MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY STAFF OPERATING METHODOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100270001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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SOME WAYS OF FURTHER IMPROVING
STAFF PERATT METH DOLOG
by Colonel Yu. Yakunin,
Candidate of Military Sciences
The increasing complexity of troop command calls for
particularly high requirements for scientifically organizing the
creative work of control organs. It is not by chance, therefore,
that in recent years the military press has begun to devote
considerably more attention to the problem of improving troop
-command in general, and to staff operating methodology in
particular.
V. I. Lenin urged the serious study of the theories of
scientific control an.{ advised, "to beware of enthusiasm for
command, know first how to deal with that which science already
has produced" (Complete Works, Volume 42, page 347). The
problems of scientific control were profoundly developed by
M. V. Frunze, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, B. M. Shaposhnikov, and other
Soviet military leaders.
What are the basic tasks of the theory of scientific troop
cgjfral? This theory is called upon to reveal an explore
conformity in control processes, to determine the principles
of troop command in the interest of reaching maximum productivity
in administrative work. In addition, it gives specific
recommendations pertaining to the work of generals and officers
for example, standards and a detailed account of the duration of
the work of staffs in general, and of the activities of each
executor. Specific recommendations help to fully occupy all
personnel of control organs with purposeful work in accordance
with an established schedule, taking into account the qualifi-
cations and abilities of the executors. This is very important,
for organization of this kind can avoid bustle, nervousness,
uncertainty, waiting, pointless and frequent summons of
subordinates to their chiefs, and other vices of disorganized
work.
Troop control in general, and staff operating methodology
in particular, obtain further development only if the theory
of scientific control is based on Marxist-Leninist methodology,
and comprehensively takes into account the rules and methods
of cybernett ns, statistics. psycholn v. and nrae_tical field
experience.
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Speaking of scientific methods, we would like to emphasize
the special role of the methods of cy exm_et;cs which allow deeper
penetration into the essence of control and disclosure of the
fundamentals of staff operating methodology, since in general
this method represents a precise determination of the component
parts and the entire scope of the problems being solved, and
the sequence of their implementation. The mathema j methods
Q bernPti- s facilitate working out scientifically valid
schedules of staff activities such as, for example, adopting
a plan under various conditions of a situation. The network
method of p annincr or the order
z T determines the bnt? imam t,a,-; a.,t-fof carrying out very complicated measures. It is highly convenient
for monitoring and operational command, especially in the planning
for bringing troops to full combat readiness and for working out
coordination.
The experience of the foremost staffs of military districts
and armies attests that statistical methoda-ahould be used more
Wldely for the crew i nn njai Anti f{.. ., ..r.t.~d v WOr S In COI1 OI
organs. It is well known that military statistics are used~o -"
stu~'fcy the quantitative characteristics and activities of staffs.
They help systematize the volume of work, properly assess functional
responsibilities and the optimum composition of working groups,
establish work standards, and, as a result, raise the productivity
of staff work. The experience of employing methods of cybernetics
and statistics in staffs keenly suggests the question of developing
standards of administrative work and formalizing a great bulk of
documents. Such standards significantly facilitate the planning
of work, heighten its efficiency, and permit specific definition
of the requirement for operational preparation.
In widely using the laws of cybernetics and statistics, Qe
must` not re`t- quantitative characteristics
of administrative processes, wher command has qualitatiyA
.tide
-l -- _ _ -
s an
Therefore, in the research of scientific staff operating
methodology it is necessary to take into consideration, for
example, moral and political aspects, and the requirements of
psychology, ethics, and esthetics. In particular, it is a
question of ways of strengthening a congenial relationship among
staff personnel and of building a more favorable creative
atmosphere. Research shows that timely assessment, say, of
the psychological aspects--proper relations between chiefs and
subordinates, gut ority of the supervisor, a system of encourage-
ment and punishment, an atmosphere of comradeship, initiative
and creativity, normal working conditionssrensures a great
upgrading of staff work productivity and at times even predetsj,,711q6o
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the success of control. According to the data of psychologists,
a man in the process of work usually uses only about ten percent
of his physical and mental capacities. The supervisor's task
is to create all the conditions for maximum utilization of such
an enormous reserve of human capabilities.
In the practice of operational preparation, such an approach
to scientific troop control is not always observed. Many staffs
of formations spend nine to fourteen hours and more just on
preparation, adopting-
dopting a plan, and the allocation of tasks to
subordinate staffs; and the entire process of assigning tasks
to subunits sornetiies takes twenty to twenty-four hours . It
appears that field commands literally "devour" time which is
so necessary for the purposeful training of troops for combat
actions, so that the process of adopting a plan does not always
flow in an organized and precise manner.
