MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF AN ANTILANDING DEFENSE BY AN ARMY CORPS IN COOPERATION WITH NAVAL FORCES (BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF CORPS EXERCISES)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201440001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 31, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Organization and Conduct of an Antilanding Defense
by an Army Corps in Cooperation with Naval Forces
(Based on the Experience of Corps Exercises)
by
General-Mayor of Tank Troops A. Zvartsev
and
Colonel N. Nemozhenko
The conditions for co s troops going over to an antilanding defense
will be varied. We shall single out only the four most characteristic o
the Northwestern Strategic Axis.
First, large units of an army corps can go over to an antilanding
defense in a period of threat. Having a certain amount of time before the
beginning of military operations, the troops will be able to make a timely
move into the designated areas and make engineer preparation of the
terrain, which will facilitate the organization of the defense.
Second, the corps can go over to an antilanding defense when the enemy
unleashes war by surprise. In this case, the defense is organized in a
short time and under a complex situation. Irrespective of the conditions
of going over to the defense, it has to be organized on a broad front.
Thus, in the joint staff training of a corps headquarters and division
staffs, motorized rifle divisions have gone over to an antilanding defense
on a front anywhere from 200 to 1,000 kilometers. Each division
concentrated its main efforts on holding the most important area.
Third, in the course of an offensive operation of a front, a corps may
with part of its forces go over to an antilanding defense for the purpose
of covering its main grouping against strikes from the sea. In this case,
the organization of the defense will be carried out under very complex
physical-geographical conditions of the theater for short periods and under
the influence of a rapidly changing combat situation. The main forces and
means of the corps will be continuing the offensive.
Fourth, the army corps may go over to coastal antilanding defense in a
very extensive sector in the concluding stage of an offensive operation,
when separated from the main forces of the front which are operating along
an adjacent or a new axis. 50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
The width of the defense zone of an army corps, according to the
experience of command-staff exercises and war games, has reached
1,000-1,500 kilometers, and that of a division 200 kilometers and more.
Such wide defense zones are explained by the enormous length of the
seacoast and the large number of terrain sectors almost inaccessible to a
landing. Relative to the overall length of the seacoast, the sectors
accessible to landing usually comprise only an insignificant part.
The task of the first echelon of an army corps or division in a number
of cases may consist not of holding the coast in the entire zone of
defense, but of repelling the landing of an amphibious landing force and
covering the maneuver of the second echelons and reserves of defending
forces into the areas of landing or to the axes of operations of
large-scale landing forces. Therefore, the first echelon can occupy
several battalion areas or company strong points prepared in advance or
hastily on the most threatened axes, and for holding important
installations.
In view of the fact that the most intense stage of antilanding defense
is that on the shore, the activities of the commanders of all levels, and
the forces and means subordinate to them, must be concentrated on
destruction of the enemy while still in the water so as not to permit the
landing of the landing force on the shore. In this connection, we believe
it is advisable to have in the antilanding defense, as a rule, not a second
echelon, but a combined-arms reserve in readiness to maneuver on various
axes. Most often it will consist o motorized rifle and tank units and
subunits, reinforced without fail with engineer forces and means.
Thus, in one corps command-staff exercise, the coast in the zone of a
motorized rifle division was defended essentially by only two motorized
rifle battalions supported by the division artillery. A tank regiment and
a motorized rifle battalion were held in the division's reserve, and a
motorized rifle regiment in the corps commander's reserve. One more
regiment of this division defended an important remote sector of the coast
independently. Here the battalions of the first echelon were deployed in
places that did not appear likely targets of an enemy nuclear attack. They
occupied positions prepared directly on the coast if the landing axes of
the landing forces had been reliably determined.
The problem of engineer preparation of the positions and areas of
troop deployment remains complex and not fully resolved. Engineer 50X1-HUM
preparation of the terrain on the seacoast will not be uniform. Strong
points, artillery firing positions, as well as launching areas of missile
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50X1 HUM
units, should be developed only in those sectors and on those axes where
the landing of an amphibious landing force is accomplished by its rapid
advance into our territory.
