MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): MATERIEL SUPPORT OF FRONT TROOPS IN AN OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE STOPPAGE OF RAIL DELIVERIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201430001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 30, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
30 October 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Materiel Support
of Front Troops in an Offensive Operation in
the InitialPeriod of War under Conditions of
the Stoppage of Rail Deliveries
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article provides an assessment of the capabilities of pipeline, air and
water transport for delivery of materiel in determining front requirements
for motor transport when the operation of railroads in a?TEFiter has been
stopped. The author examines ways of reducing the amount of motor
transport required and increasing its capacity, as well as measures taken
to improve the front rear and lighten the army rear. This article appeared
in Issue No. 2 (78) for1966. The Russian-language version was
disseminated as FIRDB-312/03788-74.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference tion have been
assigned the CONFIDENTIAL Codewor
FIRDB-312/03277-75
William E. Nels n
Deputy Director for Op rations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1966
SOURCE
ii -4 w "4 111111.1-11
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
HRDB- 312/03277-75
DATE 30 October 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Materiel Support of Front Troops in an
Offensive Operation in the Initial Period of War aiider Conditions
of the Stoppage of Rail Deliveries
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The autho777-ihis article is General-Mayor V. Yuryev. This
article provides an assessment of the capabilities of pipeline, air and
water transport for delivery of materiel in determining front requirements
for motor transport when the operation of railroads in a-TEFaer has been
stopped. The author examines ways of reducing the amount of motor
transport required and increasing its capacity, as well as measures taken
to improve the front rear and lighten the army rear.
End of Summary
Headquarters Comment:
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. The Russian-language
version of this article was disseminated as FIRDB-312/03788-74.
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Materiel Sunport of Front Troops in an Offensive
Operation in tie Initial Period of War under Conditions
of the Stoppage of Rail Deliveries
by
General-Mayor V. Yuryev
According to the views of the military leaders of the US and NATO, one
of the tasks of a nuclear attack in a theater of military operations is to
isolate the areas of combat operations and prevent the arrival in these
areas of reserves and materiel from the interior. It is expected that up
to 20 percent of the total amount of nuclear warheads will be allocated for
the achievement of this aim.
In considering the consequences that may be suffered by a front rear
as a result of an exchange of nuclear strikes, we should point out that it
is primarily the rail lines of transportation in the operational rear that
will be subjected to heavy and massive destrUction.
It is known that the rail network is better developed in the Western
Theater of Military Operations. But even here, in operations in the
initial period of a war, one cannot count on the wide-scale use of rail
deliveries in territory that has been captured from the enemy. The NATO
Command is adopting serious measures to hinder the operations of troops in
captured territory, to slow their rates of advance, to disrupt the
operation of transportation facilities, primarily the railroads, and in
this way prevent the arrival of reserves and materiel and technical means
from the interior to the areas of combat operations.
We should also keep in mind the fact that there will be a very limited
number of railroad troops and military railroad operating formations in a
front during operations in the initial period of a war. The results of
operational command-staff exercises show that in the Western Theater of
Military Operations, for example, railroad brigades, separate railroad
operating regiments and special formations of the Ministry of Railroads
will arrive at the fronts of the first strategic echelon only on the fifth
to eighth day of an operation, or even later. Thus, they will hardly be
able to perform any substantial rail restoration work before the end of a
front operation which lasts 10 to 12 days.
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If we assume that a railroad brigade arrives at the front on D3 and
rail restoration work begins on D4 or D5, then by D12 it will have restored
no more than 160 to 180 kilometers* of one rail line where the depth of the
operation is 1,000 kilometers or more. By deploying another railroad
brigade to this same line on D7-D8 it may be possible to restore a total of
320 to 350 kilometers of railroad before D12. The length of the land
supply line will have reached 500 kilometers by D4-D5 and will increase to
600 kilometers on subsequent days of the operation.
One also cannot count on the use of local railroad operating
organizations in support of the fronts. Even isolated sections of
railroads that have withstood nuclear strikesand are suitable for train
movements cannot be used immediately without special agencies (military
railroad operating directorates, their branches, railroad operating
regiments and others).
Thus, any significant amount of operational and supply movement over
the railroads can be carried out only in a small section from the state
border to the regulating stations of the front, that is, in the rear area
assigned to the front at the beginning of the operation. The role of rail
transport in the operationalrear in territory captured in the course of an
offensive by the troops will be very small.