Such activity of separate control organs, in our view, is
explained by the very slow and al n of _tse
methods of scientific troop control,__and also by the great
persistence of archaic concepts of staff operating methodology
in operational situations. There is a widespread view that
the work methods of formation commanders and staffs supposedly
have no clearly expressed regularity, since the work methods
are predetermined by specific conditions and, especially, by
the work style of the formation commander and chief of staff.
Sometimes the question of scientifically based staff operating
methodology is directly related to the degree of automation
of the control process, ,a oug full automations y
at operations -strategic levels, is still in the distant
future.
Of all the complicated problems of scientific troop control
we will examine only the specific question of the possibility
of creating and using a single scientific method adopting a
plan and allocating tasks to executors in all staffs from top
to bottom, on the scale, for example, of a front, and also the
12rinciples, which, in our opinion, can be assumed to be the
basis of this scientific method.
Sometimes the question is asked: is it possible to recommend
a single specific method in staff work for adopting a plan in a
front operation being prepared in peacetime or, even more so,
at the beginning or during the course of a war? it is known
that at any given time troop commanders and staffs will be
required to take almost instantaneous action in solving highly
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complex problems. Some comrades question the possibility of
working out such a method. In doing so, they usually allude
to the varied nature of the problems, their magnitude; and the
specificity of the conditions of a situation for the pertinent
staff, with the result that each plan must have its own
distinctive approach. Of course, the conditions under which
the plan is adopted exert a definite influence over the nature
of work of a given staff, but surely there just cannot be an
infinite number of work methods of adopting a plan.
It occurs to us that all the objective conditions exist
for the creation of a single scientific method in staff work,
the whole complexity of this problem notwithstanding. If
examined by analogy with algorithms in the mathematical method
of solutions, the process of adopting a plan for an operation
and allocating tasks to troops consists of the-same elements
at all levels of control and is worked out in the same sequence:
co collation of info* a~-Lon
c jari fir_atzanp
mis~ice, adoptingthp o an, allocation of tasks, and monitoring.
Staffs and other control organs have the same uniform structural
makeup in all instances. The differs
volume and content of problems to be sole d and of the period
o time required for their solution, so it predetermines only
the scale of the work.
Consequently, from the standpoint of the quantitative
nature of control processes, the possibility of working out a
single scientific method for staff functions cannot be denied.
It corroborates both the experience of operational preparation
and the experiments conducted by the Red Banner Belorussian and
Volga Military Districts.
In our opinion, in adopting a plan, there can be the
following basic staff operating methodologies: consecutive
parallel and so-called directed, and also combinations of them.
Each of them has its own specific features.
The method of consecutive work is best represented in
situations when the time factor does not exert a decisive
influence, for example, up until the beginning of war. It is
set forth in detail in manuals and regulations, and consists of
clarification of the problem, a detailed estimate of the situation
with due attention to the comprehensive reports of the chiefs of
arms of troops and services, conduct of reconnaissance, adopting
a plan, announcing it, working up the orders, directives, and
instructions, etc. This process is followed strictly from tor50x1-HUM
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to bottom right to the tactical level. In general, several
days are spent on this on the scale of a front. This method
undoubtedly is scientifically valid and ensures the most
complete solution to all problems. However, it is unacceptable
during a threatening period, and even less acceptable in wartime.
In wartime all staffs use the method of parallel work for
adopting a plan and allocation of tasks to the executors on the
basis of preliminary instructions; and only this method ensures
the essential reduction of time in the.process of adopting a
plan at all front and army command levels and rapid allocation
of tasks to un and subunits. In the Red Banner Belorussian
Military District synchronized parallel staff work permitted
shortening the process of implementing General Staff directives
on a task for tactical elements from twenty-four to seven to
eight hours. Such an experience undoubtedly deserves attention.
This method for the activities of control organs is aimed first
of all at maximum gain in time without lowering the quality of
work. It is fundamental in combat conditions, when it is
necessary to quickly adopt a new plan and allocate or clarify
tasks from top to bottom.
The third method, directed, is used primarily when almost
instant reaction is required to a situation which has developed.
The troop commander of the front or armies directing the
operation makes a decision at definite times during the operation
to clarify the operational plan and issues the necessary
instructions personally or through-his staff.
In the overwhelming majority of cases the method of parallel.
work in the process of adopting a plan is the rinci al one
used. In our view, the fundamental experience of the Red Banner
Belorussian, Volga, and Carpathian Military Districts, can be
stipulated to be the following basic principles of staff
operating methodology.
The first principle is the o timum distribution of functional
duties among command personnel and the staffs of a front, armies
and d vis ons; and between command posts, departments, and working
groups and the executors within each of these echelons.
