troop actions are planned can be turned in advance into zones that are
inaccessible to the enemy, and structures located at bottlenecks and
defiles on the main roads can be destroyed. In this case it is better to
move our subunits along prepared dirt roads and cross-country routes,
avoiding paved roads.
When the going over to the defense is done on a state border,
obstacles and areas of demolition are set up first in front of the
positions of the covering units and in the depth on the axes that lead the
enemy to the movement and deployment routes of the main army grouping.
Most of them can be prepared while it is still peacetime. The mine and
explosive means needed for this work should be concentrated in advance on
the appropriate axes. These preparatory measures, when coupled with
extensive minelaying using mobile means, especially helicopters, will make
it possible to substantially increase the effectiveness of the obstacles
and reduce the expenditure of manpower and time in setting them up when
combat actions begin.
When the army goes over to the defense while a front offensive
operation is in progress, the task is not merely that of quickly covering a
captured line with obstacles on the axis on which the enemy will most
probably deliver his counterattack. In our opinion, after this axis and
the deployment line for the counterattack grouping have been correctly
ascertained, in a nunher of cases it will be possible to inflict
considerable damage on the enemy by using obstacle means, provided that
helicopters and aircraft are used to set them up, thus gaining the time
needed to organize the defense more systematically. 50X1-HUM
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An obstacle system in the depth of the defense usually includes:
installations that have been readied for demolition on the axes where the
enemy offensive will most probably take place; centers of obstacles
covering important strong points, major bridges, and key sectors of the
transportation lines; and, occasionally, zones of obstacles of varying
width and depth and consisting of minefields and areas of demolition on
several road axes. In order to expand obstacles early in a defensive
engagement, the necessary forces and means must be provided for at the very
same time the grouping of engineer troops is formed. For this purpose, in
addition to mobile obstacle detachments, it is best to allocate
engineer-combat engineer units of army subordination that are engaged in
tasks in the vicinity of the installations or areas where centers and zones
of obstacles are to be set up.
This, of course, does not mean that the army will assume direct
responsibility for organizing the setting up of all obstacles from the time
the defensive engagement begins. While the battle is in progress,
regiments and divisions set up obstacles in their on defensive sectors and
zones in close coordination with the fire system and the plan for
conducting the defensive battle. The army organizes the destruction of
important installations located within the obstacle system that are of
operational and, in some cases even strategic, importance, as well as the
demolition of structures and mine laying in the operational depth on axes
where large enemy armored groupings are operating. This applies
particularly to those centers and zones of obstacles where nuclear mines
can be emplaced. The staff of the army rust also plan to allocate engineer
forces and means to set up engineer obstacles during the operation on the
routes where enemy airborne landing forces are operating.
Modern mechanized means of mine laying -- minelayers, mechanical
minelayers, and helicopters -- make it possible to set up an obstacle
system on known axes of the enemy offensive in a relatively short period of
time. Minelayers of the tracked minelayer type are able to quickly lay
mines in the ground. They have cross-country capability and armored
protection. As compared with other methods of mine laying, the use of
helicopters greatly simplifies the process of transporting mines and
setting up minefields. They do not leave the give-away signs typical of
mines laid by hand or by minelayers. Helicopters constitute an
indispensable means in areas of radioactive contamination when covering
breaches f=ed by the bursts of nuclear weapons. As a result, the
effectiveness of engineer mixed minefields will, obviously, be much higher
than it was during the last war. 50X1-HUM
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When determining what density of engineer obstacles is necessary on
any given axis, the following factors should be taken into consideration:
the balance of forces of the belligerents; the probable nature of enemy
troop actions, and enemy capabilities for clearing obstacles; and the
extent of the sectors or zones that are accessible to tanks and within
which it is anticipated that the enemy tank large units and units will
concentrate their efforts. The more reliably these factors are determin.ad
when the staffs of combined-arms large units and armies predict the
situation, the greater the effectiveness of the obstacles will be.
Operational camouflage measures, as the experience of the last war
demonstrates, help to make troop resistance on certain sectors of the
defensive lines, aviation and artillery strikes, counterattacks and
counterthrusts come as a surprise to the enemy. When means of mass
destruction are employed, nuclear strikes that take the enemy by surprise
can sometimes decide the outcome of a defensive engagement.