All of this leads to the conclusion that under present conditions rail
transport, which earlier had played the main role in the rear of a front,
has become an auxiliary form of transport. _Motor transport and pipe-TIFF
transport have become the main forms of transport at the operational level
of supply.
*The rate of rail restoration is assumed to be 20 to 25 kilometers per day
for one railroad brigade, or an average of 22 kilometers per day, and 45 to
50 kilometers per day for two railroad brigades, or an average of 47
kilometers per day. See the article by Hero of Socialist Labor
General-Leytenant of Technical Troops P. Bakarev and Colonel K. Pavlovich,
"Some Questions of Ensuring the Survivability of Railroad Lines of
Transportation in Modern Operations", Collection of Articles of the Journal
"Tyl i Snabzheniye Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" (Rear and Supply of the
Soviet Armed Forces), No. 54, 1964.
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In our opinion it is precisely this situation which must be considered
in organizing the integrated use of all types of transport in the interests
of the timely delivery of materiel and technical means at the operational
levels of supply. This requires that an entire series of steps be taken
for improving the forms of organization and operation and for further
technical equipping of front and army rear control organs as well as many
large units, units and TEETIlties of the rear.
* * *
The need of front troops for transport means for bringing up supplies
in the course of an operation is determined first of all by the expected
expenditure of materiel, which in turn depends on the fighting strength of
the front, the planned rates of advance, the depth and duration of the
operation, and the terrain.
According to the results of operational command-staff exercises, for a
front consisting of three combined-arms armies, a tank army, an air army
and means of reinforcement (a total of up to 20 motorized rifle and tank
divisions), the average daily expenditure of materielat high rates of
advance* may reach 20 thousand tons, including 11 to 12 thousand tons of
fuel. On the whole, for an operation with a depth of 1,000 kilometers and
a duration of 12 days the amount of materiel required to cover expenditures
may be 300 thousand tons, including up to 80 thousand tons of ammunition,
up to 180 thousand tons of fuel, up to 8,000 tons of rations and up to 30
thousand tons of other types of materiel (within limits of 15 percent by
weight of the main types of materiel).
This maximum expenditure of materiel is taken without consideration
for losses of armament, combat and motor transport equipment, and
personnel. Obviously calculations of transport requirements should be
determined on the basis of maximum expenditure since in the course of an
operation a front will be reinforced with motorized rifle and tank
divisions and, ina number of cases, armies.
*Of course, at other rates of advance all of the author's calculations
reflecting the troops' needs for transport and repair and restoration means
will be different.
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What about the needs of a front for means of transport of materiel
when the operation of the railroads has been stopped? Naturally the needs
for motor transport can be determined correctly only if an accurate
evaluation is made of the capabilities of other types of transport used in
an operation, in particular pipeline, air, and water transport.
Pipeline transport is the form which is the most promising, relatively
less vulnerable and rather economical. It should become the chief means of
supplying fuel from the rear bases of fronts (from branches) deployed at
the railheads to mobile front bases and their branches. In our opinion a
front in the main theaters OT military operations must have enough pipeline
brigades to lay pipelines in the zone of advance of each combined-arms and
tank army and one pipeline for the air army.
It is very important that the rate at which main pipelines are laid be
increased sharply. In fact, the new principle for joining pipes invented
by the fuel supply service of the Carpathian Military District makes it
possible to lay pipeline at a rate of up to five kilometers per hour. This
will significantly increase the efficiency of main field pipelines.
In our opinion the readiness times of pipeline units and large units
should be reexamined with the aim of reducing these periods as much as
possible. But this is only one side of the matter. We must attempt to
reach the position in which the materiel for pipeline large units and units
will be located in the theaters of military operations and their manning
can be accomplished in not more than one to two days.
If we consider that one brigade will begin laying pipe on the second
day, two on the third day and one on the fourth day of an operation, then
before the end of the operation they will be able to supply up to 50
thousand tons of fuel (with 150-mm pipeline) where the fuel needs are 180
thousand tons. On the basis of days of the operation (at the indicated
pipe-laying rates), fuel delivery may reach 1,000 tons by the end of D2,
3,000 tons by the end of D3, 4,000 tons per day for D4-D9, 5,000 tons for
D10 and 7,000 to 8,000 tons per day for D11-D12. (In these calculations it
is assumed that only 50 percent of the fuel capacity of the pipeline is
actually delivered to the troops while the remaining fuel is used to fill
the pipelines.)