One of the most important features of engineer preparation of the
terrain is the increase by two or three times, on the average, in the
difficulty of constructing earthworks in rocky soils as compared to
ordinary conditions. In this regard, the need arises to carry out certain
basic measures in the preparation of troop positions beforehand, even in
peacetime. To reduce the volume of engineer works and to complete them in
short periods of time, it is necessary to skilfully employ the camouflaging
and protective features of the terrain: the numerous crevices, caves, heaps
of rocks and boulders, as well as the soft soils in river channels.
Pneumatic tools and explosives should find wide application. This now
obliges us in peacetime to instruct subunits of all branch arms to carry
out blasting in rocky and hard soils. Calculations show that a motorized
rifle division is capable of carrying out with its own forces the immediate
operations in the engineer preparation of positions in periods varying from
three to ten days, depending on the condition of the ground. It goes
without saying that these periods are still too long, and further search
for ways to reduce them is necessary.
For antilanding defense there is set up a system of antilanding
obstacles in the coastal zone, obstacles in the depth of the defense and on
the flanks. Installation of antilanding obstacles on the coast under
conditions of high and low tides has a number of special features and calls
for a great expenditure of forces and means. Thus, a combat engineer
company lays up to 2,400 conventional antitank mines (three kilometers of
minefields) in ten hours; under the conditions being considered, it lays
only 300 to 350 antilanding mines for one kilometer in the same time. And
for the construction of non-explosive antilanding obstacles, significantly
more forces, means, and time are required. Consequently, non-explosive
obstacles, in our opinion, can be readied and erected mainly during advance
organization of an antilanding defense of a seacoast or in case of a
protracted period between the occupation of positions by troops and the
landing of the enemy landing force.
50X1-HUM
The engineer troops of the navy and, in particular, of naval bases
take upon themselves the large tasks of installing special sea antilanding
obstacles at depths over ten meters as well as conventional obstacles in
the coastal sectors, on the approaches to fixed artillery positions, and in
other places.
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50X1-HUM
Organization of control and communications. According to the
experience of exercises, control of troops was carried out from a command
post, an alternate command post, and a rear control post. At the probable
departure line of the second wave of the corps reserves, forward command
posts were prepared. Such a system of deployment of control posts ensures
troop command.
Based on the conditions of the terrain, the possible axes of enemy
operations, and the grouping of forces and means, it is advisable to locate
the command post in the center of the battle formation of the corps, near
the routes of maneuver from which reliable control of all units of the
corps and the reserves would be ensured, and stable cooperation with a
fleet, units of the air defense of the country, and adjacent units would be
maintained.
For troop control on an axis most in danger of a landing or on one of
the remote flanks in the depth of the battle formation of the first-echelon
units, it is advisable to have an alternate command post. The rear control
post, in our view, should be located 20 to 25 kilometers from the command
post. It must be in readiness to take over control of troops in case the
command post and the alternate command post go out of action.
We believe that under the conditions being considered, the transfer of
control of the troops of the corps to the command post of one of the
divisions may have no less importance. The division commander can
successfully accomplish this task if he is briefed in advance on the
details of the concept of the conduct of the antilanding defense by the
troops of the corps, and if there are in his staff the necessary corps
documents and representatives from the cooperating forces with means of
communications.
Reliable communications in the corps have paramount significance for
control of troops. In a two-level command-staff exercise, division control
posts were located at a distance of up to 600 kilometers from the corps
command post. Radio communications with them were maintained by the radio
nets and radio links of the corps commander and staff mainly using radio
sets of medium power; they were maintained with the corps reserves by the
radio nets of the corps reserves. Radio communications with units and
subunits organizing the defense in important independent sectors of the
coast were provided through a separate link using radio sets of medium
power. Provision also was made for using the radio communications centers
of the naval bases and of an army of the air defense of the country. 50X1-HUM
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50X1-HUM
Wire telegraph and telephone communications, both secure and plain
text, were provided mainly by overhead and cable communications lines.
