MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SUPPORT OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DURING AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100220001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 13, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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GENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
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13 July 1973
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Support of Transport
Aircraft During Airborne Operations
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Military Thought." The article states that
airborne operations are likely to fail without special measures
to protect transport aircraft from air defense missiles and
fighters. Special measures suggested are the creation of a
corridor through missile defenses by air and missile strikes,
and the destruction of fighter aircraft on the ground. The
MIG-21 is said to have low combat effectiveness against enemy
fighters. As replacements for it, two new fighters are recom-
mended, a light one to escort transports in the forward area
and a heavy fighter to provide cover to a depth of 1000 kilo-
meters. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencici 50X1-HUM
364puty ' W. E. Colby
Directo for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY
USSR
DATE OF
Early
1970
DATE
INFO.
SUBJECT
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13 July 1973
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat with Enemy Air Defense
Means to Support Flights by Military-Transport
Aviation to Drop Troops
SOURCE Documentary
Summary
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought." The authors of
this article are General-Leytenant of Aviation I. Taranenko,
Lieutenant Colonel A. Borisov (Candidate of Military Sciences)
and Engineer Lieutenant Colonel G. Rastorguyev (Candidate of
Technical Sciences). The article states that airborne operations
are likely to fail without special measures to protect transport
aircraft from air defense missiles and fiqhters. Special measures
suggested are the creation ofa-corrici8r through missile defenses
by air and missile strikes, and the destruction of fighter air-
craft on the ground. The MIG-21 is said to have low combat effec-
tiveness against enemy fighters. As replacements for it, two new
fighters are recommended, a light one to escort transports in the
forward area and a heavy fighter to provide cover to a depth of
1000 kilometers. It is also recommended that transports be
equipped with electronic countermeasures and air-to-surface
missiles. A table of the quantities of enemy air defex5ox1-Humpons
to be faced is included.
Comment:
End of Summary
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General-Ley.IaLant I. _A__...T.L.r.a.aalko was idelltiLtiod.144..LuLullya_
Zvezda in 1968 as First De ut Commander of Mil -4
Aviati . Lieutenant o one orisov was identified by
asnaya Zvezda in 1970 as commander of a missile battalion. He
m T, rT1
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authored an article appearing in Issue No. 2 (84) for 1968 of the
Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" titled
"The Overcoming of Enemy Air Defenses by Military-Transport Avia-
tion" There is no information in available
reference materials which can be firmly associated with the other
author. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry
of Defense in three versions in the past--TOP SECRET, SECRET, and
RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP
SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is
published three times annually and is distributed down to the
level of division commander
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Combat with Enemy Air Defense Means to Support Flights by
Military-Transport Aviation to Drop Troops
by
General-Leytenant of Aviation I. Taranenko
Lieutenant Colonel A. Borisov, Candidate of Military Sciences
Engineer Lieutenant Colonel G. Rastorguyev,
Candidate of Technical Sciences
The fulfilment by military-transport aviation of the tasks of
landing troops inevitably involves overcoming enemy air defense
countermeasures. To appreciate the difficulties which may be
encountered by military-transport aviation in overcoming enemy air
defenses, let us examine certain aspects in the conduct of airborne
landing operations as they apply to the conditions in the Western
Theater of Military Operations.
First of all, let us note that, regardless of the natue pf
the war (whether nuclear or fu11mentQ
i 0 era-
tions will require large-scale airbitgae_14,44414ag. Air drops
Manc?Ir?T.ngs-TiFe?FiFiTe-irou-t, as a rule, successively or simulta-
neously in the shortest possible time at a depth of 200 to 800
kilometers from the front line. In addition, the methods used in
carrying out airborne 'landing operations are those worked out by
military-transport aviation large units in peacetime. 50X1-HUM
During operational training and in exercises a landing in one
flight of ,an understren th airborne division usual x_2.1.12.1. e p
-transport aviat'
use of
e., 300 to 400 AN-12B
aircra t of which a
roxima
comprise 4Malp.rac u e ?roup and the theJ.nding
rgh ing fligh o mi itary-transport aviation large units is
planned along three or four routes in a zone 60 to 80 kilometers
wide with intervals of 10 to 20 kilometers between the routes.
The flight profiles selected for it are usually variable: medium
and high altitudes (6000 to 8000 meters) over our own territory,
and low altitudes (200 to 300 meters) over enemy territory.
Results of exercises show that, when military-transport
aviation large units fly along three routes and make a simultaneous
drop of a landing force onto six landing sites, the time needed for
a parachute landing of an airborne division at night, or during
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the day under adverse weather conditions, is seventy to eighty
minutes. Flying in single file at a cruising speed of 500 to 550
kilometers per hour three or four large units of military-transport
aviation will have an operational disposition depth of 500 to 550
kilometers (regiments of division in two echelons) and a width of
40 to 60 kilometers. Depending on the depth of the landing, the
number of aircraft and, also, the operational disposition of
military-transport aviation large units (landing group), the
military-transport aircraft flight may be under attack by enemy
air defense means and forces for three to ei ht hours.