Each staff, its component elements, and officer-executors
must determine specific duties and individual assignments and
break down the process of their fulfilment in time periods in
conformity with the basic work schedule. It must be clear what
should be resolved independently, and which problems should have
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guidance. The formation commander and his closest assistants
should proceed on the basis that under modern conditions they
can resolve only the main problems in short periods of time,
and otherwise leave the initiative to subordinates. For example,
it is advisable that chiefs of arms of troops and services, on
the basis of the concept of the operation, submit for the
formation commander's approval not a report but a plan ~ for the
utilization of the troops subordinate to them. Only then will
they actually become true assistants to the formation commander
and organizers of the combat use of the arms of troops.
In determining the functional responsibilities of generals
and officers it is necessary to take into account skilled and
unskilled work, the capabilities and inclinations of executors,
the time needed for preparation and the order of priority for
finishing each document. It is necessary to free thg_mogt
capable and creative off icer-a _f Yom d?tio 7_S,__; h can easily be
performers hr__~ tin i pr Officers raf gmen and typi.-ts. In this
respect,?an analysis of the work of the officer-operator in
exercises conducted in the Red Banner Belorussian Military
District deserves attention. The analysis showed that the
.% officer-operator spent a3mos ha f of his working time pasting
together maps and coloring situations plotted on them, drawing
up documents in the secret section, making an inventory of
materiel, and other things. These deficiencies are the
consequence of an improper T /O for staff directorates and
apartments. For example, the directorates of a front staff
have one junior officer for about-30 senior officers, and one
draftsman for 40 officers. It appears to us that it would be
more rational for an operational directorate of a front staff
to have thirty to forty percent senior and junior o-Mcers,
ten to fifteen percent draftsmen, and no less than ten percent
clerks out of the total T/0 of a directorate. In this case, up
to forty percent more experienced and trained officers could
raise the productivity of work twofold, and on the whole the
pace and quality of the work of the directorates and departments
would increase significantly. As a result, the performance of
duty by officers would improve, and the total costs of main-
taining staffs in general would be reduced.
The experience of operational preparation has shown that,
to regulate the functional responsibilities of generals and
officers, it is very important not to change the basic tasks
assigned to them from exercise to exercise. It is advisable
to set forth in the work books specific duties, the time required
to fulfil them, a standard work schedule for a command post
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(forward command post, rear command post) in the process of
adopting a plan, samples of completed documents and standardized
blank forms, important operational-tactical estimates and memos,
radio operating data for communication with the staffs two
echelons lower, and also sheets for notes and transmission of
instructions or messages. It is useful to keep these work
books permanently and to improve their contents during exercises
and in the course of training sessions for officers.
The second principle is broad tpecialization/as the basis
of sharply increasing productivityin staff work. It is known,
for example, that the operational directorate of a front staff
has operational and information departments, but the operational
department of an army staff has no specialized sections. This
is likewise the situation in other directorates and departments
of staffs. The experience of the past war and of postwar
exercises has shown that the operational directorate and
department solve the following problems in parallel and contin-
uously: planning, information, the work of the branches, the
duties of communications officers, work at the forward command
post, and various organizational problems. Accordingly, similar
working groups are set up in exercises, and in other directorates
and departments are usually set up groups for planning, information,
and control, or branch officers.
However, sometimes objections are raised against such a
compartmented principle of staff work allocation which has been
formulated in practice. It is thought, for example, that a
planning department should not be created in the operational
directorate of a front staff, because it is impossible to
separate planning functions from the assigning of tasks to
troops and the monitoring of their actions. It apparently is
deemed inadvisable to designate branch officers in an operational
directorate and department, since it supposedly leads to the
narrowing of officer-operator specialization and lessens his
knowledge of the general situation. In many cases the thought is
expre fficer-operator 'should e a e to ski ully
solve the major problems connected with maintaining control of
troop combat actions.
In our opinion there is no more dangerous tendency in the
theory of control than the denial of the principle of specialization
in staff work. This principle is the basis of scientific
organization of control in general. If an officer-operator is
charged with the planning of combat actions, then required to
report on the condition of any given army, and, finally, macR5oXl-HUM
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to prepare a situation report, then these tasks will be carried
out in an imprecise, impranptu, and unskilled manner. It is
clear that in such a statement of the problem one cannot seriously
talk about ways of attaining a high level of efficiency in staff
work.
Meanwhile there is talk not only of specialization but also
of of so-called narrow specialists. It is
the direct route to solving the problem of the time factor. It
is imQox?a i iat specialization be scientifically based, and
rat onal. We do not reject the principle of interchangeability
of officers of a staff, but that is another question. In
peacetime an officer-operator should prepare himself for
solving all problems which may be placed before him, but first
and foremost he must be a virtuoso-specialist in his assigned
activity in wartime.
The third principle is the organization of the work process
of a formation commander and staff when adopting- a plan for an
operation in a definite sequence and in a minimum amount of
time in order to attain synchronization in the work of field
directorates and all their elements from top to bottom. For this
the entire activity of formation commanders and staffs must be
regulated by a corresponding work schedule.