Air transport should be used primarily for the delivery of missiles
and missile propellant and to deliver conventional types of materiel in
support of the tank army.
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The delivery of missiles and missile propellant by land (using special
vehicles) becomes particularly difficult by D4-D5, when the reserves of
previously prepared missiles have been expended and the supply lines for
motor transport reach 500 kilometers. Under such conditions the movement
of missiles or missile propellant by land becomes an extremely complex if
not hopeless operation. Therefore it is important to use air transport to ,
supply the rocket troops with nuclear warheads, missiles and missile
propellant.
Calculations show that approximately one regiment of M7-6 (MI-10)
helicopters and one regiment of AN-8 (AN-12) aircraft must be used to
supply a front with "surface-to-surface" and "surface-to-air" missiles and
missile propellant.
The air transport delivery of fuel and ammunition for a tank army in
an amount equal to the average daily expenditure would require at least one
military air transport division by D4-D5. If we consider that a military
air transport division can make one and a half trips per day, it could
deliver 12 to 14 thousand tons of fuel in seven to eight days.
Water transport, in our opinion, can be used only on coastal axes and,
for use on a broad scale (to support the needs of one to two armies),
cannot be used earlier than D4-D5. These time periods result from the
geographic position of the Warsaw Pact countries. At the same time,
straits zones must be captured to facilitate ship movements. In addition,
before transports can put to sea with materiel it will be necessary to
carry out decisive strikes against enemy ship groupings, sweep for mines in
channels, clear moorages, etc. All of these are difficult tasks requiring
personnel, equipment and time.
If we assume that from D5 maritime transport can meet the daily needs
of one army, this would amount to the delivery of 30 to 32 thousand tons of
materiel by D12.
Thus, up to 100 thousand tons out of a total requirement of 300
thousand tons can be supplied to an operation by pipeline, air and maritime
transport. Obviously the remaining materiel (up to 200 thousand tons) must
be delivered by motor transport.
According to calculations, the unit means and army means of transport
bring up materiel (40 thousand tons) during the first two days of an
operation. If we estimate that the army transport of three combined-arms
armies can complete one more trip in the course of the next ten days of the
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operation and deliver up to nine to ten thousand tons of supplies, then on
the whole the army means and unit means of transport can deliver up to 50
thousand tons of materiel during an operation.
An air army using its unit means and army means of motor transport is
capable of fully supporting the delivery of approximately 32 to 35 thousand
tons of supplies (not taking into account the delivery of fuel by pipeline)
in the course of an entire operation. In addition, 10 to 15 thousand tons
of materiel may be brought up by railroad for the bomber aviation. (This
is made possible by the fact that bomber aviation is based deep in the rear
area of a front in the first four to six days of an operation.)
Front large units and units, and rear large units, units and
facilities located deep in the rear area of a front, as well as large units
and units passing through this area can deliver up to 15 thousand tons with
their own means of motor transport during the period of an operation.
On the whole, 110 to 115 thousand tons may be delivered by the motor
transport of armies, large units, units and facilities during the period of
a front offensive operation. A front's motor transport system can deliver
approximately 85 to 90 thousand tons of supplies beginning at D3, or eight
to nine thousand tons daily. At least nine motor transport battalions (1.5
motor transport brigades) equipped with five-ton trucks are required for
this delivery.
However, because the length of the supply line increases daily by 80
to 100 kilometers, the turn-around rate of the motor transport will be
reduced. Thus, the one and a half motor transport brigades that arrived at
the separate forward front base on D3 (a distance of 200 to 250
kilometers), will return on D4 from the rear front base (its branch
deployed on the state border line) and will bring inateriel to the new
separate forward front base (or mobile army base) only on D7. Subsequently
these one and a half motortransport brigades will make a complete round
trip (separate forward front base - separate rear front base - separate
forward front base), where theaverage daily run is 300 kilometers, only by
, the end of D12.
The motor transport of the front assigned to deliver materiel
beginning on D4-D5 can make two trips before D12, while that assigned on D6
or later can make only one trip. The nine motor transport battalions which
deliver materiel to the separate forward front base on D4 can make the
second trip on D9, while those that deliver materiel on D5 can make their
second trip only at the end of D11.