An analysis of enemy air defense in the Western Theater of
Military Operations shows that 50 to 100 kilometers before the
front line the military-transport aircraft will be subjected to
attacks by single enemy fighter-interceptor aircraft whose efforts
will be directed primarily at disorganizing the battle formations
of military-transport aviation large units and also at destroying
the transport aircraft before they reach the SAM operational zone.
Two hundred to two hundred fifty kilometers beyond the front line,
the main countermeasures the military-transport aircraft will face
will be the "Hawk," "Chaparral" and "Red Eye" SAM and light
antiaircraft artillery.* In this zone they may also be attacked
by enemy fighter-interceptors and tactical fighters. In the
operational depth the most serious countermeasures will be from
air defense all-weather aircraft, while in certain areas the
countermeasures from these aircraft may be augmented considerably
by SAM and light antiaircraft artillery fire. The chart below
shows the approximate strength of air defense forces and means
which the military-transport aircraft will face during the flight
to and from the landing area, as it applies to the Western Theater
of Military Operations. [See chart on page 7.]
Calculations conducted on the basis of the data shown in this
chart show that, if special measures are not taken to support
their actions, losses to transport aircraft during the flight to
the landing area my be so heavy that the landing operation would
fail
*The "Nike-Hercules" SAM are not considered, as they are not
capable of destroying any air targets below 1000 meters.
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The Amount of Enemy Forces and Means Capable of
Countermeasures Against Military-Transport
Aviation Within Its Flight Zone
Type of air defense means
Strength of
forces a
air defense
nd means
During non-
nuclear period
of war on the
4th or 5th day
after it began
(depth of landing
200 to 300 km)
The 2nd or 3rd
day after massive
use of nuclear
weapons (depth of
landing 600 to
800 km)
Air defense fighters
Tactical fighters
"Hawk" SAM launchers
"Chaparral" SAM launchers
"Vulcan" antiaircraft
artillery
"Red Eye" crews
60-80
100-140
30-40
40-L50
40-50
140-170
60-100
80-100
50-60
30-40
30-40
70-80
Note: 1. The above figures are based on preliminary
neutralization of the air defense system:
thirty to forty percent in a non-nuclear war;
fifty to sixty percent in a nuclear war.
2. The enemy has at his disposal up to fifteen
guidance and control command posts for control
of the above air defense forces and means5oxi-Hum
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Which air defense means inflict the most damage on military-
transport aircraft?
It ?s known that a high density of fire can be created by
using .1.1rface-to-airnues Thus, in the tactical zone of a
theatesT-Traritary operations they completely cover the air space
above the troops and installations of the probable enemy. Along
certain axes the depth of the dense SAM cover also extends over
the operational zone (up to 300 kilometers). Calculations show
that in a round-tri fli ht to the landing area without the use
ot_s?- ? ? - ctive measures, ere. *y_oilitary-
tupsport a..LrQnly.L2.1_,LAL2r.L.A.....alEauto over one third
of their total losses.
????? ----
Taking into account that in their own zones SAM can cover the
entire range of altitudes used by transport aircraft and under
all weather conditions, one of the main problems arising in a
landing operation is the problem of protecting military-transport
aircraft from enemy SAM. The solution of this problem must be
based on the fact that the SAM are primarily static air defense
means and when neutralized in various areas, the restoration of
enemy air defense combat effectiveness will take considerably
longer than will the flight by military-transport aircraft over
these areas.
Thus, the successful landing of airborne troops is not
possible without the creation of corridors for military-transport
aircraft through the SAM zone. This will necessitate the
as tance S. 4e f_tile front, primarily the
In the depth of the enemy defense, SAM batteries cover only
certain individual areas which, in most cases, can be bypassed
by the military-transport aircraft by selecting appropriate flight
routes. It must also be noted that the SAM countermeasures during
the flight by military-transport aircraft through the area can be
rOuced _to_ a certain pxtpn_t_ by having flap* tranzpnrt_airaraft use
r4dioelectronic countermeasure means and, also, by reducing the
altitude at which aviation large units fly.
Another air defense means which is no less dangerous to
military-transport aircraft than SAM is the all-weather fighter.
These are the aircraft that will concentrate their ettorts against
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military-transport aircraft in specific areas, and, first of all,
in the corridors carved through the SAM zone.
The fighter-interceptors used by the probable enemy can, from
their own airfields, intercept military-transport aircraft within
the boundaries of the entire front zone.* Most of them are capable
of carrying out multiple approach angle attack against military-
transport aircraft under any weather conditions, both day and
night, as well as against the background of the earth's surface.