When preparing for an operation on a state border, the concept for
operational camouflage may provide for misleading the enemy as to: the
forces allocated for covering; the disposition of the defense on especially
crucial axes; the disposition areas of missile units; army control posts
and large units of the second echelon; and the axes for carrying out the
army counterattack. This concept can be successfully implemented only if a
number of preparatory measures are carried out in peacetime. Included
among them are: supplying the units with table of equipment camouflage
means; using designated dL=,y areas for conducting various troop exercises;
manufacturing, storing, and maintaining an adequate quantity of equipment
for mock-ups and other camouflage means. Also,an advance determination
must be made as to which units and subunits are to conduct each of the
measures, including the simulation of: the concentration areas of large
units of the second echelon and missile units, the system of control posts,
and the axes of the couterattacks.
The basic method of concealing the defensive disposition is to set up
a non-linear defensive disposition and set up throughout the entire depth
of the defense a system of engineer preparaticn of the terrain that will
confuse the enemy. The existence of a large number of defensive areas and
zones of varying shapes and of dimrT installations can impede the detection
by the enemy of the actual grouping of forces and induce him to deliver
nuclear strikes against simulated installations. It is advisable that
engineer camouflage measures carried out during a defensive engagement be
aimed primarily at concealing the actual counterattack grouping of soxl'UM
and displaying the simulated one.
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Operational camouflage usually is planned by the front staff. However,
if the army is independently carrying out the task of ed stroying an
attacking enemy in its zone on the state border, then by agreement with the
front staff it may plan and carry out operational camouflage measures. The
army will also have to do a great deal along these lines independently
should it go over to the defense during a front offensive operation.
Specifically, the army commander and staff determine which camouflage
measures must be carried out in the divisions of the first and second
echelons, and where to simulate the location of the second echelon and the
reserves, and the siting areas of the missile troops and ccTltrol posts.
Engineer support in preparing for and conducting an army defensive
operation on a state border, like the operation as a whole, is usually
planned in peacetime. This plan should embrace all engineer measures
carrie out in support of troop actions, beginning with the advance of
covering units and the deployment of the main forces of the army. It
should precisely set forth the set of measures that should be carried out
in peacetime. In our opinion, it is essential that this be regulated by a
special plan that has been worked out in greater detail. The fact that the
engineer units will have a minimal amount of time to carry out measures in
direct support of the movement forward of the troops and the defensive
operation must be taken into account. Consequently, it is desirable that
they be sent to the areas where they are to carry out their tasks at the
same time as the units that have been allocated for covering the border.
It is also advisable to distribute the mine and explosive means at that
time, having formed established forward branches of an army engineer depot
for this purpose.
When the army goes over to the defense during a front offensive
operation, engineer support for the defense, as a rule, planned within a
very limited period of time. Under these conditions, the oupiingof
en ineer troops that is to support the army defensive is gradually.
The initial engineer measures are carried out 7y an already operating
grouping. In the majority of cases the regrouping of engineer troops will
take place while a captured line is being secured. Engineer troop units
that previously had been part of the engineer reserves of the army can play
an important role during this period.
Regardless of the conditions under which a defensive operation is
prepared and conducted, the main forces of the engineer troops are massed
on the decisive axes and provide the capability for stepping up efforts on
the main axis throughout the entire defensive operation. This makes it 50x1-HUM
necessary for the army to have an engineer reserve strong enough not only
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to actively affect the course of engineer support if there is an enemy
breakthrough into the depth of the defense, but also to provide reliable
support for troop actions during the delivery of an army counterattack and
in going over to the offensive.
In the event the belligerents employ nuclear weapons, the engineer
troop grouping must be capable of carrying out engineer measures to
eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes, and irst and foremost
to restore the combat rea iness of the units of the branch arms that were
subjected to these strikes. The engineer reserve of the army and other
units of engineer troops of army subordination can be allocated to carry
out such measures as: restoring mixed minefields and laying new mixed
minefields; making important sectors of defensive zones and lines combat-ready; rebuilding destroyed roads and bridges and removing
obstructions on them; and -- in certain instances -- laying new sections of
routes to bypass zones of radioactive contamination, helping to extinguish
and localize centers of fires, rescuing casualties, and recovering combat
equipment.
The availability of an engineer reserve in the army and maneuvering of
the engineer units subordinate to the army can ensure the swift elimination !MM
of the aftereffects of a nuclear attack and restoration of the engineer
preparation of the terrain, primarily where this is necessitated by the
conditions of the situation. It is essential that the plan for engineer
support of a defensive operation provide that such a reserve be allocated
mainly from engineer-combat engineer units and engineer position
M..
preparation units. They are responsible for carrying out the most complex
engineer measures, entailing the use of appropriate equipment. Mass work to
eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes will be carried out by
the troops themselves.