Communications with the first-echelon divisions and the regiments
comprising the corps commander's reserve were maintained by not less than
two independent links, which ensured their reliability.
Helicopters were widely used to deliver combat documents and in the
capacity of radio retransmitting points. We have great hopes for
communications helicopters as mobile retransmitting points that permit us
to increase significantly the communications range over ultra-shortwave
radio channels and the channels of radio-relay stations. Thus, rising to
an altitude of 60 meters, a helicopter provides two-way communications by
ultra-shortwave radio sets up to 250 kilometers. But such helicopters
require special fitting out beforehand.
cooperation communications were organized in the following manner. The
corps commander an staff maintaind communications with the commander of
the naval base by radio link through representatives of the base located at
the corps command post with their own means of communications, and also by
links by wire and radio-relay means of communications. Communications of
the chief of the rocket troops and artillery of the corps with the flag
specialist for artillery of the supporting large unit or group of ships
were maintained by radio through a representative oi`the fleet present at
the corps command post with radio means of communications, and -- in the
period of naval ship fire support of the counterattacks against the landing
force that had landed -- through spotter officers of the fleet located on
shore in the battle formations with their own radio sets. Communications
of the corps command post with supporting aviation and the air defense
forces of the country were maintained accordingly through representatives
of the aviation and an operations group of the army of the air defense of
the country. For receiving the signal which warned of the appearance of
enemy ships, all staffs of the large units of the corps had receivers on
the information radio net of the fleet, the air defense, and aviation.
A few words about the problem of stability of operation of the means
of communications under conditions of enemy delivery of nuclear strikes. In
one of the exercises, 21 nuclear strikes were delivered in the course of
two hours against the troops of an army corps and important installations
in its zone of defense. As a result, all the main communications centers
were put out of action and wire communications with the troops of the corps
were broken. For control there remained the means of radio communi.catisoxl HUM
and helicopters. In this situation commanders and staffs of large unit
and independently operating units must take all necessary steps toward
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rapid restoration of disrupted control.
Organization of coo eration between the ground forces, naval forces,
aviation, and units of te air defense of the country in support of
successfully repelling the landing of amphibious landing forces and
destroying airborne landing forces and unifying the operations taking place
over a large area simultaneously on land, sea, and in the air, is a crucial
factor, and it must be carried out with utmost precision.
Cooperation must be organized by tasks and to the full depth of
defense on the main axes where there is danger of landings. Destroying the
enemy during passage by sea, repelling the landing of the landing force,
and destroying the troops who have landed on the shore should be considered
the most typical tasks.
During destruction of the enemy in passage by sea, cooperation will he
carried out mainly between the missile units, aviation, and the naval
ships. In repelling the landing of a landing force, when all forces and
means are going consecutively into combat, cooperation is maintained among
all elements of the battle formation of the corps, and with aviation, and
the coastal missile and artillery units and the ships of the navy, and --
during the destruction of the landing force that has landed on the shore --
with the reserves of the higher commander as well.
In the course of combat with enemy amphibious landing forces, the
organization of cooperation of the corps with large units and units of the
navy is distinguished by the greatest number of specific features.
Coordinated actions can be accomplished directly only on the approach of
the landing force to the minefields and in the effective fire zone of
missile units and ground artillery. Zones for conduct of fire or targets
for destruction are allocated among the fire means; provisions are made for
recognition signals of our own ships, exchange of reconnaissance data, and
use of the reconnaissance means of the naval coastal missile and artillery
units in support of the corps and division rocket troops and artillery, and
for other actions.
For purposes of maintaining clear-cut cooperation of the fire means of
various branch arms it is necessary, in our view, to have a representative
of the naval forces command with means of communications at the command
posts of the corps and division commander, and at the fleet reconnaissance
posts (combat information post) to have a representative of the artillery
staff of a division with means of communications and signalling and5oxi HUM
tables.
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50X1-HUM
On the basis of the corps commander's decision and instructions
concerning the organization of cooperation, the staffs of the corps and
divisions develop a planning timetable or cooperation diagram, enlisting
the services of representatives of the cooperating units and large units of
the navy, aviation, and the air defense of the country.