As a rule, they are armed with four to six "air-to-air" missiles
of the "Sparrow," "Falcon" or "Sidewinder" class, and some of
them are armed with guns (six-barreled Vulcan). The effectiveness
of interceptors against individual targets even now does not
really yield to the SAM in effectiveness, in addition to which the
size of their zone of operation is considerably greater than the
SAM kill zone.
From the above it is evident that fighter aviation is capable
of maintaining constant combat readiness and combat effectiveness
of enemy air defense, especially during the fluidity of combat
actions. It is true, of course, that modern fighters still depend
to a considerable degree on the support of ground guidance systems
and cannot use their weapons fully at low altitudes. But it is
expected that in the nearest future there will be all-weather
fighters with variable geometry wings and the latest sight-nviga
tional autonomous systems (without 'ground support). It follows
that another important problem of airborne troop landings is the
protection of transport aircraft from enemy fighter attac50X1 -Hum
Overcoming the countermeasures of air defense fighter aircraft
is considerably more complicated than defending against SAM. Thus,
while it is still ? ? - LAN! syat_ems 1PY
partiall as
in a
practically impps.sible to prevent attacks by enemy fighters in
this manner. Air defense fighters can also be guided against
military-transport aviation battle formations from airfields
arativel
them
*At the present time the basic types of air defense fighters
in Europe are the."F-102," "F-104," the "Lightning," and the
"Mirage IIIC." By 1973 a massive addition can be expected in the
NATO air defense of fighters of the "F-4C, E, D" types and,
possibly, the "F-111."
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situated at considerable distances (up to 350 kilometers) from
the flight zone of military-transport aircraft. Therefore, air
defense fighters can be encountered along the entire flight route
over enemy territory.
In the Western Theater of Military Operations, taking into
account the preliminary neutralization of aircraft on airfields,
when landin. e troo?s durin a non-113aigAz..jwiod of war
a ers countermeasures may be
ec e to 0 fighters Including tactical ones) during
50 to 70 at night. During a nuclear period of wart...in
a
at a d-? ? arNatilliTionamaittillfill ? so - -
counter-
measures can be expected from 60 to 90 fighters during t e day and
30 to 50 at night. With this number of combat-ready aircraft,
even assuming that only half of them will attack military-transport
aircraft (the rest will have to be used for combat with long-range
and fighter-bomber aircraft), the losses to militar
the day and
aircraft durin? t?- li?ht to
the
Ill ? ?
ur
in
the
da
under
a
verse
weather conditio
or at
? it
1
1
be
twenty-five
to thirt ?- Dunn. the day, un er avora e we-a-cm r
con?itions, the effectiveness of enemy fighters would naturally
be even higher. In addition, military-transport aircraft will
suffer some _Losses on their return flight.
Research indicates that the most efficien
the problem of protecting military-.transport aviation from enemy
fighter aviation is he destruction and neutralization of the
la er on the gr_gAlld- During the nuclear period of a war the
mission of destroying fighter aviation on the ground will be the
responsibility of front rocket troops, long-range aviation, and
front aviation (fighter-bomber aviation and bomber aviation).
During the non-nuclear period of war, because of the extremely
limited capabilities of the rocket troops, it can be solved only
by aviation.
Calculations show that create cond 4.1911?..la-4.1a1
militar -trans to fulfil its tro9p
la Titte cent
it will be necessary to use large contingents of supporting forces
and means, the main mission of which will be to neutralize and
destroy enemy air defense installations. Thus, the destruction on
the ground of three to four air defense fighter squadrons, five to
seven tactical fighter squadrons and four or five control points
I ?
Tut, S-E eRET
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will require 40 to 50 sorties by long-range aviation and 140 to
200 sorties by front aviation. Besides, while providing support
for landing operations during the non-nuclear period of war, front
aviation will have to operate against a very powerful air defense
system in the theater of military operations and will itself suffer
considerable losses. In addition, it will not always be possible
to assign the necessary amount of front aviation in support of
military-transport aviation operations and, therefore, counter-
measures by enemy air defense means, especially his fighter
aircraft, will remain quite strong.
Consequently, in most cases the neutraliz
aZ,LI5jaa_aa not 1)9 transport aviation aviation losses sufficientl
S T ere ore, another necessary measure for combat-
tThir-erier- air defense fighter aviation is to have our own_ fighter
.i..rcralt_escort the battle formation of military-transport aviation
of large units to the entire depth of its flight to the landing
area. It should be noted, however, that some militar s ecialists
at the ? nt t he o.inion that i ter cover_c_s
iiTlITTit is not ver effec-
tive. us see how much this opinion correspon s wi rea 1 y.