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Thus, if we proceed on the basis that a front must deliver eight to
nine thousand tons of cargo to its troops daily to replenish expended
supplies, it will be necessary for a front to have five or six motor
transport brigades. As far as materiel reservesrequired at the end of an
operation are concerned, with this number of vehicles available for supply
the reserves could be built up only by D15-D16 OM the second trip of the
brigades that delivered materiel on D6-D8).
The need for motor transport in a front may increase or decrease
depending upon the availability and time Fremployment of other types of
transport (pipeline, air and water). All other conditions being equal, if
a front were allotted two military air transport divisions rather than one,
the need for motor transport would be reduced to eight to nine motor
transport battalions (1.5 brigades). If we increased the scope of the
water (maritime) transport supply system so that it can support two armies
rather than one, the need for motor transport would also be reduced
somewhat.
We believe, however, that one must be careful in approaching the
question of reducing motor transport supply. In calculating the need for
motor transport we must consider the most favorable conditions under which
other forms of transport will be used: for pipelines -- a pipeline brigade
can deliver fuel beginning on D2-D5; for air transport -- one military air
transport division can make one complete trip per day beginning On D3; for
water transport -- a supply capacity of 30 to 32 thousand tons beginning on
D5. The times and distances required to bypass zones of radioactive
contamination are also not taken into consideration.
If the number of pipeline brigades is reduced by one, the need for
motor transport increases by seven to eight motor transport battalions
(considering the turn-around rate of the motor transport). A delay in
laying pipelines will lead to an increase in the length of the motor
transport supply line (meaning an increase in the amount of motor transport
required) since its turn-around rate will be reduced.
At the present level of industrial development there are real ways of
reducing the amount of motor transport in a front. The first way is to
increase the carrying capacity of the vehicles; improvedmechanization of
loading and unloading operations can increase the turn-around rate of
supply vehicles; the introduction of containerized shipments; increasing
the technical reliability of motor vehicles entering the service of the
army. In addition, the presence of two drivers per vehicle in front and
army motor transport supply units (this is already being put into practice)
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makes it possible to increase the distance traveled in one day from 250-300
to 500 kilometers, which also reduces the overall need for motor transport
vehicles.
The question of motor vehicles used for the transport of fuel also
deserves the most serious attention. It is known that the total
expenditure (and therefore the amount that must be supplied) of fuel is
more than 60 percent by weight of all materiel required by the troops in an
operation. In fact, the ratio of tanker trucks to general-purpose trucks
(by cargo capacity) in large units and formations is 1:3 and 1:4. But
this, if we may say so, is a purely formal calculation. What is alarming
is the fact that there are so few special-purpose tanker trucks in the
national economy. Instead of tanker trucks, the troops are receiving
general-purpose trucks with drums which unquestionably will not replace
special-purpose tanker trucks with respect to carrying capacity,
turn-around rate, or speed in loading or unloading the fuel.
Moreover, the pumping facilities and fueling equipment of the fuel
supply service at the present time are not suitably adapted to supplying
the troops with fuel from drums. Powerful and highly efficient refueling
stations and loading facilities (conveyer-type drum hoists and drum loading
equipment) are needed in the tactical, army, and front rear to load and
unload fuel Owe are talking about tens of thousands of drums). This work
cannot be performed without mechanization of loading operations and a
certain increase in the number of personnel at the fuel depots. In
addition, the tactical, army, and front depots must obviously have a
turn-around system so that full drums can be exchanged for empty ones
during the resupply process.
These proposals are suggested because of the present unfavorable
conditions under which the troops are being supplied with special tanker
trucks. But this is only a half-measure in our opinion. We must gradually
build up the special-purpose tanker trucks as an "emergency reserve" of the
troops, primarily in tank and motorized rifle large units.
The army and front rear. Measures taken in recent years to improve
the front rear and lighten the army rear have significantly increased their
capability to provide rear support to modern offensive operations. The
army rear has become more mobile and capable of operating when separated
from the railroads. This is very important. The organizational structure
and equipment of the front rear have improved and their capabilities have
increased. The very system of the front rear has become more streamlined,
stable and reliable.
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But in our opinion all the problems have not been solved. A further
improvement of the organizational structure and technical equipment of the
army and front rear is necessary.