Combat with the landing force of the enemy begins long before his
approach to the coast. Strategic missiles, naval forces, and front
aviation will deliver strikes against ports of embarkation of the landing
force and during its passage by sea.
The main task of large units and units of the corps in this period
consists of preventing the enemy's conduct of reconnaissance, concealing
the true disposition of the defense, preventing both the clearing of
antilanding obstacles by sabotage-reconnaissance groups and also preventing
their neutralization and destruction of the most important installations of
the defense. In this respect, a timely and secretly conducted antinuclear
maneuver of forces and means is exceptionally important.
With the appearance of the landing force in the outer anchorage or
maneuvering area for transports and landing ships (at a distance of 18 to
30 kilometers from the coast), large units of the corps using their own
means inflict damage on the enemy. For destroyinWthe transports, landing
craft, and warships concentrated in a limited area in the period when the
landing force is debarking from transports, all types of weapons should be
used, especially nuclear weapons.
It seems to us that battalions of tactical missiles should deliver
nuclear strikes against the landing force in the outer anchorage or
maneuvering area of the ships and especially against the areas where the
landing force forms up into waves (rendezvous).
As the landing force waves approach the shore, all fire means go into
action, and on the arrival of the enemy at a distance of 300 to 400 meters,
fire reaches its maximum intensity; the mixed minefields are brought into
action.
In the case of an enemy dropping (landing) an airborne landing force,
as well as large sabotage-reconnaissance groups, they are destroyed by
forces and means designated beforehand or taken from secondary sectors. If
there are not enough of these forces, the airborne landing force is at5OX1-HUM
first isolated and, after repulse of the amphibious landing force,
destroyed. We also see some sense in employing border guard troops and
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civil defense detachments for this purpose.
If the enemy succeeds in landing an amphibious landing force on the
coast, the actions of our troops will not in principle differ from actions
under ordinary conditions.
In conclusion, Let us express some practical desires directed at
raising the combat capabilities of the army corps in antilanding defense.
Since the corps can occupy the defense on a front of 1,000 to 1,500
kilometers, its weak area will be the low capabilities for maneuvering
troops into the landing areas of the landing forces because of the absence
of prepared road axes. Rapid maneuvering can be accomplished only by units
and subunits equipped with amphibious tanks and heavy tracked carriers.
Motorized rifle divisions of the northern type are capable, as the
experience of exercises has shown, of moving from 20 up to 40 to 50
kilometers a day over wooded-swampy or boulder-strewn terrain. To increase
the maneuverability of such divisions under roadless conditions, it is
necessary, in our view, to have in a tank regiment not less than one
battalion of amphibious tanks in constant combat readiness, and to work out
in the process of combat training with this battalion the tasks of moving
along the shortest wooded-swanTpy axes to those areas suitable for landing.
Besides this, it is also necessary to have amphibious tanks in the
tank companies of motorized rifle regiments. All of the motorized infantry
should be put in heavy tracked carriers. It is advisable to equip staffs
with vehicles with a cross-country capability. Under almost completely
roadless conditions it is also advisable to accommodate all the supply
reserves of the division in tracked carriers.
It should be mentioned that on some axes suitable for landing, the
maneuver of reserves can be accomplished only with the aid of helicopters
or transport aviation. This circumstance permits us to state that it is
necessary to attach not less than a regiment of helicopters to an army
corps fulfilling the task of an antilanding defense of the seacoast.
In order to decisively influence combat operations to destroy the
landing force at its bases and during its passage by sea, we consider it
advisable to strengthen the corps with a missile brigade of
operational-tactical missiles with a range of operation up to 300 to 500
kilometers. It is useful at the time of fulfilling the antilanding task to
resubordinate part of the fleet large units and aviation large units to t50X1-HUM
corps commander. For the purposes of combat with enemy nuclear means as
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well as for destroying the landing forces while they are landing, it is
necessary to have in the divisions artillery systems with a range of fire
of 18 to 30 kilometers.
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