Considering the tactical-technical _characteristics of our
existing and future fighter aircraft and the methods of their
combat use, it is possible to specify three typical zones of
front fig4er aviation oprations in support of military-transport
aviation: (,)forward edgeactical zone, andS6perational zone.*
Fighter aircraft can support the flight of military-transport
aviation in the forward edge in a conventional manner, just as
they do when providing support for front troops and installations,
i.e., by intercepting enemy fighters on duty on the ground or in
the air, by escorting military-transport aviation flights, or by
covering its flight zone by autonomous actions. Control of the vtc
fighters in this zone is carried out by the existing-centralized
system of front aviation command posts.
*The forward edge may be considered those areas above our own
territory and above the territory of the enemy to a depth of 50
kilometers from the front line: the tactical zone, to a depth of
250 to 300 kilometers; and the operational zone, from 250 to 300 to
500 to 1000 kilometers.
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In the tactical and operational zones the front fighters
will not be able to cover military-transport aircraft by conven-
tional methods; it will be necessary to organize special patrol
escorts for military-transport aircraft. 50x1-HUM
It should be noted that the existing types of front fighter
aircraft are capable of escorting military-transport aircraft to
a depth of 250 to 300 kilometers beyond the front line. They are
not ? ite suitable for autonomous actions, mainly because of the
Maract ristics o -. ."-. -t. Apart from their
ra ar, MIG- ig ers can organize coordination in the air
between themselves and the military-transport aircraft only under
1 simple weather conditions. Besides, their effectiveness in combat
with enemy fighters is low.
However, the above-mentioned limitations in providing cover
for military-transport aircraft during an airborne troop landing
flight can, in principle, be overcome. An analysis of the
present-day level of development of science and technology shows
that all the necessary technical prerequisites exist for the
creation in the very near future of the types of front fighter
aircraft which will be capable of effectively supporting military-
transport aviation operations.
To resolve the many tasks levied on front fighter aviation,
it would be advisable for it to have two types of fighters: light
and heavy. They will differ from each other in the unit of fire
and flight range. The light fighter will be capable of operating
at a depth of up to 300 to 350 kilometers from the front line, and
the heavy fighter up to 800 to 1000 kilometers. It is assumed
that the light fighter aircraft will be more numerous and will
comprise seventy to eighty percent of the entire fleet of front
fighter aviation. considerably increase the
autaaomy of both _type ? - 11 enable them to
intercept enemy fighters while escorting military-transpor aircraft
with, on the average, a probability of 0.5 to 0.6, while their unit
of fire will allow them to carr ou tacks.
Support of military-transport aviation operations by the
above types of front fighter aircraft should be organized as
follows. In the forward edge the cover for the military-transport
aircraft is carried out by the light front fighters employing the
usually front air defense methods. In the tactical zone these
fighters provide patrol escort for military-transport aircraft.
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In the operational zone military-transport aircraft are covered by
a patrol escort of heavy front fighters. In addition, in those
areas along the flight route where very strong countermeasures by
enemy fighters are possible, military-transport aircraft cover can
be reinforced by directing a flight of light front fighters to
these areas along the optimum routes.
Thus, in conducting an airborne landing operation, combat
with enemy_t13:Ef.ens_e_meespectizaters one of
t1)e_zpIe_2211plicated problems, the solution of which requires
the adoption of a complex of operational-tactical and technical
measures. By technical measures we mean the equipping of military-
transport aircraft with onboard weapons and with means for radio-
electronic countermeasumes.
Research shows that, if military-transport aircraft are
equipped with onboard fire means, including scanning/sight equip-
ment and gun installations with a mixed unit of fire (shells with
radar, infrared, and contact heads), their losses from enemy air
defense means (mainly from his fighters) can be lowered by ten to
fifteen percent. In airborne landing flights it is advisable that
military-transport aircr. ?
for the destruction of ground radar stations of the enemy air
defense means (primarily of the "Hawk" SAM batteries).
11
Radioelectronic countermeasure means of military-transport
aircraft include devices for the creation of active and passive
jamming and also equipment for using radar and infrared decoys.
The overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the protective
means examined above indicates that their employment will permit
a thirty to forty percent reduction in military-transport aviation
losses from enemy air defense means. 50X1-HUM
Thus, an analysis of the conditions of combat use of
military-transport aviation for airborne landings in the Western
Theater of Military Operations shows that, if special measures
are not taken for the support of their operations, their losses
in aircraft from enemy SAM and fighter aviation can be very high.
To successfully perform airborne landing_npexations in this
theater of military operations i is necessary to carry out pre-
liminary neutralization of air defense installations in the fligh
zone of military-transport aviation, to cover their operational
formations with front fighter aircraft, military-
transport aircraft withonboard means of protection.
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