For example, it is very important to increase the mobility of the army
base of a tank army. According to norms and calculations, the mobile army
base depots of an army must have up to 3,000 tons of various types of
supplies, including up to 1,800 tons of fuel. But the load-carrying
capacity of the tanker trucks is 2,700 to 2,800 tons. Obviously it would
not be advantageous to solve the problem of increasing the mobility of an
army base by reducing the amount of supplies that they must carry; such
supplies are limited and can support the replenishment of expenditures for
an average operation of one to two days. An increase in the number of army
motor transport battalions would make the army rear unwieldy and
overloaded. Also, this would not be reasonable for economic
considerations.
The more correct approach is to increase the cargo-carrying capacity
of the motor transport system. If the motor transport battalions of an
army were supplied with three- and five-ton vehicles, three separate motor
transport battalions could transport 2,100 to 3,100 tons of supplies. The
cargo-carrying capacity of the motor transport should also be increased in
the combined-arms armies.
The front rear represents the connecting link between the rear of the
country and the rear of an operating army. This leads to a differentiation
of its functions: on the one hand, the task of receiving materiel,
armament and reserves from the deep rear ties the front rear to the
railroads as the primary means of the rieneral Headquarters delivering
everything required by the fronts in land theaters of military operations;
on the other hand, the high rates of advance, the fast flow of operations,
the great expenditures of materiel, the broad-scale destruction of rail
lines and the slow rates of their restoration require that the front rear
and its supply reserves not lag behind the troops under such coil-ET-ions and
that they be capable of providing close support to the combat operations of
troops that are separated from the rail lines.
Experience gained in operational command-staff exercises shows that,
beginning on the third or fourth day and until the end of an operation, the
troops of a front receive materiel as a rule every two or three days from
forward front basebranches deployed on the ground. This requires an
increaseiri?The mobility of the forward front bases so that they can be
moved with the least possible expenditure of means, and time. This
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can be done by lightening as much as possible the equipment of the base
depots, replacing the RG-16 and RG-25 containers for fuel with rubberized
containers, replacing slow-running tractors, cumbersome engineer
terrain-preparation equipment, heavy loading and uAkoading mechanisms, etc.
A forward front base should have two branches. A front should have three
or four bases, one for each combined-arms and tank army.
The best results are achieved if the operation of the bases is
organized as follows: in the initial position the troops should be
supplied from the rear front bases and their branches during the first two
to three days of an operation to a depth of 200 to 250 kilometers.
Subsequently, forward front bases (their branches) should be deployed after
each 200 to 250 kilometers (every two to three days of the operation). In
this way any forward front base could support the combat operations of one
army as well as front large units and units operating in the army area to
depths up to 800 kilometers.
In conclusion we would like to say several words about control.
During the first days of an operation the commanders of the VOSO (military
transportation service) of the armies (primarily of the border military
districts and the groups of forces) are called upon to organize rail
shipments to a much lesser degree now than previously. Their main task in
the course of an operation will be to organize motor transport shipments.
They are still nbt adequately prepared to carry out this function; they do
not have special training or operating experience. Almost the same
situation can be observed in the military districts (fronts). If the road
service in the VOSO of a military district is represented by a group of
officers in peacetime, the motor transport supply service is the
responsibility of only one man on whose shoulders lies the entire weight of
control of motor transport large units and units charged with the delivery
of materiel. It would be best if the training of VOSO specialists were
organized in such a way that they could control not only rail (water)
shipments but motor transport and air shipments as well.
In addition, in peacetime the VOSO organizations of the districts
(groups of forces) should have, without changing their numerical strength,
three or four officer-specialists responsible for motor transport and air
shipments.
These are our proposals for further improving the rear of the front
and the motorization and mechanization of certain rear large units, units
and facilities.
TS #208527
Copy # 13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201430001-6
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(RFT
FIRDB-312/03277-75
Page 14 of 14 Pages
Certainly one can either agree or disagree with the author's opinions
on the quantity and composition of the motor transport, pipeline and air
transport of a front. More detailed calculations and special exercises are
needed in order to clarify this question. The important thing is to note
the correct ways of preparing the operational rear for war on the basis of
an analysis of the possible conditions under which it will function in
operations during the initial period of a war.
50X1 -HUM
TS #208527
Copy #0
TO CRET
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201430001-6