The fourth principle is the organization of parallel
activity within a command post and in all subordinate staffs
on the basis of a single methodology and an adopted concept of
the plan. The experience of operational preparation has shown
that the optimum variant in the work of control organs can be
attained by organizing the work of staffs, chiefs of arms of
troops, services, and chiefs of subordinate staffs, on the
basis of preliminary instructions given after adopting the
concept of the plan. According to the experience of the work
of front field directorates, the concept of a front tion
canoe formulate in ne o one and nnP-half hours af?ej
receipt of the General Staff direct'
e. The preliminary
instructions for the army, which were prepared on the basis of
the concept, indicate the position of the army in the operational
makeup of the front, the missions or the axis of the offensive,
and the boundaries between formations. With this data available
the chiefs of arms of troops and services of the front and the
chiefs of subordinate staffs can start their work in parallel
with the front staff without waiting for the final adoption of
the plan and receipt of the directive. This gains five to six
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To attain positive results, it is necessary to resolutely
reject archaic methods of adopting a plan, wherein officer-
operators first prepared proposals and then repeatedly refined
them. From the very beginning, the work must be performed as
a collective. From the moment of receipt of the directive of
the General Staff until the allocation of tasks to the-troops,
and also during the operation, the front troop commander must
always have with him the chief of sta , a member of the
Military Council, the chiefs of the operational and intelligence
directorates, and the chief of rocket troops and artillery.
The front troop commander personally adopts the plan on
the map, while the remaining generals and officers actively
assist him. All resolved problems are immediately plotted by
officer-operators on two maps (formalizing the decision and the
operations plan). The place where the collective work of this
grow of supervisory a Bonne of a field directorate takes
p ace is customarily called the con ro cen er. ere are
located the planning group and branch officers of the operational
directorate. The remaining personnel attend as requested, but
preferably in accordance with the work schedule.
In line with their functional duties officer-operators
must have samples, and preferably completed forms. The moment
work is completed on the concept or other problems of the plan,
branch officers must present the completed forms of preliminary
instructions and directives for signature and immediately relay
them to their subordinate staffs through their assistants, using
technical means of communication. The deputy chief of staff, or
another responsible person, takes the concept to the chiefs of
arms of troops and service who by this time have assembled in the
control center so they can, in parallel, work out a plan for the
use of the troops subordinate to them. This is their way of
allocating tasks as required by instructions and regulations.
During the preparation of the plans, the chiefs of arms of troops
and services submit them, according to the schedule, to the troop
commander of the front or army for approval.
At a certain point the group of supervisory workers at
the control center may be temporarily divided into two parts.
For example, after determining the concept of the operation,
the formation commander will continue to work on the plan, while
the chief of staff, along with the chief of intelligence, the
chief of rocket troops and artillery, and other necessary
officers, in parallel, will prepare proposals for delivery of
the first nuclear strike, and report them to the formation 50X1 HUM
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commander in one to two hours. This shortens the total time
needed to reach a decision.
After the map for the plan has been completed (according
to experience, five to six hours), all directives and instructions,
which had already been prepared by this time on standard forms
are immediately signed and forwarded to subordinate headquarters.
By this method, the plan adopted for the operation need not be
explained to the generals and officers of the field command,
since, while the plan is being worked on, each of them learns
everything necessary about that part of it which pertains to
him.
If all the signed directives and instructions arrive at
the subordinate staffs at approximately the same time, the work
of these staffs is significantly facilitated. In particular,
army staffs will know the general contents of these documents
from the preliminary instructions relayed by the branch officers
while the plan was still being worked on at the front; and that
is why the staffs can make the very essential clay ications
in the army plans and immediately start allocating tasks to the
troops.
The fifth principle is a desirable disposition of command
posts and their elements which will be conducive to shortening
t e contact time between them. It has a significance of no
small importance for attaining a high level of efficiency in
the work of control organs. With this view, as is known, its
advan Pal=a to-situ=ate*--hprzr' i1a ements of control posts
close to each other, although the rote gists of viability
is ate their dispersal at intervals of three to five kilometers.
In our opinion this problem should be solved differentially.
Such independent elements of -a command post as the air defense
command post, the operational group of the air army, the
topographic department, and the support group can be situated
two to three kilometers and more from the location of the
troop commander. It is advantageous to deploy the leading
directorates and departments not far from the control center
(250 to 500 meters). de en secure, selecti it =it
communication is estab fished between the most important
elements, these distances can be increased.
Finally, the sixth principle is the organization of
continuous representation at the front comman st of
appropriate personnel from the forward command post, the rear
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control post, and the replacement staff, for more efficient
solution of problems which may arise, especially during the
course of an operation.
These, in our view, are the general principles and some
proposals on staff operating methodology during the drawing up
of a plan by a front and by armies in short periods of time, and
in light of the requirements of the theory of scientific troop
control.
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