An army mobile obstacle detachment and the engineer units subordinate
to the army which have been allocated to set up the obstacle system during
a defensive operation will be able to set up obstacles designed to box in
the enemy in areas that have been subjected to nuclear strikes and in which
the enemy offensive will most probably take place.
How promptly all engineer measures are completed in areas that have
been subjected to nuclear strikes will depend on the speed with which the
situation is ascertained. The employment of helicopters with engineer
reconnaissance subunits for this purpose can expedite the acquisition of
data on the status of positions, routes, obstacles, etc, 50X1 HUM
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When planning engineer support, great emphasis is placed on the
conduct of active engineer measures during a defensive o eration.Tt is
extremely important that the forward detachments defending the forward
security zones and approaches to the army's forward edge of the defense
systematically reconnoiter the probable movement routes of the enemy and
the areas where his nuclear means of attack may be located. It is
essential that engineer reconnaissance subunits take part in this in order
to ascertain what methods and means are being employed by the enemy to
negotiate obstacles and obstructions. On the whole, engineer
reconnaissance efforts should be focused on detecting what engineer
measures the enemy is carrying out to support his high-speed offensive.
During a defensive operation, too, engineer preparation of the terrain
will be resolutely expanded on the detected axes of the enemy offensive.
It will be of urgent importance that engineer position preparation units
and subunits be skilfully maneuvered, concentrated on decisive axes, and
given precise tasks regarding the setting up of positions having a certain
degree of protection against nuclear attack. No less important will be
engineer troop actions related to the development of a system of engineer
obstacles and areas of demolition.
If coLmte reparation fire is conducted, engineer support will first
be requireci-tor artillery, missile units, and the tanks belonging to the
second echelons of the army which are being allocated to neutralize and
destroy the enemy. In accordance with the variants employed for conducting
the counterpreparation fire, prepared routes and prepared, camouflaged
positions for missile units, artillery and tanks will play an important
role. Routes will have to be prepared in advance in the road network
system so that, after the counterpreparation fire, artillery and missile
units can return quickly to their main positions, and the tanks to their
areas. After the counterpreparation fire, the engineer troops must be
prepared in certain cases to ensure the passage of our tank troops, who are
delivering an attack in front of their own forward edge of the defense,
through the obstacles.
During a defensive operation, timely engineer support of the
maneuvering of troops out of sectors that have not been subjected to
nuclear strikes for the purpose of closing gaps in the disposition of the
troops and carrying out counterattacks and counterthrusts against enemy
airborne landing forces and armored troops, acquires great importance. The
crossings, defiles, and road junctions on the routes along which the troops
are moving will be especially vulnerable points. It is therefore 50X1-HUM
advisable, already from the moment of going over to the defense, to
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stockpile repair and reconstruction materiel, such as prefabricated
sections of bridges and road surfaces, for use in urgent reconstruction of
maneuver routes.
During a defensive operation, engineer troops will also have to
quickly restore sections of obstacles destroyed by enemy strikes and
activate controlled minefields. At the same time they will have to swiftly
build up the strength of minefields on the detected axes of operations of
the main enemy grouping. In a number of cases new obstacle zones must be
set up, especially when nuclear mines are used for this purpose. The
efforts made by the mobile obstacle detachments of divisions and armies can
turn out to be clearly insufficient. It will become necessary to deploy
larger engineer forces in order to erect obstacles that are echeloned in
depth on these axes within a short period of time.
One of the most important operational measures to be taken during a
defensive operation will be the delivery of a counterattack in order to
wipe out an enemy grouping that has made a penetration. It is extremely
important that provision be made for engineer measures in close support of
the advance of the second echelon of the army under these circumstances.
It is advisable to form a detachment to support the movement of the troops
of the second echelon and the reserves of the army simultaneously with
going over to the defense.
Under all circumstances, in order to deliver a surprise counterattack,
engineer forces and means must be provided for in the battle formations of
the second echelon. The commanders of the units and large units that are
delivering the counterattack must have information on the obstacles that
were placed by our troops on the territory occupied by the enemy grouping
that has penetrated or broken through.
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Thus, we have arrived at the conclusion that questions relating to the
engineer support of an array defensive operation are acquiring great
iriportance under present-day conditions and require thorough research.
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